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ABSTRACT OF THESIS (Regulation 6.9)




This thesis involves an analysis of the .development of the lav/ relating to
chattel slavery in North America from the period of British colonial expansion until
the post Civil War era when the legal category officially disappeared from lav/. My
analysis, "based on an approach v/hich regards lav/ as a social practice, not only
explains the origin and operation of specific laws and legal practices within a
specific set of apparatuses hut also recognises that law produces its own unique
effects. Thus it is through the forms of law that slaves are differentiated from
other unfree persons and it is through a definite construction in legislation that
the slave is defined as chattel property. This legal definition of the slave status,
while neither pre~given hy nor totally independent of the political, economic and
social conditions of its existence, exerted its own unique effects on the pattern of
capitalist development in North America hy creating the hasis upon which a
specifically slave mode of production could develop in the South.
The legality of private property in slaves was recognised in "both Southern and
Northern colonies and later throughout the United States of America v/hen, in the
creation of the federal republican state, the right of slave property was guaranteed
under the US Constitution. There was no conflict over the existence of slavery in
the USA as a developing capitalist country. The slave-owning regions of the South
produced specialist agricultural commodities for distribution through Northern markets.
The South depended on the financial and commercial institutions of the North just as
the North depended on the commodities produced in the South.
The conflict which developed between North and South, which finally resulted in
the Civil War, was not over the legality or existence of slavery as such hut was rather
over the extent of the expansion of the slave system to new territories - it was a
complex political struggle over whose interests would predominate in the government of
the USA. The legal definition and refinement of the chattel slave status became
central to the ideological struggle and it was through the forms of lav/ that this
conflict between North and South over who would rule the USA was primarily fought.
Moreover, in the aftermath of the Civil War, it was through the forms of lav/ that
chattel slavery officially disappeared. Yet in the process of translating the
conditions surrounding the abolition of slavery into legal discourse a particularly
potent legacy for the legal category was created - a legacy which has and continues to
exert distinctive effects on the definition and recognition of civil rights.
The case of the development of chattel slavery in North America provides an
analysis of both, why and how, within this particular category, the law functioned as
an instance of construction, recognition, regulation and transformation and, in so
doing, contributes to our understanding of the nature and effectivity of legal a.s
opposed to other forms of defining and regulating social relationships.
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INTRODUCTION
The substantive area to which this thesis is addressed concerns
an analysis of the development of the law in relation to the legal
category of chattel slavery in North America. ^ In addition to
providing an explanation for the existence of chattel slavery which
attempts to resolve the long-standing dispute between scholars who
have argued that, fundamentally, chattel slavery is to be explained
in terms of racism as opposed to those who have argued, more or less
crudely, that economic expediency created this form of slavery, my own
approach, focusing on the role of law, attempts to do justice to the
complexities inherent in providing an adequate explanation of chattel
slavery and, at the same time, to contribute to an understanding of
precisely what makes legal forms more or less effective in the
practice of other social, political and economic institutions, thereby
making a contribution to more general theorising about the nature of
law in society.
While the last decade or so has witnessed a considerable
resurgence of interest by sociologists in the relationship between
law and society, resulting in the proliferation of various kinds
of empirical studies and theorising, sociology of law is,
nevertheless, still lacking in detailed analyses of: (i) the
precise relationships between specific laws and specific social
1. I am here referring to the development of chattel slavery during
a particular period in the evolution of western capitalism. While
the case of chattel slavery in the North American colonies, and later
the United States of America, provides the substance of the historical
evidence, Great Britain is, to some extent, also used as an important
source throughout the same period. I must stress that I am not
discussing the case of slavery in Classical Antiquity.
2.
formations; and (ii) the point at which, or the conditions
under which, distinctively legal regulation assumes a position
of pre-eminence in society: that is, analyses which go toward
the development of general theories about the nature of the link
to be made between law and society. By taking a specific
instance, that is, the development of chattel slavery as a legal
and social form, this thesis attempts to provide an explanation
of the specific relationships between law and society in that
particular instance, and also to make some contribution toward
more general theorising.
The specific instance of chattel slavery has been chosen as
the focus for my analysis for a number of reasons. As Hindess
and Hirst have argued, slavery, by definition, is always a legal
or customary status and it is through the forms of law that such
a status is legitimated or otherwise. While there can be
little doubt that slaves were largely excluded from the logic of
the law with its standards of equity and universality, the
detailed analysis of the legal practices and institutions tells a
much more complex and significant story in relation to chattel
slavery. This story forms the main substantive part of this
thesis, but, at this stage, it is necessary to emphasise that both
slaves and their masters appeared increasingly in the courts of
justice throughout the ei^iteenth and early parts of the
nineteenth centuries, and that these legal institutions and their
1. Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, "Ere-Capitalist Modes of
Production", London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975:109.
3.
practices played a critical part in the process of the uneven
development of capitalism ^ thus bringing into being a society
based on the espousal of ideals concerning the essential nature
of human freedom, whilst part of its economic growth was based
on what remains perhaps the most extreme denial of human freedom.
If, as I will argue, the legal form is an integral
definitive characteristic of the existence of chattel slavery
under the conditions of capitalism, where slave property is a
special variant of private property in general, it is necessary
to explain how legal apparatuses and practices which were formally
(2)
premised on bourgeois v ' notions of right were able to contain
the ideological contradictions between slave property and
bourgeois property right (the latter being based on notions of
1. By the 'uneven development of capitalism' I am referring to
the process whereby different regions experience the development
of the capitalist mode of production at different rates.
It should be noted that when I use the term 'capitalism' in
this analysis, I am following the definition used by Giddens.
which he constructs on the basis of a review of the approaches of
Marx and Weber. Giddens constructs a definition of capitalism
as existing wherever:
"(l) Production is primarily oriented to the realisation or
search for the realisation of profit accruing to
privately-owned capital.
(2) This process is organised in terms of a market upon
which commodities, including labour itself, are bought
and sold according to the standards of monetary
exchange" (Anthony Giddens, "The Class Structure of
Advanced Societies", London, Hutchinson, 1973:1^-2).
This definition incorporates the principal elements of the
definitions adopted by Marx and Weber and, as Giddens suggests,
is sufficiently broad to allow for the many different patterns of
development which are historically evident (1973O3-U0; llpU—lUS) •
2. The term 'bourgeois' as used here refers to those values
associated with the development of the middle-classes in
capitalist society, namely individualism, formal legal equality,
the proportionality of labour and rewards, and so on.
k.
formal legal equality, equity and so on). While the
contradictory nature of precedent and legislation in relation
to the status of slave clearly illustrate the capacity which
legal systems have to uphold inconsistencies in definition and
practice, it is the argument of this thesis that the containment
of such contradictions at a substantive level in this case is to
be explained by the specific effectivity of legal apparatuses
and practices.
This is not, however, to suggest that chattel slavery is to
be understood wholly in terms of the legal definitions and
practices pertaining to it. This particular form of slavery
existed within a wider social and political system and an
adequate analysis must predicate itself upon at least a broad
reference to the importance of these structures. What I am
r
arguing is that by a detailed study of the law and its practices
in relation to chattel slavery much can be learned, not only about
the part which law has to play in the production and re-production
of social and political relations, but also about the precise
manner in which social and political structures shaped the nature
of the slave system in question through the forms of law. Indeed,
the argument of this thesis is that while capitalist development
created the possibility for a particular form of chattel slavery
to exist, legal institutions and practices formed, in this case,
part of the process of the uneven development of capitalism and,
as such, were inextricably linked with the development of the
capitalist mode of production.
5.
My analysis of the operation of law in relation to chattel
slavery demonstrates that there is, in fact, no inherent
contradiction between slave property right and bourgeois
property right, and that, on the contrary, the existence of
slavery in bourgeois society only serves to hi^ili^it the •dark
side* of bourgeois notions of legality. In both its practices
and discourse the law pertaining to chattel slavery performed a
critical role in defining extreme inequality in social
relationships by legitimating the status of master (owner) versus
slave (owned). Wot only did legal institutions and practices
define extreme inequality in this particular social relationship
but also they defined a more or less absolute deprivation of
liberty. In this sense, as property, as propertyless and as a
human being deprived of liberty, the slave provides an ante-type
for the propertyless members of the nation states emerging in
the sixteenth century who, in turn, came to be regarded as the
•dangerous* classes, and from whose ranks the bulk of the
'convicts' were, and continue to be, drawn. It is in this
context that my analysis contributes to an understanding of the
importance of slavery to penological/criminological thought.
The explanation, however, for the continued resemblance
between contemporary penal systems and slave systems, is not to be
found in the accumulation, however well supported historically, of
comparative evidential material about the two, ^ but rather in
1. See, for example, Thorsten Sellin, "Slavery and the
Punishment of Crime", in Roger Hood (ed) "Crime, Criminology and
Public Policy", London, Heinemann, 197^4- and Thorsten Sellin,
"Slavery and the Penal System", Hew York, Elsevier Scientific
Publishing Co.Inc., 1976.
6.
the kind of social formations which produced both chattel slavery
and criminal punishment. My argument is that in order to
provide an adequate explanation of the importance of the link to
he made between slavery and punishment it is first of all
necessary to explore the significance of the legal apparatuses
and practices pertaining to the case of chattel slavery. These
apparatuses and practices developed and evolved within the context
of values associated with bourgeois society: notions of liberty,
individualism, equality, private property and so on. And,
within bourgeois society, law defined, refined and finally
eradicated the status of 'slave' while, at the same time, it also
defined the limi ts of the penal sanction and the status of
'convict'.
With Kennedy, ^ I will argue that both crime and penal
sanction, as we know them, are only possible with the advent of
the institutions of western capitalism including the ethic of
individual responsibility for conduct. This 'legal fiction' of
individual responsibility for conduct makes possible the
simultaneous recognition and non-recognition of the status 'slave'
in legal practice and discourse. How is it possible for a slave
to be owned yet individually responsible at the same time? This
possibility is both created and maintained through the forms of
law. Similarly, how is it possible to be held individually
1. Mark C. Kennedy, "Beyond Incrimination: Some Neglected
Facets of the Theory of Punishment", in Catalyst: No.5, Summer
1970:1-37.
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responsible for 'being a criminal' while it is the State which
creates and maintains crime? The forms of law make this
possible.
The question which I am addressing is, therefore, how does
it come about that law, in the form of legislation, institutions
and practices, comes to define social relationships which are
clearly based on assumptions of inequality? The role of law in
the production and re-production of such social relationships is
critical. Moreover, such relationships, based on assumptions of
inequality, are, according to my argument, central to the
development of bourgeois society. To Tinderstand the nature of
■these relationships and the extent to which the legal definition
is inextricably bound up with them, has implications for the
understanding of bourgeois society.
Sociological theory has itself included a persistent concern
with alternative ways of defining the major elements of social
relationships and then finding ways of distinguishing types. For
some of the most notable sociological theorists, including Durkheim,
Marx and Weber, a prominent question concerns what kinds of social
relationships it is necessary to distinguish: what are the
properties of social relations and the arrangements they imply?
What range of combinations do and can social relations assume?
How do these combinations come about, change or cease?
What I am arguing is that by studying the nature of specific
social relationships it is possible to Tinderstand the structure of
lived experience and enlarge upon it to the point where insights
8.
can be gained about the nature of a given social formation.
There are, of course, many kinds of social, relationships and a
variety of ways of characterising them. While the concept of
•social relationship' implies some mutual recognition of
reciprocity it does not, by definition, imply equivalence,
equality or anything else. Many writers have argued that the
development of law under capitalism necessarily involves
assumptions about equivalence in social relationships. ^ My
own analysis of the operation of law in relation to chattel
slavery does not, however, start from such a premise. On the
contrary, the examination of the role of law in the production and
re-production of this extreme form of social relationship, where
neither equality nor equivalence is assumed, suggests that the
nature of bourgeois law cannot be explained in terms of an
assumed equivalence in social relationships.
I am not, however, arguing that the study of social
relationships, in particular those where the legal definition is
fundamental, is itself unproblematic. Social relationships are
only samples, as it were, of social reality. Their analysis does
depend on prior ideas concerning the coherence/differentiation of
any particular social formation and the processes whereby this is
produced, reproduced and transformed. Nevertheless, to begin
with studying the social relationships, in line with a long
1. See, for example, E.B. Pashukanis, "The General Theory of
Law and Marxism" (translated by H. Babb) in J. Hall et al (eds)
"Soviet Legal Hiilosophy", Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University
Press, 1951.
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tradition of sociological questioning, and. end with, more general
theorising, provides space for Imagination and insight, whereas
to "begin questioning within a framework which itself sets the
limits of the possible questions and answers and no room for
discovery, seems a somewhat sterile mode of inquiry. Within
Marxism, for example, where the main "body of work regards law as
epiphenomenal, the way to pose the problem of law, that is, to
ask the question of the relevance of law as an object of knowledge,
is within a scheme which already answers the question. Indeed,
much sociological thinking seems suspended between two images;
one of these conceives of society as constituted by the social
arrangements of sleepwalkers and the other as a play involving both
actors and audience, a stage and a realm behind the scenes.
Neither of these images is wrong; both are appropriate versions of
social reality but both are incomplete. And, although
completeness is not necessarily the aim of sociological
questioning, it is, nevertheless important to ask the questions in a
way which does not limit the possibility of achieving at least a
more complete understanding of the social.
Clearly, sociological questioning is bound up with the matter
of method; questions imply a method and demand techniques for
answering them. The matter of method, however, is not simply
concerned with technique. It is primarily concerned with conceptual
and theoretical notions. For the purposes of my analysis,
therefore, the concept of 'social relationship' should be regarded
as a heuristic device which provides the basis upon which to explore
the specific questions about the nature of social life to which
this thesis is addressed. By focusing on chattel slavery, and
the role of law in defining this extreme form of social
relationship, I am able to explore what makes legal forms more or
less effective in the practice of other social, political and
economic institutions, and, as such, I am able to make some
contribution to more general theorising about law and society.
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to an articulation
of my proposals for understanding the nature of law and society
with specific reference to chattel slavery. Hy own approach to
the problem of law has been constructed within a sociological
tradition and attempts to select the most relevant sociological
concepts tor my analysis. As I mentioned earlier, sociology of
law is still lacking in detailed analyses of: (i) the specific
relationships between specific laws and specific social
formations; and, (ii) the point at which, or the conditions under
which, distinctively legal regulation assumes a position of pre¬
eminence in society: that is, analyses which go toward the
development of general theories of law and society. By taking a
specific instance, that is, the development of chattel slavery as a
legal and social form, this thesis does attempt to provide an
adequate explanation of the specific relationships between law and
society in that particular instance, and also to make some
contribution toward more general theorising about the nature of the
relationship between law and society.
11.
Given my interest in recent developments within sociology
of law the following section reviews some of the main
contemporary approaches within that "body of knowledge. Such a
review is central to the construction of an adequate theoretical
and methodological approach and my objective here is to select
those aspects of the approaches reviewed which will be useful in
developing a conceptual framework for my substantive analysis of
the law and its operation in relation to chattel slavery.
Particular attention is given to the concern mentioned above,
namely, the extent to which the studies reviewed contribute to our
understanding of the specific relationships between specific laws
and specific social formations and also to the development of more
general theories concerning the relationship between law and
society.
APHIOACHES TO THE STUDY OP LAW AMD SOCIETY
Although the studies referred to in this review do not
necessarily address themselves explicitly to my particular concerns,
I select those aspects which are useful to the development of my own
approach. The studies reviewed are grouped under three broad
headings depending on the orientation adopted to the law/society
problematic. Broadly speaking, I have grouped studies in terms of
the types of questions they pose: the law in action; the
emergence of law; and theorising law and society.
The studies which I review in the following sections have not
been chosen because they represent the 'best' or the "worst1 but
rather because they typify what is most useful, theoretically
and methodologically, to the development of my own approach.
For example, the fact that I do not discuss Hall's classic
study, 'Theft, Law and Society' ^ under the heading, Emergence
of Law, does not mean that I do not regard it as important
within the literature on the emergence of law, but rather that
my aim is to illustrate, how sociological concepts have been used
in this literature and other studies are more centrally related
to my purposes. Again, the fact that I do not discuss, in
detail, either the Lurkheimian or Veberian approaches under the
heading, Theorising Law and Society, does not mean that I regard
these approaches as unimportant but rather that other approaches
are more helpful in the development of an adequate conceptual
framework for the analysis of the law and its operation in
relation to chattel slavery.
Law in Action
Studies considered under this heading are those empirical
studies which have characteristically not been related to any
explicit theoretical concerns. Such examples of 'socio-legal'
work have tended to be heavy on design and technique and light on
theoretical reflection. Their main intellectual effort has gone
into emphasising the central importance of knowing operative law,
•that is, 'law in action', as opposed to positive law, that is, 'law
1. Jerome Hall, "Theft, Law and Society", 2nd edition, Indianapolis,
Bobbs Merrill, 1952.
on the hooks'. The 'law on the hooks' is simply regarded as
some unproblematic and unexplored standard from which the 'law in
action' deviates to a greater or lesser extent. This central
concern reflects the underlying rationale to many socio-legal
studies: that the sociologist of law, by virtue of some sort of
technical expertise based on methodological, analytical and
statistical skills, is able to clarify, hence alleviate, problems
which lawyers, administrators and politicians regard as
important.
A good deal of research effort has therefore been conducted
in areas regarded as demanding the immediate applicability of
(2) (3)
results. For example, studies of plea-bargaining, v ' of bail,
of legal-aid assignment procedures, ^ of lawyers, ^ and most
of the studies of the 'access of the poor to the law', ^ ' and
(7)
'legal needs' v ' are mainly concerned to demonstrate the effects
of social and organisational differentiation on the administration
of justice. While these studies have provided us with
1. Jerome H. Skolnick, "The Sociology of Law in America:
Overview and Trends", in Social Problems, 1965, Vol.13:20.
2. John Baldwin and Mike McConville, "Negotiated Justice",
Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1977•
3. M. King, "Bail or Custody", Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1972.
]+. B. Abel-Smith and J. Stevens, "In Search of Justice",
London, Allen Lane, 1968.
5. Jack Ladihksky, "Careers of Lawyers, Law Practice and Legal
Institutions", in American Sociological Review, 28, February
1963, 53-51+.
6. Murray L. Schwartz, "Foreword:Group Legal Services in
Perspective", U.C.L.A. Law Review, 12, January 1965, 279-80.
7. P. Morris, R. White and P. Lewis, "Social Needs and Legal
Action", London, Martin Robertson, 1973«
documentary results about various procedures, there is little
that is stimulating about their findings, either theoretically
or philosophically. This is also true of the many impact
studies which examine the effects of introducing particular
schemes, such as duty solicitors or law centres, into specific
areas.
The majority of such studies accept the notion of 'legality1
as unproblematic and, as such, notions of 'the rule of law',
'equality before the law' and the like are simply assumed. Prom
these unexplicated assumptions, 'socio-legal' studies of the kind
mentioned above go on to attempt to demonstrate how, in fact, the
law in action does not correspond to certain implicitly understood
ideals of justice such research holds to. Carlen suggests that
the aims of such 'correctionalist' approaches to law are, however,
quite explicit:
Based upon an implicit assumption that legality
is potentially analagous with distributive justice,
and that both can be achieved independently of
change in the material social relationships wherein
such notions are resolved, normative-correctionalist
studies aim at a notional adjustment of present day
laws and procedures so that their material
manifestations might be seen to conform more nearly to
their own jurisprudential claims and connotations. (l)
In other words, such studies accept the law as given and make no
attempt either to explain the substance and procedure of law
itself or to consider why law as such is an object of knowledge.
What they do is to document how the law operates in this or that
1. Pat Carlen (ed) "The Sociology of Law", Sociological Review
Monograph, 23, University of Keele, December 1976, 2.
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context. Indeed, as Hunt points out, an orientation toward
empirical studies is one of the most pronounced features of the
recent resurgence of interest in the sociology of law, "both in
Britain and the United States. The criticism to he made here
is not ahout empirical studies as such hut rather ahout the
•methodological empiricism' upon which such studies are hased.
For example, in an overview of trends in the sociology of law in
America, Skolnick states that, "the most important work for the
sociologist of law is the development of theory growing out of
(2)
empirical, especially institutional, studies". v ' This
(3)
sentiment has heen endorsed hy many others who, like Selznick,
have stressed the need for much greater attention to theory as
central to the development of sociology of law. Campbell has
stated this position categorically in suggesting that, "if
characterised hy inter-disciplinary research, with little
attention given to general sociological theory, and motivated hy
reformist ideas and a missionary zeal to educate lawyers and law
students, sociology of law is likely to contribute little of lasting
value". ^
While it is true to say that much of this empiricist work is
1. Alan Hunt, "Perspectives in the Sociology of Law", in
P. Carlen (ed) 1976:29.
2. Skolnick, 1965:21;.
3. Philip Seljsnick, "The Sociology of Law", in Journal of Legal
Education, 12 (1;), 1960:521-31; and P. Selznick, "Law, Society
and Industrial Justice", New York, Russel Sage Foundation, 1969•
U. Colin Campbell, "Legal Thought and Juristic Values", in
British Journal of Law and Society, Vol.1., No.l., 197U:8.
characterised by the lack of an explicit theoretical framework
it does, of course, have some sort of implicit theoretical
framework. The implicit theory behind these studies is one
which views law as a means of social control based on widespread
value consensus. ^ In this perspective, law is an embodiment
and reflection of societal values, and the central question for
these students is to document the extent to which law is
administered in accordance with these assumed values. But how
does it come about that the law does reflect societal values?
Y/hat are the processes involved in the ascription of legitimacy to
the legal order? Are we to understand legitimacy as based on
some sort of understanding of the 'fair and just' operation of
specific legal practices and against what standards are we able to
judge this? How are we to begin to understand the relationship
between law and social organisations? Such questions have not
been asked far less answered in the context; of 'law in action'
type studies and yet they are only a few of the questions which any
sociology of law must address itself to. As Carson notes, "law
is not merely something that by dint of its relationship with other
social phenomena may justifiably be subjected to sociological
analysis, it also converges at many points with central
(2)
sociological concerns". N ' This concern with wider theoretical
considerations is reflected in those studies grouped under the
second broad heading - emergence of law.
1. Hunt, 1976:29.
2. W.G. Carson, "The Sociology of Crime and the Emergence of
Criminal Laws", in P. Rock and M. Mcintosh (eds) "Deviance and
Social Control", London, Tavistock Publications, 197^:67-
Emergence of Law
Broadly speaking, within the sociology of law, there have
"been a number of studies which undertake to explain specific
laws in terms of their emergence and development. The emphasis
in these studies is on how the content of specific laws relates to
wider social, political and economic interests. The questions
which they address themselves to range from attempting to
understand the conditions under which specifically legal controls
come into operation in specific instances, that is, the evolution
of legal as opposed to other social controls within society, to
explanations of how the particular content of certain laws results
from the differential distribution of interest and power in any
given society.
All of the studies discussed under this heading involve at
least some explicit sociological reflection and go some way toward
the development of useful concepts concerning the analysis of law
in society. Unlike the studies considered under the heading 'law
in action', (the 'socio-legal' approach), studies of the emergence
of law have made an important contribution to the development of
theory in the sociology of law. For those of us who seek an
explanation of the 'social', studies which can treat the emergence
of specific laws as sociologically problematic, resulting from the
struggle of interest groups with differential access to power,
as manifesting state constraint and the like, are an important step
forward. Thus by considering in more detail the approach and
contribution of such studies the particular problems to which this
thesis is addressed can be thrown into sharper relief.
Many of the studies which attempt to explain the emergence
of law - in terms of origin and development - adopt what can
loosely be described as a theoretical framework which
conceptualises law as the product of the competition between
interest groups seeking to influence the emergence and/or
development of law in accordance with their particular needs.
Many such studies have been oriented towards documenting the wide
range of interest groups involved in legal changes, but very
few have taken the explanatory power of such an approach much
further. Some have reached Quinney's somewhat unsurprising
conclusion that, "power, or the ability to determine the conduct
of others, is unevenly distributed in society. Those groups
which are powerful are able to shape the laws in accordance with
(2)
their interests". v ' These tautological and commonsense
conclusions about the nature of power, conflict and coercion in
the emergence of law, are arrived at, in work like Quinney's,
because of a failure to address certain central questions about the
nature of legal change/development: for example, why is it that
certain interests arise at certain times under certain social
conditions? How does it come about that certain interests attain
power over others at these times? What is the precise locus of
the power of these interests?
Carson has pinpointed some of the deficiencies in this kind of
analysis of the emergence of law and has attempted to demonstrate
1. See, for example, Richard Quinney, "The Social Reality of
Crime", Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1970;U3—97•
2. Ibid., U3-
19.
how the concepts of conflict, power and. interest can he used to
develop a sociological understanding of the emergence of law in
society. He notes that many sociologists have come to adopt,
"the twin themes of conflict and power as the main organizing
framework for their analyses of criminal laws", ^ and that, on
balance, their emphasis is upon, "criminal law as mirroring
diversity of interests, shifting distributions of power and the
maintenance of social order through the use of the state's most
efficient apparatus of coercion". ' He cites Turk, for
example, who, while acknowledging that coercion and conflict are
not the sole bases of social order, finds it useful to "view
social order as mainly a pattern of conflict rather than the
(3)
expression either of consensus or of sovereign wisdom and will".
Again Chambliss, while conceding the extremity of a position
which asserts that legal norms are, "simply a device by which
persons in positions of power maintain and enhance their
advantaged position by using state power to coerce the mass of
people", ^ still states that he must conclude, on the basis of
the case studies he presents that, "many, if not most of the laws
emerge through the efforts of vested interest groups", and that,
1. Carson, 197^:69.
2. Ibid., 70.
3. Austin Turk, "Criminality and Legal Order", Chicago, Rand
McNally, 1969:90.
U. V.J. Chambliss, 'Introduction', in V.J. Chambliss (ed)
"Crime and the Legal Erocess", New York, McGraw-Hill, 1969:8.
"more often than not, the views of the groups in power will he
expressed in criminal legislation simply because their
perspective prevails among those who make the laws". ^ As
noted earlier, Quinney' s version of this kind of approach to the
study of the emergence of law is even more crudely put when he
states that criminal law is "formulated and administered by those
segments of society which are able to incorporate their interests
(2)
into the creation and interpretation of public policy". v '
While such conclusions may be valid, many emergence studies
of law fail to develop the notions of power, interest or conflict
into explicit theoretical concerns. Indeed, it is precisely this
lack of development of such concerns which leads to some of the
gross over-simplifications contained within some of the studies of
the emergence of criminal law. While Carson notes that it is not
1. Chambliss, 1969:10. In Chambliss' own study, "A
Sociological Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy", in Chambliss,
1969:51-63 he considers the main periods of change with respect
to the English law of vagrancy and relates each period/change to
developments in the economic structure of English society.
Within the analysis, Chambliss places his notions of power and
interest in the context of broad historical and institutional
developments: he traces the emergence, successive declines and
resurrections of the law in different socio-historical contexts.
Nevertheless, the main part of his analysis and the conclusions
from the specific study focus on how this instance demonstrates
the impact of "vested interest groups" and "status groups" on the
law (1969:62). Thus while his work shows an awareness that the
study of the development of the law of vagrancy reveals the
processes involved in the emergence of specific interest groups,
how they achieved and used power, how problems arose within
specific structural contexts and generated concerns with the law
and effected specific changes to the law (1969:61-63), Chambliss
does not develop these issues into explicit theoretical concerns.
2. Quinney, 1970:39 •
surprising that a link should he drawn between the emergence of
criminal laws and power since, "if power involves the ability of
some individuals or groups to impose their will on others, then
law with an organized and authoritative apparatus of coercion
might seem to provide a highly expedient mechanism for its
exercise", ^ he also draws attention to the lack of subtlety in
a fairly crude power/conflict approach to the emergence of laws.
On a strictly empirical level he demonstrates that the issues of
how power and interest are related to law creation in the criminal
area are complex. For example, criminal liability is imposed upon
powerful interest groups in Great Britain under a variety of
statutes such as the Companies Act, the Factories Act and the
Pure Food and Drugs Act. In discussing his own work and that of
(2)
others, v ' Carson notes that, while there are only infrequent
criminal proceedings under such statutes, barriers to the efficient
implementation of such laws may be built in at the legislative
stage itself, and there are examples of criminal laws which, on the
surface, seem antithetical to the interests of the powerful or
irrelevant to such groups. One explanation for this, says Carson,
1. Carson, 197U:71.
2. See, in particular, W.G. Carson, "White Collar Crime and
the Enforcement of Factory Legislation", in British Journal of
Criminology, 10 (J+):383-98; R. Hofstadter, "What Happened to
the Anti-Trust Movement", in J. Gusfield (ed) "Protest, Reform and
Revolt", New York, Wiley, 1965; V. Albert, "Some Functions of
Legislation", in Acta Sociologica, 10 (l-2), 1966:98-120; and
G. Kolko, "The Triumph of Conservatism", New York, Quadrangle
Books, 1967.
is that there are, for example, as Duster v ' and Gusfield
have argued, often symbolic functions to legislation. Clearly,
the question of how power, conflict and interest are related to
the emergence/development of legislation is a much more complex
one than some of the studies mentioned earlier would suggest.
Carson goes on to conclude that:
For me the process may be more accurately
portrayed as one in which many powerful groups
compete and from time to time coalesce, giving
rise to legislation frequently distinguished
by compromise rather than by outright victory. (3)
He demonstrates that there is a substantial consensus over a range
of criminal laws at any stage in time and suggests that this fact
raises the need for a, "meaningful sociological differentiation
between types of criminal law", an approach which treats, "the
emergence of consensus as problematic and for a sociology of law
that concedes the centrality of social change". ^ He goes on to
make the very significant and critical point that:
1. T. Duster, "The Legislation of Morality", Hew York, Free
Press, 1970«
2. J JR. Gusfield, "Symbolic Crusade: Status Politics and the
American Temperance Movement", Urbana, University of Illinois
Press, 1963.
3. Carson, 197^+: Si¬
ll. Ibid., 82.
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The distribution of power is obviously itself
a dependent variable, a fact which must
ultimately draw the sociologist of law back to
a wider analysis of the social order. As with
any other sub-division of the field of sociology,
the sociology of law will only realise its true
potential by maintaining its allegiance to the
mainstream of sociological thought. (l)
(2)
For example, citing Lenski, Carson notes that criminal law
has many self-defeating properties when used "merely as a
(3)
coercive means to the ends of acquiring and retaining power". J
Drawing on the Weberian tradition, he argues that a justification
for any system of domination must be made in terms of an appeal
to the principles of its own legitimation, and concludes that, as
far as the criminal law is concerned, the "commonest form of
legitimacy derives from belief in legality itself". ^
Carson1s work on the emergence of criminal laws represents an
important step forward from some of the other studies mentioned
earlier, insofar as he draws our attention, in an explicit way, to
some of the central theoretical concerns within sociology of law.
He realises, for example, that the distribution of power is itself
a dependent variable, that the ascription of legitimacy to the
legal order is problematic and that, "where societies approximate to
the legal-rational, claims to authority cannot be divorced from
legality, nor can the constraints which the latter imposes upon the
1. Ibid., 82.
2. G. Lenski, "Power and Privilege", New York, McGraw-Hill, 1966.
3. Carson, 1974:83«
U. Ibid., 83.
exercise of authority "be ignored", and again, that, "to talk of
legality as distinct from the substantive content of specific
criminal laws leads into realms of thought in which contemporary
sociologists have not been notably prone to wander". ^ Yet it
is into precisely these realms of thought that sociologists of law
must wander in order to develop adequate theoretical and
conceptual tools for the study of law in society.
While Carson does recognise that the notion of legality is
problematic and is linked in some sort of way to the development
of legal-rational types of society, he does not specifically
address himself to an explanation of the nature of this link.
Rather, he concludes with Selznick that:
Properly understood, the concept of legality is
more critical than celebrationist ... An
affirmative approach to legal values need not
accept the defensive rhetoric of men in power.
On the contrary, it offers principles of criticism
to evaluate the short-comings of the existing
system of rules and practices. (2)
But what is this concept of legality, under what conditions does
it emerge and what is its significance?
To put it another way - what is there about a system of norms
and rules that makes it distinctively legal? In
contradistinction to Weber's notion that the distinctively legal
emerges when there exists a coercive apparatus for norm enforcement,
1. Ibid., 81+.
2. Selznick, 1969:14.
Selznick argues that the key concept is authority not coercion.
For him:
The legal order is pre-eminently an
authoritative order, and the fundamental problems
of jurisprudence stem from the puzzles and
ambiguities associated with identifying the sources
of authoritative rules, the authoritative application
of rules, and the nature of authoritative change in
existing rules. To understand the distinctively
legal we must look to a special kind of obligation,
an obligation to act in accordance with
authoritatively determined norms. (l)
Such a position is, as Skolnick remarks, "related to a 'natural
(2)
law' conception of legality", v ' in which legality is regarded
as an instance of a 'normative system', a 'master ideal' which is
implemented in accordance with rational norms. Skolnick argues
that from Selznick's position one may, in principle, conceptualise
degrees of legality, and moreover, that there "may be a tendency
toward legality as an inherent characteristic of human society -
as man strains toward freedom, so too may he aspire toward a rule
of law". ^
Skolnick draws our attention to the importance of the
distinction between the notion of legality and the operation of law:
1. P. Solznick, "The Sociology of Law", in D. Sills (ed)
"International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences", Vol.9«> New
York, Free Press, 1968:51.
2. Skolnick, 1965:29.
3. Ibid., 29.
It is common for sociologists to ignore the
rule of law in society. This tendency derives
from a too facile dismissal, indeed
misunderstanding, of the nature of legality
arising out of the obvious limitations of rules
in maintaining social order. Such writers do
not comprehend a distinction between order and
law, between conformity to rules and a commitment
to restraints upon arbitrary authority. There
is a confusion of legalism with legality, of
rules of law with a rule of law. (l)
It is his view that for sociology of law to develop we should be
concerned to -understand the nature of legality and the conditions
under which it emerges as an ideal. He calls for the
development of a "meaningful set of comparative categories"
which will enable sociologists to study the "conditions under
(2)
which different types of legality tend to emerge". v '
While Skolnick makes the important distinction between rules
of law and the notion of 'the rule of law', legalism and legality,
the rationale behind his argument is one which, with Carson,
Selznick and others, is simply to view legality as an ideal to
be striven for - legality is the ideal of the legal order which
provides the basis on which there can be a reduction in the degree
of arbitrariness in the operation of positive law. This
approach, however, not only masks the ideological nature of the
notion of 'the rule of law' but also side-steps the very important
prior question which they all touch on, that is, to furnish the
1. Ibid., 38.
2. Ibid., 39-
development of the notion of legality and legal regulation with
an adequate explanation.
Although the studies discussed under the heading 'emergence
of law' do not address themselves to the problem of providing
an explanation of why legal regulation is necessary they do make
an important contribution to our understanding of the emergence
and development of specific laws insofar as they see the processes
of law creation and its application in definite historical and
institutional contexts, thereby drawing attention to the wider
societies from which such laws emerge. The law is no longer
regarded as somehow 'given' in some unproblematic way, but rather
as being created by men, albeit by men with powerful positions in
any given society, and later adhered to, as legitimate, by most
members of that society. Such analyses have drawn attention to
the role of conflict, power, interest and consensus in society in
the formation and continuance of specific laws. Nevertheless,
while such concepts have proved to be useful heuristic devices
in the analysis of the origin and development of specific laws
they have not been articulated within a coherent theoretical
framework. Power, conflict, interest and consensus are, in
themselves, derivative concepts in the sense that they are
dependent on some (either explicit or implicit) notion of the nature
of society, social relationships and the like. In this sense they
are not fundamental concepts to our -understanding of law and legal
forms but are premised upon some other concepts which are not
usually articulated.
Thus, while concepts such as 'power', 'domination' and
'interest' are certainly useful in attempting to articulate
and explain how specific laws and their contents emerge and
persist within the context of legal regulation as a generalised
form they do not, in themselves, help us to explain why legal
regulation exists as a form in our society and what part it
plays in that society's very existence. It could, for example,
he argued that legal regulation is essential to bourgeois
society in the sense that both come into existence
simultaneously and their conditions of existence are mutually
interdependent. It is not enough to investigate the content of
specific legal regulations during specific periods nor to
provide detailed analyses which distinguish between types of
criminal laws (though such studies are also required). The
problem which remains, and which the studies considered under the
'emergence of law' heading do not address themselves to, is why
law? While not wishing to underrate the importance of analyses
of legal processes, this is certainly one of the central concerns
of sociology of law: why this particular form (that is, the legal)
rather than any other? Legal regulation itself is a definitive
social/historical form which requires an explanation.
Generally then, studies of the emergence of law have passed
over any consideration of whether or not it is possible to create
formal definitions of general theories of law in society. Instead,
attention has been focused on the specific content of legal norms
and the historical development of particular legal institutions.
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Thus we are provided with detailed accounts of the specific
content of the law in this or that particular period, that is,
the law at a given stage in the course of its development.
'the explanation and understanding of law is •therefore regarded
exclusively from the point of view of its content and the problem
of the legal form as such remains imposed.
As Pashukanis argues:
If we abjure the analysis of basic juridic
concepts, we shall get merely a theory which
explains for us the emergence of legal regulation
from the material demands of society, and shall
consequently get a conformity between legal norms
and the material interests of particular social
classes. But legal regulation itself -
notwithstanding the wealth of the historical
content which we pack into this concept - will
remain as a form and unanalyzed. (l)
Thus, the studies considered under the heading 'emergence of law'
cannot form the basis for attempting to develop general theories
of law and society. These studies presume their object of
knowledge - they do not ask the question, why law? Law is
simply assumed to exist and is not treated as the fundamental
problem requiring explanation.
Theorising Law and Society
Within the recent body of literature concerning sociology of
law many of the studies which attempt to confront theoretical
issues derive from or are compatible with Marxism. Such studies/
1. Pashukanis, 1951=116-7.
perspectives generally provide at least some explicit
theorising about the relationship between law and society, and,
as such, go some way toward the development of explanatory
concepts. To focus on these studies is not, of course, to deny
the importance of other sociological traditions, notably
Weberian and Durkheimi an, in theorising the relationship between
law and society, but merely to emphasise how these approaches
relate to the concerns of this thesis. The studies/approaches
considered under this heading present a challenge, either
explicit or implicit, to what Carlen refers to as the belief in
the "essential and ultimate morality of legality which continues
to provide the immanent rationale for the increasing number of
socio-legal studies ..." ^
In Carlen's collection of papers on the sociology of law,
it is suggested that each article is "partly constitutive of the
major theme which predominates, the analysis of law as a mode of
(2)
reproduction of the social order". x ' Hunt, for example, in a
(3)
paper titled, 'Perspectives in the Sociology of Law',
articulates many of the assumptions which he claims lie behind
what ho terms 'normative analyses of law', and, in the process of
doing so, explains what he considers to be the main problematic
for a materialist approach to the study of law, that is, to
1. Carlen, 1976:1.
2. Ibid.,
3. Alan Hunt, "Perspectives in the Sociology of Law", in
Carlen (ed) 1976:22-144.
demonstrate, theoretically, how law is a mode of reproduction
of the existing social order.
Law as a means of domination is the specific problem
reflected on by Hunt in his consideration of law as a mode of
reproduction of the social order. Relying heavily on the work
of Gramsci, and in particular the distinction which Gramsci
makes between 'hegemony' ^ and 'direct domination', Hunt
spells out the theoretical importance of the difference between
'ideological' and 'repressive' domination. Essentially Hunt
puts forward the hypothesis that:
In the pure form of the bourgeois democratic
state the primary role in the maintenance of
the social order is fulfilled by the process
of ideological domination and that repressive
domination plays a secondary and reinforcing
role. (2)
While acknowledging that some of the features of law as a means
of domination are consistent with many of the functional
analyses of law he has criticised, Hunt claims that the
distinctive features of his approach stand out when related to
Gramsci's concept of 'hegemony'.
For Hunt, the crucial aspect of Gramsci's notion of 'hegemony
is that it is an active process in the sense that it designates
the process of the creation and mobilisation of consent as well as
1. Gramsci defines hegemony as: "the 'spontaneous' consent given
by the great mass of the population to the general direction
imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental group (ruling
class)". (See, A. Gramsci, "The Intellectuals", Prison Notebooks
Lawrence and Wishart, London, 1971:12, cited by Hunt, 1976 :i+2).
2. Hunt, 1976:37.
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the fact of consent and further, that social classes contend in
the exercise of hegemonic control. Such a concept is useful to
the elaboration of a theoretical framework for the sociology of
law:
By using the concept of 'hegemony' we see that
neither consent nor dissent are regarded as
'natural' - rather, they are the result of the
activities that constitute the hegemonic struggle
in society, and in which law participates. (l)
While such materialist explanations of law can theorise law, in
terms of such concepts, as being a mode of reproduction of social
order, as a form of ideological and/or repressive domination or as
manifesting state constraint, we are still faced with the problem
of the necessity of legal as opposed to any other form of
regulation. In Hunt's particular contribution he makes no
claim to have developed or articulated a general theory of law as
such but rather to have provided some concepts which are useful in
elaborating a conceptual framework for the study of law.
Nevertheless, the ultimate usefulness of such concepts cannot be
adequately assessed without some attempt to address the logically
prior question - why law?
Indeed it is precisely this question which Pashukanis confronts
when he states that:
1. Hunt, 1976:1+3.
Marxist theory must indubitably not merely
investigate the material content of legal regulation
during definite historical epochs, but furnish to
legal regulation itself - as a definite historical
form - a materialist interpretation. (l)
As Hirst notes, Pashukanis is concerned to "explain law in the
(2}
specificity of its form". v ' Pashukanis criticses other general
theories of law, such as natural law and legal formalism, which,
while acknowledging the specificity of the legal form, fail to
analyse law as a definite historical form. Such theories, he
argues, tend either to eternalise law in the form of some sort of
representation of fundamental values or to translate it into a
(3)
product of juridic reasoning. s '
Pashukanis also criticises sociological and psychological
theories of law which, while attempting to explain law in terms of
its social and historical emergence and development, do not address
themselves to the question of the specificity of the legal form.
As Pashukanis notes, such theories apparently go toward providing
a materialist explanation of social phenomena by casting the
explanation of law in the context of a struggle of interests,
manifesting state constraint and the like, and indeed, many
Marxist writers have adopted this kind of methodology in "their
explanation of law along with the introduction of tie Marxist
notion of class struggle. However, in such explanations, the
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juridic coloration, or a history of institutions - hut by no
means a general theory of law". ^
One of the principal difficulties in attempting to
•understand the Marxist theory of law concerns the apparent
variability in expressions which at times suggest a very high.
degree of determination of law by the economic 'substructure'
of society and others which suggest that law has a great deal of
autonomy. For example, statements such as:
The jurist imagines that he is operating with
a priori principles, whereas they are really only
economic reflexes, (2)
are not easily reconciled with arguments which stress that in
the modern state the law:
Must also be an internally coherent expression
which does not, owing to inner contradictions,
reduce itself to naught. And in order to achieve
this, the faithful reflection of the economic
conditions suffers increasingly. All the more
so, the more rarely it happens that a code of law
is the blunt, unmitigated, -unadulterated expression
of the domination of the class. (3)
Nevertheless, despite the variability of statements about the
degree of determination of law by the economic substructure, the
Marxist theory of law "conceives it as a 'superstructure' brought
into existence by the private possession of the means of production
1. Pashukanis, 1951:ll6.
2. K. Marx and F. Engels, "Selected Works", Moscow, Foreign
Languages Publishing House, 1950, I:l|82.
3. K. Marx and F. Engels, "The German Ideology", Moscow,
Progress Publishers, 1968:61+5-
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and. the consequent division of society into classes". v ' But
what then is meant by 'law' conceived of as a 1 superstructure1
in the Marxist sense?
The definition of the state as the institution controlling
organised force and the means of legitimation within a society is
central to the conception of law in much Marxist theorising.
Many Marxist writers agree with Lenin* s assertion that "an
essential feature of the state is its inseparable connection with
(2)
the law". v ' Thus, laws are defined as rules specified and
enforced by the state. The connections between mode of
production, class, state and law are exemplified in the following:
Law and the state are not two distinct phenomena -
one preceding the other - but are two sides of
one and the same phenomenon: class dominance,
which is manifested (a) in the fact that the
dominant class creates its apparatus of
constraint (the state), and (b) in the fact that
it expresses its will in the shape of rules of
conduct which it formulates (law) and which - with
the aid of its state apparatus - it compels people
to observe. (3)
In the last instance then, laws are enforced by the coercive
apparatus of the state - the feature which Weber identifies as
the definitive characteristic of law:
1. Hirst, 1976:96.
2. V.I. Lenin, "Democracy as a form of Government of Society",
in A. Spirkin (ed) "Lenin on State and Democracy", Moscow,
Novosti Press Agency Publishing House, 1967:19.
3. S.A. Golunskii and M.S. Strogovich, "The Theory of the State
and Law" (translated by H. Babb) Moscow, The Institute of Law of
the USSR Academy of Sciences, 19^40 :366.
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An order will be called law if it is externally
guaranteed by the probability that coercion
(physical or psychological), to bring about
conformity or avenge violation, will be supplied
by a staff of people holding specially ready for
that purpose. (l)
Moreover, laws will necessarily reflect the conditions which
determine the nature of the state, that is, the class structure
and the mode of production by which it is determined:
Your jurisprudence is but the will of your class
made into a law for all, a will whose essential
character and direction are determined by the
economic conditions of existence of your class. (2)
The nature of law is thus regarded as a product of the nature
of the substructure which itself determines the manner of the
determination of class relations.
The status of law as practices which reflect the interests
of the dominant class does not, however, necessarily imply that
the formative interests will be nakedly exposed. The nature of
the relationship between class interests and law will to a
greater or lesser extent be masked to both members of the
dominant class and the underclass by virtue of the proposition
that perceptions of social order are conditioned by the prevailing
1. Max Weber, "Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society",
edited by Max Rheinstein, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University
Press, 1966:5. Weber's definition can be regarded as being more
open to criticism than the Marxist definition insofar as, unlike
the latter, "he offers no satisfactory theoretical ground for
identifying the requirements of the legal order as he does"
(Selznick, 1968:5l).
2. Marx and Engels, 1950* 1:1+7.
dominant-class ideology. For example, as Poulantzas ^ and
(2)
Miliband v ' both stress, it is for precisely this reason that
the personnel of the state - the legislators, the executive,
the judiciary etc. - need not be drawn exclusively or even
overwhelmingly from the dominant class itself. Personnel from
the underclass may be drawn into the state hierarchy on grounds
of merit, but since merit is assessed in terms of the state
ideology, maintenance of the status quo is not placed at risk.
Nevertheless, whatever the degree of sophistication, the
dominant tendency in 'materialist1 analysis has involved the
reduction of law to the state and to class coercion and, as
Hirst notes, "in this reduction the specific social necessity of
the form of law disappears, it becomes mere legality, a
(l)
legjtimi sation for class oppression". Prom his analysis of
this dominant tendency in Marxist theory, which regards law as
either a means by which the relations of production are
regulated or as having the function of regulating the class
struggle, Hirst concludes that, "law is uncovered as an economic
necessity and as a cloak for class violence", and, as such,
"both forms of analysis reduce the legal forms to exigencies of
the mode of production of which they are an effect". ^
1. Nicos Poulantzas, "Political Power and Social Classes",
(translated by T. O'Hagan) London, NLB and Sheed and Ward, 1973*





Pashukanis, however, in calling for a materialist
explanation of the specificity of the legal form attempts to
break with the tendency in Marxist theory to view law as
epiphenomenal: that is, the reduction of law to the state and to
class coercion. For example, in commenting upon Stuchka, the
Soviet jurist, Pashukaois states:
Stuchka was perfectly correct in putting the
problem of law as a problem of social relationship.
Instead, however, of starting to search for the
specific social objectivity of this relationship,
he reverts to the ordinary formal definition ...
Law no longer figures in this general, formula
furnished by Stuchka as a specific social
relationship; its character (as is the case with all
relationships in general) is that of a system of
relationships which answers to the interests of the
dominant class and of safe-guarding that class with
organized force. Within this class framework,
consequently, law as a relationship is
indistinguishable from social relationships in
general ... question: how do social relationships
become juridic institutions? How is law converted
into itself? ... Stuchka's definition ... discloses
the class content comprised in juridic forms, but
fails to explain why this content takes such a
form. (l)
He therefore criticises the Marxist theory of law for its failure
to develop any clear concept of law, and where such concepts have
been articulated, Pashukanis attempts to demonstrate how they are
misguided. For example, he criticises Renner, who places, "at
the foundation of his definition of law the concept of an imperative
(2
addressed to the individual by society (considered as a person)". v
1. Pashukanis, 195l:139~UO - emphasis in original.
2. Ibid., 117.
39.
Renner's study of the 'Institutions of Private Law and
their Social Functions', ^ regarded as the classic Marxist
(2)text on the law of property, v ' derives from an adherence to
formalist legal philosophy which, as Hirst notes, was "put to
(l)
work in the body of his Marxism". w/ The formalist thesis
about the autonomy of legal concepts is used by Rermer in such
a way that he can treat the "institutions of private law as an
independent legal totality, recognising the specific legality of
their interrelations rather than reducing them term by term to
the economic facts they reflect". ^
What Renner does is to demonstrate that there is not
necessarily a constant and immediate correspondence of legal
institutions and economic forms. For example, he starts his
analysis of the way in which legal institutions serve economic
functions by a consideration of the social relations of simple
commodity production where he finds that the institutions of
private law do correspond to the categories of the economy. Ron-
correspondence is produced by the advent and evolution of capitalism
until it creates the conditions for a new correspondence between
socialist legal forms and a planned economy. Thus, while there is
not an immediate and constant correspondence between legal
1. Karl Renner, "The Institutions of Private Law and their
Social Functions", London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 19h9-
2. Hirst, 1979:122.
3. Ibid., 122.
1+. Ibid., 122 - emphasis in original.
institutions and economic forms, Renner can still maintain
that legal institutions are a direct expression of economic
needs.
Although Renner does make the important distinction between
the form of law and the social functions which legal institutions
perform, his understanding of the form is by no means analagous
to Pashukanis' attempt to analyse the specificity of the legal
form. What Renner means by the form of law refers to the form
of the terms and specifications of the law. What Pashukanis
means by furnishing the legal form as such with an explanation
refers to some concept of law-as-origin, that is, when did the
specifically legal form originate and why? Thus, for
Pashukanis, Renner's conception of law is misguided since it
cannot address itself to the question of the origin of the legal
form.
In his analysis, Pashukanis claims that private law, the law
of property in particular, is the point of origination of the form
of law. He poses the problem of law as a problem of social
relationships - a specific social relationship. Thus, he asks:
Where shall we search for the unique social
relationship whose inevitable reflection is the
form of law? We shall seek infra to prove in
greater detail that the required relationship is




The specific fact distinguishing the legal order
from every other social order is that it is based
upon private isolated subjects. A norm of law
acquires its differentia specifica - which
distinguishes it from the general mass of governing
rules (including moral, aesthetic, and
utilitarian rules) - by the fact that it presupposes
a person endowed with a right and, moreover, actively
asserting a claim.
This general concept of law allows Pashukanis to make an
analytical distinction between public and private law and to
insist that private law defines the essence of the legal form.
In private law, right can be understood only by analogy with
possession: right is a defining characteristic of the legal
subject. As Hirst notes, "it is in pursuit or defence of a
right that its possessor appears in law and it is as the sphere
of regulation of this possession between subjects that the law
(2)
itself comes into existence". '
Thus, for Pashukanis, law arises as a form of mediation/
resolution of disputes between separated individuals over
exclusive possession, and it is the characteristics of commodity
exchange which create the possibility of disputes taking a form
which is formally resoluble. The concept of legal subject (the
possessor of a right) is a development from the subject of
commodity exchange (the possessor of alienable things capable of
entering into an exchange of equivalents with another possessor).
Thus, for Pashukanis, "the form of law emerges directly from the
commodity form: it is an effect of the social relations of




commodity production". x '
Hirst criticises Pashukanis' conception of law by turning
the latter's posing of the problem of law as a problem of form
against him. Pashukanis uses his concept of law as form to
attempt to establish the specificity of legal norms thereby
avoiding their reduction to mere ideology. Nevertheless, Hirst
points out that Pashukanis*:
Construction and defence of the form also involves
a particular content: in being defined in its form
law is given a unitary origin, nature and social
function. Possessive right, the essence of the
legal form, is a derivative of commodity relations
between economic subjects. One reductionism, of
law to class oppression, is rejected in the
interests of another, of legal form to commodity
form. (2)
Thus Pashukanis, in seeking a general theory of law, fails to
break with the dominant tendency in materialist explanations of law
which regard law as epiphenomenal, since, ultimately, his argument
leads to the reduction of the legal form to commodity form. In
confining his theory of law to a perspective which regards law as
an expression of the relationships of commodity-capitalist
society, Pashukanis is unable to explain the existence of law in
other societies. Moreover, a theory which explains law as
recognising and regulating prior social relationships is unable




construction in legislation and application of categories of
subject". Indeed, this thesis is addressed to an
explanation of one significant instance of the construction in
legislation, where law not only created but also refined,
regulated and transformed, the relationships involved in the case
of chattel slavery.
In his critique of Pashukanis1 posing of the problem of law
as a problem of form Hirst recasts the problem in terms of legal
institutions and practices: "to conceive the law as certain
institutions and practices is to raise the question of their
(2)conditions of existence and operation". v ' Prom this position,
he suggests that both law and legislation must be conceived of as
(3)
processes w/ where various conditions, for example, of access,
and influences, which act upon the process, are effective insofar
as they are given form through, legal procedures. However,
"conditions and influences are not themselves legal forms or
effects: it is only through and as legislation and legal practice
that they are effective. Legislation is not an expression, it
is a translation into another and specific language". ^ In
arguing that: "legal apparatuses and categories have political
1. Paul Q. Hirst, "Law, Socialism and Rights", in Pat Carlen
and Mike Collison (eds) "Radical Issues in Criminology", Oxford,
Martin Robertson, 1980:60.
2. Hirst, 1979:113.
3. Hirst uses the term process in the sense of Marx's definition
in 'Capital' as meaning a "synthesis of many determinations".
U. Hirst, 1979:113.
1+1+.
and other conditions of existence and effectivity, hut within
these conditions (however limiting) they constitute a specific
sphere of effectivity which synthesises rather than merely
reflects the determinations acting on it" Hirst is able to
provide us with a perspective which neither views law as
essence-in-origin nor as simply reducible to ideology, coercion
and the like.
In Hirst's perspective we are no longer concerned with the
question of law-as-origin as such but rather primarily with the
question of the nature and effectivity of legislative/legal
systems. In effect, this means that we must consider the various
processes of enactment and adjudication, understand the conditions
(2)
necessary to them and explain the effects which they produce. v '
For Hirst:
The general categories for such an analysis must
be limited to specifying what is involved in the
determination of those processes and conditions.
What law and legality is cannot be defined as a
general concept independent of legal system ...
Legal institutions work through and as definite
bodies of discourse (although they and their effects
are not reducible to discourse and discursive
effects); definite categories are part of the action
of these institutions as social relations. Law is
defined in and by it3 discourses and categories. (3)
1. Ibid., 113-1+.
2. To some extent this is what some of the studies considered
under the heading Emergence of Law attempted to do but without
explicitly addressing themselves to the question of why legal
regulation in the: particular instance or what the precise effects
of legal regulation might be.
3. Hirst, 1979:112.
In other words, this perspective suggests that the question
to be asked is why law in specific instances rather than why
law in some general sense. Such a perspective is developed
throughout this thesis since the central concern of this work
is to explain why and how law, in the form of legal institutions
and practices, created, regulated, transformed and ultimately
eradicated, the social relationships involved in the system of
chattel slavery which existed from the colonial period in North
America until the post Civil War era. In the following section,
the type of analysis proposed and the extent to which it relies
on a theoretical orientation which regards law as a social
practice which is produced and reproduced at the same time as it
produces and reproduces social relations, is more fully
discussed.
PROPOSALS EUR THE ANALYSIS OF LAW AND SOCIETY"
On the basis of the preceding review of the three main
approaches which have broadly characterised the recent resurgence
of interest in the sociology of law, I now propose to attempt to
articulate an adequate conceptual framework for the analysis of
the relationship between law and society. As mentioned earlier,
sociology of law is still lacking in detailed analyses of the
specific relationships between specific laws and specific social
formations and more general theorising which is ' grounded' in such
analyses. The approaches which have been considered tend, to
some extent, to be polarised between those which generate somewhat
isolated case studies which, though often established well
enough empirically, are largely unconcerned with the
development of concepts within the context of more general
theorising, and those which are concerned to provide general,
all-embracing theoretical positions on the nature of law but
which are by no means •unambiguously substantiated by detailed
research.
It is the purpose of this thesis to attempt to go some way
toward bridging this gap. By analysing a specific instance,
namely, the emergence and development of chattel slavery as it
existed and was defined in Great Britain and the North American
colonies throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, an
attempt will be made to provide an explanation of the specific
relationships between law and society in that particular
instance, and also to make some contribution toward more general
theorising about the nature of the relationship between law and
society. In order to undertake such an analysis, however, it
is clearly necessary to indicate, from the outset, the broad
conceptual framework within which the analysis will proceed.
In outlining the framework, I am primarily concerned, at this
stage, to specify those aspects of the approaches reviewed which
inform my own perspective and to provide some definition of the
concepts to be employed in my analysis.
As was noted earlier, studies of the 'law in action' tend to
devote their efforts to an attempt to document how operative law
corresponds (or otherwise) to the 'law on the books'. The
central question addressed by such studies is to describe the
extent to which law is administered in accordance with certain
implicitly understood ideals of justice to which such research
holds. As such, these studies, either explicitly or implicitly,
present a discontinuous and disjointed understanding of the
nature of the relationship between law and society. In various
forms, and with varying degrees of elaboration and
sophistication, those who adhere to a 'law in action' type of
approach, present us with a view of law as existing somewhere
'out there' though clearly subject to a number of social pressures
which may act upon it producing a variety of social consequences.
Clearly, a position which states that there are a multiplicity of
pressures acting upon law (however conceived and expressed)
producing a multiplicity of social outcomes, without giving any
theoretical account of the nature of the relationship between
these pressures, the law, and outcomes, is not a fruitful basis
upon which to explore the complexity of the relationship between
law and society.
Studies of the emergence of law have, however, demonstrated
concern for wider theoretical issues and have provided some
important insights into how to study the relationship between law
and society. In their attempt to explain specific laws/legal
practices in terms of their emergence and development, studies of
the emergence of law have located their explanations within
definite historical and institutional contexts. The emergence of
specific laws is regarded as sociologically problematic: law is
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no longer viewed as somehow ' given' in some sort of unproblematic
way, but rather as being created by men in definite and specific
historical and institutional contexts. While it was rioted that
such studies do not address themselves to an explanation of the
need for legal regulation as such, that is, the question - why law? -
the approach adopted does have a contribution to make to the
analysis of the relationship between law and society.
Some of the attempts to explain the emergence of laws/legal
changes post facto have generally been made in terms of the use of
concepts such as 'conflict', 'power', 'interest' and 'interest
groups', and many of these attempts have resulted in explanations
characterised by tautology and triviality. This, however, is not
to suggest that the notions, in themselves, cannot be developed
in a useful way. For example, the problems encountered in
Quinney's approach are largely attributable to his failure to
develop any adequate conceptual scheme which could account for the
appearance of particular interests at specific times in specific
contexts or which could provide a satisfactory explanation of the
distribution of power and of changes in the distribution of power
which could account for the ability of various 'interest groups' to
achieve their desired ends. Nevertheless, since laws are clearly
created by men acting in specific ways then notions of power,
interest and conflict are of importance in the sense that they
provide a means of articulating the nature of the link to be made
between the emergence/development of specific laws and the specific
social formations of which they are a part.
1+9.
It is not, however, enough merely to provide explanations
in terms of these notions: the nature and appearance of power
and interest must also he explained. Reference to some broader
sociological and historical process - such as the development of
capitalism - which may account for the nature of power and the
effectivity of interest groups must be made in order to take the
explanatory power of these concepts beyond tautology. Moreover,
sociological explanations of the emergence and development of
specific laws cannot simply refer to other social phenomena as
providing the explanation without accounting for the human
actions through which such laws come about. The context in which
laws are negotiated must be examined if adequate explanations of
the nature of the link to be made between law and society are to
be given. In other words, the impact of structural changes on
legal development requires to be traced in some detail. As
Rock suggests, "between 'social structure' and legislation there
are many mediating activities which cannot be simply dismissed or
guessed at". ^
One of the criticisms made of studies concerning the emergence
of law was that many did not explain what was meant by 'power',
'interest' and the like. To the extent that such concepts will be
utilised in my own analysis it i3 therefore necessary to provide
some definition of what I take these concepts to mean. What I
take the concept of power to mean is largely predicated upon
1. Paul Rock, "Deviant Behaviour", London, Hutchinson, 1973:8.
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Giddens1 v ' definition. For Giddens the conception of power
is logically related to the conception of action. Action
involves the application of "means" to achieve specific outcomes
and power represents the capacity of the actor to assemble
resources which will constitute these "means". In this sense,
"power refers to the transformative capacity of human action",
where the actor can intervene in a series of events and alter
their course if he so chooses. In a narrower sense, however,
power can be defined as a property of interaction where the
capability of any given actor to secure an outcome depends on
the capability of another actor in resisting the claim in
question. This is the sense in which men have power "over"
others, and it is in this sense that power is synonymous with
domination. ^
In both the above senses, the concept of power refers to
capabilities and there is no intrinsic implication within that
concept of the necessary existence of conflict. This definition
of power is consistent with what is perhaps the most famous
definition of power in the sociological tradition, namely that of
Weber, who defines power as, "the capacity of an individual to
(3)
realise his will, even against the opposition of others".
Thus, the relationship between power and conflict is defined as a
1. Anthony Giddens, "New Rules of Sociological Method", London,
Hutchinson, 1976.
2. Giddens, 1976:108-112.
3. Weber, 1966 (ed) 22- my emphasis.
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contingent rather than a necessary one. As Giddens notes,
many authors who have quoted and claim to have adopted Weber's
definition of power have significantly omitted the word "even".
He cites, for example, Parsons, who, in his omission of this word
has argued that power, by definition, presupposes conflict,
because power can only exist when the resistance of others has
to be overcome and controlled.
The concept of interest, however, is directly related to the
concepts of conflict and solidarity. Although power and conflict
are often associated with each other in social life, it is not
because one inevitably implies the other, but rather because
power is theoretically linked to the pursuit of interests in
society and men's interests do come into conflict. Thus, while
power is characteristic of every form of human interaction,
division of interest is not necessarily so, as evidenced by the
fact that men's interests are often shared in common, resulting
in solidarity. The use of power in interaction must be understood
as the capacity to bring resources into interaction which can
direct its course, including the possession of "authority" and
the threat of force. ^
While such concepts will be useful in my analysis of the
emergence and development of the law pertaining to chattel slavery
it should be emphasised that they are of use only within the




regulation in the context of more general theorising about the
nature of the relationship between law and society.
In reviewing some of the recent theoretical approaches to
understanding the relationship between law and society it was
noted that the dominant tendency in materialist analyses of law
is reductionist in the sense that law is reduced to the state and
to class coercion. For such analyses the question of the
specificity of the legal form is irrelevant insofar as it is
regarded as !mere' legality - a legitimation for class oppression.
Legal forms are simply reduced to the status of exigencies of the
mode of production of which they are an effect. Even
sophisticated analyses, such as Renner's classic work on the law
of property, can lead to a similar conclusion. Thus while
Renner, through his analytical distinction between the form and
social function of law, emphasises that legal categories and legal
practice and its social effects do not necessarily correspond and
demonstrates that there is no necessary immediate and constant
correspondence between legal institutions and economic forms,
legal institutions are, nevertheless, regarded as a direct
exprescion of economic needs.
In an attempt to break with this tendency in Marxist analysis,
Pashukanis concerns himself directly with an explanation of law in
the specificity of its form. He argues that while materialist
explanations can disclose the class content in legal forms they
cannot provide an adequate explanation of why this content takes
t
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this specific form. And, although Pashukanis does not himself
solve the problem of the relationship between form and content,
he does draw attention to the central question for sociology of
law - why law? That is, under what conditions do specifically
legal controls develop in society and why? And what are the
consequences of legal regulation for that society, that is, what
is the precise nature of the effectivity of legal regulation?
Pashukanis also makes an important contribution in posing
the problem of law as a problem of social relationships.
However, it is in answering the question he sets himself about
what kind of social relationship defines the legal form that he
falls into the same trap he criticises others for. Hirst argues
that because Pashukanis poses the problem of law as a problem of
form this leads Pashukanis to analyse law-as-origin. In so
doing Pashukanis reaches the conclusion that possessive right
is the essence of the legal form and such right is premised upon
commodity exchange taking the form of equivalence. Thus,
Pashukanis ends up by substituting one form of reductionism by
another - in this case the legal form is reduced to commodity form.
Nevertheless, in posing the problem of law as a problem of social
relationships, it is not inevitable that we come up with
Pashukanis' answer. Where Pashukanis goes wrong is in his
assumption that bourgeois law is defined by equivalence in social
relationships. This is clearly not the case as any legislation
on strict liability offences amply illustrates as does Hirst's
analysis of the importance of the legal form of corporate property
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in the limited company. ^ In fact, I would also like to pose
the problem of law as a problem of social relationships but from
a quite different angle. In effect, the question I am addressing
myself to is how does it come about that the law - in the form of
legislation, legal institutions and practices - can define social
relationships which are clearly not based on equivalence, which
are based on assumptions of inequality?
Indeed, Hirst also turns round Pashukanis' posing of the
problem of law in suggesting that Pashukanis is misguided in
attempting to assign to law an organic origin in society. In
attempting to solve the problem of law-as-origin, law is given an
essence thus a unitary origin, nature and social function, and the
process of legislation is simply reduced to the status of being a
phenomenal form. Instead, "is not the origin of and operation of
the laws within a specific set of apparatuses itself a specific
(2)
form which requires explanation?" v ' In fact, Hirst's
critique of Pashukanis' understanding of the legal form opens the
door to what Pashukanis tried to do, that is, to break with the
dominant materialist tendency which regards law as ephiphenomenal.
Instead of attempting to develop some concept of law-in-general
which necessarily essentialises law and ascribes its essence to
conditions outside it, Hirst suggests that we regard law as a




definitive effectivity to legislation and legal practice, which
means that "law can outrun and redefine its discursive and
categoric forms". Erom this perspective it can be argued
that law does not merely reflect the political, economic and other
conditions of its existence but rather that, within these
conditions, legal apparatuses and categories constitute their own
specific sphere of effectivity which synthesises the
determinations acting on it and thereby can produce its own unique
effects. What this implies is that in studying law and society
it is necessary to consider the various processes of enactment and
adjudication in relation to specific laws, understand the conditions
necessary to such enactment and adjudication, and explain the
effects which they produce. The general concepts to be used in
such an analysis are not concepts of law-in-general but rather those
concepts which specify what is involved in the determination of the
processes of enactment, for example, and the conditions necessary to
it. ^
To follow the kind of perspective advocated by Hirst in his
critique of Pashukanis does not necessarily imply that the question
of why law is being abdicated. Rather, it suggests that an
understanding of the nature of law and society must be predicated
upon an •understanding of what law is and why it exists in specific




about the nature of law and society can proceed. To study law
as a social practice is to recognise its dynamic nature, that is,
it allows us to view law as something which is produced and
reproduced in given societies while, at the same time, it
provides us with a means of understanding the part which law
plays in the production and reproduction of society.
The notion that social life is produced and reproduced
appears to be consistent with the Marxist conception of praxis:
"as individuals express their lives, so they are. What they are,
therefore coincides with their production, both with what they
produce and with how they produce". However, as Giddens
points out, in order to detail the implications which the Marxist
ontology of praxis has for our understanding of social life, it is
necessary to think of the term 'production1 in its widest possible
sense and in doing this we must go beyond what is strictly
available in Marx's own works. He notes, for example, that many
sociologists have elaborated positions which suggest that the
production and constitution of society is not only a skilled
accomplishment of its members but also that this production does not
take place under conditions which are completely intended or
understood by them. And, it is in this context that Giddens
comments that the "key to understanding social order ... is not the
'internalization of values' but the shifting relations between the
production and reproduction of social life by its constituent
(2)
actors". v 7
1. Marx and Engels, 1968 (ed) 1+2 - emphasis in original.
2. Giddens, 1976:102 - emphasis in original.
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The definition of reproduction contains within it the
definition of production - both notions are conceptually
interdependent. Every act of production contributes to the
reproduction of society and, at the same time, contains within
the act the possibility of innovation and change. This
conception locates the origins and necessary conditions of
reproduction in the material facts of human existence, that is,
in the re-procreation of the species and the transformation of
nature. For Marx, human beings 'freely' produce in relation to
nature, while, at the same time, they are forced to actively
transform the material world in order to survive in it. This is
so because human beings, unlike animals, do not possess an
instinctual framework which would permit a purely automatic
response to their material environment. Ultimately, however,
the central distinguishing characteristic of human beings is their
ability to reflexively systematize their environment, this being
possible, above all, through the medium of language. ^
While the argument here is, like that advanced by many members
of the interpretative school of sociology, that the production of
social life is always an accomplishment by society's members, such
a view has not often managed to accommodate the equally important
proposition that if men do in fact create society they do not
simply do so under conditions of their own choice. Giddens notes
that this dichotomy, between voluntarism and determinism, has
always been central to social thought and suggests that one way of
1. Ibid., 103.
resolving this apparently irreconcilable opposition is to
complement the idea of the production of social life with that
of the social reproduction of structures. ^ By focusing on
the idea of social reproduction it becomes apparent that it is
not possible to treat society as something that 'is'. Society
is possible and maintains itself only insofar as the sets of
activities, interactions, relations and institutions which are
constitutive of it are reproduced. Thus, it becomes possible,
in this perspective, to move away from a static and reified
conception of society to one which is dynamic and capable of
explaining both persistence and change in social processes.
(2)
With others, Hunt v J has claimed that this perspective has
considerable potential in its application to the study of law.
One of the main defects in legal theory, he says, has been the
tendency to reify law, thereby treating it as an autonomous force
within any given society. On the other hand, by suggesting that
the general function of law is related to the reproduction of
social life, we are also suggesting that the law itself is
reproduced. Law is therefore not merely conceived of as an
institution or system of rules but rather as a social process
itself, and as such, it is dependent on the functioning of other
social processes. On certain levels the reproduction of law is
quite obvious, such as in the recruitment and training of legal
personnel or in the creation and enforcement of rules of law.
1. Ibid., 101+-105.
2. Hunt, 1976:33.
However, law also reproduces itself on the level of the
reproduction of social relations which form the core of its
subject matter and upon which it acts. As Hunt comments, to
adopt a reproduction perspective in the study of law is to view
the law as both determined and determining within a wider set of
social processes. ^
It should also be.noted that in adopting a conceptual
framework which contains within it the idea of the production of
social life and the idea of the social reproduction of structures
it is recognised that every act of production is, in an important
sense, a novel enterprise, which may be transformative by
altering the structure at the same time as it reproduces it.
If a reproduction perspective is adopted then a fundamental issue
becomes the nature of the part, if any, that a specific social
activity, relationship or institution, has to play in the
reproduction of a particular society. Thus, if we are concerned
with the part which law has to play in the process of the
reproduction of given societies, then we must ask - what law and
in which particular society? It is not society in general that
is reproduced but rather certain societies which are historically
1. Ibid., 3U.
2. Following Giddens' use of the concept of 'structure' I am
referring not to classical functionalist analysis of the relations
of interaction which 'compose' collectivities, but rather to
'systems of generative rules and resources'. It must be
emphasised that although 'structures' are considered as 'impersonal'
and 'out there' for analytical purposes it is essential to note
that 'structures only exist as the reproduced conduct of situated
actors with definite intentions and interests' (Giddens, 1976:121).
specific instances. The question then becomes - what role does
law have to play in the overall process of the reproduction, or
indeed transformation, of any given society?
This conceptualisation of social life as a continuous
process of production and reproduction is compatible with an
approach to the study of law in society which concerns itself with
the question of the nature and effectivity of legislative/legal
systems as specific forms, which, of course, requires an
explanation of the origin and operation of specific laws within a
specific set of apparatuses. If we regard law as a social
practice, which, as such, is part of the continuous process of
the production and reproduction of social life, then we can
recognise that there is a distinctive effectivity to legislation
and legal practice. Moreover, if we do then accord a distinctive
effectivity to law, we are not necessarily forced into a
reductionist perspective. On the contrary, it now becomes possible
to argue that law is not merely a reflection of the economic,
political and other conditions of its existence, but rather that,
within these conditions, legislation and legal practice can
constitute their own particular sphere of effectivity. Although
created by its conditions of existence (for example, economic and
political), the law's specific sphere of effectivity is not simply
an expression of these conditions but is, rather, a translation of
the conditions into another and quite specific language, (the legal
form). As a specific language and discourse, legislation and
legal practice represent the translations which have their own
distinctive effectivity and, as such, can impose constraints and
limits on, for example, the political aims sought through them.
As Hirst notes, clearly the form and degree of such constraints
and of access to the legislative process, for example, vary
enormously within and between legal systems. Nevertheless,
because law does have its own distinctive sphere of effectivity,
it synthesises the determinations acting upon it and, in so
doing, produces its own unique effects which can then impose
constraints and limits on the economic, political and other
spheres.
I have been arguing that, in order to bridge some of the gaps
within the body of knowledge referred to as the sociology of law,
my work will attempt to provide an explanation of the specific
relationships between law and society in a particular instance -
chattel slavery - and also will attempt to make some contribution
toward more general theorising about the nature of the
relationship between law and society. For the purposes of such
an analysis, I have suggested that in explaining the emergence and
development of specific laws and legal practices, attention must be
given to the specific historical and institutional contexts within
which specific legal forms are generated. This involves
reference to some broad sociological and historical development,
such as the acceleration of the capitalist mode of production, as
well as reference to the specific stages in such a development.
1. Hirst, 1979:113, 1U6-50.
Within such an analysis it is important to consider the role of
human agency. Since laws are created by men acting in specific
ways, I have argued that notions such as power, interest and
conflict, have heuristic value in explaining the processes of
mediation between social structure and legislation.
It has been stressed that my analysis does not adopt a
reductionist perspective which views legal forms as exigencies of
the mode of production of which they are an effect, as 'mere*
legality, a legitimation of class oppression and the like.
Rather, the approach I adopt attempts to address itself to an
understanding of the precise nature of the effectivity of legal
regulation in a specific instance. While, with Pashukanis, I
agree that the problem of law should be posed as a problem of
social relationships, I disagree with his assumption that
bourgeois law is defined by equivalence in social relationships
and his reduction of the legal form to commodity form. By
contrast, I am asking the question quite differently - how does it
come about that legislation, legal institutions and practices
can define social relationships which are based on assumptions of
inequality? In this context the concern is with the question of
the nature and effectivity of legislative/legal systems as
specific forms. This involves an explanation of the origin and
operation of specific laws within a specific set of apparatuses,
where social life is conceptualised as a continuous process of
production and reproduction.
In this thesis it will be argued that the limitations,
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constraints and supports imposed on political, economic and
other practices by legal forms and procedures varied both within
and between the legal systems and constitutional forms of
North American and British societies throughout a specific
period. In particular, an examination of the legal sphere, in
the context of the United States constitutional form which
asserts the 'separation of powers', is central to the purpose
of this work in analysing the nature of the effectivity of legal
regulation in relation to chattel slavery. Such an analysis
should therefore contribute to an understanding; of what exactly
makes legal forms more or less effective in the practice of
other social, political and economic forms.
THE SPECIFIC INSTANCE : CHATTEL SLAVERY
The preceding discussion has aimed to provide the broad
conceptual framework within which the substantive analysis of the
relationships between chattel slavery, law and the wider social
formations of which they were a part will be undertaken. In
accordance with the position outlined, my interest lies in
attempting to understand the precise nature of the effectivity of
certain aspects of the legal system during a particular stage in
the development of western capitalism. I have argued that the
1. Hirst has argued that the degree of constraint offered by
the legal system, to, for example, political practices, is highest
where the 'separation of powers' is effective in the practice of
other social, political and economic institutions (l979:ll+6,
Note 8).
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orientation adopted in this work regards law neither as
epiphenomenal nor as an exigency of the mode of production in
question. While, with Durkheim, ^ I agree that law is one of
the main indicators of social organisation, it is also more than
this. Law represents a translation of the various social,
economic and political determinations acting upon it and the
process of this translation produces a sphere with its own
particular effectivity, thus giving law a transformative as well
as reproductive capacity. It is the purpose of my analysis,
therefore, to contribute to an understanding of precisely what
makes legal forms more or less effective in the practice of other
social, political and economic forms, thereby making some
contribution to more general theorising about the nature of law
in society.
The specific instance, that is, the law and its operation in
(2)
relation to the development of chattel slavery x ' in North
America, has been chosen as the focus for my analysis since, in
accordance with the position outlined earlier in this chapter,
which suggests that this work will contribute to an understanding
1. Enile Durkheim, "The Division of Labour in Society"
(translated by George Simpson) New York, The Eree Press, 192*7,
has argued, for example, that mechanical and organic solidarity,
as two specific forms of social organisation, differ by virtue of
the relative role of repressive and restitutive law, the amount
of the division of labour, the degree of individuality possible
within them, and the immediate conspicuousness of a binding social
consensus constraining the members of this society.
2. I am here referring to the development of chattel slavery in
the North American colonies and not the case of slavery in
Classical Antiquity. See Note 1, page 1.
of the nature of the effectivity of legal forms, it was necessary
to focus substantively on a status to which legal definition and
regulation was central. Prom the period of British colonial
expansion to Worth America until the post Civil War era, legal
institutions and practices were central to the creation of the
slave status and its subsequent regulation and control. Moreover,
if legal institutions and practices could not only recognise, but
also create, an extreme form of social relationship which denied
any basis of equivalence, then law cannot be defined or explained
in terms of assumptions of equivalence. The case of chattel
slavery clearly demonstrates that legal rhetoric not legal
practice is imbued with notions of equivalence.
Legal rhetoric, as Hay and Thompson have argued,
became critical in eighteenth century England where the law
assumed a position of pre-eminence as the central legitimating
ideology of the social order, displacing religious authority and
the other sanctions of previous centuries. As Thompson
demonstrates, in his detailed analysis of the Black Act, the
rhetoric of eighteenth century Ehgland was certainly saturated with
the notion of law, and tremendous efforts were made to project an
image of a ruling class which was itself subject to the 'rule of
law' and whose legitimacy in fact rested upon the equity and
1. D. Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law", in
D. Hay, P. Leinebaugh and E.P. Thompson (eds) "Albion's Fatal
Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England", London,
Allen Lane, 1975:17-65»
2. E.P. Thompson, "The Crime of Anonymity", in Hay et al,
1975:255-308.
universality of the legal forms. ^
If this is true of eighteenth century Britain then it is
certainly no less true of the eighteenth century in the North
American colonies. The rhetoric of the 'rule of law' not of
men reached its zenith on that continent in 178? when the
Constitution of the United States of America was explicitly
framed and written in a language which placed all men (sic)
as subject to the rule of law. Indeed, the rhetoric of the rule
of law was to provide the central forum for the resolution of the
major issues in relation to slavery both before and after the Civil
War.
In order to understand the significance of the rhetorical and
practical consequences of the rule of law in relation to chattel
slavery it is necessary to indicate how the definitional and
conceptual issues concerning slavery are to be resolved. Clearly,
the forms which human bondage can take, and indeed has taken, are
extremely varied and, for this reason, it is essential to specify
how the term 'chattel slavery' is used in this work. Chattel
slavery refers to a form of legal sub-ordination in which the
owner has rights of property over another human being, his slave.
In this case the slave is a variant of private property deriving
from the existence of private property as a general form.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that a slave is a legal non-subject,
his value as property depends on his having the attributes of a
1. E.P. Thompson, "Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black
Act", London, Allen Lane, 1975*
human subject, such as being able to act under instruction. v 1
The fact that legal systems are able to uphold such
contradictions and inconsistencies in definition and practice is
clearly illustrated by the contradictory nature of precedent and
legislation with regard to the status of slave and slavery to be
analysed in the following chapters. Nevertheless, whatever the
inconsistencies and anomalies, there can be no doubt that it was
primarily as a form of property that the slave was regarded in
law and in practice.
If slavery is then a legal form of property which gives the
owner certain rights, however variable, over the person of the
slave, then the question to be addressed is - within what
particular form of state or community is this legal form having
these particular rights created, reproduced or transformed and
how are such processes accomplished? By a detailed analysis of
the law, in term3 of its definitions and practices, much can be
learned, not only about the part which law has to play in the
production and re-production of social and political relations,
but also about the precise manner in which certain social and
political structures shaped the nature of the slave system in
North America through the forms of law. Indeed, the argument of
this thesis is that while capitalist development created the
possibility for a particular form of chattel slavery, to exist in
North America, the operation of law and legal institutions was, in
this case, part of the process of the uneven development of
1. Hindess and Hirst, 1975:112.
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capitalism and, as such, was inextricably linked with the
development of the capitalist mode of production.
Many writers have explained the Civil War in North
America as a conflict primarily between two distinct and
incompatible economic forms and social systems arguing that a
mode of production based on slavery cannot co-exist with a
capitalist mode. However, with Hindess and Hirst, I would argue
that chattel slavery, as it existed in North America, required the
existence of private property as a generalised social and economic
institution. Indeed, they argue that the slave mode of
production was, in fact, present in the Americas as a subordinate
mode to the capitalist mode of production within both the
international division of labour and the world market created by
capitalism. Contrary to the assumption that capitalist and slave
systems are necessarily antagonistic, they argue that slave
production appears under specific conditions as a subordinate form
(2)
to the capitalist mode of production. v '
Under the conditions of capitalism then, slave property is a
special variant of private property in general and while in formal
terms the ideological basis of bourgeois right, that is, formal
legal equality, equity and so on, is apparently contradicted by
1. See, in particular, Eugene Genovese, "The Political Economy
of Slavery", New York, Vintage Books, 1967; "The World the
Slaveholders Made", New York, Vintage Books. 1971; "American
Slaves and their History", in A.J. Lane (ed) "The Debate Over
Slavery: Stanley Elkins and His Critics", Urbana, University of
Illinois Press, 1971a:293-321.
2. See Hindess and Hirst, 1975:1^+8-162.
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slave property, in fact, these contradictions were successfully
confined and contained ideologically. Central to this
containment and lack of substantive contradiction were the legal
forms and practices associated with the development of chattel
slavery. Indeed, it is this lack of substantive contradiction
which is to be explained by the specific effectivity of legal
apparatuses and practices.
In a very important sense the co-existence of slave
property ri^it and bourgeois property ri^it is not contradictory
at all. On the contrary, the existence of slavery in bourgeois
society only serves to highlight the 'dark side' of bourgeois
notions of legality. ©ie rhetoric of the 'rule of law' with its
standards of equity and universality is a transparent mask and,
in the case of chattel slavery, it is through the forms of that
law that the shadows of the unequal are both created and
maintained. In its practices and discourse the law pertaining
to chattel slavery performed its own unique task in defining
extreme inequality in social relationships by legitimating the
status of master (owner) vs. slave (owned). How then does it
come about that law, in the form of legislation, institutions and
practices, comes to define social relationships which are clearly
based on assumptions of inequality and the deprivation of liberty?
In answering this question it must be stressed that my
argument is not based on the idea that bourgeois notions of right
necessarily make assumptions about equality. While some
70.
writers v ' have based their arguments about slavery on the
conception that its distinguishing characteristic is inequality,
I would agree with Fine that:
This formulation would be misleading. For,
as far as the social relations of slavery
operated, the question of equality or
inequality could not even emerge, for there was
no common element between master and slave that
would allow for any such equation. Equality
implies something that one is equal in with
another (or unequal in); it implies
commensurability. (2)
The important conception within bourgeois notions of right for
my argument concerns the issue of liberty/freedom which is
posited at the base of common humanity and democratic formations.
Only within a context where the deprivation of liberty is itself
regarded as contrary to the notions of what it means to be human
is it possible to talk about the contradictions inherent in a
society based on the espousal of ideals of human freedom while it
simultaneously tolerates slavery: the possession of one human
being by another.
The importance of this argument relates not only to the
explanation of the importance of legal forms in the definition of
the status 'slave' but also to those which define the status
1. See, for example, Carl N. Degler, "Neither Black nor White",
New York, Macmillan, 1971.
2. Bob Fine, "Obrectification and the contradictions of
bourgeois power: Sartre and the modern prison", in Economy and
Society, Vol.6., No.!;., 1979:^19.
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'convict' and it is within this context that the importance of
slavery to penological/criminological thought lies. Sellin,
for example, has argued that the physical punishments which
characterised the treatment of slaves were gradually extended to
cover free men and concludes that contemporary penal systems
retain the essential hallmarks of these formerly slave
punishments, most notably in the existential qualities associated
with convict status and its imputed diminution of social honour. ^
Sellin's argument is based on a great deal of historical evidence
supporting his thesis concerning the resemblance between modern
penal systems and slave systems in these respects. Nevertheless,
both slave and convict status require an adequate prior
explanation - it is clearly of limited explanatory value to simply
explain one in terms of ihe resemblance it bears to the other.
(2)
With Morris, v ' I would argue that the importance of the
comparison between slave and convict status does not lie in an
explanation which demonstrates the transference, over time, of
such factors as methods of punishment. Instead it lies in the
exploration and elaboration of the idea that the slave, being
propertyless, provides an ante-type for the propertyless members
of the nation state that emerged in the sixteenth century and who,
in turn, became variously regarded as the lumpenproletariat or
'dangerous' classes of industrial society. Ihe critical point
1. Sellin, 1976:197-
2. Terrence Morris, Review of Thorsten Sellin's "Slavery and the
Penal System", in British Journal of Criminology, Vol.l8., No.3«>
July 1978.
to be made here is that the propertyless in bourgeois society
are not simply regarded as having no substantial rights in civil
society, "but that they are treated as if they were themselves
property". It is this conception of human beings as property,
most obviously defined in the case of slavery, which is of
interest to penological thought. While conceived of primarily
as property the slave also required to function as a human being -
he must labour. Clearly there are critical explanatory
links to be made between the trade in slaves, for example, and
the trade in convicts. Both slavery and transportation provided
a labour supply for colonisation and capitalist expansion.
The explanation for the continued resemblance between
contemporary penal systems and slave systems is not to be found
in the accumulation, however well supported historically, of
comparative evidential material about the two, but rather in the
kind of social formations which produced both chattel slavery and
the penal sanction. The link to be made then between slavery and
punishment does not lie at the level of particular treatments given
to slaves and convicts but rather in terms of the social
organisation which produced them. My argument is that in order to
explain the importance of the link between slavery and punishment
it is first of all necessary to explore the legal apparatuses and
practices pertaining to the case of chattel slavery. These
apparatuses and practices developed and evolved within the context
1. Ecison labour is still compulsory and refusal to work is a
disciplinary offence.
of values associated with bourgeois society: notions of
liberty, individualism, equality, private property and so on.
In such societies, law defined, refined and finally eradicated
the status of 'slave' and, at the same time, defined the limits
of the penal sanction and the status of 'convict'.
In a detailed argument, Kennedy ^ develops the thesis
that crime and the penal sanction (which defines punishment)
arose together in post l£th century Europe as a function of the
advent of formally rational states. He traces the roots of
crime and penal sanction, along with other political, economic,
religious and familistic transformations generally, to the
transformation from the ethic of shared responsibility for human
conduct, the 'co-operative ethic', to the ethic of individual
responsibility:
In part as the legacy of the collapse of feudalism
and in part as a consequence of the rise of
capitalism which this collapse afforded,
individualism as a generalized social movement
emerged from a fact of institutional chaos to a
social philosophy and a normative order and
transformed, as it grew, the whole of Western
society and its culture.
Thus individualism, Kennedy argues, found its expression in all
aspects of social life: politically, with the birth of formally
rational states, citizenship, the theory of the social contract




In ma.;ring these profound, transformations to all social
institutions, the emergence of the ethic of individual
responsibility for conduct transformed both social and
interpersonal relations. Thus each person became solely
responsible for his own conduct and its consequences and this
'legal fiction' became, "reified both at the level of self or
personality and at the .level of law and judicial practice.
Individualism as an attitude of self is basic to guilt, and as a
premise of both civil and criminal law it is elemental to the
whole legal practice of incrimination".
The thesis which Kennedy attempts to support, historically
and cross-culturally, is that crime and the penal sanction axe
twin products of the origin and continuity of the State and
citizenship, that these institutions, founded on emergent civil
and criminal law emerged as a cluster of new institutions, such
as entrepreneurship, private property and the market system, all
of which were originally the social manifestations of the ethic
of individual responsibility for individual behaviour. Thus, he
argues, it follows that in the absence of the State, in the
absence of its laws, crime and the penal sanction do not exist,
and, in the absence of the institutions of capitalism, their
special features cannot exist.
Kennedy's argument is based on a detailed discussion of
feudalism, its breakdown and the beginnings of capitalism. He
1. Ibid., 38.
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demonstrates how, in feudalism, customary law possessed no norms
bearing similarity to the civil and criminal laws of post l5th
century Europe. The notion, that each person is a citizen of
the State and alone responsible for his conduct and its
consequences was not to be found either in court procedure, in
the characteristics of custom, or in judicial decisions. And,
with Rusche and Kirchheimer, Kennedy argues that the power
to pardon, even until the mid l6th century, lay with the offended
party and not the State.
With the birth of capitalism, the State came to recognise
and guarantee, as well as create, civil laws relating to market
conditions, private property, labour and imports, and, at the same
time, it came to have full power to create and impose criminal
laws which related to the same institutions of capitalism.
Violation of the criminal law came to be regarded as a harm
against the State which itself obtained a monopoly over the
processing of acts of violence and the power to pardon. In this
way, and by this process, the State came to play an ever-
increasing role in the determination of crime and the penal
sanction.
For the purposes of my argument, the main point of Kennedy's
thesis is the significance he attributes to the 'legal fiction' of
1. Georg Rusche and Otto Kircliheimer, "Punishment and Social
Structure", New York, Russell and Russell, 1968 ed.
2. Kennedy, 1970:14-6.
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individual responsibility. It is this 'legal fiction' which
makes possible the recognition and non-recognition of the status
'slave' in legal practice and discourse: how is it possible for
a slave to be owned yet individually responsible at the same
time? This possibility is both created and maintained through
the forms of law. Similarly, how is it possible to be held
individually responsible for 'being a criminal* while it is the
State which creates and maintains crime? The forms of law make
this possible. The question then becomes: what kind of social
organisation creates the forms of law which make possible both
slavery and crime/punishment? Kennedy's conclusion is that crime
and penal sanction, in being limited to specific countries and to
a period of Western history, are not universal but are a function
of the emergence of formally rational states, of citizenship under
such states, and of the transfer of the power of pardon from
communities based upon the ethic of shared responsibility to a
political or territorial community founded upon the 'fiction' of
individual responsibility. While the general characteristics of
crime are determined by the emergence and continuation of the
State and citizenship, special characteristics, for example, acts
proscribed, are determined by the kinds of institutions, such as
socialist or capitalist, which the State supports. In Kennedy's
study, these special features are determined by the emergence of
the institutions of capitalism and by guaranteed commercial codes
corresponding to emergent criminal laws which are meaningful only
within a context where the market system, private property and
private laws of contract predominate. And, with the power to
pardon in the hands of the State, politicality and penal
sanction emerge as the chief definitional characteristics of
criminal law. It is, says Kennedy, only then that crime, as
defined by the State, becomes possible.
If, as Kennedy argues, the special features of criminal law,
are determined by the kinds of institutions which the State
supports, in this case the institutions of capitalism, then the
question of providing an explanation for crime in any specific
(2)
social formation is, as Makela v ' argues, analytically linked to
an articulation of the relationship between law and the mode of
production in question. Makela criticises much of the Marxist
tradition for its failure to point out that criminality varies
under different historical conditions and its failure to consider
the question of the tasks of the system of penal law in the
maintenance of the prevailing mode of production. He also
criticises the classical functionalist theory of crime, deriving
mainly from Durkheim, and argues that it is meaningless to speak,
as this orientation does, of the functions of crime in general
and of the maintenance of society in general. Instead, he
argues, that criteria must be used for the identification of the
system one is talking about, and, in line with the Marxist
tradition, he argues that the main criterion for the identity of
1. Kennedy, 1970:62-3.
2. Klaus Makela, "Hie Societal Tasks of the System of Penal
Law", in "Scandinavian Studies in Criminology", Vol.5-> London,
Martin Sober t3on and Co. Ltd., 197U:i;7-65.
any given social formation is the dominant mode of production.
Makela's contribution to my argument concerns his raising
the question of the relationship between law and the mode of
production in question. In other words, both how law is
influenced by the conditions prevailing under the mode of
production in question and how the system of law contributes
toward the maintenance of a given mode of production. I am not,
however, arguing that there is a simple determinative relationship
(2)
between the mode of production and law. With Foucault v ' I
would agree that there is no simple relationship between penal
systems and the organisation of production. This is not to say
that economic factors do not play an extremely important part in
l
the maintenance or change in penal systems but rather that the
economic does not have any pre-given place as a determinant in
the last instance or as a general paradigm. There is a space
between the mode of production and the system of law in question
and within this space the translations from economic to legal and
from legal to economic forms take place. But there is no reason
to assume that trie economic determines the legal expression in any
simple or direct way. As wa3 noted earlier, one of the main
criticisms to be made of many of the contemporary materialist
analyses of law concerns the determinism of the structuralist
(3)
problematic they confront. w/
1. Makela, 197U:U7-59-
2. Michel Foucault, "Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the
Prison" (translated by Alan Sheridan), London, Allen Lane, 1977*
3. P. Rock and D. Downes (eds) "Deviant Interpretations:
Problems in Criminological Theory", Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1979*
What the mode of production does is to provide the setting
for the determination of the realm of the possible in the sense
in which individuals "make choices and pursue strategies within
given limits". While this position recognises the
importance of structural limitations it leaves enough space for
the simultaneous recognition of the negotiated, ambiguous and
symbolic features of social relations and permits us to agree
with Rock's comment that:
Laws do not arise full-grown children of the
dragon's teeth. They do not enjoy an uncomplicated
and unproblematic relationship with the settings
and intentions of their original drafting. Rather
they undergo natural histories whose unwindings
shape them in ways unanticipated by their first
authors.
While such 'natural histories' create much that is unique about
particular laws, thus giving law its o\m distinctive sphere of
effectivity, this effectivity is limited to a greater or lesser
extent by structural constraints emanating from the productive
order. The relationship between structure and action is
therefore regarded as a dialectical one where no pre-given place
is attributed to the economic as determinant in the last instance
1. S. Lukes, "Essays in Social Theory", London, Routledge and
Kegan Paul, 1979:29.
2. Paul Rock, 'Foreword' to Ingeborg Paulus, "The Search for
Pure Pood", London, Martin Robertson, 197^+.
CONCLUSION
My argument is, that within a specific social formation, a
slave mode co-existed with a capitalist mode of production and
that the operation of law in relation to slavery in that
particular instance demonstrates that law cannot he theorised
as epiphenomenal or as an exigency of the mode of production of
which it is an effect. Rather, legal apparatuses and practices
have their own sphere of effectivity producing their own unique
effects which are neither pre-given hy nor totally independent of
the mode of production in question. In the case of chattel
slavery it will he seen that the unique effects of law concerned
what was apparently the site of a fundamental conflict within
bourgeois ideology. The part which law itself played in the
creation of this apparent conflict as well as its role in the
resolution and containment of ideological contradictions and the
basis which it provided for the ultimate transformation of
structures are all explored in this thesis.
As was argued earlier, the legal status is considered
fundamental to the development of a specifically slave mode of
production subordinate to the capitalist mode. The development
of the slave mode itself created the conditions necessary for the
uneven development of capitalism in a particular instance: the
North American colonies and by implication the development of
international capitalism. The following chapters of this thesis
trace out exactly how this was accomplished by exploring, in a
substantive way, the role of law in both indicating and constituting
the kind of social organisation evident in a specific period.
In accordance with the position outlined in the earlier
sections of this chapter, my interest lies in attempting to
understand the precise nature of the effectivity of certain
aspects of the operation of law in relation to chattel slavery
during particular stages in the development of western capitalism.
I have stressed that an adequate explanation of the emergence and
development of specific laws and legal practices must pay
particular attention to the specific historical and institutional
contexts within which definite legal forms are generated. This
necessarily involves reference to broad sociological and historical
developments, in this case, the acceleration of western capitalism,
as well as reference to specific stages in such a development.
In the substantive analysis of the law and its operation in
relation to chattel slavery, the methodological proposals outlined
in this chapter will be used where possible. The study will
consist of an analysis of the main phases in the legal definition
of chattel slavery and the systems of slave production founded on
this which developed in North America in particular. To analyse
the phases, however, is not to suggest any necessary evolutionary
unfolding of either the legal definition or of a system of slave
production, but rather to suggest that there were, in fact, certain
distinct and conjunctural systems of production based on slave
labour to which the legal definition was integral.
The study begins in Chapter 2 with a critical examination of
the common law debates surrounding the 'slave' status in Great
Britain which were to provide the central precedents to which
the North American colonies would refer in establishing the
legality of slavery on that continent. The central issues
raised in these legal debates concerning the rights of property
versus those of liberty would be raised and referred to time and
again from the establishment of the constitutional form of
government in the United States of America, in connection with
the legality of slavery,through the 19th century up to the post
Civil War era. In Chapter 3 "the forms of colonial expansion to
North America are discussed with particular reference to the legal
definition of the forms of bondage in the colonies. The legal
differentiation between black 'slave' labour and other forms of
'unfree' labour is already evident in the early colonial period,
albeit in an ambiguous and inconsistent way. Chapter k>
focusing on the later colonial period, discusses why a resolution
of the ambiguities surrounding the 'slave' status was necessary
and discusses how effectively the status of slaves as akin to
chattel property was accomplished through the construction of the
slave status in legislation. Chapter 5> which deals with the
birth of the nation state of the United States of America through
the excessive use of constitutional law, explains how slave
property right became guaranteed in constitutional law and how
this guarantee was effective in the practice of political and
economic forms. Chapter 6, in focusing on the international slave
trade and the expansion of the slave system to the Western
Territories, explains how legal institutions and practices effected
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the expanded, reproduction of the slave system. The
implications of this expansion for a fully developed slave mode
of production in the Southern States of the USA. are discussed in
Chapter 7 which, in analysing the legal debates surrounding the
issue of whether the rights of property are exclusive to the
definition of chattel slaves, concludes that legal forms ensured
that such rights were paramount and that they were effectively
guaranteed throughout the USA. Chapter 8 examines the conflict
in law and ideology which ultimately led to Civil War and the
abolition of the slave system and argues that this conflict was
not a conflict of capitalism versus slavery but was rather a
political conflict over the further expansion of the slave
system and over who would rule the USA. In Chapter 9 the
concluding chapter, the legacy of the chattel slave status as a
legal category is analysed in terms of how legal institutions and
practices have analogised between the slave and other unfree
statuses and it is argued that my analysis of law in relation to
chattel slavery has demonstrated just how law can function as an
instance of construction, recognition, regulation and
transformation with specific effects on the practices of other
social, economic and political forms.
CHAFFEE 2 : THE SETTING : COMMON LAW AND SLAVERY
IMROHJCTION
DOMESTIC v COLO ICCAL LEGAL FORMS
THE LEGALITY OE CLAIMS TO PROPERTY v LIBERTY
THE LEGAL RIGHTS OP PROPERTY PREVAIL
COKGLUSIGN : THE LEGACY FYS COLONIAL LEGAL FORMS
I1M10KJCTI0N
In this chapter, the context within wiiich the legality of
slavery would he established in the North American colonial
dominions of Great Britain is examined. This context 2101 only
provided the legal basis upon which these colonies could develop
using- slave labour but also the legal discourses and practices
which permitted an articulation of the master/slave relation
under the constitutional form of government ultimately
established in the United States of America, Through a critical
analysis of the common law debates surrounding the 'slave®
status in Great Britain, in the context of the social, political
and economic structures within which these legal issues were
resolved, this chapter demonstrates that legal practices can
uniquely effect the nature of the development of social and
economic relationships. The issues raised at common law,
concerning the rights of property versus those of liberty in
relation to the legal status of slavery, were to form the central
legal precedents which would be referred to time and again in
North America from the establishment of the British colonies there
until the post Civil War era. The legal practices analysed in
this chapter and the scope of particular legal decisions will
therefore be referred to throughout this thesis and the precise
effects of the common law debates surrounding slavery, in
establishing the basis upon which a slave system of production
could develop in North America and on the constitutional debates
within law concerning the legality of slavery under the US
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dependent on and centrally involved in the "business of slave
trading. The city1 s ships were used solely for the
transporting of slaves and it was responsible for five-eighths
of the British slave trade and three-sevenths of the European
(l)
trade. v J One consequence of the extent of this kind of
participation in the slave trade was the number of slaves
residing in Britain itself - approximately twenty thousand
(2)
living in London alone by 1764.
Many of the slaves living in Britain were the personal slaves
of masters returning from the colonies, either permanently or
temporarily, whilst others were the 'property* of slave trading
(
merchants. Slave auctions at which such 'merchandise' was
openly bought and sold were commonplace in the larger cities
engaged in slave trading activities, these auctions typically
being advertised in local newspapers. Thus Williamson's
Advertiser of Juno 214, 1757 contained the following advertisement:
For sale immediately, One stout ITegro young fellow
about 20 years of age, that has been employed, for
12 months on board a ship, and is a very serviceable
hand. And a Negro boy, about 12 years old, that
has been used since Sept. last to wait at a table,
and is of a very good disposition, both warranted
sound. Apply Robert Williamson, Broker. (It)
1. Williams, 1966:3U-
2. This estimate derives from the Gentleman's Magazine - cited by
Gomer Williams, "History of the Liverpool Rriva.teers and Letters of
Marque", London, Eeinemann, 1897'^77•
3. For a discussion of the slave population resident in Britain
throughout this period, see F.C. Shylion, "Black Slaves in Britain",
London, Oxford University Press, 197^•
i}. As cited by Gomer Williams, 'History of the Liverpool
Priva,teers', 1897
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Yet, despite the fact that such slave auctions were a regular
occurrence the rising slave population in Britain did pose some
critical issues about the legality of such transactions and
indeed about the legality of slavery itself in Britain.
When English courts were first confronted with slavery cases
in the seventeenth century they began to consider a wide range of
questions within the context of the familiar forms of the common
law and without any significant guidance from either Parliament
or the Privy Council. For example, the courts asked whether
slavery had an adequate legal foundation in the indigenous law of
England itself. If not, did colonial slave laws mean that English
law must recognise the legality of claims to slave property?
Indeed what was the status of a slave and the rights of his master
on returning from the colonies to England? Could a slave claim
any rights under English law? Was a contract for the sale of a
slave capable of enforcement in the English courts? Clearly
the answers to such questions were central not only to the issue
of the legality of slavery under English law but also to the
legality of the slave trade itself. Legal rulings on the issue of
slavery then could critically affect not only the status of 'slaves'
in England but also the legitimacy of a particular form of colonial
1. For a discussion of the significance of these questions to
the development of American constitutional and conflict of laws
theory, see W.M. Viecek, "Somerset: Lord Mansfield and the
Legitimacy of Slavery in the Anglo-American World", in
University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. i|2., No.1., Fall 197U:
86~lq6„
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expansion and the Immense profits of the 'triangular trade5. v
(2)It was against This background that the English v J courts
(3)handed down a series of apparently contradictory XJ judgments
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries with regard
to the question of the legality of the status 5 slave5 at English
common law. Throughout this period court decisions concerning
the legality of slavery in England had at worst established
contradictory precedent and at best "very special conditions in
.a \
applying individual liberty concepts to slave-master disputes".
When deciding the issues in question, courts rarely confronted
directly the legality of slavery as such but instead, relied on
creating a special form of pleading in relation to the master-
slave relationship. Thus, the issue of whether or not one man.
could legally own another was seldom addressed and judgments were
based on technical matters of pleadings, such as whether the writ
1. The term 'triangular trade5 refers to the exchange established
in the 17th and l8th centuries whereby England, and to some extent
the North American colonies, supplied the exports and the ships;
Africa provided the slaves; and the plantations provided the raw
materials. The triangular trade was geared to the interests of
Britain and formed the basic tenet of the mercantile system.
(See generally, Williams, 1966:5>l-8i|.).
2. While the cases discussed in the body of this chapter are
predominantly English, several important Scottish cases are eiso
referred to.
3. E.Eiddes, 'Lord Mansfield and the Soramersett Case5, 5>0 L.Q. Rev.,
h99 (193k)i for example, argues that the pre-1772 (pre-Sommersett)
precedents on slavery were in hopeless disagreement on the legal,
issues regarding slavery in England.
1|. Higginbotham, A.L., Jnr., 'In the Matter ox Color: Race and
the American Legal. Process: The .Colonial Period5, New York, Oxford
University Press, 1978:31b-
in question was in the correct slegal form1 to establish
ownership of a slave or a right to Ms services. The
critical factor in whether or net a judge found in favour of
the alleged 'slave' was not whether or not slavery was in fact
recognised at common law but rather whether the proper form of
common law pleading had been chosen.
It was not until June 22, 1772, that Lord Mansfield, Chief
Justice of the King's Bench, in the case of Sommersett v
(2)
Stuart, J was to set a common law standard which was to take
on "a life of its own and' [enter] the mainstream of American
constitutionalism". But, as will he discussed later in
this chapter, even the Sommersett decision was itself very
narrowly constructed, though the interpretation placed upon it
by contemporaries, both within Britain and in the North
American colonies, gave the case a significance in subsequent
litigation right np to the outbreak, of Civil War in the USA.
1. Higginbothan, 1978:320.
2. King's Bench: 12 George III A.D. (1771-72) Lofft, 20
Howell's State Trials 1, hereafter referred to as How. St. Tr.
3. Wiecek, 1974:88.
si.
In delivering a 'brief oral opinion in the ce.se of
Sonimersett v Stuart ^ on the issue of whether James
1. 20 Howell's State Trials, 1. This is a. verbatim copy of Capel
Lofft's version of the Sommersett case. Legal, cases in the late
ei^iteenth century were not officially reported. Judges delivered
their opinions orally, and whether their deliberations survived
depended on whether a lawyer or other person was present to take
notes. Wiecek (I974sl4l-l46) notes that there are apparently four
variant reports taken down by persons present when Mansfield
delivered his opinion on June 22, 1772. These reports contain some
significant textual variations, thus controversy has arisen amongst
scholars about which version ought to be regarded as the 'authentic'
or 'authoritative' version. Trie four different versions are:
(i) Lofft 1, 18-19, 98 Eng. Rep. 499 (K.B. 177?-) and 20 Howell's
State Trials, 1;
ii) An account in the 'Gentleman's Magazine', 293-'94s June 1772;
iii) An account in 9k 'Scots Magazine', 2975 June 1772. This
version is reprinted in Shyllon,.1974:108-110; and
(iv) An unsigned handwritten document in the Granville Sharp
transcripts, New York Historical Society, titled, "Trinity
Term 3.772. On Monday 22 June 1772 In Banco Regis". This
document is reprinted in Prince Hoaxe 'Memoirs of Granville
Sharp', 2nd ed., London, Henry Colburn, 1828.
The modern controversy began with the publication of Jerome
Nadelhaft's 'The Sommersett Case and Slavery: Myth, Reality and
Repercussions' in Si J. Negro Hist. 193 (l°66). In opting for the
Gentleman's Magazine version, Nadelhaft argues that Lofft (ana
hence the verbatim copies) attributes arguments made by Hargrave
(counsel for Sommersett) to Lord Mansfield. David Brion Davis,
"The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 177C--1823",
Ithica, NY, Cornell University Press, 1975* and P.O. Shyllon
(1974)? suggest that the Scots Magazine may be a more authentic
version "than Lofft's. However, when Sommersett is discussed in
this work reliance
_ is placed on tie version as reported by Lofft
because of Wiecek's (1974) convincing arguments accepting Lofft
as the authority on this case. Wiecek notes that Lofft was a
recognised 'expert' on the subject he was reporting on as opposed
to other un-named anonymous persons. If Lofft erred in reporting
then it was on the side of inclusiveness rather than abbreviation:
his technique was to attempt to report verbatim and his accounts
square with those of his contemporaries. (See Wiecek, 1974:143-
145) • Perhaps more importantly, I agree with Wiecek when he
claims that, to a large extent, the debate ever what Mansfield
really said is of secondary importance. What is at issue is what
Mansfield was taken to have said in terms of establishing, within
law in the form of judicial precedent, a basis upon which it could
be argued by later jurists that slavery was inconsistent with both
British and North. American, bourgeois constitutional forms and
social institutions.
Somraersett, a "black alleged to "be the runaway slave of Charles
Stuart, was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus to prevent
Stuart from seizing and detaining him in England for shipment to
Jamaica to be sold, Mansfield held:
die only question before us is, whether the cause
on the return is sufficient? If it is, the negro
must be remanded; if it is not, he must he
discharged. Accordingly, the return states, that
the slave departed and refused to serve; whereupon
he was kept, to be sold abroad. So high an act of
dominion must be recognised by the law of the
country where it is used. Hie power of the master
over his slave has been extremely different, in
different countries. Hie state of slavery is of
such a nature, that it is incapable of being
introduced, on any reasons, moral or political, but
only by positive law, which preserves its force long
after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from
whence it was created, is erased from memory. It is
so odious, that nothing can be suffered to support
it, but positive law. Whatever inconveniences,
therefore, may follow from the decision, I cannot say
this case is allowed or approved by the law of
England;
_ and therefore the black must be
discharged.
This particular holding, as developed by both British and North
American jurists would take on an equivocal, ambiguous, if not
totally contradictory status, in the process of its subjection to
shifting considerations of jurisprudential theory and legal
reasoning; articulated by men whose political views spanned the
entire spectrum of pro and anti-slavery arguments and sympathies;
and as used within the rhetoric of both pro and anti-slavery
crusades. To a large extent the Soiamersett decision is
indicative of the ambiguities involved in the case law cn slavery
1. 20 How. St. Tr. 1 at 82.
as opposed to 'the statutes which were created to regulate both
the International trade in slaves and the conditions of slavery
itself. Hie statutes governing the status of slaves, as
developed in the North American colonies (end later the USA),
were precisely constructed and directed at regulating the
detail of daily life for slaves as opposed to free people. Yet
the early case law on slavery, in particular the English common
law precedents, was remarkably fluid and could be used as
precedent for or against 'the compatibility of slavery with
British and colonial notions of legality.
In fact, within the realm of legal discourse, the Sommersett
decision settled only two narrow, technical legal points on
slavery: a master on bringing his slave to England could not
remove his slave from England against the slave1s will; and a
slave could secure a writ of habeas corpus to prevent that
(l)
removal. v ' Yet this holding was and continues to be variously
represented as establishing the dictum that 'as soon as a slave
sets foot on English ground, he becomes free'; a,s not only
abolishing slavery in England but also as legally challenging its
existence in the colonies by establishing the freedom giving
qualities of the 'pure air' of England; and, if not establishing
that slavery was illegal everywhere, at least establishing that
(2)where slavery existed it did. so in viola-tion of natural law, v '
1. For a detailed discussion of the legal points settled, see,
E.C. Thomas, 'Leading Cases in Constitutional Law', Jrd- ea.,
London, Stevens and Eaynes, 1901:67-68,
2. For a discussion of how contemporaries represented Lord
Mansfield's decision in Sommersett, see, Shyllon, 197Mlii-I~76.
For a. discussion, of how historians continue tc represent the
Somaersett decision, in particular on the oarigins and prevalence
of the now commonplace misunderstandings, see, Shyllon, I97's :ix-x.
Sommersett provided a powerful precedent which could be,
and often was, cited as posing fundamental constitutional
problems for the legality of slavery in British colonies; it
gave the abolitionist movement a legal authority which could
be used as an ideological weapon in the crusade against
slavery; it provided North American slave state judges with
the difficulty of finding- a legal basis for the existence of
slavery at common law, thus necessitating a construction of the
status 'slave' in legislation to be compatible with the holding
that the state of slavery "is so odious that nothing can be
suffered to support it, but positive law"; it had a lasting
impact on American conflict of law theory and influenced the
development of interstate legal regulation in the American
federal system; and, by a simple twist of fate, it represented
a significant expansion within lav: of the scope of habeas
corpus and the development of the law on personal liberty.
This chapter then, by examining the pre and post 1772
British ca.se law on slavery in relation to the social, political,
and economic structures within which these legal decisions were
made, attempts to analyse the precise nature of the effectivity
of legal practices, by an articulation of just how the
translation of the slavery issues into the realm of legal
discourse uniquely affected the direction in which British
colonial expansion, through the use of unfree labour, was to
develop. In an important sense this chapter sets the
parameters of the tension between slavery as a mode of supplying
colonial labour needs and the ideological foundation of
bourgeois notions of legality, which, in terms of the formal
conditions of bourgeois right - the recognition of
indiv.idual.ity, the proportionality of labour and reward,
liberty and so on -• is antagonistic to slavery.
For slavery to be effective, however, as a mode of colonial
expansion within bourgeois society it required a legal form.
Without such a form, contracts for the sale of slaves could not
be enforced in legal practice nor could the trade in slaves be
legitimated. But. how could Great Britain, which did not require
a. slave labour force domestically, create the legal basis upon
which it was possible to assert the incompatibility of the slave
status with common law, yet, at the same time ensure the legality
of its interests in slave-trading as an integral aspect of the
developing capitalist economy and its interests in supplying the
colonies with slave labour? It did so within law by a
translation of the apparently incompatible issues surrounding the
existence of slavery into distinctive legal categories.
•Thus it was primarily through legislation that the legality
of the trade in slaves, as trade, was established. Within this
realm slaves were simply another form of merchandise subject to
the forms associated with the legal regulation of any commercial
transaction involving merchandise. As a source of the supply of
labour for colonial expansion, the legality of slavery could be
upheld by arguing that the legal status 'slave' was municipal in
character, thus while English courts could not legitimate a.
master* s claim to forcibly remove a slave from England, they
could recognise the master* s right to a slave* s sex*vices in
England and his absolute rights of property in the colonies.
As such, the British precedents on slavery, as v/ill become
clear later on in this chapter, provided the basis upon which
the North American colonies were able to construct, within law,
the slave status; to define the agents, master and slave; and
to regulate the precise nature of that particular relationship.
DOMESTIC v COLODIAL LEGAL DORMS
We have no slaves at home. They why abroad?
.And they themselves, once ferried o*er the wave
That parts us, are emancipate and loose*d.
Slaves cannot breathe in England; if their lungs
Receive our air, that moment they are free:
They touch our country, and their shackles fall.
That*s noble, and bespeaks a nation proud
And jealous of the blessing - Spread it then,
And let it circulate through every vein
Of all your empire, that where Britain*s pow*r
Is felt, mankind may feel her mercy tool
Cowper*s Ta.sk
By the eighteenth century, England prided herself for the alleged
personal freedom which English people enjoyed under the common
law. Yet, at the same time, she promoted and legally sanctioned,
bo"lii througi statutes regulating her involvement in the
international slave trade and through the acts of colonial
legislatures, a system of slavery in her colonies. It was
therefore inevitable that the question would arise concerning;
whether a slave brought to England would be regarded as free under
the common law, or whether the legal status of 1 slave* under
colonial law would still adhere. This issue was hardly likely
to "be resolved by uttering metaphoric statements concerning the
freedom-giving proper-ties of either English soil or air. But
how exactly was it to he solved?
"While "by the end of the sixteenth century villenage in
England was almost an extinct social institution, a new economic
and social institution which violated conceptions of human
freedom was to emerge - the growth of racial slavery in the
North American and other British colonies and the vast
organisation of the international slave-trade. And, although
Britain was not deeply implicated in the slave-trade when it
"began in the sixteenth century, there were notable exceptions:
(?)
for example, the Elizabethan adventurer. Sir John Hawkins.
In fact, black slaves had appeared in England at the end of the
sixteenth century, as an aftermath to the Spanish wars during
the reign of Elizabeth 1, but in July 1596 the Privy Council
1. The main legal treatises on the institution of villenage
in England include: Littleton, "Tenures", (1268); Cowell,
"Hie Interpreter", (l607); and Coke, "Institutes of the Laws of
England", Vol.1. For a general discussion of the legal system of
villenage in England, see P. Vinogradoff, "Villainage in England:
Essays in English Mediaeval History", at chs. i-iv, (1892). The
pre-ELizabethan poor laws contained a short-lived experiment with
domestic slavery for vagabonds -- 1 Edw. 6. c. 3 0-547)> repealed
by 3 & l\ Edw. 6. o. 16 (l55l) - see M. Davies, "Slavery and
Protector Somerset: The Vagrancy Act of l51t7"? 19 Econ. Hist. Rev.,
2nd ser, 533-49 0-966).
2. See, Shylion, 1974:1-?.
ordered the removal of a number of them for economic reasons.
There is, however, no record of the number removed nor of the
number who remained. Indeed, no record is available to
indicate exactly what happened to any of these slaves.
By the middle of the seventeenth century, however, England
began to organj.se the business of slave-trading on a larger
(2)
scale, v ' and it was not long before she became the greatest
slave-trader if not slave-owner in the world. Erom the sources
of slave-trafficking, wealth poured into Britain, particularly
to its great ports: Liverpool; Bristol and London. To this
traffic in human beings the British Government gave not only its
approval but also it exerted pressure to ensure both maintenance
and expansion. In 1750, for example, a, statute was passed, to
secure the supply of blacks at a 'reasonable' (sic) rate to the
plantations, and, on numerous occasions, import duties on slaves
imposed by colonial legislatures were disallowed by trie British
Government. ^ ^
1. The Privy Council declared that: "understanding that there
are lately divers biackamoores brought into this realms, of which
kinds of people there are ailready here too marie, considering how
God hath blessed this land with great increase of people of our
owne nation as anie countrie in the world, whereof manie for want
of service and means to sett them on works fall to idleness and to
great extremytie ... that those kinde of people should be sent
forth of the lande as cited in John Roche Dasent, ed. "Acts
of the Privy Council of Engl3rd (New Series) l5So~7j xxvi,
London, 1902:16-17.
2. For a discussion of England's involvement in the international
slave trade and the legal issues involved, see Chapter 6.
3. Piddes, 193h:5'00. Import duties on almost everything were
disallowed, in accordance with mercantilist theory.
Given the organisation of slavery in the British colonies,
it is hardly surprising to find that slaves were often brought
to Britain by their masters. Consequently, the question of
how far their status as slaves continued in Britain was raised
in the courts and by the mid eighteenth century a series of court
rulings on the legal issues concerning slavery had been
established in which the judges not only apparently contradicted
each other, but also, on occasion, themselves. ^
For well over a century there was a legal pendulum swinging
between whether or not the colonial legal status 'slave1
continued •under British law and, if it did, to what extent could
this legal title to slave property be applied? fbroughoiri this
period the courts seldom addressed themselves to the question of
the legality of slavery as such in any direct way. Instead they
relied on whether the particular writ was in the proper form?
to establish ownership of a slave, a suit in trover: to establish
a right to the services of a slave, a suit per quod servitium
amisit; or to establish a right to the recovery of damages for
non-performance of a contract, a suit in assumpsit. The choice
of the specific form of common law pleading, the various forms of
which had developed over centuries of adjudication, often became
the critical legal issue in the court's ruling for or against the
alleged slave. legal practices in relation to these writs and
their appropriateness or otherwise to slavery cases not only had
a distinctive effectivity on the question of the legality of
1. Helen T. Catterall (ed) "Judicial Cases Concerning American
Slavery and the Negro", 5 vols., reprinted, Hew York, Negro
Universities Press, 1963:1:1-52.
slavery but also on the development of common law in terms of
the judicial endorsement of the motto, in favorem liberatis,
that is, that all parties be presumed free until proven
otherwise.
The first legal decision concerning the compatibility of
slavery with English law was handed down in 15>69« la the
Cartwight case the Court held that the slave in question,
imported from Russia, must be manumitted because "England was
(2)
too pure an aire for slaves to breathe in". J Exactly why
this air was considered to be too pure is not recorded, if it
was ever stated, but these words would become subject, in later
legal decisions and in political debates, to constant reiteration
and interpretation. Although "the race of Cartwright is not
stated in the brief report, it is unlikely that the slave in
question wa.s black, w/ thus the first recorded ea.se involving
(h)
black slaves was not heard until 1677• rn Butts v Penny v '
English courts were, for the first time, presented with the issue
of whether or not black slavery was sanctioned by English law.
In the event, the Court did not rule on this issue in Butts but
instead ruled on the issue of whether or not and under what
conditions black slaves constituted personal property to the
extent that an action in "trover could be maintained.. Trover, a
1. 2 Rushworth I4.68 (1569) •
2. Ibid.
3. See Higginbotham, 1978:321.
1+. 2 Levins 201, 83 Eng. Rep. 5i3 (K.B. 1677)? also reported
with variation in 3 Keble 785-
form of action in common law pleading that would lie for recovery
of damages for the wrongful talcing and detainer of specific
chattels, required plaintiffs to have a property right in the
chattels. The plaintiff therefore, in Butts, required to
(2)
have a property interest in the slaves he claimed had been
taken from him, if his suit for the recovery of damages was to
be sustained.
In a special verdict for the plaintiff, in which the judges
of the King's Bench held that there might be property rights in
slaves sufficient to maintain trover, since black slaves were
"usually bought and sold among merchants, as merchandise" and
because they were also "infidels", the earlier precedent of
Cartwright was not referred to. The judgment£>r the plaintiff
was given "nisi Causa, this Term" (emphasis in original)
indicating that the judgment was valid unless the party affected
came to show cause within the specified time why it should rot
stand. In other words, the ruling was not necessarily final,
though no record exists of any further adjudication on this
(3)
specific case. ' The absence of any final judgment in this
particular case meant that it was, at best, a shaky precedent,
1. A trover is an action to recover for wrongful interference
with or detention of the goods of another, (3 Steph. Comm.,
li.25); and also a common lav/ remedy to recover the value of
personal chattels wrongfully converted by another, (l Burr 3)•
2. In Levinz the action was recorded as being for 200 blacks,
whereas Kehle and the original records list the number to be 10.
See, Keble 785-
3. Further complicating its status was a problem common to all
17th century decisions - the informal character of the reporting,
(Wiecek, 197^:90).
and, at worst, no precedent at all. •' 'Hits however did
not prevent a reliance on it as precedent within legal discourse
in subsequent slavery cases.
Nevertheless, while the Court in Butts v Penny, in common
with the other pre-Sominersett cases, gave judgment in terms of
the technicalities of common law pleadings, counsel used the
issue of whether trover was the appropriate form of action for
the recovery of a group of black slaves to address the
substantive issue of whether it was legally possible to hold
property in human beings.
In discussing this substantive issue, counsel in Butts
considered what would become the most commonly cited precedent
for the New World legal institution of slavery - the ancient
1. For a full discussion of the precedential issues in the
case see Higginbotham, 1973:321-2.
h)
English feudal form of bondage - villenage. The defence
counsel in Butts had argued that an action of trover would not lie
for any person (hence not for a slave) since the laws on
villenage only permitted the acquisition of a property right in a
person by virtue of either conquest or compact but in the present
case there was no evidence adduced to show that Butts had acquired
(2)the slave, Penny, in either of these particular ways. v While
the court, in the event, ruled against the slave*s defence and gave
1. The ancient system of villenage, having its roots in forms
of feudal tenure, provided an arguable legal and social precedent
for slavery in England. (For a discussion of an analogous form
of bondage in later centuries in Scotland, see p. 136. Note 1
infra.) Legal treatises, such as Littleton's work on "Tenures"
(1268), Cowell's legal dictionary, "The Interpreter" (.1607), and
Lord Coke's first volume of "Institutes of the Laws of England",
continued to be used as.sources of reference throughout the
eighteenth century and continued to include writings on
villenage within their texts, thus making it possible to suggest
that however loosely interpreted, sia.very and villenage could be
related giving slavery some form of precedential support. As
chattel slavery in the colonies became more developed, English
lawyers tended to characterise the .institution of slavery as a
New World version of villenage, (See, Davis, 1975>:^69-5?-2). The
feudal villenage labour system bound the worker (villein) to the
master's land/estate in a status analagous to that of a serf, and
in some ways to the status of a slave. A villein was attached
to the manor, performed work for his lord and was, to all intents
and purposes, his lord's property. The lord possessed a limited
right of physical power over both the villein and his direct
descendants through the male line. There were basically two
types of villeins - villeins in gross who were annexed to the
person of the lord and could be transferred by deed from one
owner to another; and villeins regardant who were annexed to the
manor of the lord and were serfs. (See Black's Law Dictionary,
ipth edition, p.!7Ul)• For a discussion of the social and legal
rights of villeins in the middle ages as compared with those of
the New World black slaves, see, Winthrop Jordan, "White Over
Black", Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1968.
2. Higginbo tham, 1978:322.
no indication of its views concerning whether or not villenage
could be regarded as a legal precedent for slavery, the issue
of whether or not villenage could be viewed as relevant
precedent was to be discussed time and again in relation to
slavery cases.
Another issue which had been raised in Butts which
apparently made it possible for one person to hold property in
another concerned whether the person claimed to be a slave was
a 'heathen*» Two subsequent cases, Noel v Robinson, 1687 ^
and Gelly v CIeve, l69U> recognised the legality of claims
to property interests in slaves who were not Christians. The
court in Noel v Robinson implicitly upheld the master's property
interest in black non-Christian slaves in deciding that Sir
Martin Noel's devise of a moiety (one of two equal portions) of
his plantation, including slaves, was a legally valid disposition
(3)
of property. ' In Gel.l.y v CIeve the court was more explicit
in holding that the law recognised a properly interest in black
slaves ^^ who were heathens in judging that:
1. 1 Vernon IS3 (1687).
2. 1 Ld. Raym. Ili7 (169U)»
3. For a discussion of this case, see Higginbotham, 1978:32^.
it. It must be emphasised that the word 'slave1 changed its
connotations of status as the slave system in the colonies
developed, thus references to 'slaves' in the 17th snd l8th
cen-fcurj.es and in different locations mean very different tilings.
105.
Trover will be for a Begco boy; for they are
heathens, and. therefore a, man. may have property
in them, and -that the court ... will take notice
that they are heathens. (l)
Two years later, in the 1696 case of Chamber!aine v
(2)
Harvey, x ' the Kingfs Bench qualified the master's legal right
of property in slaves. In Chamberlaine, suit was brought in
(3)
trespass against the defendant, Harvey, for detaining a slave
allegedly owned by Chamberlaine. The slave had originally been
owned by Chamberlaine's father, a planter in Barbados. In
Barbados a slave was legally considered as real estate rather
than as chattel property. Chamberlaine's father had died
leaving the slave to Chamberlaine's mother. The mother
subsequently remarried and moved to England, talcing the slave with
her. While in England, the slave Was baptised without
Chamberlaine's permission and when the latter's mother died, her
(<)
second husband "put the negro out of his service". ' Tie
1. 1 Ld. Raym. II4.7 (l694) - emphasis in original.
2. Three reports of this case exist: Carthew 39^, 9C Eng.
Rep. 830; 5 Mod. 186, 87 Eng. Rep. 598; and 1 Ld. Raym. II46,
91 Eng. Rep. 994 (K.B. l697)« I adopt 1 Ld. Raym. for the report
of Holt's decision and 5 Mod., for the arguments of counsel
because they are the fuller version.
3. Trespass was an action for financial, redress for unlawful
injury done to the plaintiffs person or property by the
improper act of the defendant.
4. For a discussion of the significance of this distinction, see
Chapter 3 which notes the Barbadian heritage in the early colonial
period in South Carolina, and Chapter 4 which analyses the shift
from regarding slaves as real estate to chattel property.
5. 3 Id. Raym. 133-
106.
/
slave subsequently hired himself out to several masters and,
when the current suit was instituted, he was working for wages
for Harvey.
Counsel for Harvey explored several of the issues which were
to be examined in Sommersett almost a century later. firstly,
he argued that slavery was contrary to the "law of nature" and
whilst this alone did not render the status illegal in England
the thrust of the common law was in favour of liberty and
presumptions about personal status must run in favour cf freedom.
Slavery, he argued, could,therefore only exist by "the
constitution of nations". Counsel for Harvey also argued that
in England it was not possible for one person to have absolute
property in another, "because by Magna Carta, and the laws of
England, no man can have such a property over another". Lastly,
and this is where he explored the implications of colonial versus
common lav; - the nature of the imperial relation ^ ^ - he
insisted that the law making the particular individual in question
(2)
a slave was merely lex loci, ^ whose force dissolved when the
slave was removed from the jurisdiction or when the slave was
(3)
baptised.
Chamberlaine' s counsel, on the other hand, argued that,
1. This issue was not resolved, within lav;, until the Sommersett
CclSG •
2. The law of the country in which the relation originated.
Municipal lav;, on the other hand, is the law of the country
where the case is being ■tried..
3. for a fuller discussion of opposing counsel's arguments,
see Viecek, 197^:91-92.
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"though, the word 'slave1 has "but a very harsh sound in a free
and Christian country" slavery could nevertheless he
legitimated there by a quasi-contract Tinder which the master
derived "power" over the slave in return for providing him with
food and clothing* Such a quasi-contractual relation, argued
counsel, found its precedential support from the ancient law of
(l)
villenage. J The specific fea/fcure of Barbadian law which
regarded a slave en real estate made such a slave equivalent in
status to a villein regardant, that is, a villein attached to the
manor of his lord. Sineq a- villein regardant had to be formally
manumitted by his lord before he could be considered free to taJ.ce
up other employment, so too, said counsel, must the slave in
this particular case. The slave had not been, thus any manumission
would have to be implied or constructive either from the slave's
baptism or from his having been brought to England.
Chamberlains's counsel argued, however, that baptism should not be
construed as conferring freedom because su.ch a construction would
"endanger the trade of the plantations, which cannot be carried on
without the help and labour of these slaves".
Hie court, however, in deciding the case in favour of Harvey,
did not address the question of whether baptism conferred freedom
nor did it confront the issue of whether a slave's migration to
1. Although villenage was extinct as a viable social form by
the mid sixteenth century, lawyers continued to draw on its
analogies with slavery regardless of whether or not they were
arguing for or against the legality of slavery. For a fuller
discussion of this issue, see Jordan, 1968.
England granted freedom. Instead Chief Justice Holt relied
on the technical issue of whether the correct form of common
lav/ pleading had been adopted in the present case. Holt
rejected the precedent of Butts v Penny in asserting that
neither trover (as in Butts) nor an ordinary action in trespass
(as in the present case) would lie for the taking of a slave.
He suggested that the master*s proper remedy was a suit per quod
servitium amisit -- a suit claiming loss of the services of a
servant. nevertheless, whilst relying on technical, matters of
pleading in the judgment, the distinction between trover and
per quod servitium amisit had significant implications for the
legal status of a * slave' in England. Within law, a slave
could be recognised as a chattel if an action in trover were
sustained. If however the correct form of pleading was to be
pec quod servitium amisit then the 'slave' would be analogous
in status to a bond servant rather than to vendible
merchandise, ^
Hie extent to which English law would recognise the
legality of claims to slave property right in England as opposed.
(2)
to within its colonies v ' was further qualified in two
subsequent decisions of Chief Justice Holt. In Smith v Brown
1. For somewhat differing interpretations of the significance
of Holt's judgment in Chamberlaine v Harvey, see Eigginbothairq
1978:32ip-5; and Wiecek, 197h'- 90-92 .
2. Whatever challenge there was to the legality of slavery in
England, the legality of slavery in the colonies was not
seriously questioned in the English courts.
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and Cooper. ^Holt, for the Court, held that the plaintiff could
not sue in assumpsit (an action for the recovery of damages for
the non-performance of a contract) for the purchase price of a,
slave because, following the reasoning of Cartwright and
Chamberlaine, "as soon as a negro comes into England, he becomes
(2)
free; one may be a villein in England, but not a slave". '
This particular decision has been variously interpreted as having
(l)
abolished slavery in England v / or as having found the colonial
law to be inconsistent with metropolitan law. Such
interpretations however are misguided given that, in dialogue
with counsel, Chief Justice Holt attempted to suggest an
alternative procedural mode by which the claimant might be able to
recover the value of the slave sold, in order to preserve a. legal
(<)
mechanism for -the selling of slaves in England. ' Moreover, as
in Butts, "there was no final, judgment in Smith v Brown and Cooper,
1. 2 Salkeld 666, 91 Eng. Rep. £66 (k.B. 17Cl). Trie case is
also reported at Holt K.B, h95j 90 Eng. Rep. 1172 (K.B. 1701).
2. 2 Salkeld at 666.
3« See V. Holdsworth, "Some Makers of English Law", Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1966 ed:l56.
i-l. See A. Sutherland, "Constitutionalism in America: Origin
and Evolution of Its Fundamental Ideas", 1965:129; as cited
in Wiecek, 197b:92, Rote 22.
5. Viecek, 197b:93- This interpretation is supported by the
fact, for example, that in 1689 C.J. Holt had signed a report
concerning the maintenance of the slave trade against the Spanish
in which black slaves were explicitly considered as merchandise,
(Eiddes, 193L:501, citing the Calender State Papers, America,
and the West Indies, Roy.11, 1689).
making its precedential value somewhat dubious.
In another case before the King's Bench, Smith v Gould,
(2)1706, v 1 Chief Justice Holt again gave judgment in tecrms of
mechanistic common lav; pleadings. The Smith plaintiff had
brought suit in trover for, amongst other things, a de uno
Aethione vocat (a o.iwgi-ng Ethiopian). The Court held, in line
with the defendant's argument, that trover was not an
appropriate form of pleading for the recovery of a slave because,
"the owner- had not an, absolute property in him; he could not
kill him as he could an ox ... Men may be the owners and
therefore cannot be the subject of property". After
further noting thai, "by the common law no man can have a
property in another, but in special cases, as in a villein, but
even in ham not to kill him: ... there is no such thing as a
slave by the law of England", the Court went on to suggest
just how title to a, slave could be asserted by analogising
between the status of slave and servant. Tiius, "if a man's
servant is took from him, "the master cannot maintain an action for
(<)
taking him, unless it is laid per quod servitium amisit ...".
1. Holt suggested that the plaintiff could obtain relief if he
amend his complaint to show that at the time of the sale the
black was in Virginia and subject to Virginia laws - "by the law of
that country, negroes are saleable" (2 Sail:eld 666).
2. 2 Salk. 666; 91 Eng. Hep. (K.B. 1705); and 2 Ld. Raym.
1274; 92 Eng. Hep. 338 (K.B. 1706).
3. 2 Ld. Raym. 127^ (1706).
i|. Ibid.
5. Ibid., - emphasis in origins..
Moreover, the Court explicitly overruled the opinion of the
Court in Butte v Penny which had held that trover would lie
for the recovery of a slave. Nevertheless, although an action
in trover could not be sustained whereby slaves would have been
legally regarded as chattel property under English law, the
fact that a writ of trespass for loss of services (per quod
servitium amisit) could be,meant that the legal title to a black
'servant1 acquired through purchase could still be upheld.
Against this background of judicial opinion concerning the
legality of slavery, the Attorney-General, Sir Ehillip Yorke,
and the Solicitor-General, Charles Talbot, gave •their comments on.
slavery to a delegation of merchants and planters who attended a
special dinner at Lincoln's Inn Hall in 1729. According to
these authorities the merchants and planters had little cause
for worry on legal grounds: a slave coming to Great Britain
with or without his master, was not liberated; the master's
property right in that slave whilst in Great Britain was not
"determined or varied"; baptism neither liberated a slave nor
changed his temporal condition; and "the master may legally compel
(2)him to return again to the plantations". v
While the Yorke-Talbot position could not. of course,
overrule judicial precedent, in the case of Pearne v Lisle,
1. Por a more detailed discussion of this event and the
circumstances surrounding it, see Piddes, 193^502.
2. The joint opinion is quoted in full in the Scottish case of
Knight v Wedderburn, 8 Fan. Dec. For. 1hSkB (Scot. Ct. Sess.
1778)" Por a discussion of this case see pp.137-lUO*
The opinion is also referred to by Lord Mansfield in Somiaersett v
Stuart, 20 How. St. Tr. 1.
171-1-95 Yorke, now Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, was able to
place his interpretation in the realm of official legal
discourse. In Pearae, the plaintiff had hired out fourteen
black slaves to the defendant in Antigua at a yearly rate of
£100. Pearne (the plaintiff) claimed that the defendant had
refused to pay for the slaves and had refused to return them.
Lord Hardwicke ruled that Pearne would, be required to pursue
his claim in the colonial court in Antigua and, although it was
unnecessary for Hardwicke to rule on any other issues, he re¬
affirmed his earlier position in relation to the question of
the legality of slavery. Thus, in his opinion he held that
trover would lie for a negro slave just as it had for villeins
(2
since "it (the slave) is as much property as any other thing", v
citing Butts v Penny as precedent. Moreover, Haxdwicke
maintained that Holt's ruling in Smith v Gould only turned on a
procedural error by the plaintiff: there were no legal
differences between enforcing the service contracts of English
servants or villeins and black slaves. He further remarked that
slaves did not become free by landing in England nor were they
(3)liberated by baptism. w/
In addition to these reflections on the legal status of
slaves in England, Hardwicke clearly demonstrated that his view
1. Ambler 75; 27 Eng. Rep. L-7 (l7^9)»
2. Ambler 76 (l7i(9).
3. For a fuller discussion of Hardwicke's opinion, see
Higginbotham, 1978:327-8.
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that trover would lie for a slave was "based on the extent to
which such 'things' were unequivocally regarded as chattel
property. Thus his opinion closes in Pearne v lisle with the
observation that the delivery of the specific slaves at issue:
Is not necessary, others are as good; indeed ...
The Negroes cannot be delivered in the plight in
which they were at the time of the demand, for
they wear out with labour, as cattle or other
things; nor could they be delivered on demand,
for they ere like stock on a farm, the occupier
could not do without them, but would be obliged,
in case of a sudden delivery to quit the
plantation. (l)
Hie opinion however was qualified in some measure less than
thirteen years later by Lord Chancellor Henley in the case of
(2)
Shanley v Harvey, 1762. ^Shanley, owner of the defendant-
Harvey, had brought Harvey as a child to England in 1750.
Shanley gave the slave to his niece who baptised him and gave
him money before her death. After her death, Shanley tried to
resume control over Harvey but Harvey resisted. Lord Chancellor
Henley ruled that Harvey could exercise the rights of a free man
since "as soon as a man. sets foot on English ground he is free: a
negro may maintain an action against his master for ill usage and
(3)
may have a Habeas Corpus if restrained of his liberty". Hie
1. Ambler 77 0-71+9).
2. 2 Eden 125; 28 Eng. Hep. (1762).
3. 2 Eden 126 (1762) - emphasis in original.
significance of this decision was that Henley did not rely on the
"baptism for holding Harvey to be entitled to the legal rights of
a free man but rather on the fact that Harvey had "set foot on
English ground" and, this being the case, Harvey* s liberty could
be protected by Habeas Corpus. Applications by 5 slaves5
for Habeas Corpus would subsequently become central to the question
of the legality of claims to slave property in Great Britain.
Shanley v Harvey also represents a new feature in litigation
concerning slavery in Britain - one of the parties involved in the
court action was the claimed slave himself. Until this case the
highest courts of both common law and equity, the judges and
counsel, had spoken on many of the legal issues presented by a
form of colonial expansion which involved the incorporation of the
ownership of persons into a, legal system based on the ideology of
the common law motto - in favorem liberatis - without any of "these
'owned1 persons being direct parties in the legal actions. This,
however, was to change throughout the 1760s: partly because of
the beginnings of the antislavery crusade with abolitionist
leaders taking an active part in supporting slaves to bring suits
(2)for freedom in the British. v ' courts; and partly due to the
1. The Habeas Corpus Amendment Act of 1679? 'An Act for the better
securing the Liberty of the subject and for Prevention of
Imprisonment beyond the Seas1, 31 Car. 2. c. 2., had explicitly
extended 28 Edw. 3* c» 3 (l35U)s itself an extension of Magna
Carta1s provisions to all men, in declaring that "no man of what
estate or condition that he be, shall be put out of land or
tenement, nor taken nor imprisoned, nor disinherited, nor put to
death, without being brought in answer by due process of the law".
2. Such suits occurred, in Scottish courts also, see pp.l37~lUO
infra.
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fact that with the development of the plantation economy in "the
colonies, more planters were bringing their personal slaves to
Britain. These slaves, while in Britain, frequently ran. away
from their masters, who, unable to apply the punishments which
were legally sanctioned in the colonies, adopted the method
of seizing and forcibly shipping runaway slaves back to the
plantations. As will he discussed in the following section,
these factors together with the tremendous escalation of
Britain's involvement in the international slave-trade made it
more problematic for legal institutions to avoid confronting -the
issue of whether the legal rights of property or of liberty
would predominate.
THE LEGALITY OF CLAIMS TO PROPERTY v LIBERTY
By the 1760s Great Britain contained a large residential
(3)
slave population, J in addition to a number of free blacks,
mostly begging in London and known as the "St Giles'
blackbirds". The slave-trade itself had escalated to
tremendous proportions in the 1750s and 60s. Liverpool's eighty-
1. See Chapter i+ for a discussion of the special legal
procedures applied to criminal slaves.
2. Gentleman's Magazine, 1761+, 1+93-
3. See Shyllon, 197U:3~l6, for a discussion of the black slave




seven slave-traders alone had the capacity to hold at least
25,000 slaves though the number actually shipped in these
vessels:
If not actually delivered 'in good order and
condition5 was probably much higher, as it was
customary to overload, with the most frightful
results.
As was discussed in the introduction to this chapter, this
traffic in human beings became one of 'the most lucrative branches
of the commerce of cities like Liverpool and, in addition to
newspapers carrying advertisements relating to the articles,
such as shackles, necessary for a slave voyage, and for the sole
of slaves, there v.7ere also numerous adverts concerning the return
of runaway slaves in Britain. For example, the Williamson5 s
Advertiser of February 17, 1758, carx'ied the following:
Run away from Bent, in Yorkshire, on Monday the 28th
August last, Thomas Anson, a negro man, about 5 ft.
6 ins. high, aged 20 years and upwards, and broad set:
whoever will bring the said man back to Bent, or give
any information that he may be had again, shall
receive a handsome reward from Mr Edmund Sill, of
Bent; or Mr Bavid Kenyon, merchant, in.
Liverpool.
The 1760s however was also a period in which signs of protes
against trading in slaves began to emerge and newspapers began, to
comment on the sale of slaves in a critical way. Thus, in. the
Stamford Mercury, 1771J
1. Williamson's Livernool Memorandum Book, cited by Williams,
1897:473.
2. Ibid., 475-6.
At a sale of a gentleman8 s effects at Richmond,
a Negro Boy was pat up and sold for £32; ... a
shocking instance in a free country.
Such comments paralleled the beginnings of the abolitionist
movement and it was in this period that Granville Sharp, one of
the most influential abolitionists, began to take up the
question of the legality of slavery under English law.
(?)
Sharp8 s involvement in litigation concerning slavery began
following his discovery of an abandoned and badly beaten sieve,
(3}Jonathan Strong, in 1765. Lisle, a, planter from Barbados
who owned Strong, had discarded the slave when he no longer
considered him fit for labour. Sharp had helped Strong to
regain, his physical health but in 1767 Lisle kidnapped Strong,
sold him to a Mr Kerr who planned to take Strong to Jamaica,
but was prevented from doing so due"to Sharp's success in
preventing Strong's re-enslavement. Lisle, however, subsequently
brought suit against Sharp and his brother claiming £200 damages for
the deprivation of Ms property in Kerr and Lisle v Sharp and Sharp,
1. Ibid., k91>
2. Granville Sharp was born in Durham, one of fourteen cMldren,
to an eminent ecclesiastical family. He was originally
apprenticed to a draper, became a linen merchant for a short time
and then a clerk in the Ordnance Department, until Ms
resignation in 1776 because he was no long&r able to make out orders
for shipping munitions to combat the revolting colonists whose cause
he supported. His wealthy older brothers were leading
philanthropists who assisted him in his crusade against slavery.
See, Prince Hoare, "Memoirs of Granville Sharp Esq. Composed Itom.
Ms Own Manuscripts", London, H. Colburn, 1828, 2nd ed, 2 vols.
3. Hoare, 1828:32-37.
1767. ^ In the event, hisle dropped his suit against the Sharp
brothers alhiough Sharp5s chance to argue that no action could be
brought for detainer because the master could not have a property
right in a slave would soon come again.
After two years of research Sharp produced 'A Representation of
the Injustice ... of Tolerating Slavery1 in which he condemned slavery
as a "gross infringement of the common and. natural rights of mankind"
and as "plainly contrary to the laws and constitution of this kingdom"
because no laws "countenance(d)" it and others, in his analysis, made
(2)
it actionable. v - On this last point, Sharp drew on the traditions
established under Magna. Carta which, in its 39th chapter, had
provided that no freeman should be killed, imprisoned or disseised,
"except by the lawful judgment of his pears or ... by the law of the
land". By a 1354 statute these provisions were extended to
all men, not just free men, and by the Habeas Corpus Amendment Act of
1679 the provisions had been further extended to "any person or
persons". Sharp therefore argued that these provisions enabled all
persons in England, including' slaves, to contest in cohort any
restraint in their persons, through the writ of habeas corpus.
1. The story of the Strong litigation is told by Shyllon, 1.974'
24-39.
2. Granville Sharp, "A Representation of the Injustice and
Dangerous Tendency of Tolerating' Slavery: Or of Admitting the Least
Claim of Rrivate Property in the Persons of Men in England" 1.769,
hereafter cited as Sharp, 'Representation', London, B. YZhite and
R. Horsefield,
3. The translation is from C. Stephenson and F„ Marcham, "Sources
of Constitutional History", 2nd. ea., 1972, Yol.1:121 - cited by
Wiecek, 1974'97, Rote 36.
4. 28 Edw. 3. c. 3 (1334).
5. 31 Gar. 2. c. 2 (1679).
If this procedural point was accepted then the substantive
issue of the legality of slavery would also require to be
addressed. Sharp's analysis dissolved the distinction within
legal discourse between procedural and substantive due process
since the claim which would permit a slave to get into court,
that is, that he was a protected 'person' deprived of his
liberty without due process of law, would ipso facto if not
ipso jure challenge the legal basis of his enslavement.
Indeed, the due process clause of the l4th Amendment of the US
(2)Constitution can be traced to this kind of reasoning.
Sharp, however, also had to consider the numerous
parliamentary statutes regulating the slave trade, granting
concessions to slavers, and confirming the master's property
(3)
right in slaves, ' which afforded legality to the ownership of
man by man. In considering these laws, Sharp argued that where
statutes create injustice, courts should regard them as
superceded by statutes favouring liberty since these are of
superior obligation. To back up this reasoning Sharp appealed to
1. Viecek, 1974:98.
2. For a discussion of the llyfch Amendment, see Chapter 9-
3. See 5 Geo. 2. c. 7 (1732); 23 Geo. 2. c. 31 (1750);
25 Geo. 2. c, 40 (1752). These statutes define slaves and
R'egroes as goods, assets, or property. The charter of the new
Royal African Company, I672 (see Chapter 6) defined 'slaves' and
'negroes' as 'goods' and 'commodities'. (See Calendar of State
Papers, Colonial Series, America-and West Indies, 1669-1674, at
409-12, V. Sainsbury ed. 1889).
natural law and justice which could not legitimate the
deprivation of liberty. ^
In preparing his 'Representation' Sharp also consulted
(2)
Sir William Blackstone whose 'Commentaries' v was regarded as
the definitive work on the laws of England. In the first
edition of his Commentaries, Blackstone argued that slavery in
its pure form "does not, nay cannot, subsist in England" nor
could English legal traditions recognise as legitimate the
origins of slavery which continental writers had found to
(3)
legitimise the legal status 'slave'. Citing Smith v Brown
and Cooper, Blackstone argued that "a slave or negro, the
moment he lands in England ... falls under the protection of the
laws and without regard to all natural rights becomes eo
(<)instant! a freedman". s ' This position however was qualified
insofar as Blackstone, while denying that continental
justifications for the legitimate origins of slavery (captivity
in war, self-sale, inherited status) had any force under English
law, went on to suggest that slavery could have a contractual
1. Sharp, 'Representation', 26-7; 3^.
2. William Blackstone, "Commentaries on the Laws of England",
1st ed. 1765j Oxford; 3z*d ed, 1768, Oxford.
3. Blackstone, 1765 ed., 123, hll-2.
U. This case, decided in 1701, has already been discussed at
p.109 of this chapter.
5. Blackstone, Commentaries, 1st ed. 1765:123 - emphasis in
original.
basis and that whatever rights an English master derived on
"this basis continued in England and were unaffected by
baptism.
By the time of the publication of the third edition of the
'Commentaries* in 1768 Blackstone had. further qualified his views
concerning the legality of slavery in England. He modified the
pensages referred to in such a way as to remove the implications
that slavery depended on contra/it or that a slave was entitled
to liberty under English law, Thus he stated that "whatever
service the heathen negro owed to his American master, the same
is he bound to render when brought to England and made a
christian"; and he revised his earlier position that a slave
becomes free upon coming to Englaid by amending that passage to
read that a slave merely comes under the "protection of the laws,
and so far becomes a freeman: though the master's right to his
(2)
service may possibly still continue". v '
Sharp's 'Representation' also considered, the implications
(3)of the colonial statutes, particularly those of Virginia, v J for
1. Ibid., U12.
2. Compare, Blaekstone, Commentaries, 1st ed. 1765 at 123,
with 3cd ed. 1768 at 127.
3- Sharp, however, failed to explore a passage in Virginia's
first comprehensive slave code, the Act of 1705} c• U9•6,
3 Hening 1|1|8 (1823), providing that a slave's "being in England"
would not work an automatic emancipation without other proof
cf emancipation. Eor a fuller discussion of the creation of the
status 'slave' in legislation in colonial America, see Chapter
and for a discussion of its roots in early colonial legal, form,
see Chapter
the Question of the legality of slavery at common law. He
noted that "wheresoever the bounds of the British Bnpire are
extended, there the Common Law of England must of course take
place", urging that the colonial legislatures have greater
respect for the common lav; principles underlying the British
Constitution, but failing to explore the avenue which later
(2)
American aDolrtionists would. -- the fact that colonial
charter's had stipulated that the colonial legislatures could
enact only those laws which were "not contrary to 'the laws of
this realm of England". K '
Sharp distributed free copies of the Representation' to
lawyers in. order to propagate his interpretation that slavery
was totally at odds with English legal traditions. However,
while numerous cases involving the question of the liberty of
black slaves presented themselves in the late 1760s where,
according to Thomas Ciarkson, liberty was secured in each
case, none of this litigation ruled explicitly on the issue of
1. Sharp, 'Representation', at 70-71-
2. For a discussion of American abolitionism in relation to
this point, see Chapter 3.
3. This wording is from, the Connecticut Charter of 1662, as
cited in C. Stephenson and F. Marcliam, 2, 1972 ed. at 590.
1|. T. Clarkson, "The History of the Rise, Progress, and
Accomplishment of The Abolition of the African Slave-Trade by
the British Parliament", Philadelphia, James P. Parke, l308:
Ik-S.
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whether a slave becomes free when brought to England.
(2)
Nevertheless, in Rex ex rel. Lewis v Stapylton, 1771? a
typical case involving the usual pattern of kidnapping and
attempted shipment to the colord.es, some of the directions in
which the law of slavery might move became evident. Lewis, the
former slave of Robert Stapylton, was seized by his former master
and two watermen hired for the purpose, and placed on a ship
bound for Jamaica where he was to be sold into slavery. Sharp
was able to procure a writ of habeas corpus in order to halt the
deportation and to have an indictment issued by the Grand Jury
at Middlesex against Stapylton and the watermen for assault and
false imprisonment for having seized Lewis for transport and
(3)
sale outside the realm. v y
R v Scapylton and. Others was heard before Lord Mansfield, ^
Chief Justice of the King1s Bench, who evaded the issue of whether
1. See, for example, the case of Hylas v Newton, 1768, cited by
Shyllon, 197^4:i+O—ij-3, Hyias and Ms wife had been black slaves in
Barbados. Both were brought to England by their respective
masters; they married in England with their owners' consent and
Hylas' owner set him free after his marriage in 1758. In 1766,
after living' together for 8 years, Hylas' wife was kidnapped and
sent to the 'Jest Indies to be sold. Sharp took up Hylas' cause
for the return of his wife and the case was tried in the Court
of Common Pleas in December' 1768, under an action for the recovery
of damages. The court found in favour of Hylas but only awarded
1 shilling damages (despite the fact that under the Habeas Corpus
Act damages were set at £500) and Newton was bound to return Hylas'
wife either by the first ship or within 6 months. The case,
however1, only decided that since Hylas had been freed he was
entitled to his own liberty as well as that of his wife.
2. This case is not officially reported but is cited in detail
in E. Lascelles, "Granville Sharp and. the Freedom of Slaves in
England", London, Oxford University Press, 1928:29 et seq.
3. For a discussion of the circumstances in this case, see
Clarkson, 1808:Is73.
U. The same judge as In the Sommersett case.
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or not the law recognised a right to property in slaves "by-
charging the jury to decide on whether there was evidence of
Stapylton's ownership: if there was then Stapylton must be
acquitted; if not then the jury should find him guilty. "While
trie jury found that the evidence did not support Stapyl ton1 s
contention that Lewis was his slave and thus issued a verdict of
guilty on Stapylton as charged, Lord Mansfield, in
conversation with harming, counsel for Lewis, remarked:
You will see more in the question (whether there
is a legal right of property in slaves) than you
see at present. It is no matber mooting it now;
but if you look into it, there is more than by
accident you are acquainted with. There are a
great many opinions given upon it; I am aware of
many of them: but perhaps it is much better it
should never be finally discussed or settled. I
don't know what the consequence may be, if the
masters were to lose their property by
accidentally bringing their slaves to England.
I hope it will never be finally discussed; for I
would have all masters think them free, and all
Hegcoes think they were not, because then they
would. both behave better. (2)
Thus, even although in his remarks to counsel, Lord. Mansfield was
concerned with issues other than evidence as to Stapylton's
ownership, in his initial encounter with the issue of whether a
slave could be forcibly removed from England to the coloni.es, he
avoided ruling on whether the right to slave property could be
upheld under English law. This issue, however, would be raised
1. Judgment, however, was not delivered on Stapylton, arid
Mansfield advised that future proceedings would be dropped.
(See Eoare, 1828:78-92).
2. Minutes of the Trial, of Thomas Lewis, 20th February, 1771?
in the possession of the African Institution, as cited by Hoare,
1828:92.
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again in less than, a year when Granville Sharp and other
abolitionists took up the cause of another runaway slave,
James Sommersett.
Ci)
Hie case of Sommersett v Stuart, 1771-72, argued before
the King' s Bench with a total of five separate hearings, involved
a factual background similar to that involved in the Lewis case.
Sommersett hah originally been purchased in Virginia by Stuart
who had brought his slave with him to England in 1769. In
October 1771 Sommersett escaped but was seized by Stuart's
agents in November of 1771 and chained in a Jamaica-bound ship,
commanded by Captain Knowles. Through the intervention of
c2^
Sharp and several others a writ of habeas corpus was secured
from Lord Mansfield on Sommersett's behalf ordering Knowles to
bring Sommersett before the foil court and justify the detention.
On December 9s 1771, upon producing Sommersett before Lord
Mansfield, Captain Knowles replied that Sommersett was owned by
Charles Stuart and that Sommersett had been a slave in Africa
even before he was purchased by Stuart. Knowles also stated
that Sommersett had "without the consent, and against the will of
the said Charles Stuart, and without any lawful authority
whatsoever, departed and absented himself from the service of the
1. 20 Howell's State Trials, 1. This is the version of the
Sommersett case referred to in this text unless otherwise stated.
For a discussion of the various reports of this case, see Note 1,
p.91 of this chapter.
2. Three English citizens - Thomas Vatkins, Elizabeth Cade and
John Marlow - submitted affidavits in support of a motion to Lord
Mansfield for a writ of habeas corpus against Captain Knowles.
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said Charles Stuart." ^
On February 7, 1772, Mr Serj. Davy and Mr. Serj. Glynn
(?)
argued, on Sommersett's behalf, against the return made by Knowles.
Lord Mansfield postponed the other arguments by counsel on both
sides until the Easter term, these being heard on May 9, lU and
21, although Mansfield himself did not give judgment until 22
(3)
June, 1772, in the 'trinity Term. ' Throughout these
proceedings Mansfield attempted to get the parties involved in
the litigation to make an out of court settlement in order to
avoid establishing a precedent of vide applicability. Both
sides: Sommersett who was backed by Granville Sharp and other
(9)
abolitionists; and Stuart who was backed by the West India
merchants; ^ however, were either unable or unwilling to settle
the issue in this way so that finally Mansfield exclaimed "fiat
1. 20 How. St. IT. 1:19-20, 22.
2. Ibid., 23.
3. For a detailed discussion of the chronology of the case
including a synopsis of the daily arguments of counsel together
with extracts from newspaper reports on the progress of the case,
see Shylion, 197*+: 77-121+.
i;. Hoare, 1823:133, reports that at least twice in the course of
the proceedings Mansfield suggested that some arrangement be rna.de
whereby the slave could be set free so that, in his own words
Mansfield thought "the master- might put an end to the present
litigation by manumitting the slave".
5. See Shyllon, 1971+:77-90.
6. See Wiecek, 197^+:1C2. The West India Interest, a very
powerful political force at this time, was a combination of planters
resident in the colonies and the metropolis, together with merchants
trading in the colonies, and their agents, lawyers and spokesmen in
the metropolis. (See, E. Williams, 'Capitalism and Slavery', 1966).
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Justicia, ruat coelum" -- let justice "be done whatever the
consequences.
The specific legal issue presented in Sommersett concerned
whether it was legal for a slave owner from another country to
forcibly remove his slave from England. And while it was
unnecessary for the court to give a general determination on the
legality of slavery in England, the ruling on the precise issue
may bear on the more general one. Thus, counsel on both sides
had to discuss the issue of removal within the context of which
laws were to be applied to the enforcement of restrictions on
foreign slaves being transported through or held in England.
Was it English common law or the laws of the country from which
they had been imported or purchased? The decision as to which
law would be binding involved •the field known as conflicts of
law and Mansfield had to determine whether the King's Bench would
uphold the laws of Virginia, which sanctioned slavery and under
which Sommersett had been purchased, or whether the court would
rely solely on the laws of England, where the case was being
prosecuted, in deciding on the legality of claims to slave
property in England. Moreover, if the common law was chosen as
the relevant standard the Gourt had to determine just how this
(2^
would be interpreted to apply to the fasts of Sommersett. J
1. 20 How. St. Tr. 1 at 79 - emphasis in original.
2. See Higginhotham, 1978:33b•
Hargrave, v"'counsel for Sommersett, presented an argument
based on the premise that the common law forbade slavery on
English soil. He did not attack'the legality of colonial
slavery or the legality of the extinct villenage system of
feudal England. What he focused on was his assertion that
slavery on English soil was unenforcible in English courts. He
emphasised the extent to which slavery was antagonistic to the
traditions of English common law by arguing that foreign slavery
could not be imported to England without fundamentally undermining
the common law doctrine in favour of personal rights and freedom
for all Englishmen. While acknowledging that villenage and.
slavery had certain features in common, Hargrave argued, that
those very aspects of common law which had limited and finally
eradicated villenage applied with equal force to the New World
version of slavery. He also noted the differences between the
ancient system of villenage and contemporary slavery, such as the
legal protection afforded to villeins, as further substantiating
(2)
his view that chattel slavery in England was illegal. x '
Hargrave also found supporting evidence for his anti-slavery
argument based on the precedent of villenage in the legal
presumption against slavery by the law of contracts. He explained
that the English courts had refused to enforce contracts of self-
1. Francis Hargrave made His legal reputation with, his argument
in this case which he subsequently published. He 'was also in
correspondence with Granville Sharp from 1769 and was allied with
the anti-slavery movement. See Shyllon, 197U•8q-S5.
2. 20 How. St. Ik. 1 at 214.—lj.8»
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enslavement - the law of contracts would not permit an
individual to enslave for life both himself and liis posterity,
nor permit Mm to subject himself to other incidents of slavery,
such as salability. If English lav/ would not permit this
slavery by consent, said Hargrave, then other, more extreme
forms, such as those based on captivity and introduced from
(2)
another country, could not be legally sanctioned. v
Hargrave, however, did not contest the legality of colonial
slavery thus he was able to argue that if the American colonies
were exempt from British [Law then the English legal system was
exempt from the enforcement of foreign slave laws. the legality
of slavery was limited to the boundaries of the colonies -
slavery could not be sanctioned by the common lav/ of England nor
had it any statutory authority in England since the only act of
Parliament giving official sanction to slavery implied that
slavery was exclusively in the colonies. Thus, "in the instance
of slavery, the lex loci /_the law of the country in wMch the
relation originated~Jmust yield to the muMcipal law [the law of
—7 (3}
the country where the case is being triedj".
1. Ibid., at 50. At the centre of Hargrove's argument against
the legality of slavery by contract lay a distinction between
ordinary wage contracts and the slave 'contracts' challenged in
Sommersett. He argued that although, the courts may enforce a
contract to serve for life, Ms was the "ne plus ultra of
servitude by contract in England". Hie courts, however, would
not "allow tlie servant to invest the master with .., arbitrary
power ... In other v/ords, it will not permit the servant to
incorporate into his contract the ingredients of slavery", at 50«
2. Ibid., at 50.
3. Ibid., at 60 ~ emphasis in original•
On the other hand, Dunning, counsel for Stuart, argued
that the case was exclusively concerned with "the legal.
enforcement of the performance of certain services which might
have been required of a servant but, in the present case,
happened to be exacted from a slave. Dunning's argument for
the legality of Sommersett1 s slavery began with asserting 'that
it was possible that Sommersett had initially been enslaved in
Africa as punishment for crime. It was the plaintiff's
(Soramersett) burden to prove that he did not fall under this
(2)
legal category of slavery, v ' However, even if this was not
the method by which Sommersett' s slavery had commenced, Dunning
maintained that other bases for slavery had precedent under
English law. In particular, Dunning argued that the laws
protecting villenage, though now extinct, continued to permit
forms of involuntary servitude. The fact that common lav; rules
had developed to prevent the formation of any new villenage
system, as Eargrave had argued, was irrelevant. All that
mattered here, said Dunning, was that the legal institution of
slavery found precedent in England - the process by which any
particular slavery came into being was irrelevant to the
1. Dunning had argued for the freedom of the slave in the Lewi
case in 1.771 • However, in accordance "with the English Bar code
of practice, a barrister' was obliged to accept a client unless
otherwise retained.
2. 20 How. St. Tr. 1 at 73• Hargrave had noted that slavery,
as punishment for crime, was the only form which the lav? could
uphold. The significance of this attribution of legality to
penal, slavery is discussed in Chapter 9 in the context of my
concluding discussion of the legacy of the legal category 'slave
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judiciary.
What the Court was being asked to do in the present case
was simply to affirm the legality of requiring reasonable
service from a slave - it was not being a,sked to support the sale
or physical aljuse of a slave, in Tunning's view. The
restrictions on slaves, he said, were fundamentally no different
(2)from those found in most service contracts. A x^efusal to
enforce these "obligations" would be equivalent to a refusal to
enforce ordinary English contracts that take effect abroad.
Slave owners should sue for the services of their slaves (per
quod servitium amisit) not for their property,
After hearing the arguments of the oilier counsel on both
sides, ^ Lord Mansfield, Chief Justice of the King's Bench,
delivered the opinion of the court on June 22, 1772, to a packed
gallery of spectators. Lord Mansfield, one of the most able
1. Ibid., at 73-
2. Ibid., at 7^-5* Dunning compared the service contracts
of slaves with "those of apprentices bound out by their parishes
who could, choose neither their trade nor their employer.
Hargcave, however, noted, that the idea that slaves entered a
'service contract' was a legal fiction - slaves had not been
party to amy contract since their status denied them the power to
make one.
3. The other counsel emphasised the points made by Hargrave and
Dunning. 1 have selected the arguments of Hargrave and Dunning
because theirs illustrate most clearly the kind of reasoning
being adopted.
lj. Hoare, 1828:13k.
l8tb. century judges, had made it clear that he was reluctant
to establish judicial precedent in this area. He hah, for
example, encouraged the parties in Sommersett to mate an out of
court settlement noting that "in five or six cases of this
nature, I have known (.the controversy^ to be accommodated by
(2)
agreement between the parties". v J In rendering the decision,
therefore, he noted the conflicting arguments on both sides and
emphasised the legal and practical liabilities to the enforcement
of any aspect of slavery as well as the "disagreeable" effects
which the emancipation of li|,000 - 15,000 slaves in England would
1. William Murray, later Lord Mansfield, was born at Scone Abbey
on March 2, 1705, into a, Scottish Jacobite family - his brother
James, known as the Earl of Dunbar, would, have been Prime Minister
if the 1745 Rebellion had been successful. Throughout his life
Murray was accused of Jacobite sympathies, but he always denied
this. Educated at Perth Grammar School, The Westminster School
and Oxford, he was called to the English Bar in 1730. Murray
also became an influential politician and was a member of various
Whig administrations until he was made Chief Justice of the King's
Bench in 1756 and elevated to the peerage. He continued to be
politically active though he became more famous for his judicial
decisions - indeed, he has been credited with the formation of much
of "the coromercia! law of England. Despite his development of the
commercial law, Mansfield is noted for a. number of controversial
decisions in relation to personal liberty issues. He upheld the
rights of religious dissenters in Rex v Webb, 1767; Chamberlin v
Evans, 1769; and Atcheson v Everitt, lTTF- This may explain why
his house in Bloomsbury Square was 'b'urned down during the 'Gordon
Riots' in V/SO. Mansfield also reversed the outlawry of Wilkes
in 1768, though he affirmed the verdict of guilty for the libellous
publication against King George III. He had considerable
independence as a jurist, and was unlikely to be influenced in
Sommersett by popular sentiment. (See, for example, J.C. Campbell,
"Lives of the Chief Justices of England", Boston: Estes & Lauriat,
1873; andC.H.S. Fifoot, "Lord Mansfield", Oxford, Clarendon
Press, 1936.)
2. 20 How. Si. Tr. 1 at 79• Shyllon, 19'7l+:±lS)~2l[ discusses
the reasons for reluctance.
have. However, in disposing of the Sommersett case he made
sure that he reduced the legal issue to the narrowest possible
scope. Firstly, he re-affirmed one point of English law
which he took to be well settled, that the "contract for sale of
a slave is good here; the sale is a matter to which the law
properly and readily attaches", and went on to suggest that the
West India Interest should apply to Parliament to have other
points of the law resolved by statute. Secondly, he reduced
the legal issue before hira to the narrow question of whether
"coercion can be exercised in this country, on a slave according
to the American laws?" Moreover, this question was to be
determined solely on the basis of the pleadings, that is:
The only question before us is, whether •the
cause on the return /"to the writ of habeas
corpus// is sufficient? If it is, the negro
must be remanded; if it is not, he must be
discharged.
In explaining his reasoning, however, that the cause
on the return to the writ of habeas corpus was not sufficient
and that "I cannot say this case is allowed or approved by the
law of England; and therefore the black Soimnersetty must be
(o)
discharged", Mansfield's utterances went into much broader
legal questions than the narrow point on which he made his
1. Ibid., at 80. (The planters did have a bill introduced in
Parliament to legitimate the slave relation in England, see
Fiddes, 193U at
2. Ibid., at 8l~82.
3. 20 How. St. Tr. 1 at 82.
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decision - that is, whether any legitimate authority could he
exercised in Engl and on a slave under colonial lavs. Firstly,
in arriving at his decision that Sommersett must he discharged,
Mansfield had argued that "so high an act of dominion /^seizing
a slave in England for sale abroadJ must he recognised hy •the
law of the country where it is used". This statement, in
relation to the question of conflict of laws, laid down the
general rule that the lex domicilii hy which a person is held in
slavery does not alone determine the slave* s legal sta/tus in
England, even although the legal systems of both countries are
based on the same general body of statutory and common law, as
was the case with the British metropolis and its colori.es,
(2)
The remainder of his opinion, ' however, which touched on
the relation between natural and municipal law, would be repeated
in countless American legal decisions and pro and anti-slavery
pamphlets for decades, producing its own unique effects on US
constitutional law:
The state of slavery is cf such a nature, that it
is incapable of being- introduced on any reasons,
moral or political, but only by positive law which
preserves its force long after the reason, occasion,
and time itself when it was created, is erased from
memory. It is so odious that nothing can be
suffered to support it, but positive lav;. (3)
1. Ibid., at 82.
2. For a full analysis of Scmmersett and the legal issues
involved, see Wiecelc, 1974:101-108. See also, Higginbotham,
1973:333-355.
3. 20 How. St. To. 1 at 32.
Now that slavery was labelled as requiring the authority of
the positive law of the jurisdiction in which the legality cf the
status 'slave' was claimed, it became possible for England not to
enforce the municipal law of the colonies in England. Moreover,
in his implicit reliance on natural lav; to establish the 'odious'
nature of slavery, Mansfield had laid the foundations whereby
natural law could serve as a standard of justice against which
exogenous legal forms could be tested, to determine their
appropriateness for incorporation into English law.
Despite the fact that, technically speaking, Mansfield's
holding in Sommersett was narrowly restricted to the ruling that
a master could not forcibly send his slave out of the realm and
that habeas corpus could be granted to the slave in question to
forestall such removal, the initial reaction to the decision,
both in terms of public opinion ^ ^ and judicial decisions, was
to place a. much wider interpretation on Sommersett. Thus in "the
case of Cay v Cr.ichton, 1773 > the judge held that "the Sommersett
decision had a retroactive effect so that slavery had never had a
(2)
legal basis in England. v ' In the Scottish case of Knight v
Vedderburn, 1778, K 1 the Court of Session was unequivocal in
holding that both slavery and/or perpetual unremunerated service
1. For an interpretation of the public's reaction to the
Sommersett decision, based on an analysis of contemporary
newspapers and periodicals as well as correspondence between pro
and anti-slavery propagandists, see Shyllon, 197U'II4I-I76.
2. This case is not officially reported but it is referred to in
the Granville Sharp Transcripts, New York Historical Society, New
York, cited by Wiecek, 197d:10S, Note 76.
3. 8 Fac, Dec. $ Mor. 1kShS (Scot. Ct. Sess. 1778).
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'l)
was illegal in Scotland. v '
1. Hie significance of this decision relates not only to
"black slavery "but also to the legal form of perpetual
servitude which Scottish colliers had endured sinee l606. As
T.C. Smout, "A History of the Scottish People, 156O-I83O",
London, Collins, 196?, has noted, "the workmen in the coal mines
and salt pans: ... suffered a degradation without parallel in
the history of labour in Scotland" (180). By an Act of the
Scottish Parliament of 1606, employers were forbidden from
hiring a collier1 or Salter without leave of their masters, duly
written or attested. If any collier or Salter left his master's
service without a certificate or testimonial he could be reclaimed
within a year and a day and punished as a thief, (he had stolen
himself away from his master). The new employer was forced to
surrender him, within 21; hours, under penalty of a fine, and the
collier/salter would be punished in his body. (On this last
point compare the fact that 'criminal' black slaves in N.
America were punished in their bodies - see Chapter 1; infra.).
Lastly Parliament gave "power and commission to all masters and
owners of coal-heughs and salt-pans to apprehend all vagabonds
and sturdy beggars to be put to labour" - as cited, in R.P. Arnot,
"A History of the Scottish Miners", London, Allen ana Unwin, 1955'
1;. A new Act of Parliament, of November 6, I6I4I, ratified the
Act of 1606 and extended its scope. A.cts of l61;7 and l66l
restricted holidays and the Act of 1701 (known as the Scottish
Habeas Corpus Act) explicitly denied habeas corpus to colliers.
In effect Scottish colliers and salters, just like a, piece of
mining equipment, could be bought, sold, and inherited by the
master. Moreover, through the practice of 'arling' which was
used to bind the children of the colliers/salters to follow their
parents in the mines, the serfdom became hereditary. The status
of these colliers/sal ters was upheld in a series of legal,
decisions, (see Smout, 1969:1|31 for references) up to the Act of
177^+ which provided for their gradual emancipation. (On this
point compare the tendency for Northern American colonies/states
to pass gradual emancipation statutes in the case of black
slaves - see Chapter 1; infra.) This Art proved more or less
wholly ineffective in emancipating the colliers/sal ters but it was
not until 1799 that a new Act unconditionally removed the
condition of legally authorised perpetual servitude. For a fuller
discussion of this legislation and the conditions of colliers/
salters, see Arnot, 1955; Smout, 1969; J. Barrowman, "Slavery in
the Coal-Mines of Scotland", Mining Institute of ScotIaud:XIX:
1897-8; and J. McKechnie and M. Macgregor, "A Short History of
the Scottish Coal-Mining Industry", Edinburgh, Pillans and V/ilson,
1958.
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Although there had been earlier cases involving litigation
concerning black slaves in Scotland, Knight v Wedderburn,
1778} was the first in which a conclusive judgment was given.
Wedderburn had bought Knight in Jamaica when the latter was
about 12 years old. Knight later accompanied Wedderburn to
Scotland where he acted as the latter* s personal servant.
Several years later Knight left and Wedderburn apprehended him
on a warrant from the justice of the peace whereupon Knight
petitioned the Sheriff for his liberty, The Sheriff granted
Knight's petition holding that "perpetual service, without wages,
is slavery" and that "the state of slavery is not recognised by
the laws of this kingdom, and is inconsistent with the principles
(2N
thereof". 1 The case then moved to the Court of Session,
1. For example, a'case brought before the Court of Session in
1737, Sheddan v A Negro (Faculty Collection of Decisions:II:
No.xxxiv, i+July' ,17577 concerned "lie issue of whether a slave,
purchased in Virginia and subsequently living in Scotland, could
be forcibly sent back to Virginia. During the hearing the slave
died so no final ruling "was given in the case. In a. later case,
a negro slave Spens, originally purchased in the West Indies,
applied to the Court of Session for his liberty in 1770, (as
cited in W. Ferguson, "Scotland:l689 'To The Present", Edinburgh,
1968: at l88). Spens1 case was supported by the funds
gathered by the local colliers and salters, (Smout, 1969:^-33;
Ferguson, 1968:188) who were themselves taking initiatives to
secure their own emancipation, (see Smout, 1969:^33 seq.).
Spens* master died before a decision was reached ana thus ended
"what had obviously been regarded as a test case applicable not
merely to negro slavery in Scotland" (Smout, 1969: at U33).
By the Act of 177U the colliers and salters were to be gradually
emancipated on application to the sheriff courts, a provision which
made such emancipation unlikely, thus it was not until 1778, the
year of the Knight v Wedderburn decision that the first collier
serfs were actually freed from bondage. And while the Act of 1799
abolished the colliers' serfdom, it said nothing about the conditions
of labour', thus maintaining a de facto serfdom for much longer.
(See Ferguson, 1968:189 et seq.). This de facto serfdom can be
compared with the de facto slavery which existed in the USA post
the passage of the 13th Amendment to the US Constitution abolishing
slavery - see Chapter 9 infra.
2. As cited in Shyllon, 197^:178.
where counsel for both Knight and Wedderburn argued along
similar lines to Hacgrave an.d Dunning in Sommersett. For the
master, Wedderburn, it was argued that "in this case, the master
is not insisting for the exercise of rigorous power. He only
demands, that he shall be entitled to the personal, service of
the negro in this country, during life ..." ^^ On behalf of
Knight, the slave, it was argued:
Dhe only title on which any right of dominion
is claimed over this African, is the institution
of the municipal law of Jamaica ... but the
municipal law of the colonies has no authority
in this country. On the grounds of equity, the
Court, in some cases, gives effect to the laws
of other countries; but the law of Jamaica, in
this instance, will not be supported by the
Court; because it is repugnant to the first
principles of morality and justice ... It is_
plain, that, to give the defender [_Wedderburnj
any right over the pursuer /TOnightJ the positive
law of Jamaica must always be resorted to;
consequently Hie question recurs, Whether that
law ought to be enforced beyond its territory?
But a service for life, without wages, is, in
fact, slavery. Ihe law of Scotland would not
support a voluntary contract in these terms ... (2
Counsel for Knight also argued, in. response to Wedderburn's
contention that he was entitled to send Knight out of the kingdom
without his consent, that the 1701 Act, known as the Scottish
Habeas Corpus Act, applied to all persons - including Knight -
within the realm. Citing the precedent of Sommersett as his
chief authority, he stressed that Knight could not be sent out of
the country without his consent.
1. Ibid., at 178.
2. Ibid., at 179.
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The Court of Session upheld all of the submission made
on behalf of Knight and held that:
The dominion assumed over this negro, under the
law of Jamaica., being unjust, could not be
supported in this country to any extent: that,
therefore, the defender had no right to the negro's
service for any spare of time, nor to send him out
of the country against Ms consent: that the negro
was likewise protected under the Act 1701, c.6,
from being sent out of the country without Ms
consent. (l)
Thus, Knight v W'edderbum endorsed the Mew taken by Mansfield in
Sommersett, that a slave was entitled to habeas corpus; it-
followed the reasoning which made it possible to regard slavery
as a municipal regulation whereby, in any issue involving the
conflict of laws, the law of the country where the case is being
•tried would prevail; it made a distinction between natural end
'unjust' municipal laws so that an exogenous legal form could be
rejected; and it went much further than Soramersett in asserting'
that the master had no legal right to even exact services from
(2)
the slave in Scotland. v '
Just how long this interpretation and expansion of Sommersett
would be allowed to stand, however, was another issue. Was the
granting of habeas corpus to black slaves in Britain, in order to
test the legality of Ms alleged master's claim to him, a serious
threat to British colonial expansion and Britain's interests in
1. As cited in Shyllon, 197^-'179•
2. Boswell, in his 'Life of Johnson' noted that Knight went much
further than Sommersett addressing "truly the general question,
whether a perpetual obligation of service to one master in any mode-
should be sanctified by the law of a free country", (cited in
Shyllon, 197^:183).
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the international slave trade? Clearly, the fact that habeas
corpus could be granted meant that British legal institutions
and practices recognised the personality of 'slaves' * But did
this recognition of slaves as persons make it impossible for the
law to simultaneously recognise slaves as property? Bid the
assertion that only 'positive lav?1 could establish the legal
status 'slave' mean that Parliament had actually to establish
slavery rather than simply recognise its existence in the slave
trade statutes? In the discussion which follows it will become
clear just what the 'liberty' of slaves in Britain actually
meant - the legality of claims to property right in slaves could
still be upheld despite the 'purity of English air'.
QUE LEGAL RIGHTS OE PROPERIT IREVAIL
Indicative of the extent to which the legality of claims to
slaves as chattel property were circumscribed in England, post
Sommersett, are the legal, practices Involved in questions
concerning the insurance of slaves 'obtained' through the slave
trade. By the law of insurance at the time in relation to
slaves:
iia.
Hie insurer takes upon him the risk of the loss,
capture, and death of slaves, or any other
unavoidable accident to them: but natural
death is always understood to be excepted:
by natural death is meant, not only when it
happens by disease or sickness, but also when
the captive destroys himself through despair,
which often happens: but when slaves are
killed, or thrown into the sea in order to quell
an insurrection on their part, then insurers
must answer. (l)
Just how this law would be interpreted was put to the test in the
(2)
case of Gregson v Gilbert, 1783 otherwise known as "the case
of the Slave Ship Zong, ,ln this case an action was brought
(3)
in the Guildhall, London, by a firm of slave-ship owners,
against the underwriters, to recover the value of lj2 African
slaves 'lost' (by the captain and crew throwing them overboard)
in transit between the Coast of Guinea and Jamaica. It was
argued by the owners that the throwing overboard of the slaves
had been necessary for the preservation of the rest of the
slaves (due to lack of water supplies caused by the additional
time involved in the journey on account of conditions at sea).
1. J. Veskett, "A Complete Digest of the Laws, Theory and
Practice of Insurance", London, 17'3l: at 5-5- Later statutes,
Acts of 28 G.3. c. 514, 1788; 30 G.3. c. 33, 1790: and 'jh G.
3. c. 80, 179i+5 regulated the insurance of slaves so that
cargoes of slaves could not be insured for any purposes other
than against the perils of the sea, piracy, insurrection,
destruction by fire or capture by the King's enemies. These
statutes made it clear that insurers would not have to pay when
slaves were thrown overboard by those acting for the owners.
2. 3 Dougl. 233; 99 Eng. Rep. 629 (17S3).
3. The vessel belonged to a large and influential firm of
Liverpool slave-ship owners - Messrs W.J. and J. Gregson,
E. Wilson and J. Aspinall.
11+2.
Hie Court ordered the underwriters to pay £30 per 'lost'
slave to the owners of the Zong. The underwriters,
however, refused to pay claiming that, on the facts, "the
throwing overboard of the 133 slaves (one survived) by the
commander and crew of the ship was a fraud on hie insurance
policy - they ha.d thrown the slaves overboard when there was
sufficient water for survival thus the throwing overboard was
not a genuine act of jettison to save the ship.
The underwriters applied to Lord Mansfield in the Court of
King's Bench for a second trial and the application was heard
on 2] -22 May 1783. Counsel for the underwriters argued that
there had been no sufficient necessity justifying the captai.11
and the crew in throwing the Africans overboard but counsel for
the owners said that the only issue was whether it was necessary
to throw "this property" overboard for the preservation of the
rest (at the time of throwing overboard it was claimed that 60
slaves had already died of sickness). Counsel for the owners
(?)
argued that "this is a, case of chattels or goods" v J and it
would appear that Lord Mansfield concurred in this view when he-
ordered a new trial. Although there is no official report of
the second trial, one contemporary in court noted that at the
l
second trial judgment was found in favour of the insurers on the
1. The slaves had been insured at £30 per head.
2. As cited in Shyllon, 197i+:190«
"basis thai the evidence presented at trial "by the owner's
differed from the pleadings. The central question at
issue, however, was still that of property or cost and the
Court held that there was no "thing in the transaction which
(2)
constituted a murderous act: v J the case was legally of
exactly the same kind, as if it had "been horses thrown into the
(3)
sea - costs would have "been assessed in gross.
Only two years later, in the case of Jones v Schmoll,
1785, Lord Mansfield was presented with another case
involving the killing of slaves on "board a Bristol owned slave
ship, where the question of an insurance policy on the slaves
'lost* was at issue. The slaves were about to be shipped
from Africa to the West Indies when a mutiny broke out. Some
of the slaves at issue in the case died during the mutiny;
some died as a result of wounds; and some 'hung out1 from the
sides of the ship. In Lord Mansfield's direction to the jury
he treated the issue in the case as a standard commercial
matter- of construing rights under an insurance policy in
accordance with the Law of Insurance at that time. Thus the
1. Shyllon, 1974• 19-15 notes that the second trial is not
reported. W.E.E. Lecky, in, "England in the XVIIIth Century"
Vol.VI, New York, Appleton and Co. 1887: at 286, uses notes
taken during the trial to discuss the case.
2. Granville Sharp and other abolitionists attempted,
unsuccessfully, to have the Captain, crew and/or owners of the
Zong indicted for murder. See Shyllon, 1974:184-202.
3. Lecky, 1887:286; Hoare, 1828:355.
4. 1 Term. R. 130, 99 Eng. Rep. 1012 (1785).
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verdict of the Court was that all slaves hilled in the
mutiny or dying of their wounds were to be paid for by the
insurers. However, those slaves who had swallowed salt
water, leapt into the sea,, hung out of the ship or died of
"chagrin" were not to be paid for.
While these cases, involving the insurance of slaves,
indicate that in this instance the law clearly regarded slaves
as chattel property - .indeed the kind of property which could
be paid for in gross - other cases, concerning the legal status
of slaves resident in. England as opposed to those in the slave
trade, demonstrate just how narrowly Sommersett would be
interpreted as precedent. Lord Mansfield himself had the
- (2)
opportunity, in Rex v Inhabitants of Thames Litton, 1785,
to articulate the precise limits of his prior ruling in
Sommersett and to decide whether the broad rationale of the
Knight case would be adopted in England. In the Thames Litton
case, the issue before the Court was whether a parish was
responsible, under the poor laws, for the support of a pauper
slave, Charlotte Howe. The slave had been purchased in America
by a Captain Howe who brought "to England in 1781. She
continued in his service until his death in 1783 and then lived
1. 99 Eng. Rep. 1012. The ca,se of Tathaa v Hodgson, 6 Term.
R. 656, decided before Lord Kenyon, Chief Justice of the King's
Bench in 1796, was an action on a policy of insurance in the
common form similar to the one in Jones v Schmoll. In Tatham,
decided after the passage of the insurance acts (see Note 1,
p.llll) it was held that "starvation" was not due to the "perils
of tiie sea", hence no insurance.
2. U Loug. 300. 99 Eng. Rep. 891 (K.B. 1785).
with his widow for about 6 months. She then left and 'served1
as a pauper in the parish of St Chelsea and subsequently filed
suit for wages due from the parish.
In the course of an involved argument about 'the
interpretation of the poor laws, counsel suggested that King's
Bench had never decided that a, slave was bound, to serve his
master in England. Mansfield, however, interjected with a very
precise and narrow construction of Sommarsett: "the determination
got no further than that the master cannot by force compel him to
go out of the kingdom". ^ Counsel then suggested that the
slave relationship implies a hiring, but again Mansfield ruled
this line of reasoning out noting that:
The case of Sommersett is the only one on this
subject. Where slaves have been brought here,
and have commenced actions for their wages, I
have always fdenied the plaintiffs clainQ.
The condition of slavery is not totally rescinded
by their coming to England. With regard to the
right to wages it still subsists. 1 Blackst.
Com. q25'. But wages are no necessary part of the
contract for the purposes of a settlement. It
cannot be contended that this 'was a voluntary
hiring, and therefore not a service: and if the
sex-vice with the captain be admitted, it continues
with his widow. The odious part of slavery, which
is contrary to the law of England, determines on the
slave coming to England.; and if the relationship of
master and servant subsists on the coming to England,
the master has the common legal remedy for his
servant being taken from him per quod servitium
amisit: Chamberlain v Harvey. The reason why a
negro is not- entitled to wages is because there never
was a contract for wages ... (2
1.
2.
1; Doug-, at 301*
Ibid., at 301-2 - emphasis in original.
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Mansfield®s decision to deny the pauper slave's claim,,
while turning on a question of statutory .interpretation which
did not necessarily involve the question of the legality of
slavery in England, gave him the chance to set the record
straight about what Sommersett actually meant in law. In
Thames Ditton, Mansfield rejected the broad interpretation of
Sommersett relied on in Knight and he qualified his view 'thai;
slavery existed only where sanctioned by positive law. "While
in Sommersett he had argued that a roaster did not have the
power, under English la.w, to forcibly remove a slave from the
realm, in Thames Ditton he clearly articulated tha.t the master
did have power, under English law, to require a slave's services
whether or not the slave was provided for. He did not
acknowledge, for example, that a service or hiring by contract
and chattel slavery were "mutually exclusive legal and economic
categories". ^ Thus, the scope of habeas corpus in relation
to slaves as well as other 'unfree® persons remained elusive
and the issue of the incompatibility of earlier precedents on
the question of the legality of the status 'slave® as chattel
property in Britain was not resolved.
Slave owners visiting England with their slaves managed to
circumvent even the narrowest possible construction of Mansfield's
holding in Sommersett: that a slave could not be forcibly
removed from England by his master. In giving judgment in
Sommersett, it will be recalled that Mansfield noted that the lav/
1. HiggLnbotham, 1978:358.
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would recognise a contract for the sale of a slave made in the
colonies. By implication the master-slave relation could
persist on the basis of the law of the country in which the
contract was made rather than the law of the country in which
the master and his slave were living. Thus masters who wanted
to take their slaves temporarily with them to England began to
(2)
get their slaves to sign or mark an indenture contract
under which the 'slave' could be held as an 'indentured servant'
for a given period, and required to return, with his master, to
the colonies, where his slave status would reattach. - ' This
practice became very common and, for example, in Keens v
Boycott, 1795? the Court of Common Pleas upheld the legality
of a 3' year indenture of this kind.
(?)
In a later case, Williams v Brown, 1802, 1 the legality
of an indenture contract entered into by a runaway slave wa.s
upheld, though on this occasion the Court of Common Pleas also
noted that, while indenture contracts were always upheld, no
1. See p. 133 of this chapter.
2. Indentured servitude was a typical, form of bondage in Britain
and as a means of colonial expansion throughout the 17th and l8th
centuries. For a discussion of its relevance to Worth American
colonial expansion and the legal form of chattel slavery which
developed there, see Chapter 3«
3. See J. Walvin, "Black and White: The Negro and English
Society 1555-19^5", London, 1973;135> - cited in Wiecek, 197^4'108.
1+. 2 H. Blackstone 512: 176 Eng. Sep. 676, (C.P. 1795).
5. 3 Bos. & Pul. 69, 71; 127 Eng. Rep, 39, Ul (C.P. 1802).
English, court could uphold a contract for slavery since
slavery was not recognised in England. Williams, the runaway
slave, became a sailor and joined a ship in London bound for
Grena,da. When the ship arrived in Grenada. Williams was
claimed as a runaway by his former master, a Mr Hardman. At
a meeting between Williams, Haxdman and Brown, the ship's master,
it was agreed that Hardman would manumit Williams if Brown paid
a. certain sum to Hardman. In return, Williams, describing
himself now as a "free black man of the island of Grenada"
entered into an indenture to serve Brown for a set salary for
3 years. When Williams arrived in London after the 3 year
period he sued for wages commensurate with the value of the
services he performed. While the judges in the case all
concurred in the view that Williams was capable of maiding a
binding contract and. the C ourt ruled that Williams could claim
no more wages than he had agreed to by the terms of the
indenture, Judge Chamfer© noted, that it was possible that a
runaway slave, when bargaining for his freedom, may not be able
to strike a fair bargain with respect • to wages in an indenture
agreement. However, he found the contract in question to be
legally valid, not on the grounds of fairness but rather on the
grounds that if such contracts were not enforced then masters
may be less able to manumit slaves.
1. Fcr a discussion of Judge Chamfers's views on the
desirability of such manumissions, see Higginbotham, 1978:
359-60.
Further clarification of exactly what the temporary
residence of slaves in England actually meant to the legality
of the slave status in the colonies was given in the 1827 case
of Rex v Mian, ^ known as Hie Slave Grace, In 1.822 a Mrs
Allan from Antigua, brought her female slave, Grace, to
England where they resided for a, year. Grace then 1 voluntarily1
accompanied Mrs Allan back to Antigua where she continued as
Mrs Allan's slave until 1825 when she was seized by customs
officials as illegally imported. The officials5 assumption
was that she had become free because of her residence .in
England and was thus a free person being brought into slavery
(without import duties being paid). The trial judge ruled -that
Grace was to be returned to Mrs Allan and on appeal to the High
Court of Admiralty in England Lord Stowell affirmed this decree
by holding that Grace was "not a free person" nor could liberty
be claimed by virtue of a "mere residence in England". Grace
therefore reassigned her status as a slave in Antigua, which had
only been suspended, not terminated, by her residence in
(2)
England. v
In Stowell's long and detailed opinion in the case of Slave
Grace he strictly qualified the Sommersett decision. He noted
that "the personal traffic in slaves resident in England had been
1. 2 Hagg. 9b; 166 Eng. Rep. 179 (Adm. 1827).
2. 2 Hagg. 9b et seq.
as public; and as authorised in London as in any of our West
(l)
India islands" v and 'that, al'though the master-slave relation
did not exist in English lav;, slavery did have a legal, existence
in the colonies. The maxim which the anti-slavery
interpretation of Sommersett held to, "Once free for an hour-,
(2)
free for ever", v ' had, said Stowell, "never "been once applied,
since the case of Sommersett, to overrule the authority of the
(3)
transmarine law". Moreover, even al'though the legality of
the master-slave relation as it existed in the colonies was to
some extent incompatible with English law, this incompatibility
extended no further than to confer on the slave a "sort of
limited liberty" in England which completely dissolved on the
return to the coloni.es.
By juxtaposing the legal discourse of Lord Mansfield in
Sommersett, about the 'odious' nature of slavery, with Lord
Stowell's in Slave Grace, about the 'limited liberty' of slaves
in England, English legal institutions and practices were able
to contain an apparent contradiction between the espousal of the
common law motto, in favorem liberatis, and a form of colonial
expansion which treated human beings as articles of merchandise,
whose value in insurance cases could be assessed in gross. As
Davis has noted:
1. Ibid., at 105 - emphasis in original.
2. This common law maxim had originally developed in relation
to villenage.
3. 2 Hagg. at 127.
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English law was flexible enough to recognj.se the
validity of slave property, to uphold contracts
for the sale of slaves, and to provide room for
a. qualified servitude, even a servitude without
wages. It simply told masters that they should
not make Stuart's mistake of locking a slave in
irons for forcible shipment out of the country ...
regardless of legal forms, English courts endorsed.
no principles that undermined colonial slave
law. (l)
COKCLUSIOR : THE LEGACY FOR COLORIAL LEGAL FORMS
A few years after the decision in The Slave Grace, the
(2 s!
British Parliament, by the Abolition. Act of l833» ' removed the
(3)
•limitations' and granted liberty to slaves in the colonies. ^ 1
While this colonial emancipation provoked considerable
resistance from slave-owners in the colonies and a good deal of
constitutional debate about the extent to which the British
Parliament could legislate for the .colonies, it was
1. Davis, 1975:500-501.
2. 3 & 1+ Will. 5- c. 73 (1833).
3. It must be emphasised that by the Act of 1807, Great Britain
had outlawed British involvement in the international slave trade.
While the political and economic reasons for abolition at this
tjLme are discussed in Chapter 6 infra., it is worth noting here
that British Abolitionists' fervour was placed, in the first
instance, on the slave trade rather than slavery itself. While
at the time it made economic sense, (see Williams, 1966) to
outlaw the slave trade, to outlaw slavery in the colonies at
that time would have been to destroy an extremely profitable mode
of production based on slavery in the colonies, (see Chapters 1+
and 7 infra., in particular).
Ij.. See, for example, S. Romilly, "The Life of Sir Samuel
Romilly", edited by his two sons, 3^8. ed., London, John Murray,
18^2:Vol.II.
ultimately accepted by colonial legislatures that Parliament-
did, indeed, have the power to bind "the colonies.
However, one particular group of colonies, the Horth American
ones, had, almost half a century before, shed the yoke of the
colonial power. And., what was settled for Great Britain and her
colonies in 1833 had still been inchoate in 1776 when the
American colonies fought for their independence from the
imperial relation. At that time, the Lord Chief Justice of
the King's Bench in England had rendered a judgment in the case
of Sommersett v Stuart which found slavery to be incompatible
with the principles behind the unwritten British Constitution.
Hie fact that, within legal discourse, that particular decision
(or indeed any other one) did not in any way undermine the
legality of colonial slave law did not prevent the North
American colonists from fearing that, if incompatible with the
British Constitution, slavery might also be illegitimate in the
colonies. Bid a colonial statute or custom recognising slavery,
for example, require any greater authority than the
parliamentary statutes encouraging the- slave trade or creating
(2)
the Royal .African Company? v J Bid the common law exist in
full force in the colonies and, if so, was slavery not recognised
1. Viecek, 197^:112.
2. For a discussion of the formation of the Royal African
Company, see Chapter 6.
by this standard? These imperial constitutional problems
were not even touched upon by Sommersett or any other judicial
decision - indeed only the surfere of the British constitutional
questions in relation to slavery had been addressed.
Neverthelessj, the decision and the arguments of counsel in
Sommersett became known almost immediately in the mainland
colonies of Nor ill America. Extracts from both Sharp's
'Representation' and Eargrave5s 'Argument' were reprinted in
(2)
Philadelphia and Boston in 1773 s-nd 177d respectively.
Hie impact on the North American colonies, in particular in
Massachusetts, was for black slaves to bring suits for freedom
( 3)
in rapidly increasing numbers ' and for anti-slavery
propagandists to cite Sommersett as declaring that colonists
were forbidden to pass laws inconsistent with common law. It
led to the articulation of two particular strands in what would
become an almost century long anti-slavery crusade in North
America: an appeal to the privileges and immunities of all
Americans, including those treated as 'slaves'; and the view
that constitutional guarantees of due process had their
foundations in natural law concepts. Lord Mansfield's statement
in Sommersett that slavery was "so odious, that nothing can be
1. While the notion of an imperial constitution, may be
debateable, I have followed Wiecek's use of the term, (197^:112)
in viewing e. constitution as a set of written and unwritten
principles guiding the working of any government's polity. In
this sense the British empire had an imperial constitution.
2. As cited in Wiecek, 197U'H^»
3. For a. discussion of these suits, see Chapter 1+.
suffered to support' it but positive law" was interpreted by
anti-slavery ideologues in North America to the extent that they
created a new "neo-Somnersett" doctrine which argued that,
since slavery was contrary to natural law, it could not be
attributed with legitimacy unless it was explicitly established
by positive law. Pro-slavery jurists, on the other hand,
argued around this doctrine and ultimately repudiated it
(2)
altogether. v '
Even although Sommersett did not threaten the legality of
the North American colonial forms of slavery, since it did not
even outlaw slavery in the metropolis nor did it hold squarely
on the issue of whether slavery was incompatible with the common
(3)
law, w/ British legal institutions and practices exerted their
unique effects on just how the legality of slavery would be
established within the North American colonies, how it would be
maintained in the new republic of the USA post 1776, and finally
how the status 'slave1 was eradi.ca.ted from US Constitutional law.
The common law debates, within British legal discourse, about the
rights of liberty versus property in the case of chattel slavery,
were to be referred to time and again by North American judges
1. I am indebted to Wiecek. 197^» for the use of this
particular term to explain how the Scmmersett doctrine was
elaborated,
2. See Chapters 7 and 8 for a discussion of this repudiation
in law,
3. Even if British courts had held conclusively on "these issues
it was not clear what the implications of such rulings would have
been for the colonies particularly since, in the case of the North
American colonies, the Sommerseit decision was handed down at a
time when these colonies were in the embryonic stages of
revolution -see Chapter 5>
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and legislatures throughout the l8th and 19th centuries in the
creation, refinement, regulation and transformation of the slave
system. In the following chapters it will become clear just
how the British precedents on slavery formed the basis upon
which the North American colonies and the republican state of the
USA were able to construct, within law, the slave status; to
define the agents, master and slave; to regulate the precise
nature of the master-slave relation and ultimately to transform
it.
CHAPTER 3 : COLONIAL EXPANSION TO NORTH AMERICA :
LEGAL DEFINITION OF THE FORMS OF BONDAGE
INTRODUCTION
COLONIAL EXPANSION : THE FORMS OF BONDAGE











As was indicated in the previous chapter, slave labour
constituted one of several sources of labour initially used to
supply the British colonies with their labour needs. In the
case of many of the North American colonies, slave labour would
become the primary source of unfree labour and these colonies
would become major purchasers of the slaves 'obtained1 through
British involvement in the international slave trade. In the
context of capitalist forms of credit, banking and so on,
commercial transactions in relation to the slave trade required
legal regulation and for a system of production to develop on
any significant scale, it was necessary to give the agents in
the labour process - master, slave - a legal status. Without
legal definition and regulation, contracts for the sale of
slaves could not be enforced nor could larger trading transactions
be legitimated. The legal status, however, was not simply
created by one statute or body of statutes. Laws and legal
practices did not simply evolve to recognise prior realities or
existing relationships between 'masters' and 'slaves'. In this
instance, that is in the case of the development of chattel
slavery in North America, legal institutions and practices
espoused within English common law traditions, played a central
role in the definition of the agents in the labour process and in
creating the basis upon which a fully-fledged system of production
based on slavery could develop.
In the early colonial period, however, the plantation system
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of production had not yet developed and the legal definition
of master/slave was evident only in an ambiguous and embryonic
form. Throughout this period, various forms of unfree labour,
including indentured servants, transported convicts and slaves, ^
were used to supplement the labour of the settlers in the
cultivation of farms and estates. During the first half of the
17th century production on these farms and estates was
primarily for subsistence and only a small portion of the product
was fitfully sold for trade. Any 'slaves' working on these
farms were not held to have a status completely antithetical to
that of 'free' persons, rather there were various conditions of
freedom versus unfreedom and, within the latter category, several
gradations were recognised by legal institutions and practices.
Nevertheless, in the discussion which follows, which places the
early legal definitions of the slave status in the context of
colonial expansion and forms of bondage generally, it is clear
that, very early on in the development of both Southern and
Northern colonies in North America, legal institutions and
practices differentiated between blacks and other bonded persons.
The reasons for this differentiation, either in judicial
decisions or legislative practices, were not articulated nor were
they wholly consistent, but by the end of the 17th century, when
the plantation system of production was forming, the definition of
"slaves' as a legally distinct category from other forms of
servitude had begun to develop.
1. The term 'slave' as used here has a different meaning in law
and practice from the fully-fledged system of slavery discussed in
later chapters.
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This chapter then, traces the ambiguities of status in
relation to black 'servants1 or 'slaves' as opposed to other
persons in bondage. In the context of the case materials
discussed and the statutes of both Northern and Southern
colonies it becomes clear that, in controlling the unfree
labour market, legal practices differentiated between black
unfree labour as opposed to any other unfree labour. While,
for example, runaway white servants would be given an additional
3 years of service by the courts, black runaways would be given
life or, later, no addition in service but simply punished in
their bodies. The fact that no addition of service could be
given in these cases indicates that these 'servants' were already
'serving for life'. This kind of differentiation in treatment
is evident in both Northern and Southern colonies though
different patterns of development emerged which would later require
to be resolved. For this reason this chapter discusses the
patterns of development in a number of Northern and Southern
colonies and, in analysing the early cases and legislation
pertaining to the legal regulation of unfree colonial labour,
demonstrates the central role of law, from the beginning, in
creating the basis upon which a distinctive system of production
based upon chattel slavery could develop.
1. The form which this resolution would take, by the construction
of the slave status in legislation, is fully discussed in Chapter
U. The construction in legislation was necessary to define
clearly the agents in the labour process - master/slave - and to
resolve the ambiguities in existing legal practices.
COLONIAL EXPANSION : THE FORMS OF BONDAGE
From the late l6th century English expansion to the
colonies faced problems associated with the shortage of labour.
Throughout the mercantilist period, ^ in particular, the
Government adopted numerous measures restricting the liberty of
individuals in order to overcome the need to pay higher wages
to a limited labour force. The State established maximum
wage scales, for example, to halt the rise in wages resulting
from free competition in the labour market, it prohibited the
emigration of labour outside the realm, it fostered the
development of child labour and, in some instances, it
(2)
introduced forced labour. Against such a background in
the metropolis, Britain needed to look for some other sources of
labour for the colonies. One source of labour, tried in the
case of the North American colonies, but of more effect in the
(l)
later colonial expansion to Australia, w/ was the labour of
transported convicts.
1. For a discussion of the perceived shortage of labour in this
period, see M. Lobb, "Studies in the Development of Capitalism",
London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1975; K. Knorr, "British
Colonial Theories 1570-1850", Toronto, Toronto University Press,
19U1+; and B. Semmel, "The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism",
Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1970.
2. For a fuller discussion of these points see, Rusche and
Kirchheimer, 1968 ed:26-33.
3. For a discussion of the importance of transportation to
colonial expansion to Australia, see E. O'Brien, "The Foundation
of Australia", London, Angus and Robertson, 1950.
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From the beginning' of the 17th century convicts, under
sentence of death, were sent to the North American colonies,
Virginia in particular. Governor Dole of Virginia, for
example, wrote to the King in l6ll asking that prisoners under
sentence of death be sent to that colony for 3 years. ^ And,
by an Order of the Privy Council of 1617, reprieve and stay of
execution could be granted to those persons convicted of robbery
who were strong enough to be employed in service 'beyond the sea'.
By the middle of the 17th century conditional pardons were
frequently given to prisoners consenting to be transported to the
North American plantations for a number of years and this
practice, at first mainly confined to clergyable offences, was
later extended to cover all offences by the statutory basis
(2)
provided by the 1679 Habeas Corpus Amendment Act. v ' Between
1695 and 1699 at least U,U31 prisoners on 'praying' for
transportation, actually 'benefitted', as did many judges and
1. As cited in Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968 ed:39« A form of
transportation had been introduced by the Act of 39 Eliz. c. k
(l597) entitled 'An Act for Punyshment of Rogues, Vagabonds and
sturdy Beggars'. For a discussion of this Act and its relation
to the control of labour, see W.J. Chambliss, "A Sociological
Analysis of the Law of Vagrancy", in Social Problems, Vol.12.
67-77, 1961+.
2. 31 Car. 2. c. 2. s. li+, which stipulated that "if any Person
or Persons lawfully convicted of any Felony, shall in open Court
pray to be transported beyond the Seas ... such Person ... may be
transported into any Parts beyond the Seas ...". For a
discussion of the use of such conditional pardons, see L.
Radzinowicz, "A History of English Criminal Law", Vol.2, London,
Stevens and Sons Ltd.; 1996:108-110.
Ci)clerks since such transported convicts were profitable. '
A further extension of transportation came with a statute
of 1717 which provided that offenders convicted of certain
offences could be transported to American plantations for seven
years and that those convicted of other (non-clergyable)
offences, but conditionally pardoned, could be transported for
(2)
fourteen years of for any other term specified in the pardon. v '
The reason given for the change was the "great need for servants
(3)
to develop the colonial plantations". w/ Although the number
of transported convicts shipped to North America was considerable,
the labour needs of these colonies could not be satisfied in this
way. Throughout this period large numbers of indentured
servants were also shipped to the North American colonies even
although this policy was resisted by those who thought that the
practice of indenture diminished the labour pool at home.
There were various forms of indentured servitude, each
permitting differing degrees of control and discipline in the terms
of service. At its most basic level indentured servitude was a
form of bondage in which the ' servant' was obliged to serve a
master for a certain period, usually from b to 7 years. Typically,
the potential servant was brought over from Britain to the colonies
by some merchant or ship's captain who gave free passage on
1. As cited by Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968 ed:60.
2. Act of k Geo. 1. c. 11, 1717*
3. As cited by Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968 ed:60.
b. Ibid., 59.
condition that he could defray his cost and make a profit by
leasing the servant to a colonist through an 'indenture contract'
for a certain period. In effect the 'master' paid the 'servant's
fare to America, and, throughout the period of indenture, was
required to provide basic subsistence for the servant. When the
servants landed in the colonial ports they were 'sold' for the
period of their original indenture contract to the highest bidder
- the new masters were typically bound by the terms of the
original contract, though some added a section to the indenture
which provided that the servant would be given, at the end of the
service, a specified award known as 'freedom dues' .
The early indentured servant system was based primarily on
a contractual agreement between two parties, which, like any
other contractual agreement, could be modified at any time during
the service on the agreement of both parties. Before the middle
of the 17th century printed indenture forms were commonplace only
requiring that the blank spaces be filled out in individual cases
detailing specifics such as names and length of service. Some
servants were able to obtain agreements which specified wages in
addition to food, clothing and shelter, and, in the indentures of
children, some were able to obtain clauses which specified a basic
1. For a discussion of the labour contracts known as indentures
and the conditions applying to various forms of indenture, see
Abbot Hnerson Smith, "Colonists in Bondage", Chapel Hill,
University of North Carolina Press, 19U7- While the conditions
and treatment of indentured servants varied enormously the fact
that they possessed some sort of 'contract' meant that they were
entitled to certain basic legal and civil ri^its.
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education. ^ There were, of course, many abuses of this
system of supplying the colonies with a labour force, most
notably in the practice of .Kidnapping- and the corruption of
judges and justices of the peace who would commute sentences
to transportation when, in reality, convicts were being sold to
(2)
merchants and ship's captains. x ' In part such abuses led to
the creation of a colonial board in l66l to regulate the trade
in indentured servants, though by this time another source of
labour which would not reduce the labour force at home was
being tapped - black labour obtained through England's
involvement in the international slave trade.
Nevertheless, this new source of labour had not yet become
the primary source of labour for the plantations, so that in the
latter part of the 17th century a modification of the earlier
indentured servant system, known as redemption, was developed.
While the indenture system remained the primary means whereby
white labourers could be obtained for the plantations which were
developing, redemptioners went to the colonies in increasing
numbers. Redemptioners, unlike indentured servants, could
usually pay part of their fares and they normally went as
families. On arrival in the colony they would be given a
certain period of time in which to find the rest of the money
owing to the ship's captain for their passage. If they were
1. For a discussion of these arrangements, see Smith, 1947:
183-9.
2. Williams, 1966:70-74* discusses these abuses and the
subsequent establishment of the Colonial Board on Indentured
Servants.
unable to raise the money they would be 'indentured' as servants
for a period of time equivalent to the amount of money still
owed. ^^
The main purpose, of course, behind indentured servitude
or redemptioner systems, as is arguably the case with the system
of the transportation of convicts, was that of obtaining a
viable and economic labour supply for the colonies. Colonists
had also attempted to enslave the native population from the
earliest period of settlement. The early settlers had bought
Indians from other Indians, who took captive slaves in inter¬
tribal wars, but also from other colonists. Thus, a Maryland
colonist in June l6i|<3 notes that:
Mr Sowth (of Virginia) ... desyred him to sell
him an Indian. This Dep't answered him he had
none to sell. And then he desyred this Dep't
to goe with him up to Wicocomco, and gett him an
Indian (girle), and hee would give him content.
And upon these speeches they went with the
Sloope.
However, the colonists did not depend on traffic or kidnapping
for the supply of Indian slaves but took them captive in wars
between the settlers and the Indians. Through intensive
guerilla raids between the Indians and the settlers, disease,
1. For a discussion of the redemptioner system as opposed to the
indentured servant system, see Higginbotham, 1978:39U-5«
2. As cited in Catterall, 1968 ed., Vol.1:62.
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and extremely severe compulsory labour when settlers did
enslave Indians, the native population was quickly decimated
on the seaboard colonies - the bulk of the remainder being
driven inland to the vast, unsettled, open territories. ^
If then the native population could not be enslaved or
forced to labour in an economically productive fashion, and if
the import of servants and convicts could not supply the labour
demands of the colonists, the basis for the importation of
another labour force had been created. Given the fact of
England's involvement in the international slave trade by the
middle of the 17th century and the massive scale which England
(2)
ensured, in international agreements, N that such
involvement would take, the possibility had been created that
the colonies could be provided with an economically viable
unfree labour force - only the precise nature of that 'unfreedom'
remained at issue and it is in this context that legal
institutions and practices exerted their own unique effects.
Erom the evidence available, it appears that blanks were
first imported in the Worth American colonies in the first half
of the 17th century. Exactly what the status of these first
blacks was, however, has been subject to very different
interpretations as has the chronology" of the development of
1. C. Degler, "Slavery and the Genesis of American Race
Prejudice", in 'Comparative Studies in Sociology and History',
2, October 19^9:52.
2. See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the agreements in the
slave trade.
chattel slavery in the North American mainland colonies. For
(2)
example, while Bruce assumed that the first blacks,
arriving in Virginia in 1619, came as slaves, Ballagh
argued that they arrived as servants and that enslavement only
began in 1660 when the statutes concerning black slavery were
(3)
passed in Virginia. While later scholarship w/ has
perpetuated this debate, it is clear that:
No specific date marked the legal establishment of
slavery in the South but there were few obstacles
in the way of its development. Neither the
provisions of their charters nor the policy of the
English government limited the power of colonial
legislatures to control Negro labor as they saw
fit. Negroes did not have the benefit of written
indentures which defined their rights and limited
their terms of service... More than anything
else, however, the landholder's growing
appreciation of the advantages of slavery over
the older forms of servitude gave a powerful
impetus to the growth of the new labor system.
The fact that a system of production based on slave labour,
as opposed to any other form of un£ree or indeed free labour,
1. P. Bruce, "Economic History of Virginia in the Seventeenth
Century", New York, Macmillan, l896:Vol.2.
2. J.C. Ballagh, "A History of Slavery in Virginia", reprint
of the 1902 ed., New York, Johnson, 1969-
3. See, for example, Oscar and Mary Handlin, 'Origins of the
Southern Labor System' in William and Mary Quarterly, VII, 19!?0>
pp.199-222; and J.H. Erahklin, "Erom Slavery to Ereedom : A
History of Negro Americans", 3rd* New York, Vintage Books,
1969.
1+. K. Stampp, "The Peculiar Institution", New York, Vintage
Books, 1956, p.16 et seq.
developed, as the basis of the production of agricultural
commodities in the plantations of the North American colonies,
is to be attributed to a variety of conjunctural reasons. In
particular, given English involvement in the international
slave trade by the mid 17th century, this "merchandise" could
be used to supply the colonies with a labour force when
alternative sources of 'unfree' labour, such as the labour of
indentured servants or indigenous peoples, were either
insufficient or unsuitable to the nature of labour demands.
In addition, in the absence of the monopoly ownership of land,
a system of production based on free wage labour was unlikely to
develop in the agricultural regions since free labourers would
tend to become independent proprietors and artisans.
Nevertheless, the system of production based on slave labour which
did develop in North America was not merely a substitute for any
other system of production based on free wage labour or
indentured labour. The introduction of slave labour, in the
manner in which it developed through the forms of law, had
distinct and definite effects on the system of production and on
other social/political structures. The analysis which follows,
therefore, focusing on the legal regulation of labour in the early
1. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Hindess and Hirst,
1975:158-9. The reasons why slave labour as opposed to any other
form of unfree or free labour formed the basis of the plantation
system of producing agricultural commodities are more fully
discussed in the Introduction to Chapter U in the context of the
development of the large scale cultivation of crops in the later
colonial period.
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colonial period, demonstrates how legal institutions and
practices served to create the space for a definition of the
agents involved in the labour process.
In this discussion it will become clear that, from the
early beginnings of North American colonial settlement, both
Northern and Southern colonies created the possibility that the
legal title to slaves as chattel property could be created and
maintained. While Northern and Southern colonies would take
different forms of economic development, the former being based
on the capitalist mode of production and the latter on the slave
mode, there was no necessary antagonism between slavery and
capitalism. The factors which were constitutive of the legal
status of slave as chattel property in North America were not
peculiar to the productive system of the South, as some
scholars have argued. On the contrary, the development of
both Northern and Southern colonies was dependent on the
development of the capitalist mode of production in North
America and on the development of international capitalism.
Both North and South were mutually interdependent in terms of
economic growth and Northern colonies were as heavily involved in
1. See, in particular, the work of Eugene D. Genovese where he
argues that North and South came into conflict because the South's
economy was necessarily antagonistic to that of the North. In
particular, see "The Political Economy of Slavery", New York,
Vintage Books, 1967; see also, "The World the Slaveholders Made",
New York, Vintage Books, 1971; "American Slaves and Their
History" in 'The Debate Over Slavery : Stanley Elkins and His
Critics', pp.293-321, edited by A.J. Lane, Urbana, University of
Illinois Press, 1971; &&& "Materialism and Idealism in the Study
of Negro Slavery", in Journal of Social History, Vol.1., No.l*.
1961*, PP.371-9U.
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the slave trade as Southern ones were on slave labour for the
plantation.
Nevertheless, within this context, different patterns of
development would emerge both between and within these colonies.
These different patterns would create specific problems
requiring resolution before a fully-fledged productive system
based on slavery, with an effective guarantee to the legality
of claims to slaves as chattel property, could develop. in
understanding of the different patterns of development and the
ambiguities surrounding the early 'slave' status is central to
an understanding of just how these ambiguities were resolved
within the heritage of English common law, which asserted the
liberty of subjects, at a later period, through the legal
definition and control of the agents in the labour process -
master and slave. In the discussion which follows, therefore,
consideration is given to the patterns of development in the
creation of a legal basis to slavery within some Southern and
some Northern colonies.
THE LEGAL BASIS : THE SOUTH
As was noted in the preceding discussion, the North American
colonies exhibited different patterns of development both between
North and South and wi"thin these divisions. Various forms of
unfree labour were used to supplement the labour of the early
settlers in the cultivation of farms and estates in both Northern
and Southern colonies and 'slaves' represented only one such form.
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The status of these 'slaves' was by no means clear and colonies
differed in the way in which 'slaves' were differentiated from
other unfree persons. However, what did not differ, either
within the Southern and Northern colonies or between them, was
that legal institutions and practices did differentiate between
slaves and other people in bondage, and while this
differentiation was by no means clear or unambiguous, the fact
of differentiation itself created the basis upon which it would
become possible to construct, within law, the legal relation of
master/slave. The mode of this differentiation in some Southern
colonies is discussed in this section and the next section of this
chapter discusses the mode of differentiation in some Northern
colonies.
Virginia
As one of the first colonies on the North American mainland,
Virginia provided a model for other colonies to follow in terms
of its economic, social and agricultural development. At the
same time Virginia pioneered colonial legal institutions and
practices, allegedly not contrary to the spirit of English common
law, which would come to guarantee the legality of claims to
slaves as chattel property within its own territory and which
would provide a blueprint for other colonies to follow or adapt to
their own specific needs. As will be discussed more fully in
Chapter Virginia's construction of the status 'slave' in
legislation would provide the basis upon which other colonies
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could, cite a precedent for the legal articulation of the precise
nature of the master/slave relation.
Erom 1619 to 1660, however, there appears to have been
no unambiguous effort to legally define the status of negro
labour as opposed to other forms of unfree labour. The legal
decisions produced in the following discussion of litigation in
this period involving negro 'servants' or 'slaves' often failed
to articulate clearly the basis upon which a judicial decision
had been reached. Whether the decisions reached were based
simply on a finding on the facts of the case, of consequence
solely to those persons directly involved in the litigation, or
whether the decisions were judicial pronouncements of binding
legal principles which were to set precedents upon which the legal
status of negro labourers in the colony would be decided, was
seldom explicitly stated.
Nevertheless, while these early cases do not provide an
unambiguous legal definition of negro as opposed to other unfree
labour, they do provide an illustration of the fact that, in the
early legal regulation of negro as opposed to other forms of
colonial labour, there was a clear differentiation in the
treatment and control of this particular category of 'servants',
and that this differentiation and ambiguity made not only possible
but also necessary the construction of the slave status in
1. The date recorded of the arrival of the first negroes in
Virginia, as cited in John Smith, "Travels of John Smith", eds.
E. Arber and A.G. Bradley, Edinburgh, Grant, 1910., Vol.2. I4I.
Smith cites an entry made by John Rolfe, Secretary and Recorder of
the Virginia colony , in the records in 1619 to the effect that
"about the last of August, there came to Virginia a Dutchman of
Warre that sold us twenty Negers".
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legislation, which was to occur in the slave codes which emerged
in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. ^
The early colonial cases decided in Virginia were heard
before the General Court, the Court of Chancery and the Court
of Appeals. During the colonial period the General Court
consisted of the colonial governor and council, the council
having existed since the establishment of the colony, and its
members, including the governor, being appointed by the Virginia
(2) (3)
Company in London. v ' The first recorded case,
specifically referring to negroes was Re Davis, a criminal
case where the offence was sexual and the full official report
noted:
Hugh Davis to be soundly whipt before an assembly
of negroes and others for abusing himself to the
dishonour of God and shame of Christianity by
defiling his body in lying with a negro, which
fault he is to actk Next sabbath day. (5)
1. For a full discussion of this construction in legislation of
the 'slave' status, see Chapter I+.
2. See Hit. Mcllwaine, ed., 'Minutes of the Council and General
Court of Colonial Virginia, 1622-1632, I67O-76', Richmond,
Virginia, Richmond Colonial Press, 192^ x, xi. The General Court
was the hi^iest judicial body in the colony, thou^i for some years,
in the earliest period, the general assembly had concurrent
jurisdiction with that of this quarterly court, thus criminal
cases involving life or member wore tried in whichever convened
first. In I6J4I the civil jurisdiction of the assembly was limited
mainly to appellate cases, and, after 1682 appeals to the assembly
were discontinued by royal charter (Catterall, I, 1968 ed:75)«
3. The original records of the General Court of Virginia were
destroyed in the burning of the state capitol building in April
1865 when Richmond was evacuated by Confederate troops (Mcllwaine,
192J4 ed:Preface).
1+. Mcllwaine U79, September 1630.
5. Ibid.
While this report tells us nothing about the status of Davis,
nor about his race, nor about why he was to be 'whipt' before
a group of negroes, it does indicate that law distinguished,
even at this very early date, between negroes and other persons.
There was something which already the law regarded as
distinctive about negroes. Whether this was because they were
'heathens' or because they were black or because they were in
some distinctive condition of servitude is not stated - only the
distinction is articulated.
In another criminal case, involving fornication, Re Sweat,
decided in 161+0, the report provides a little more detail.
The full official court report in this case notes:
Whereas Robert Sweat hath begotten with child a
negro woman servant belonging unto Lieutenant
Sheppard, the court hath therefore ordered that
the said negro woman shall be whipt at the whipping
post and the said Sweat shall tomorrow in the
forenoon do public penance for his offense at James
city church in the time of devine service according
to the laws of England in that case provided.
While again this report tells us nothing about Sweat's race or
status, it does tell us that the negro woman in question is a
'servant'. Exactly what the condition of her servitude is
cannot be ascertained but the nature of the punishments
1. Mcllwaine 1+77 > October 161+0.
2. Ibid.
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respectively given indicate that the differential sentences
imposed, by the court had some sort of explanatory basis,
however ambiguous. And although these early cases only
indicate that some kind of differentiation was evident in legal
practices, in relation to race, subsequent cases involving
the running away of servants from their masters are indicative
of just how this differentiation in the treatment of people in
bondage began to create and define, within law, a unique form of
bondage known as slavery.
(2)
In Re Hegro John Punch. K 1 a. criminal action involving
three runaway servants from Virginia, two white and one black
(Punch), who had been captured in Maryland in 161+0, the court in
Virginia decided to impose a lifetime servitude on the black
runaway alone while the other two runaways were given an
additional 1+ years servitude each. Thus while the 'dutchman'
and the 'Scotchman' were to serve their respective masters for an
additional year and the colony for a further three years on the
expiry of their indentures, Punch "being a negro ... shall serve
his said master or his assigns for the time of his natural life
(3)
here or elsewhere". ' Punch had. the status of servant, like
the other servants in the case, but when sentence was imposed he
was clearly in a distinctive category.
1. Higginbotham, 1978:23, notes that the usual practice, in
recording court decisions in this period, was to consistently
make reference to the race of the person when that person was a
negro.
2. Mcllwaine 1+66, July 161+0.
3. Ibid.
1
In the same month, July I6I4.O, the General Court of
Virginia, in the case of Re Negro Emmanuel, handed down
a decision which indicates that at this time there were
already at least some blacks who were serving 'for life'.
This criminal case involved a black (Emmanuel) who, with six
other white servants, participated in a conspiracy to run away
and who, along with the others, stole "the skiff of Pierce and
corn, powder, and shot guns" and sailed down the Elizabeth River
where the group were caught. The court sentenced the leader of
the group, a Dutchman, to wear shackles for a year and with the
others, with the exception of Emmanuel, all were sentenced to
extra service to the colony for from one to seven years in
addition to being 'whipt and branded1 . Emmanuel was whipt,
branded with an R and was required to wear shackles for one year
but he got no addition of service. V/hy? The only reasonable
assumption to make here for the differential sentences imposed
on the runaways is that no addition of service could be made in
Emmanuel's case because he was already serving his master for life.
These cases, involving groups of runaway servants, illustrate
not only that legal practices differentiated between black as
opposed to other servants but also that such practices were already
integral to the developing productive system. This period
witnessed an increase in both white indentured labour and black
bound labour and the colonial masters, dependent on an increasingly
unfree labour force, had to prevent the possibility of any
1. Mcllwaine i+67» July 161+0.
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alliance in this labour force. To make one group or category
less free than the others through a differentiation in
treatment was one way of ensuring that such an alliance could
not develop.
Nevertheless, while by the middle of the 17th century it
is evident that negro 'servants' were already less free than
other servants, insofar as some were serving for life, and others,
when given additions in service, were given life, it was still
possible for negroes to purchase their freedom just as
indentured servants could buy their way out of an indenture.
(2)
Thus, in the 161+1 civil case of Re Graweere v ' it was possible
for Graweere, a negro, to purchase the freedom of his child to a
"negro woman belonging to Lieut. Robert Sheppard". The Court
granted Graweere permission to purchase his child's freedom only
if the justices could be assured by the child's godfather that
the child would be "made a Christian". However, there is no
indication in the report of Graweere's status. He was certainly
some sort of servant but the fact that his master allowed him to
"keep hogs" and half of the income deriving from the hogs, as well
as the fact that he was allowed to bring suit in the courts,
indicates that the nature of his bondage was not that different
from that of other 'indentured servants'. And, if this is the
case, then the fact that he had to purchase the freedom of his
1. The importance of preventing such an alliance and how this
was achieved through a thorough construction of the status
'servant' as opposed to 'slave' in legislation is discussed more
fully in Chapter 1+.
2. Mcllwaine U77» March 161+1.
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child to a "negro woman belonging" to Sheppard indicates that this
woman had a somewhat less free status than Graweere and that her
status was definitive of the child's. If the negro woman's
status defined the status of her child then this was already a
departure from the traditions of English common law where the
status of a child followed that of the father. Indeed, within
the legal definition of chattel slave which later developed in
North America, legal institutions and practices clearly articulated
that with slavery the status of a child follows that of the mother
not the father. ^^
Ambiguities of status, such as those involved in the Graweere
case, where the legality of a degree of economic autonomy for
Graweere was upheld yet where, at the same time, the legality of a
departure from common law traditions in relation to the status of
his child was also upheld, were evident in legal practices and
institutions in the early period. In litigation involving wills,
contracts and inventories of estates, the legal right of masters to
the perpetual servitude of blacks was upheld. For example, a
16U6 contract authorised the sale, by a Francis Potts, of a black
i
woman and child to a Stephen Carlton, "to the use of him forever".
1. The significance of this departure from common law traditions
and its construction in legislation is discussed in Chapter U.
The degree to which this was upheld by state legal institutions and
practices as well as within constitutional law is discussed in
Chapter 7•
2. As cited in Higginbotham, 1978:26.
And, in 17th century inventories of estates two significant
distinctions regularly appear in assessing the value of
1indentured servants' and 'negro servants': firstly, negroes
are uniformly assessed as "being more valuable than any white
servants; and secondly, in naming white servants, a notation
of the number of years of service remaining is made whereas no
such notation appears for negroes. ^^
Evidential support for the argument that legal practices
existed in the early period which were increasingly differentiating
between the status of negro as opposed to other forms of unfree
labour is provided by examples of early legislation concerning
runaway servants: in the Virginia statutes of 1661-2 dealing with
punishments for runaway servants, in particular, the 1662 statute,
which provides that "in case any English servant shall run away in
company of any negroes who are incapable of making satisfaction by
addition of a time ..." the servants would be required to pay
compensation to the master of such negro 'servants' for every one
(2)
lost or dead. v ' The reference to negroes "incapable of making
satisfaction by addition of a time" suggests that they were already
serving for life. Another 1662 statute further differentiated
between negroes and other persons by providing that the status of
1. For a full analysis of such inventories and their significance
in relation to the legal definition of slavery in North America,
see, Carl N. Degler, "Neither Black Nor White", New York,
Macmillan, 1971:59 et seq.
2. For the detail of these statutes, see, William W. Hening,
"Statutes at Large of Virginia", Vol.2., Richmond, Virginia,
Franklin Press, 1819-1820:270.
the negro mother would pass to any child, v ' thus ensuring
that the master class could reproduce its own labour force.
However, despite this differentiation in treatment, there
was, as yet, no clear and consistent legal definition of negro
labour as constitutive of a distinct category. It was still
possible for negroes to bring civil suits for freedom in the
courts, for example. Thus, in the case of Hegro Mozingo v
(2)
Stone, v ' decided in 1672, Mozingo, described as "an apprentice
by Indenture", was granted his freedom from Stone on the expiry
of his 28 year indenture. While the length of Mozingo's
indenture, in comparison to the average term of five years for
(3)
white indentured servants, w/ is indicative of a more
excessive degree of unfreedom, the fact that he could sue for
freedom at all is evidence of a liberty which would later be
denied to chattel slaves. This degree of liberty was subsequently
upheld in another freedom suit in 1673- I*1 "the case of Moore v
Liisht not only did Moore gain his freedom but also the Court
awarded him damages from Light because the latter had held him
in service for longer than the original 5 year indenture. In a
(5)
similar case, that of Negro Phillip Gowen v Lucas, v ' decided in
1673, the Court granted Gowen his freedom because of an illegal
1. Ibid., at 170. See also Note 1, p.178 of this chapter.
2. Mcllwaine, 316, October 1672.
3. Catterall, 1968 ed.l:58.
i|. Mcllwaine, 354> October 1673*
5. Mcllwaine, ijll, June 1675.
indenture to Lucas, since Gowen's former master had liberated
his 'servant' by the terms of his will. The Court rendered
the indenture invalid and ordered Lucas to pay compensation to
Gowen. However, in the 1676 case of Negro Bowze v Bennett, ^^
although the Court upheld Bowze8s petition for freedom under
the terms of his now deceased master's will this was only done
on condition that "the Said Negro Give Security for payment of
800 lb.fof tobaccoj per Annum /_to the heirs_/dureing his life
from his masters decease and that he yearely give Security and
payment of the same". Presumably if Bowze defaulted on these
conditions he could be reclaimed into servitude to the heirs,
for the duration of his life.
Thus, although there were many inconsistencies and
ambiguities involved in the legal treatment of negro 'servants8
in the early colonial period in Virginia so that some enjoyed a
limited service whereas others were held for life and some
others inherited a 8servant8 status from their 'servant8 mothers,
there can be little doubt that legal institutions and practices
differentiated between negro bondage and other forms of bondage.
Indeed, although Virginia, very early in its establishment as a
colony, enacted laws fixing limits to the terms of indenture for
servants who entered the colony without written contracts,
1. Mcllwaine, U37> March 1676.
negroes were not included, in these provisions. v 1 Such
differentiation in treatment, in both legislation and
judicial decisions, created the basis upon which the legality of
slavery could be established. And, although the precise nature
of the slave status as chattel property would not be articulated
within law until a later date, these early legal decisions and
piecemeal legislative enactments provided the basis upon which
1. For a discussion of these laws, see, 0. and M. Handlin,
1950:210. For the detail of their content, see, Hening
'Statutes', 1, J+Il, 539- While it is beyond the scope of my
analysis to attempt to provide a detailed explanation as to why
blacks, as a category, were singled out for differential
treatment in this way, it must be emphasised that a considerable
amount of scholarship has gone into attempting to answer this
particular question. The early writers on slavery, notably
Bruce (1896) and Ballagh (1902, reprint edition 1969), agree
that racial prejudice explains the enslavement of black Africans
while Ulrich B. Phillips, in, "American Negro Slavery", Baton
Rouge, Louisiana State University Press, 1966, originally
published in 1918, explains slavery as resulting from a
necessary process of socialisation for immigrant Africans.
Later writers on slavery have continued to disagree about the
role of racial prejudice in the origins of black slavery, thus
Oscar and Mary Handlin (1950) argue that, in the early colonial
period, no strong racial prejudice existed, whereas Degler (1959s
1971) concludes that such prejudice contributed decisively to
the development of racial slavery. Williams (1966 ed.) and
Stampp (1956) argue that racial differences provided ideological
justifications for the enslavement of blacks and that the
enslavement was primarily based on economic interest, and
Jordan (1968) argues that racial slavery in North America is to
be explained in terms of a process of interaction between economic
interest and racial prejudice. Ify own view is that racism
provided ideological support for slavery but that the slave system
cannot be explained in these terms. Given the extremely
lucrative nature of the slave trade and the need for labour to
work in the colonies, Africans provided one ideal source of labour
since they had no roots in the new lands and by legally
differentiating between them and other white unfree labourers the
seeds of a very powerful racist ideology could be sown, so that
poor whites and blacks would not group together and become a
political force to be reckoned with.
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the first slave codes of any colony would be passed in Virginia
in 1680-82. These early slave codes, in synthesising judicial
decisions and legislative enactments, also incorporated some of
the stringent controls adopted for the supervision of the colony1 s
white indentured servants, and, in addition, denied certain basic
civil rights, such as the right to own property or to sue in the
courts. ^^ Various other repressive measures were enacted
including the colony1 s legal right to kill a negro slave if that
slave ran away from his master's service and resisted lawful
(2)
apprehension. v ' The 1682 Act included further prohibitions
such as the one sanctioning the punishment of any slave who
remained on the plantation of a white man other than his master
(3)
for more than four hours without permission. w/ Nevertheless,
while these codes went some way towards a resolution of the
ambiguities surrounding the status of negro labour, many
ambiguities remained, and it was not until the dawn of a new
century that these ambiguities would be resolved in a comprehensive
construction in legislation of the slave status as akin to that of
private property.
1. Hening, 'Statutes': I, 1680 Act.
2. Hening, 'Statutes': I, Act X, 1680.
3. Hening, 'Statutes': II, 1682 Act at 18.
U. This construction in legislation and an explanation as to why
it was necessary is fully discussed in Chapter 1+.
lBU.
South Carolina
The proprietary government for the colony of Carolina ^
(2)
had a constitution drafted in 1669 for the governing of
the colony, a document which explicitly provided for slavery and
guaranteed to protect the interests of slave-holders in slaves:
Every Freeman of Carolina shall have absolute
power and authority over Negro slaves, of what
opinion or Religion soever. (3)
And, although this constitution never became legally operative in
South Carolina since it did not receive the required approval from
the colonists as laid down in the colonial charter, it did provide
the accepted customary standard regarding the legitimacy of
slavery from the establishment of the colony. Thus, it is not
surprising to find that the first blacks came to the colony as
1. Until 1719 South and North Carolina were one colony - Carolina.
In this chapter when discussing South Carolina it should be noted
that the legislation applied to North Carolina also. I do not
discuss the impact in North Carolina because it had different
natural resources and a different pattern of development and because
South Carolina is focused on exclusively in Chapter i|. In 1719
South Carolina overthrew the proprietary government, establishing
a provisional one until 1729 when a new government was formed under
Royal charter. North Carolina remained under proprietary rule
until 1729. See Edward McCrady, "The History of South Carolina
under the Proprietary Government, l670-1719"» Hew York, Macmillan,
1897.
2. The drafters of this document, The Fundamental Constitution,
were John Locke and the first Earl of Shaftesbury, working under
the direction of the Carolina proprietors, four of whom were
members of the Royal African Company which held a monopoly in the
British African slave trade, (see McCrady, 1897:61|3)»
3. Thomas Cooper and David McCord, eds., 8The Statutes at Large
of South Carolina1, Columbia, S.C., I836-JL1I, Vol.1, page 55.
U. McCrady, 1897:110.
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slaves, bought mainly in the West Indies (though a small number
were bought in. England). ^
Althou^i South Carolina did not import black slaves in
large numbers until the rapid development of the rice economy
(2)from the 1690s onwards, v ' in the early colonial period, when
the colony's settlers largely came from the West Indian colonies,
(3)
in particular Barbados, w/ where the legality of slave labour as
the basis of production was already firmly established, settlers
either brought black slaves with them or purchased slaves to work
the land they obtained. And, while South Carolina, like all the
developing North American colonies, originally relied on white
indentured servants in the main to supplement the labour of the
colonists, by the turn of the l8th century, black slaves
outnumbered whites (both free and bonded). Indeed, South Carolina
was unique among the North American colonies in becoming, at this
early date, and in remaining so throughout the colonial period,
the only colony where black slaves represented the majority of the
(5)
colony's population. w/
1. Poter II. Wood, "Black Majority", New York, W.W. Norton,
197U:U5.
2. Wood, 197i|:U5.
3- The early South Carolina economy, in the production of goods,
was very much based on the needs of the Barbadians and, in this
period, the Barbadian settlers brought many of their traditions
with them (Wood, 197^:32).
1+. Warren B. Smith, "White Servitude in Colonial South Carolina",
Columbia, S.C., University of South Carolina Press, 196l:5«
5. Wood, 197UslM+.
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Many different explanations have "been given as to why black
slave labour overtook white indentured labour and Indian
enslavement ^ so early on in the development of the colony.
It has been argued, for example, that because many of the early
migrants to South Carolina came from Barbados and because of the
colony's economic dependence on Barbados, these South Carolinians
(2)
brought their own established traditions on slavery. v ' Others
have argued that because South Carolina legislated for both
procedural and substantive rights for servants, the attraction of
this kind of indentured labour to colonists was reduced since
(3)
their burden in maintaining standards for servants was increased.
And others have argued that profit was the sole determinant in
the decision to enslave blacks as opposed to obtaining a different
source of labour.
The fact that black slave labour increasingly became the
most important source of labour in South Carolina is not, however,
to be attributed to any single cause, but rather to a variety of
complex conjunctural reasons including: its dependence on the
Barbadian economy and traditions; the difficulties involved in
obtaining an adequate supply of indentured labour and/or in
enslaving natives in their own lands; and the rapid escalation in
1. South Carolina did, in fact, enslave much larger numbers of
Indians than any of the other North American colonies but these
'slaves' were not typically put to labour in the colony - most were
sold in the West Indies (McCrady, 1897'399)•
2. Wood, 197U:32-U5.
3. McCrady, 1897:8.
U. Higginbotham, 1978 :l6i+.
lei'/.
the profits to he made through involvement in the slave trade.
Nevertheless, despite any alleged long term advantages to he
gained through the use of slave labour, the purchase price of
slaves was much hi^ier than 'purchasing the labour' of an
indentured servant for a specific period. ^ This requirement
for a higher initial investment in slave labour, however, was
offset to a laxge extent by the Proprietors of the colony. In
the early years of settlement the Proprietors, many of whom were
shareholders in the Royal African Company which held a monopoly
in the English involvement in the international slave trade,
modified the 'head-right' system, that is, the system giving
(2)
land grants to new colonists. x ' Through this modification,
new colonists were eligible for land grants if they imported
black slaves. Those arriving prior to March 23', l6'/0, for
example, received 15>0 acres of land for every manservant or male
(3)
3lave imported J thus enabling Barbadian planters to import
increasingly more slaves into the colony and automatically acquire
larger tracts of land. And although the statutory amendments
to the 'head-right' system of 1671, 1672, 1679 and. 1682 gradually
1. Wood, 197l+:i8.
2. Ibid., 19-20.
3. William J. Rivers, "A Sketch of the History of South Carolina
to the Close of the Proprietary Government, 1719"> Charleston,
S.C., 1856:3U7.
i+. Wesley F. Craven, "The Southern Colonies in the Seventeenth
Century, 1607-1689", in W. Stephenson and E.M. Coulter, eds., "A
History of the South", I, Baton Rouge, Louisiana State University
Press, I9I4.9:338.
reduced the number of acres granted to colonists for themselves
and for the importation of slaves and/or servants, ^ this
system of granting massive tracts of land to planters importing
large numbers of unfree labourers was to provide the basis upon
which a fully-fledged system of slave production could develop.
With the development of credit in the colony, planters
were, in the years between I67O and 1682, able to take full
advantage of the 'head-right' system without any immediate
capital outlay. This system, of course, served economically to
depress small farmers and led to an escalation of the larger
planters' importation of slaves and their control of large
tracts of land. Thus the planter "could buy Negroes on credit;
for the merchant knew that for every slave ... his debtor would
receive free fifty acres of land from the government, which
(2}
increased his ability to pay". v '
Despite this importation of black slaves in the latter part
of the 17th century, however, there was as yet no distinctive
category of labour to which these 'slaves' were assigned. Until
the specific development of the rice economy in South Carolina
from the 1690s onwards, most slaves worked alongside Indian and
white labourers. There was no strict division of labour nor was
1. By 1682 each free person received $0 acres of land and an
additional 50 acres for every slave or servant imported under the
'head-right' system, (Smith, 196l:ll).
2. David D. Wallace, "South Carolina, A Short History 1520-191+8"
Chapel Hill, University of North Carolina Press, 1951:11+7.
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there any specific effectivity to the legal status "slave" as
distinct from other forms of bonded labour. Although the 1690
statute, ^ the first slave law on the records of South Carolina,
provided that slaves were to be "accounted as freehold" except
"when other goods and chattels j_were_/ not sufficient to satisfy"
the debts of a master or in the settlement of certain estate
(2)
matters, v ' these provisions were subsequently disallowed by the
(3)
Proprietors. v ' Had this legislation remained in effect it
watti-d have had considerable significance in relation to the
specific effects of the legal status on the development of the
slave system. If slaves were afforded freehold status then, in . .
principle,.the master had a right only to the services of the
slave and not an absolute right over the person of a slave as
property, as i3 the case with personal or chattel property. ^
As "freehold" the slave was recognised in law to have human
qualities and was legally differentiated from other chattels such
(5)
as horses or cattle. K '
1. Cooper and McCord, "Statutes at Large", 1836-lpL, Vol.7->
3U3-U7.
2. Ibid., at 3h3-U.
3. M. Eugene Sirmans, "The Legal Status of the Slave in South
Carolina, I67O-I7I+O", in Journal of Southern History 28, 1962:1465.
I4. Ibid., at I465.
5. This "freehold" concept for slaves was borrowed from the
Barbadian slave code (Sirmans, 1962:1461;). In this context it is
significant to note that many of the judicial decisions concerning
slavery in England were premised on the notion that suits involving
slaves should be brou^it per quod servitium amisit (for services)
rather than in trover (for property). For a discussion of the
significance of this distinction, see Chapter 2.
The issue, however, as to whether in law slaves would be
regarded as chattel property or whether they would retain the
temporary freehold status granted in 1690 would be resolved in
South Carolina's first major slave code passed in 1712. As
will be discussed in the next chapter, the 1712 South Carolina
slave code established the basis upon which the status of slave
as chattel property was constructed in legislation thereby
defining the agents involved in a distinctive labour process -
master and slave.
Georgia
Although Georgia8 s charter as a colony was not issued until
1732, which is, compared to the other colonies, a late date, ^
it is nevertheless the case that the legal definition of slavery
in the colonial period is analytically separable into two
distinct phases. As with the other colonies, slavery, in the
early colonial period in Georgia, occupied an ambiguous status,
though in the later colonial period there was a definite
resolution of ambiguity through the construction in legislation
of the exact nature of the legality of slavery.
Georgia, however, stood alone amongst the original thirteen
colonies insofar as, very early on in the colony's settlement,
Georgia passed legislation which explicitly outlawed slavery in
the colony. The original goals of the colony, as set forth in
1. Georgia was the last founded of the original thirteen Worth
American colonies.
the charter, were to aid the British poor, to protect the
mercantile system, and to provide military defence,
particularly to South Carolina. Hie legislative proposal for
the foundation of Georgia had, in fact, originated from a
British Parliamentary Committee charged with investigating the
conditions of debtors in English prisons. One of the
recommendations of this committee was that the emigration of
English debtors to a new North American colony would give these
poor a second chance at economic self-sufficiency. The actual
proposal for the Georgia charter was later made by 21
petitioners, ten of whom were on the committee investigating the
conditions of debtors in English Prisons, Despite the
intentions, however, no more than a handful of debtors were ever
(2}
sent to Georgia s ' and most of those actually financed by the
(1)
Trustees to go there were the 'worthy poor'. w/
Georgia colonisation, according to l8th century mercantile
theory, was also thought to provide a market for the export of
British products, and, at the same time, a source of the supply
of various commodities such as silk and grapes. ^ Thus, from
1. Albert Saye, "New Viewpoints in Georgia History", Athens,
Ga, University of Georgia Press, 1943:10-26.
2. Ibid., 31-42.
3. Kenneth Coleman, "Colonial Georgia: A History", New York,
Scribner's, 1976:22.
4. Allen D. Candler, ed., "Colonial Records of Georgia",
Atlanta, Ga, Eranklin Printing and Publishing Company, 1904,
Vol.1:11.
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the outset, Georgia was thought to he a region where
specialised commodities could be produced and was dependent on
obtaining enough labour to make this production profitable.
Under the terms of the original charter, the twenty-one
English petitioners became a Board of Trustees for the colony
with special powers to guide the development of Georgia. ^^
The Trustees had absolute ownership over all the land in the
colony and extensive political authority, for a period of twenty-
(2)
one years, to establish and direct the government of Georgia.
Unlike the charters in other colonies the Georgia charter did not
require the establishment of a local colonial legislature, thus
leaving the Trustees to formulate their policy on the legality of
slavery without any institutional opposition from a local
(3)
legislature. Moreover, the terms of the charter with regard
to the personal financial affairs of the Trustees, which
stipulated that no Trustee could reap financial gain from his
position, insulated them, to some extent, from any direct
personal economic gain to be made from the introduction of slaves
to the colony. For example, no grant of Georgia land could be
made to any Trustee as an individual and no person having an
interest in such land could become a Trustee.
1. Acts of Privy Council, Vol.Ill:305•
2. Coleman, 1976:89.
3. Saye, 191+3:56-7.
I4. Candler, ed., !Colonial Records of Georgia', 190i+> Vol.1:
16, 22.
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In the early period of Georgia's settlement the Trustees
regarded the existence of slavery as inconsistent with the
purposes of the colony. If the purpose of settlement was to
give the 'worthy poor' a chance to undertake 'honest toil', and
these people were to represent the main labour force, then the
introduction of black slaves would have undermined this objective.
Thus, while there is evidence that slave labour was used in the
early period of settlement, ^ the Trustees attempted to ensure
that this labour force would not grow by passing, in 1735* only
three years after the foundation charter had been granted, its
(2)
first explicitly antislavery law. s ' This law banned the
importation of blacks into the colony after June 21+, 1733> and
prohibited the use of any blacks within the colony as slaves.
In the px-eamblc to the 1733 Antislavery law it is clear
that the prohibition of slavery in Georgia was based on the desire
to increase the numbers of white settlers who could "alone ... in
case of a War be relyed on for ... Defense and Security ..." and
because of the fear of alliances between poor whites and black
( 3)
slaves which may result in revolts and insurrections. w/
Despite this prohibition, however, other provisions of the 1733
law make clear that the Georgia colonial government was not against








from other colonies found in Georgia had to be returned to their
previous owners, and, if these owners failed to claim the slave
in question, the 1735 law provided for the sale of any blacks ^
found in Georgia into slavery outside the colony. The 1735 law
therefore, while prohibiting slavery in Georgia, at the same time
recognised the legality of slavery to the extent that slaves
could be sold there for transportation outwith the colony and claims
to property in slaves made by non-Georgia residents could be upheld
in Georgia courts.
Although most of the pre-1776 Georgia court opinions have
(2)
been destroyed or lost, Higginbotham v ' has provided an analysis
of the degree to which the 1735 law was enforced, this analysis
being based on entries in Stephens' journal - Stephens was a Trustee
(■i)
of the colony from 1737-1750. For example, in the cases
reported on, it is clear that Georgia courts permitted the sale of
captured blacks into slavery outside the colony; that there was a
policy of vigorously enforcing the 1735 clause on runaway slaves
from other colonies; and that the policy of Georgia courts in
returning runaway slaves to South Carolina was in direct opposition
to the failure of South Carolina officials to return Georgia runaway
1. The 1735 law assumed that any black was a slave placing the
burden of proof on the black in question to prove that he was, in
fact, free. See Candler, ed., 'Colonial Records of Georgia',
190l+:Vol.l:50-52.
2. See, Higginbotham, 1978:227-232.
3. See, Coleman, 1976:95-95.
i+. In particular, from South Carolina.
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white indentured, servants. v 1 Moreover, there are a number
of instances recorded where the use of slaves in Georgia itself
had been brought to the attention of the courts, but where the
courts failed to deal with violations of the explicit provisions
of the 1735 Antislavery law. For example, in the 1739 case of
(2)
Davis v Pope, v 1 where the existence of Davis' slave was central
to the issue of the legality of Davis dismissing Pope, the fact of
Davis owning a slave was ignored by the Court. In another case,
(3)
decided in 175-1, two slaves, owned by a Mr Kent, were
committed for crimes. The Court, however, does not appear to
have considered the illegality of Kent's ownership of slaves in
Georgia, nor does it appear to have fined him for breach of the
antislavery law.
The Georgia courts also accommodated the illegal ownership
and use of slaves in Georgia by upholding the legality of fraudulent
claims of South Carolina citizens to captured Georgia slaves. This
accommodation was made possible through a fraudulent 'leasing'
system whereby Georgians 'leased' slaves from South Carolinian
owners for 100 years - the advance lease payment made being equal
to the purchase price of a slave. If the slave was captured by
the authorities in Georgia, the courts sanctioned the return of
these 'leased' slaves, as runaways, to their original South
1. Higginbotham, 1978:227-8.
2. As cited in Higginbotham, 1978:230-2.
3. Ibid., 232-3.
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Carolinian owner who reimbursed the appropriate Georgian for his
loss. ^ Throughout the period of the 1735 antislavery law,
slaves were frequently transported back and forth from South
Carolinian and Georgian plantations in the process of being
'rented' or 'sold' to Georgian planters. And, by the close of
the Trustee period, magistrates themselves were so favourably
disposed to the introduction of slaves into Georgia that the 1735
(2)
statute was virtually a nullity. v '
This failure of judicial and administrative officials to
enforce the provisions of the 1735 law outlawing slavery in
Georgia, coupled with the failure of the Trustee government to
encourage an adequate supply of white labourers to emigrate to the
colony, despite the creation of a number of special schemes to
1. John C. Hurd, "The Law of Freedom and Bondage in the United
States", Boston, Little, Brown and Company Ltd., l8£8:Vol. 1:11+9 •
2. Charles C. Jones, "History of Georgia", Boston, Houghton,
Mifflin and Company, 1883:Vol. 1:1+21-2.
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promote white labour in the colony, ^ was paralleled by a
growing political opposition to the 1735 antislavery law.
Throughout the 1730s and 17l+0s political opponents presented
a series of pro-slavery petitions to the Trustees. For example,
a 1738 petition from a group of Savannah freeholders, known as
(2)
the Memorialists, v ' blamed the 1735 antislavery law for the
slow rate of economic development in the colony as compared with
that of South Carolina. In addition, this petition specified
that the land policy adopted by the Trustees was detrimental to
economic development. In a series of restrictions on land, the
1. The Trustees had tried several methods of increasing the
number of white residents in the colony to ensure an adequate
and reasonably cheap labour supply. For example, they financed
the transportation to Georgia of free unindentured persons,
called 'charity colonists', and granted them up to £00 acres of
land (see, Daniel J. Boorstin, "The Americans: 1 : The Colonial
Experience", London, Penguin, 1965:8l); another group of
emigrants called ' adventurers' paid their own passage and received
up to 500 acres of land (Candler, ed., 'Colonial Records of
Georgia', 190ij.:Vol.1:20-22); loans were advanced to help
freeholders pay for their servants' passages; and inducements of
land on completion of service were offered to encourage enlistment
as indentured servants (Coleman, 1976:137-8). All these measures
however, proved to be inadequate to meet the labour demands of
the colonists. This problem was further aggravated by the fact
that many white indentured servants escaped from Georgia into
South Carolina whose courts did not enforce claims for the return
of white indentured servants to Georgia. South Carolina, of
course, already recognised the legality of slavery, and it was in
her interest to encourage slavery in Georgia. To encourage
slavery in Georgia meant that it was necessary to cut off, to
whatever extent possible, the supply of any reasonably cheap white
labour force - mostly indentured servants. For a discussion of
judicial decisions which demonstrate the extent to which South
Carolina protected white runaway servants from Georgia, see
Higginbotham, 1978:238-9.
2. Candler, ed., 'Colonial Records of Georgia', 1901+, Vol.3:
1+22.
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Trustees had prohibited the selling or bequeathing of laud to
anyone other than male children, in order to prevent the formation
of large plantations. The Memorialists petitioned for free title
or fee simple ownership of land plus the legal right to import
black slaves. ^ The Trustees denied this petition, but it was
not long before another Savannah based group, known as the
(2)
Malcontents v ' filed another petition in 17Ul« This 17Ul
petition broadened the attack on the Trustees' regulation of
slavery and land title by also challenging land rents and the
( 3)
control over the location of individual settlement. w/ However,
for the Malcontents, the "chief error" was the trustees' denial of
"the use of negroes" and they argued that their legal right to
slaves had been granted under the terms of the Georgia colonial
charter which gave Georgians the rights of British citizens.
Indeed, in 17^1, an emissary was sent by the Malcontents to
petition the Grown and Parliament, and, although the British
Parliament did not officially outlaw the 1735 antislavery law, it
did cut off appropriations to the Trustees.
By the latter part of the 17U0s, many planters were closing
farms in Georgia and were moving to South Carolina, and it was
1. Boorstin, 1965:89 et seq.
2. Clarence L. VerSteeg, ed., "A True and Historical Narrative of
the Colony of Georgia With Comments by the Earl of Egmont", Athens,
Ga, University of Georgia Press, 1960:157.
3. Ibid., 157-61.
i|. Ruth Scarborough, "Opposition to Slavery in Georgia", Nashville,
Term, George Peabody College for Teachers, 1933:U6-7> 56-7 - as
cited in Higginbotham, 1978:2^0.
only a matter of a few years before the enactment of the 1750
Slavery Law which guaranteed that Georgians had a legal right
to import and use black slave labour in the colony. As will
be discussed in Chapter 2+, the fifteen year 'experiment1 against
the use of slave labour for the colonisation of Georgia had
failed and, through a fully-fledged construction of the slave
status in legislation, from 1750 onwards, the plantations of
Georgia, like those of South Carolina, were legally capable of
developing on an exclusively slave-based labour force.
THE LEGAL BASIS : THE NORTH
In the preceding section the modes of legal differentiation
between 'slaves' and other unfree labourers in the early colonial
period in Southern colonies with different patterns of political
and economic development were discussed. To these patterns of
development in the South there are illuminating comparisons to bo
made with the Northern colonies in the early colonial period.
While it has often been argued ^ that those factors which were
constitutive of the slave status in North America were peculiar
to the productive system of the South and that, because the North'
developing productive system was essentially different and those
factors were lacking, the Northern colonies were antagonistic to
slavery, my argument is that there was no necessary antagonism
between North and South over the existence or development of
1. See, in particular, Genovese, 1967.
slavery. On the contrary, from the beginning, North and South
were mutually interdependent in terms of economic growth and both
differentiated in law between 'slaves' and other people in bondage
to the extent that the basis was created upon which both would be
able to recognise the legality of claims to slave property right.
Massachusetts
Unlike Virginia, for example, where it took its first half
century of existence before legislation explicitly sanctioned the
legality of the status 'slave', the Massachusetts Bay and Plymouth
colonies statutorily sanctioned slavery as part of the Body of
Liberties in l61fL only three years after the first recorded
instance of negroes in that area. ^ While the l6i|l Body of
Liberties outlawed "bond slaverie, villenage or captivities" among
the settlers, there were notable exceptions: those who could
lawfully be held in bondage included "lawful captives taken in
juste warres, and such strangers as willfully sell themselves or
(2)
are sold to us ...". v ' Hie first reference, however, to any
form of slavery in colonial New England, is in connection with an
Indian, Chousop, who, in 1636 was to be "kept as a slave for life
to worke, unless we see further cause" as a punishment for
(3)
committing crime.
1. Lorenzo J. Greene, "The Negro in Colonial New England", New
York, Columbia University Press, 19^2:17»
2. Ibid., 63.
3. Catterall, 1968 ed., Vol.U:U55«
From the establishment of the colonies in New England a
system of penal slavery was in operation. Penal slavery could
be applied to all races and could be given for a definite number
of years; for the life of any particular individual; or until
>osc
(2)
restitution was made. ^ This type of slavery could be imposed
and subsequently lifted, thus, in a 1638 case, Re Andro(w)s,
Andro(w)s was "delivered up a slave" as a punishment for assaulting
(l)
his master, and in a subsequent case of Re Andro(w)s in l639>
the same man was "released (upon his good carriage) from his
slavery ... to serve Mr Endecot(t) the rest of his time". A
number of similar instances are noted in the court records of the
time, the last recorded imposition of penal slavery on a
white person occurring in 1659 Re Southwicke ^ for the non-
(6)
payment of a fine, though in the 1665 case of Re Laborne, ^ ' the
General Court of Massachusetts authorised the enslavement of a
debtor to ensure repayment to creditors.
The Massachusetts courts did, however, continue to punish
Indian criminals by penal slavery for a term of years or for life,
1. For a fuller discussion of the system of penal slavery, see
Higginbotham, 1978:66-68.
2. N. Shurtleff, ed., "Records of the Governor and Company of the
Massachusetts Bay in New England", Boston, l853» Vol.1:2)46 (1638) -
hereafter cited as Mass Recs.
3. 1 Mass. Recs. 269 0-639).
1+. See Catterall, 1968 ed., Vol.U:U55 et seq.
5. 1+ Mass. Recs. (Part l) 366 (1659).
6. U Mass. Recs. (Part 2) 153 (l66£).
perpetual servitude being imposed on an Indian and his family
for the first time in Re Indian. Popanooie, 1677 and in
(2)
Re Indian Slaves, 1678. v ' By the later 17th century some
blacks were also perpetual slaves and that status was transmitted
to their children but it appears that, at this stage, there was
no unambiguous legal distinction between 'slaves8 and 'servants'.
Black slaves, like white servants, were able to petition the
court for protection against their masters and they were able to
enjoy certain basic civil rights such as the ability to give
evidence in court. Black slave labour was not at this time, nor
at any subsequent time, an important factor, in and of itself,
in the development of the productive system in the New England
colonies, thus, arguably the need for a clear differentiation
within law of this form of labour as opposed to any other form
was virtually non-existent. However, what was critical to the
economic development of these colonies was the trade in slaves.
Throughout the 17th century a violent international struggle
was maintained on the west coast of Africa between European
trading companies and combinations, each trying to corner the
1. Higginbotham, 1978:70.
2. Ibid.
3. See, Jordan, 1968;66 et seq.; and Higginbotham, 1978:
71-75.
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markets for the supply of slaves to the Americas. ^
Massachusetts Bay Colony merchants survived this struggle, and
by the early 1700s New England colonies had become the most
heavily involved of any of the North American colonies in the
(2)
slave trade. ' To ensure that this merchandise could be
legally purchased, New England had a direct interest in
upholding the legality of commercial transactions involving the
sale of slaves, thus, if not explicitly, then at least implicitly,
the legality of claims to slave property must be upheld by their
own specific legal institutions and practices. Not surprisingly
then, a statute passed in 1705 permitted the attribution of the
legal status of chattel to black slaves, and, as will be
discussed more fully in Chapter 1+, this statute, plus subsequent
legislation in Massachusetts, resolved many of the ambiguities
surrounding the colony's massive involvement in, and dependence
on, the slave trade, while, at the same time, it wa3 more or less
totally independent of any need for slave labour itself in that
colony.
1. In 1696 the English Parliament revoked the monopoly granted to
the Royal African Company (referred to in Chapter 2 and more fully
discussed in Chapter 6) for slave trading, thereby enabling all
Englishmen to engage legally in the international slave trade.
In 1713, by the Treaty of Utrecht, Britain gained the Asiento from
Spain, that is, an agreement with Spain to have the monopoly on
the supply of I|,800 black slaves per year for 30 years to Spain's
American colonies. The colonists in New England lost no time in





Prom its establishment as a colony in 1623 under Dutch
colonial control, New York, then known as the New Netherlands,
developed a 'half-freedom' status for black slaves imported by
the Dutch West India Company ^ into the colony. The labour
of the slaves introduced by the Dutch West India Company was
used as a means of supplementing the labour of the settlers:
there was no particular division of labour based on the slave
(2)
status and there was no legal distinction in terms of rights
between freedom and slavery. Thus 'slaves' were able to own
real property, they were able to seek judicial relief when
unlawfully held in bondage and they were able to bring suit in
(3}
the courts for the non-payment of wages. w/ At the same time,
this 'half-free' status relieved the Dutch West India Company of
the burden of providing for several adult 'slaves', since these
'half-frcos' were allowed to work for other masters and receive
wages, paying a percentage to the company which 'owned' them.
Moreover, the 'half-freedom' system assured the company of a
labour force to undertake public works since the 'slaves' were
also obliged to perform certain tasks for the company.
1. The Dutch West India Company was heavily involved in the slave
trade and itself owned a large number of slaves.
2. E.B. O'Callaghan, "Voyage of the Slaver St John and Arms of
Amsterdam", Albany, J. Munsell, 1867.
3. E. McManus, "A History of Negro Slavery in New York",
Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1970:12 et seq.
1+. E.B. O'Calla^ian, "Laws and Ordinances of New Netherlands
l638-l67i4-"> Albany, New York, Weed Parsons and Co., 1868:36-7.
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This 'half-free' status for black slaves in New York
xuader Dutch colonial control was one where the company, through
legislation, in particular a statute passed in l6i+l+, ^^
defined a hybrid status for blacks in the colony. These 'slaves*
could enjoy certain basic civil rights but, at the same time, if
they failed to meet their annual quotas of wheat, for example, as
payment for their 'half-freedom' from the company, they could be
returned to a state of total servitude to the company. In
addition, the children of 'half-free' blacks were obliged to
serve the company as 'half-frees' themselves. Nevertheless, the
company did not own the person of these slaves, nor were they ever
regarded in law as akin to chattel property. What the company did
have was certain rights of ownership over the labour of these
slaves, and the terms 'freedom', 'half-freedom' and 'slavery* were
used simply to denote different kinds of labour obligations.
In 166b, however, the Dutch surrendered the colony proper to
the English and by 1669 the entire territory of the New Netherlands
(2)
had been ceded to the English and renamed New York. v ' In 1665,
(3)
the new English governor, the Duke of York, wrote and enacted
what came to be known as the Duke of York Laws, which represented
1. Ibid.
2. W.F. Craven, "The Colonies in Transition 1660-1713", New York,
Harper and Row, 1968:70-88.
3. The Duke of York (the future King James II), had personal
financial interests in the Royal African Company, the British
trading company with a monopoly on the British involvement in the
international slave trade in "the latter part of the 17th century.
the foundation of the legal system in colonial New York. These
laws had a significant impact on establishing the basis upon
which slavery in the colony could be regarded not only as
legitimate but also as highly desirable. The laws encouraged
the increase in the number of slaves in the colony as well as a
change in the role of slave labour, through limitations imposed
on the use and desirability of white indentured labour and the
granting of port privileges and warehouse priorities to ships
participating in the international slave trade.
The increase in the number of black slaves in New York,
immediately following the British take-over, was a direct
consequence of several statutes whose effect was to curtail the
economic feasibility of indentured servant labour. For example,
by limiting terms of indentured servitude in the colony to a
specific length of time, costs were increased, thereby decreasing
the viability of this source of labour. Moreover, the Duke of
York Laws also limited indentured servitude to those who would
willingly sell themselves into bondage for a period. Indians
were also excluded from the potential labour force when, in 1679,
the colonial assembly prohibited the enslavement of Indians. ^
Thus, by the latter part of the 17th century, one source of cheap
labour remained - black slaves. And, although the legislature
in this period tended to deal with specific problems as they arose,
increasingly regulations were imposed on the freedom of movement
1. Smith, 19U7:35.
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given to these slaves. For example, in 1682 the General
Court of Assizes passed an ordinance prohibiting slaves from
leaving their masters' homes or plantations on Sundays or "any
other unreasonable time" without the consent of their masters
in writing, and no one was allowed to trade with a slave without
the master's permission. ^ In another ordinance of 1683 the
General Court of Assizes further restricted the movement of slaves
by forbidding more than four slaves to gather together at any
time outwith their master's service and masters were fined if this
(2)
happened. v ' And in 1681+, the general assembly of the colony
enacted legislation curtailing the economic opportunities open to
(3)
slaves by prohibiting them from trading. '
Thus, although the exact nature of slaves as property had
not yet been unambiguously articulated in legislation or judicial
practices, it is clear that by the end of the 17th century,
restrictions on the activities of slaves plus the legal articulation
of the view that baptism did not confer freedom on slaves "after
Tthey_/had been bought", provided the basis upon which it
became possible to construct the status of slave as chattel
property. This process of construction in legislation began, as
will be discussed in Chapter l+> in 1702 when the New York colonial
1. Higginbotham, 1978:117«
2. Ibid.
3. McManus, 1970:18, 1+1, 1+2.
1+. A I67U statute, enacted by the colonial legislature, provided
that "no Negro slave who becomes a Christian after he had been bought
shall be set at liberty" - as cited in Williams, 1966:139.
legislature enacted, the first statute which clearly indicated
that the law would treat slaves as chattels.
Pennsylvania
When Pennsylvania passed under English authority in 1661+,
slavery was recognised for a brief period under the Duke of York's
Laws which sanctioned "bond slavery" and "servants ... for life" ^
for heathens. And, while this limited statutory recognition ended
after the arrival in the colony of William Perm and his fellow
Quakers in 1682, there is a considerable body of evidence in legal
records, such as wills, indicating that de facto slavery continued
(2)
to exist. v ' For example, in comparison to Virginia where the
available records indicate that some of its early blacks were
indentured servants, there is no evidence in Pennsylvania records
that blacks were held in bondage for anything other than lifelong
terms. w/ Thus, while the Pennsylvania legislature passed
statutes in 1682, 1683 and 1692 ^ relating to indentured
servants, in litigation concerning the legal rights of servants
under these statutes, the only parties involved in the litigation
were white servants. While numerous judicial decisions concerning
1. Gail Mcknight Beckman, ed., 'The Statutes at Large of
Pennsylvania in the Time of William Penn, 1680-1700', New York,
Vantage Press, 1976, Vol.1:78.
2. Edward R. Turner, "The Negro in Pennsylvania", Washington
D.C., The American Historical Association, 1911:2, 18, 26.
3. Ibid., 22.
1+. Beckman, ed., "Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania', Vol.1:
15U-56.
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the care, protection, indenture and discharge of servants
throughout this period are recorded, no case appears where
the legal rights of black 'servants' were the subject of
litigation. This absence of litigation in relation to
the rights of black servants as opposed to whites is indicative
of the extent to which black 'servants' were already
differentiated from whites.
Nevertheless, in the early colonial period, prior to 1700,
legal institutions and practices failed to take any explicit
position on the legality of slavery in Pennsylvania, thus making
the legal status of blacks in the colony an ambiguous one.
However, when Pennsylvania courts had to decide on cases
involving runaway slaves from other colonies, they had to decide
on whether they would uphold the legality of slavery in these
colonies. For example, in 1688 the Bucks County Court in
Pennsylvania tried George, a runaway slave from Virginia, for
theft. George was sentenced to be whipped; to serve 15 years
for the colony; and, after serving these 15 years, to be
(2)
returned to his Virginia master if he should be claimed.
Such cases indicate that Pennsylvania courts were quite prepared
to acknowledge the legality of slavery in other colonies at a
1. For a fuller discussion and analysis of these decisions,
see Higginbotham, 1978:275-9-
2. Higginbotham, 1978:275, provides a full discussion and
citation of this case and from 272-77 discusses other cases
indicative of the differentiation in treatment.
time when there were no inter-colonial agreements concerning
the return of runaway slaves and when, in the specific instance
of George, no Virginia master appeared to claim his runaway.
The differentiation in law as between white and black servants
was further articulated in 1700 when the Pennsylvania legislature
passed !An Act for the better regulation of servants in this
province and territories' which, while punishing white servants who
stole from their masters by the addition of time to their servitude,
noted that black servants were to be "severely whipped" in public. ^
Presumably the fact that no addition of time was made in the case
of black 'servants' who could only be punished in their bodies
(2)
meant that these 'servants' were already serving for life. '
Indeed the problem of punishing blacks for criminal acts became
more acute for the Pennsylvania courts with an ever increasing
number of petitions from masters asking for the commutation of
their black servants' sentences. These masters were anxious not
to lose the labour of their black servants - any such loss being
(3)
detrimental to the economic viability of their investments. w/
In response to this need to protect investments in blacks an act of
1700 was passed which established a special court exclusively for
the trial of negroes. All blacks, in whatever state of bondage
1. Pennsylvania Laws, Vol. 1:13.
2. A similar omission in sentencing blacks is to be found in some
of the early Virginia judicial decisions (see p.176 of this chapter).
3. Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia l838-l853>
Vol.1:6l.
L|.. Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania', Vol.2:
77-79.
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they found themselves, were to he tried before these special
courts. In addition, the 1700 Act also established special
crimes and punishments for blacks in accordance with the desire
to protect, as far as possible, the labour of these persons for
their masters.
Thus, while in the early colonial period, there was no
unambiguous legal articulation of the status 1 slave1, it is
evident that legal institutions and practices differentiated
between people in bondage to such an extent that by 1700, not
only were blacks generally serving for life while others were
serving for around 5 years, but also special courts had been
created to mete out a special form of justice to these labourers.
And while Pennsylvania had not provided in law for a distinct
legal category of 'slave8 it was, as will be more fully discussed
in Chapter I4., to provide in legislation a series of protections
for a master's investment in slaves in Pennsylvania or elsewhere.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter it has been argued that black 'slave' labour
was originally simply one form of unfree labour used as a resource
for British colonial expansion in the 17th century to North
America. However, from the beginning, in both Northern and
Southern North American colonies, this form of labour was
differentiated from other forms of labour in a variety of ways
depending on the particular nature of social, economic and
political development in the different colonies. In all the
colonies, however, the process of this differentiation occurred
through the forms of law: legal institutions and practices
playing a central role in the early regulation of colonial
labour. Thus, it is through judicial practices that blacks
are defined as 'serving for life' in Virginia; it is through
legislative enactments that South Carolina limits the
possibilities of obtaining alternative sources of indentured
labour thus ensuring that black slave labour will form the basis
of the productive system; it is through judicial practices that
Georgia manages to subvert the conditions of the original charter
and subsequent legislation outlawing slavery in that colony; it
is through the legitimation of penal slavery and the
international slave trade that Massachusetts is able to uphold
the logality of claims to slave property; it is through
legislative discouragement of other forms of labour and self-
conscious encouragement of black slave labour that New York aids
the development of the slave system; and it is through the
creation of special criminal courts for the trial of blacks that
Pennsylvania ensures that a master's property interests in his
investment in slaves can be guaranteed.
Nevertheless, while it is clear that legal institutions and
practices did, in both Northern and Southern colonies,
differentiate between black and other bound persons, it is also
clear that the nature of this differentiation, in either judicial
decisions or legislative practices, was by no means consistent or
unambiguous. These inconsistencies and ambiguities concerning
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the legal status of black "slaves' in the colonies created
specific problems requiring resolution before a fully-fledged
system of production based on slavery could develop. This
resolution was itself to take a specific form and, as will be
discussed in the next chapter, the ambiguities would be ironed
out by a definite construction of the slave status in
legislation as akin to that of chattel property.
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INTRODOCTIOH
In the previous chapter' it was argued that throughout the
early colonial period in the North American mainland colonies,
both North and South, the legal process differentiated between
black and other forms of unfree labour. This differentiation
within law, however, was by no means consistent in either
judicial practice or legislative enactments, rendering the exact
legal status of black labour in the colonies ambiguous if not
problematic. The colonial courts presented ambiguous, and
sometimes contradictory, definitions vis-a-vis a master's
property interest in his slaves, particularly when creditors, for
example, sought to collect on judgments for the master's debts.
And, although certain relationships existed between masters and
'slaves' the exact nature of the master/slave relation required
a resolution within law if slave labour was to be purchased as a
commodity; if masters were to be able to obtain credit to invest
in slaves; and if masters were to be protected in their property
so that civil actions for damage to that 'property' could be
maintained.
Thus while certain aspects of the master/slave relation had
been articulated through legal forms those same aspects were also
sometimes denied through legal forms. However, as will be
discussed in this chapter, law itself, in particular through, a
definite construction in legislation in the later colonial period,
unequivocally resolved the ambiguities inherent in. the master/
slave relation and created the basis upon which a mode of
production based upon developed chattel slavery could be
accomplished. In this particular instance law did not simply
function as a recognition or expression of relations already
existing outside it as between masters and slaves but rather it
constructed the definition of the agents in the labour process
based on slavery and provided the basis upon which this labour
process could be organised. ^^ In an important sense then, the
construction of the slave status as akin to chattel property, in
the later colonial period., not only provided the means whereby the
(2)
market in slave labour could be directly controlled v and the way
in which a system of production based upon slave labour could be
organised, but also it categorically established the means of
production themselves.
QZne construction of the slave status as akin to chattel
property through legislation was neither pre-determined nor planned.
Law defining the master/slave relation did not simply arise because
it wan necessary to any existing' system of production nor did it
( 3")
arise to regulate a pre-given labour process. w* On the
1. This understanding of law accords with that of Hirst, 1980:
58-105, v/hen he argues that there are "significant instances of the
construction in legislation and application of categories of
subject" ™(60) - emphasis in original.
2. Chambliss, 196ij:67-77> has argued, for example, that
legislation in relation to vagrants served to control directly the
market for labour in that particular instance.
3. Pashukanis, 1951» tor example, has argued that law arises
because it is necessary to the system of production that individual
subjects be guaranteed full recompense for the alienation of the
fruits of their labours. As such, law is the means whereby the
social process of production is regula.ted. Hirst (l980:59~6l)
however, in his critique of Pashukanis, shows how this analysis
reduces law to being both historically specific to and as a
necessary expression of the relationships of commodity-capitalist
society - a reduction which can only view law as recognising and
regulating prior realities and relations.
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contrary, in this particular instance, legal institutions and
practices themselves created the master/slave relation and, as
such, defined the nature not only of the agents in the labour
process but the form of the labour process itself. Through an
analysis of legal practices themselves in the later colonial
period in North America this chapter demonstrates precisely how
effectively the chattel slave status was constructed in
legislation and how this construction provided the basis upon which,
a specifically slave mode of production could develop.
In the discussion which follows, "therefore, particular
emphasis is placed upon those major legislative practices, the
issuance of the Slave Codes, which played a central part in
constructing the chattel slave status in both Northern and
Southern North American colonies. Relevant judicial decisions in
this period, that is_, from the early l8th century until the end of
the colonial era, are also considered, as illustrative of the
extent to which the construction in legislation had resolved the
previous anomalies and contradictions, so much so that the status
of slaves as chattel property had been firmly established in all
legal practices by the end of the colonial period.
The process of construction within law occurred in conjunction
with the development of the capitalist mode of production in the
North American colonies: where the Northern colonies were
becoming increasingly involved in commercial arid industrial
developments; and the Southern colonies were becoming
1. Hirst, 1979, has argued that it is through the analysis of
legal practices themselves that we can understand law.
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Increasingly involved in the production of agricultural
commodities through the development of the plantation system
worked by slaves and where slave labour was purchased as a
commodity. Indeed, the slave-worked plantations of the South
came into existence as the units of production of a specialist
agrarian commodity producing region, a region which was itself
premised on the growing international demand for items of
domestic and industrial consumption by the most developed
capitalist regions.
But why slave labour? Specialist agrarian producing
regions are not by definition dependent on slave labour. Other
regions specialising in the production of agricultural
commodities have come into existence on the basis of free
peasant proprietorship or capitalist farming using free wage
labour or indentured labour. In this particular instance,
however, there are, as was noted in Cha,pter 3s a number of
conjuncture! reasons which explain why slave labour formed the
basi.s of the Southern plantation system of production. In
particular, both the legality of the international slave trade and
the legality of slavery itself had been established prior to the
extensive development of large-scale crop production in the South.
Moreover, since the investment of merchants' capital in 'the slave
trade promoted slaves as a commodity, and the slave trade was
1. This argument is in accord with that of Eindess and Eirst,
1975; at 157-8, who provide an excellent analysis.
itself capable of more or less indefinite expansion, there
were virtually no limitations to the supply of slave labour
power. On the other hand, as was discussed in. Chapter 3>
alternative sources of labour, such as the labour of
indentured servants or the labour of indigenous peoples, were
either insufficient to the demands for labour, as in the former
case, or unsuitable for translation to this kind of production,
as in the latter case.
Nevertheless, while this explains why slave labour formed
the basis of the plantation system of production instead of
another •unfree' labour system, it does not explain why
capitalist agrarian production based on a free labour force or
production based on free peasant proprietorship did not develop.
Capitalist farming, however, could not be directly imported to
these areas since capitalist relations of production could not
simply be exported to the North American colonies. In
particular, in the absence of the monopoly ownership of land by a
class of non-labourers and the existence of vast expanses of land
free for cultivation, the separation of the labourer from the
means of production on the basis of wage payment, a condition
definitive of capitalist relations of production, was not
(2 )
possible. v Production based on free peasant proprietorship
was also unlikely to develop on a significant scale because of the
1. As was discussed in Chapter 35 P« 1^8 efforts at the
enslavement- of North American Indians proved disastrous.
2. For a full discussion of this point, see Eindess and Hirst,
1975:158-9.
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nature of the forms of co-operation and division of labour
required by the produotion of crops, such as tobacco, rice,
cotton and sugar, on a large scale. Given the extensive scale
of organisation which could be achieved using slave labour to
work the plantations, any competition from free peasant settlers
fl)
could only prove ineffectual,v
Once established, the introduction of slave labour had
definite effects on the kind of productive system which
developed and formed the basis of the Southern economy. Slave
labour came to form the basis of that productive system: slaves
working on the plantations were totally separated from the means
of production by legal institutions and practices which
prohibited them from owning anything; they were legally defined
as unfree direct producers; legal institutions and practices
regarded slave labour as a commodity and the slave as s. form of
capital; and the product of slave labour was sold as a commodity.
Moreover, in both North and South the system of production based on
"slavery was dependent on the development of capitalist financial
institutions - banking, credit and commerce. Northern merchants
were responsible for the export of agricultural commodities as
items of domestic consumption to European markets and it was
1. This argument is most convincingly made by John E. Cairnes,
,:The Slave Power", 1863* reprinted by David and Charles, Newton
Abbot, 1968.
2. These particular effects of the introduction of slave labour
are also identified by Hindess and Hirst, 1975* Chapter 3, as the
ones which demonstrate that the slave mode of production is present
in the social, formation.
through "the forms of credit created by merchants' capital that
Southern planters were able to invest in slave labour. It was
also through the Northern commercial involvement in the
international slave trade that slaves v/ere promoted as the labour
form for Southern plantations.
In this chapter therefore, it is necessary to consider the
patterns of development in the Northern as well as the Southern
colonies, since these areas, while following different courses,
were mutually interdependent in terms of economic, social and
political development. Moreover, it is also necessary to
consider0 the different patterns of development within and between
Northern and Southern colonies because the process of the
construction of the slave status as akin to that of chattel
property which was systematically accomplished in the South was
mirrored by a reversal process in the North at a later stage when
the deconstruction of the slave status through legislation and
judicial practices was accomplished. As will become evident,
the processes of construction and deconstruction were central to
the different forms of production developing in the Northern and
Southern colonies.
1. This process of the deconstruction of the slave status in
legislation and judicial practice in the Northern colonies
demonstrates that Pashukanis' (1951) argument, that the subjects
recognised and the nature of the activities regulated by lav/ are
already in existence prior to legal definition and regulation is,
while sometimes and to some extent the case, clearly not a wholly
adequate explanation for the nature of lav/. Hirst's argument, on
the other hand, that regulation is definitive of agents and that law,
as such, imposes requirements of action upon agents and, establishes
a relation between agents and the 'public power' (ly80:59-61) can
accommodate the notion that law can create as well as destroy the
definition of agents as agents.
THE CONSTRUCTION IN LEGISLATION : THE SOUTH
In Hie early colonial period, Southern courts and
legislatures handed down a series of contradictory definitions
regarding the legal status of slaves within their own
territories. However, as the numbers of slaves increased in the
Southern colonies and as these slaves became an increasingly
important source of labour for the developing plantation system of
producing agricultural commodities, courts and legislatures were
increasingly being asked to resolve disputes which concerned
slaves, in particular, where creditors sought to collect on
judgments for a slave master's debts. And, while certain
relationships between masters and slaves had been legitimated by
legal institutions and practices, it remained unclear as to
whether the slave was primarily an item of property or 'whether he
was to be regarded as a person with "certain, labour obligations.
This issue was to be fully and clearly resolved within law in the
later colonial period when legal institutions and practices,
particularly legislative practices, constructed a definition of the
slave as akin to that of any other chattel property and where the
application of this definition to slaves ensured the development of
a mode of production based on slavery where the slave was a variant
of private property in general. Exactly how this was accomplished
in some Southern colonies ^ ^ is now discussed in order to
illustrate just how complete the process of construction within lav
was in the instance of chattel slavery.
1. The colonies discussed are the same as those discussed in
Chapter 3s that is Virginia, South Carolina and Georgia.
223.
Virginia
The first legislative enactment in any of the North American
colonies, Forth or South, which made a clear and unambiguous
distinction between the legal status of 'slave8 and that of
'servant' was a statute passed in 1705 by the Virginia
legislature in which slaves were assigned to the classification
of real property. Prior to the passage of this statute the
issue of "the legal status of slaves had been left to the discretion
of the courts, as stated, for example, in a statute passed in 1671
where "the legislature were attempting to deal with the specific case
(2)of how to distribute an. orphan's estate. ' Thus, in considering
whether slaves were to be regarded as real estate or personal.
property, "the 1671 statute noted:
In a former act it is provided that sheep, horses,
cattle should be delivered in kind to an orphan when
he comes of age, to which some have desired that
Negroes be added; this Assembly considering the
difficulty of procuring Negroes in kind as also the
value and hazard of their lives has doubted whether
any sufficient men could be found who would engage
themselves to deliver Negroes ox equal ages if "the
special Negroes should die, or become by age or accident
unserviceable; it j.s enacted, that at discretion of the
courts Negroes may be appraised, sold at an outcry, or
preserved in kind, as it is deemed most expedient for
the preservation or advancement of the estates of
orphans. (3)
1. William W. Hening, 'Statutes at Large of Virginia', Richmond,
Va., Franklin Press, l8l°-l820, Vol.3033-35.
2. Hening, 'Statutes at Large of Virginia', 1671 Statute.
3. Ibid., 1671 Statute, Act IV; as cited in Higginbotnam,
1978:5i - my emphasis.
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Unlike jewelry or other undeveloped real estate which could be
held without any significant depreciation in value until an
orphan was allowed to hol.d title to the property at 21 years,
slaves, like horses and cattle, did grow older and die thus
presenting the problem of how to preserve the value of an estate
for an orphan. The 1671 sta.tu.te, however, did not resolve the
issue as to whether slaves were like horses and cattle or
whether they were like real estate. Instead, the legislature in
l6r/l left this decision to the "discretion of the courts".
rfbe issue then, before the Virginia legislature in 1705> was
not whether or not slaves could be legally held as property but
rather precisely where, in terms of the legal differentiation
amongst particular kinds of property, to place slaves; did they
belong in the same legal category as a man's personal property or
in the real estate category of a man's estate? If slaves were
to be regarded as if they were personal property (such as horses
or cattle) then they could be sold, for example, to satisfy non-
real estate debts. On the other hand, if slaves were to be
treated as real estate, they could be sold to pay off the mortgage
and other real estate debts when the owner defaulted in payments.
Hie Virginia legislature removed all ambiguity from the
discretionary actions of the courts when the 1705 statute created
a definition in la.w which made slaves hold an equivalent status to
1. In a real, estate context, the creditor who held, a mortgage on
real estate usually had priority over other creditors in realising
what he could by foreclosure on that particular property. Thus, he
would be able to sell the real estate to collect the amount owed,
even if othar creditors (without mortgages) had obtained court
judgments against the owner of real estate.
real estate:
Chapter XXXII. Ill Negro, mulatto, and Indian
slaves within this dominion shall he held to he
real estate and not chattels and shall descend,
unto heirs and widows according- to the custom of
land inheritance, and he held in "fee simple". (l)
Provided that any merchant bringing slaves into
this dominion shall hold such slaves whilst they
remain unsold as personal estate. All such
slaves may he taken on execution as other
chattels; slaves shall not he escheatahle.
No person selling any slave shall he obliged to
have the sale recorded as upon the alienation of
other real estate. Nothing in this act shall
be construed to give the owner of a slave not
seized of other real estate the right to vote as
a, free-holder. (2)
Thus while the 1705' statute clearly held slave property as akin
to real estate this status was somewhat complicated "by the
exceptions noted above. Unsold slaves, retained by slave
merchants, were to he treated as chattels in any litigation
involving their value. Moreover, the statute clearly states
that ownership of slaves, without the ownership of any other real
estate, would not render the owner a 'freeholder1 with, any
entitlement- to vote. Thus, although slaves are defined as
property akin to real estate, the mere ownership of such slave
real estate does not carry the same rights as the ownership of
1. Fee Simple is an ownership interest in land where the owner is
entitled to the entire property with unconditional power of
disposition during his life and descending to his heirs and legal
representatives.
2. Eening, 'Statutes at Large of Virginia', Vol.3:333-35) 1705
Act - emphasis in original. Chapter XXIII as quoted cf the 1705
Act was repealed in 17^-8 (Chapter II), the 17^8 provision
relegating slaves to the status of personal property. For the full
text of the 17U8 statute, see Hening, 'Statutes at Large of
Virginia', Vol.5:U32-5U-
other real estate - specifically the right to vote or wield
political power. To own slaves and have political power meant that
any slave master had also to own something else - land.
Another problem inherent in the 1705 statute with regard to the
legal definition of the slave status as equivalent to real estate
concerns its failure to indicate what was to happen when the number
of slaves in a man's estate increased due to births, or decreased
due to deaths, after the master's death. This problem was not
addressed in the several revisions of the 1705 slave code made in
the Virginia statutes of 1710, 1723, ±'J26 or 1727. ^ Indeed
it was not until the 1730 court decision in the case of Tucker v
(2)
Sweney that this particular issue was addressed.. The precise
issue before the Court in this civil action was whether the increase
in blacks born to slaves after the death of their owner, the debtor,
could be sold to pay .off his debts or whether their value as slaves
could be given in settlement of the debts. In the event the Court
held that:
Negroes notwithstanding the Act making them Real Estate
remain in the Hands of the Ex'ors by that Act as C.hatels
and as such do vest in them for payment of Debts So that
in this Case they are considered no otherwise than Horses
or Cattle, And there is no doubt but the Increase of any
living Creature after the death of the Tester, are looked
upon as part of his Estate, and are liable to be taken
for his Debts.
1. For the full text of these revisions to the 1705 Virginia slave
code, see Hening, 'Statutes at Large of Virginia', 1710 statute,
Chapters 16, 17, Vol.3:537-40; 1-723 statute, Chapter J4, Vol.li:
126-3U; 17'26 statute, Chapter 5, Vol J;: 1.69-75j an(l 1727 statute,
Chapter 15, Vol J+:222-28.
2. Rand, Sir G. 39 (April, 1730).
3. Ibid.
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This case demonstrates that while a slave could be regarded in
law as either real estate or chattel property there remained
no doubt that it was in terms of the property status 'that legal
issues were resolved. When compared with the 17th century cases
discussed in Chapter' 3? dicker v Sweney clearly illustrates how
effectively the 1705 legislation and subsequent revisions had
constructed the precise nature of the slave status. And, while
it is true that the working out of the exact legal status of slave
property took some time from its definition as real estate in the
1705 Act to its definition as chattel property in the Act of
1758, ^ it is certainly true that it was as property that the
slave was created and regarded in la.w and within the logic of law
from the enactment of the first slave codes. Considerations
about the state of slavery, other than those pertaining to the
status of the slave as property disappeared and what remained, "was
his status as property - in most cases a chattel though for
(2)
special purposes real estate". x '
The 1705 statute, representing the first major slave code of
any of the colonies, also made a very clear distinction in law
between servants and slaves. Many direct provisions were passed
to codify the duties masters owed to servants, such as, to "find
(3)
and provide for their servants wholesome and competent diet":
1. Hening, 'Statutes at Large of Virginia', 1758 Statute,
Chapter II, Vol.5:532-55. See also, Kurd, 1858, Vol.1:179? 297?
303. for a discussion of the period between 1705 said 175-8, see
Legler, 1959:59-66.
2. Oscar and Mary Handlin, 1950:218.
3. Hening, 'Statutes at Large of Virginia', 1705 Statute, Vol.3=558.
masters were precluded from discharging servants who "became
sick or lame before their term of indenture was completed;
masters were required to pay "freedom dues" to servants at the
end of any servant's term who did not receive a yearly wage;
and various provisions of the like. She rights of servants were
legally guaranteed, thus the statute provided that servants had
the legal right to bring suit against their masters in the county
court for non-payment of proper wages, ^^ and it also guaranteed.
that servants had access to the .judicial process to ensure that
(2)
their legal rights could be effectively pursued. ' Moreover,
neither master nor servant could extend the term of the original.
(oN
indenture without court approval. in contrast to this
extension of various legal rights to servants, however, was the
fact that the 1705 statute did net specify a single obligation
owed to the slave by his master.
This extension of legally guaranteed rights "to servants in the
early l8th century occurred alongside the construction of the slave
status in legislation and can be attributed to a. complex variety
of factors. "With the development of _ the plantation economy and
the potential labour supply created-through the definition of
slavery, other forms of servitude became increasingly less
important to that particular kind of productive system.
1. Hening, 'Statutes at Large of Virginia.'. 1705 Statute, Vol.3:
m.
2. Ibid., I0i8, Ui49.
3. Ibid., Sect.12:1+50.
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Commercial involvement in the international slave trade
provided a ready source of supply for "the demands for labour
to the developing tobacco plantations in Virginia, whereas
sufficient numbers of white servants were more difficult to
obtain at an 'economic' cost. And, vh.ile the reasons for the
inadequate supply of white labour are themselves complex, ^
this shortage of white labour can in part be attributed to the
reversal in mercantilist thought on the question of emigration
at the turn of the l8th century. By the end of the 17th
century the emphasis within mercantilism had shifted from the
accumulation of, for example, the precious metals, as the main
aim of British national economic policy, to the development of
industry within Britain, the promotion of employment and the
(2)
encouragement of exports. The mercantilists argued, thar
the best v/ay to reduce the costs of'industry, and thereby compete
with other countries, was to pay low wages, which itself required
(3)
a large labour pool. ' In thus context then, the extension of
rigilts to servants can. be viewed as a rational approach to
encouraging the use of slave labour - masters would not choose
to have expensive servants as compared to the better investment
in slave labour where the slave had no rights in law.
1. These reasons are discussed in Chapter 3, pp.l60-l66.
2. For a discussion of the changes in mercantilist thought
throughout this period, see, Knorr, 19W+; a^d Semmel, 1970.
3- Williams, 1966:15-16.
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In direct contradistinction to the extension of rights to
servants in the 1705 statute, the same statute, which was silent
about any rights ox slaves, clearly specified the degree to
which the master had control over slaves. For example, the
statute provided that if a master killed his slave in an attempt
to correct some aspect of the slave® s behaviour then the master
would not be held to have committed a crime. ^ Slaves could
not leave the plantation without the master's written permission
nor could they own any property. Indeed the statute specifically
authorised the seizure and sale of all slaves' cattle and other
livestock. Moreover, in the case of runaway slaves, it was
provided that two justices of the peace, upon receiving
information that a runaway slave was in the area, were authorised
to empower sheriffs to search for the runaway and this proclamation
was to be made public by nailing it to the church doors on the
Sabbath day. Once the proclamation had been made public it was:
Lawful for any person or persons whatsoever, to
kill and destroy such slaves by such ways and
means as he, she, or they shall think fit, without
accusation or impeachment of any crime for the
same. (2)
And, in order that the ma.ster class were able to protect their
economic investment, the legislature made provision for
1. Hening, 'Statutes at Large of Virginia1, 1705 Statute,
Chapter 3^, Vol.3:^59-
2, Ibid. In addition the 1705 statute also authorised
dismemberment to terrify "others with like purposes", that is,
running away. (See Chapter 37, Vol. 3:i|60-6l).
compensation to be given to masters for slaves killed or put
to death:
Provided always, and it is further enacted, that
for every slave killed, in pursuance of this act,
or put to death by law, the master or owner of such
slave shall be paid by the public.
In general and specific terms, the Virginia statute of 1705
was the first clear- and unambiguous definition of exactly how the
status slave was to be interpreted within law - as property.
And, a,lthough this slave code was subject to various revisions by
(2)
a number of Acts "• passed throughout the l8th century, none of
these subsequent statutes made any substantial change to this
definition. Furtheriiiore, the 1705 Virginia slave code, in
creating the property definition in relation to the status of
slaves, established a firm precedent in legislation to which the
other colonies could refer.
1. Ibid., Chapter 38, Vol.3:1+61.
2. Hening, 'Statutes at Large of Virginia' : Acts of 1710
(Chapters 16, 17, Vol.3); 1723 (Chapter 1+, Vol.4); 1726 (Chapter
4, Vol.4); 1727 (Chapter 15, Vol.h)} 1732- (Chapter 3, Vol.4);
1732 (Chapter 6, Yol.L); 1732 (Chapter 7? Vol.4); 171+1+ (Chapter
12, Vol.5); 171+1+ (Chapter 13, Vol.5); 171+8 (Chapter 32, Vol.6);
171+8 (Chapter 2, Vol.5); 171+8 (Chapter ll+, Vol.5); 1748 (Chapter
21, Vol.5); 1748 (Chapter i+1, Vol.6); 1748 (Chapter 38, Vol.6);
1753 (Chapter 7, Vol.6); 1765 (Chapter 24, Vol.8); 1765 (Chapter
26, Vol. 8); 1769 (Chapter 27, Vol.8); 1769 (Chapter 37, Vol.3);
1769 (Chapter 19, Vol.8); 1778 (Chapter 1, Vol.9); 1782 (Chapter
21, Vol.11); 1782 (Chapter 32, Vol.ll); 1785 (Chapter 78, Vol.12)
1786 (Chapter 78, Vol.12); 1787 (Chapter 22, Vol.12); 1787
(Chapter 37? Vol.12); 1789 (Chapter 45? Vol.13); Samuel Shepherd,
ea., "I!he Statutes at Large of Virginia', Richmond, Ya., Franklin
liess, for the Acts of 1792 (Chapter- 4b? Vol.1); and 1792
(Chapter 1+2. Vol.1).
South Carolina
As was noted in Chapter 3; "by "the early 1700s the black slave
( "' )
population outnumbered vrhite inhabitants. This tremendous
increase in the numbers of slaves at the turn of the l8th century
paralleled the development of the rice economy in South Carolina,
■where the large-scale production of crops became primary to the
development of the Southern^eponomy. The major part of crop
production rapidly became organised along plantation system lines
with a division of labour in which slaves worked the plantations
(2)
as field labourers and non-slaves worked as overseers etc. v '
Throughout this period slave labour to work the plantations was
purchased as a commodity and, as was discussed in the introductory
section to this chapter, the slave system of production had itself
become an effect of commerce in the sense that merchants' capital
dominated the export of agricultural commodities as items of
domestic consumption to Europe and, at the same time, promoted the
trade in African slaves to supply the plantations with a labour
force.
Within this context, the economic viability and development of
the colony of South Carolina in the later colonial period, that is,
from the turn of the l8th century, became increasingly dependent on
/
slave labour.. And, this increased dependence on slave labour
1. KeCrady, 1897:688.
2. Smith, 1961:21-22.
3. This phase of development in the slave mode of production is
fully discussed in Hindess and Hirst, 1975:157 et seq.. See also
Williams, 1966, Chapter 1.
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occurred in conjunction with a clear articulation within law
of precisely what the slave status implied. Up to the early
l8th century "there had been no unambiguous definition of the
slave status as akin to chattel property. On the contrary, "Hie
main legislative enactment on this subject in the late 17th
century had regarded slaves as entitled to freehold status.
However, as the rice economy escalated in importance it became
necessary to define more clearly just what the 'ownership' of
slaves meant in law: how far were slaves to be separated from
the means of production? If slaves were to be purchased as
commodities then their legal status must preclude them from
owning property. To what extent were they to be regarded as
capital, and, if so, how could this be accomplished? These
issues, which would determine just how the large-scale development
of the rice economy could proceed were confronted in the first
comprehensive slave code enacted in South Carolina in 1712. In
the preamble to the 1712 code, the insistence on the need for slave
labour is clearly one of perceived economic necessity:
Whereas, the plantations and estates of this
Province cannot be well and sufficiently managed
and brought into use, without the labor and service
of negroes and other slaves. (2)
1. This freehold status was granted in the 1690 statute
discussed in Chapter 3> p. 189.
2. Thoma.s Cooper and David KcCcrd, eds., 'The Statutes at Large
of South Carolina', Columbia, South Carolina, 1836-ijl, Act of 1712,
Vol.7:352.
(l)
Relatively early in its history then, ' South Carolina
made use of the legislative process as the primary mode for
constructing and shaping the slave system. Only twenty years
after the foundation of the colony, the 1690 Act had heen drafted
to regulate the activities of slaves. And, although this Act
(2)
had subsequently been disallowed by the proprietors, y xt had
provided that slaves were to be ''accounted as freehold" except
"when other goods and chattels (were) not sufficient to satisfy"
the debts of a master or in settlement of certain estate
( ° )
matters. rfhe significance of the freehold status was that,
theoretically, the master was entitled to the services only of
the slave: he did not have an absolute right over the person of
the slave as is the case with personal or chattel property.
The 1712 Act, however, repudiated any vestiges of the freehold
conception of slavery. To regulate the legal status of slaves
it provided that:
All negroes, mulatoes, mustizoes or Indians (who
were or will be bought and sold as slaves) are
hereby declared slaves, to all intents and
purposes.
1. Carolina was founded in I67O - see Chapter 3j p. 184- Rote 1,
2. See Chapter 3? P.I89 and Sixmans, 1962;ipoS»
3. Cooper and McCord, ' Statutes at Large of South Carolina'.
Act of 1690, Vol.7:31-3-4,
I4. Sirmans, 1962:14.65.
5. Cooper and McCord, 'Statutes at Large of South Carolina',
Act of 1712, Vol.7:352.
The phrase "to all intents and purposes" left the legal ;
definition and treatment of slaves to be determined in
practice.
The 1712 and subsequent slave codes established the legal
ba,sis upon which the plantation system of producing rice and
other' crops could fully develop using slave labour. In
particular, the 1712 Act introduced a compulsory pass system for
(l)
slaves: a provision which was repeated in the Acts of 1722 v
(2
and 1735' Trading without the explicit consent of the owner
was prohibited in the 1712 and 1711+ Acts; property held
by slaves with his owner's consent was made liable to forfeiture
by the Act of 1712 and subsequent restrictions were made in
the Acts of 1722 and 1735. ^ The 1712 slave code also
prohibited masters from granting a slave permission to hire
himself out and further restrictions in this area were imposed in
the Acts of 1722 and 1735- Moreover, although the 1712
1. Ibid., Vol.7:371.
2. Ibid., 7ol.7:386.
3- Ibid., Act of 1712, 7ol.7:353.
h. Ibid., Act of 17lh, Vol. 7O67.
5. Ibid., Act of 1712, Vol.7s353.
6. Ibid., Act of 1722, Vol. 7:39l+.
7. Ibid., Act of 1735, Vol,7:396.
8. Ibid., Act of 1722, Vol. 7O63.
9. Ibid., Act of 1735, Vol.7:380.
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code provided that runaway slaves would he subject to criminal
proceedings involving extremely brutal punishments (often
death), ^^ the Acts of 1722 ^^ and 1735 did not provide
for these harsh punishments in response to growing pressure from
the slave-owning class who did not want the value of their
property .impaired.
In general, the criminal provisions of the early slave codes
reflect the tension between the protection of the property
interest of the master class and providing assurances 'that the
crimes committed by slaves rendered them liable to punishment.
She 17-12 slave code attempted to resolve this tension by
providing for a special magistrates' court where slaves would be
tried for the commission of criminal, offences and where "swift
justice" could be given so that slave masters would not suffer
undue loss of services from their slaves. In the interests
of administering this "swift justice" the evidentiary standards
of proof required were minimal. In addition, in passing the 1712
Act, the legislature had recognised that slave owners would not
always willingly report crimes or subject their slaves to criminal
prosecutions because of the potential subsequent less of value in
their slaves (pursuant to punishment). Thus, to remove the
1. Ibid., Act of 1712, Vol.7:352-3, 359-60, 361-2.
2. Ibid., Act of 1722, Vol.7:330.
3- Ibid., Act of 1735, Vol.7:392.
4. Ibid., Act of 1712, Vol.7:354-5.
economic motive for owners not reporting their slaves1 crimes,
the legislature provided that the owner should receive the full
value of the slave, from the public treasury, as determined by
the justices and free-holders who had condemned any slave to
death. ^^
through the 1712 and subsequent slave codes then, the status
of slaves as property was defined. Slaves could not own
property; they could not engage in trading; they could not hire
themselves out; and, in the case of criminal slaves, special
legal institutions were created to administer justice and award
compensation to owners. The legislative process also prohibited
third parties from stealing or damaging the master's property, as,
(2) (
for example, evidenced in the 1722 ' and 1735 Acts which
specified that persons convicted of stealing or attempting to steal
a slave were to be sentenced to death. And, -under the 1722 slave
code the legislature regulated private slave manumissions in the
colony by providing that any slave, manumitted by his owner, must
leave the colony within twelve months. If such a slave did not
leave the colony within this period he:
1. Ibid., Act of 1712, Vol.7058. Later Acts, however, because
of the cost cx this provision to the public treasury, limited the
amount of compensation to a maximum of £50 (Act of 17lUj Vol.7:
366) and £100 (Act of 1722, Vol.7:383).
2. Cooper and McCord, 'Statutes at Large of South Carolina',
Act of 1722, Vol.7076.
3. Ibid., Act of 1735', Vol.7089-90.
Shall lose the benefit of such manumission,
and continue to be a slave, to all intents and
purposes whatsoever, unless such manumission
shall be approved of and confirmed by an order
of both Houses of Assembly. (l)
Clearly, from the early l8th century, the South Carolina
legislature played a critical role in creating the slave status,
and, in so doing, establishing the basis upon which the slave
system of production could develop. Legislation was used as
the primary mode for regulating the nature and development of
the slave system, so much so "that, following the Stono Slave
Rebellion of 1739s the legislature passed the 17U0 Slave
Code which stated in its preamble thats
The extent of ... power over ... slaves ought to
be settled and limited by positive laws, so that
the slave may be kept in due subjection and
obedience, find the owners-and other persons having
the care and government of slaves may be restrained
from exercising too great rigour and cruelty over
them, and that the public peace and order of this
Province may be preserved ... (3)
1. Ibid., Act of 1722, Vol.7:381*. Under the 1735 Act (Vol,7:396)
manumitted slaves had to leave the colory within six months and any
freed blacks who returned to the colony within 7 years of the date
of their manumissions were to be re-enslaved.
2. The Stono Rebellion of 1739 began with a group of about 20
slaves breaking into a store about 20 miles outside Charleston
where they killed the storekeepers and stole guns and gun-powder.
As they progressed south, other slaves joined the group and they
killed a number of whites en route. The group of slaves, now
numbering between 60 and 100, was met by a group of whites,
numbering 20-100 and. a battle ensued, McCrady, "Slavery in the
Province of South Carolina, 1670-1770", 657> estimates that 21
whites and I4J4 negroes died in the Stono Rebellion. For a. full
account of the Stono Rebellion, see Wood, 197^4'3lU-23«
3. Cooper and McCord, sStatutes at Large of South Carolina',
Act of 17U0, Vol.7'397 -.emphasis in original.
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In attempting to further define and regulate the slave
system, through the passage of the 1.71+0 Act, the legislature
specified that in the case of blacks the presumption of the law
was in favour of slavery. A black claiming to be free could
only bring' a suit for freedom through a guardian. The 17U0 Act
fl)
clearly stated that slaves lacked legal capacity v ' or
personality, thus it was made a criminal offence to teach a slave
(2)
to write or be educated in any way whatsoever. J Moreover, in
tiie preamble to the I7I4O Act, where it was stated that slaves were
( 3)
"subjects of property in the hands of particular persons", J it
was clear that the legislature would no longer, as under the 1712
code, permit the courts to interpret in practice just what kind, of
property a slave might be, thus the new code provided that slaves
ware to be treated as chattel property.
This specification that slaves were to be treated as chattel
property underlines the degree to which the legislature determined
to regulate the slave system since the courts had, under the
provisions of the 1712 slave code which permitted the exact
property status of slaves to be determined in practice, already
1. For a discussion of the significance of this, see Higginbofham,
1978:19li.. This, as shall be discussed later in this chapter, was
in direct contrast to Nox'thern colonies where slaves were considered
as legal persons in litigation.
2. Cooper and McCord, 'Statutes at Large of South Carolina',
Act of 1740, Yol.7:1+13.
3. Ibid., Vol.7:397.
k. Ibid., Vol.7:397-
defined the slave status as that of chattel property". After
(l)
reviewing various records Sirmans concludes that, in legal
decisions made prior to 174-0, legal institutions issued decrees
and distributed estates in accordance with a rationale which
presupposed slaves to he chattel property. For example,, in
the case of Een.jamin Scherf^ingh et al v Job Howes and Hugh Grange,
I70I1, which involved an estate issue, the complaint stated that:
Hie said Bernard in his life time was possessed
of a very considerable personal Estate, consisting
of Negroes, Horses, Sheep, Cattle -•. ready money
and of Divers other things of value ...;
thus indicating the equating of slaves and other chattels. And,
in Order on the Petition of William Ramsay's Executors, 1736, &
case involving the distribution of a decedent's personal estate,
the Court noted that Ramsay's estate consisted of "(a) 11 his
(3)
Negro slaves and ... other ... personal estate". v ' Thus, in
these and other legal practices concerning the distribution of
estates, the courts had considared that slaves held an
equivalent status to other chattel property long before "the
explicit declaration in the 174-0 Act that slaves "shall be deemed.,
held, taken, reputed and adjudged in law to be chattels
personal": a status which was to continue throughout the
1. Sirmans, 1962:i+68.
2. Records of the Court of Chancery:82, as cited by
Higginbotham, 1978:212.
3. Records of the Court of Chancery:384, as cited by
Higginbotham, 1978:212.
i;. Cooper and McCord, 'Statutes at Large of South Carolina',
Act of 171+0, Yol.7:397.
colonial period. v '
The legislation passed in South Carolina, from the first
major slave code enacted in 1712 throughout the colonial period,
was central to the development of the plantation based economy.
By defining the status of slave as primarily that of property,
the colonists obtained the right to a slave's labour for life
without repayment. The master was capable of owning the product
of the slave's labour just as he owned the slave, since the
state, v "through its legal institutions and practices,
effectively guaranteed the form of property, chattel slavery,
just as it guaranteed, through legislation, that slaves were
prohibited from owning property, thereby effectively separating
the slave from the means of production altogether. In addition,
by establishing the legality of slavery, the colony was able to
obtain revenue on imported slaves and to regulate how the
productive system would develop. Legislation dealing with the
(o\
imposition of duties on slave importations began in 1703 and
in 1706 the legislature exempted from taxation those slaves brought
1. Having firmly established in legislation that slaves were
chattels, subsequent statutes were to further regulate the
activities of slaves. By the Act of 1751 (Cooper and McCord,
'Statutes at Large of South Carolina', Vol.7:1*23), for example,
slaves could not be employed in an apothecary in order that they
could not learn about poisons. Such restrictions on the
activities of slaves reflected the growing- public concern about the
possibility of slave revolts given the very large slave population.
2. I am here referring to the colony of South Carolina.
3. Cooper and McCord, 'Statutes at Large of South Carolina',
Ant of 1703, Vol.2;201. Such imposition of duties on slaves were
generally part of bx*oad based revenue acts, dealing with a variety
of imports, such e,s the Act of 1716, 'Statutes at Large of South
Carolina', Vol. 2: 6$1.
into South Carolina "by settlors who promised by oath that they
would not sell any of their imported slaves within one year.
This latter kind of legislative provision was used to encourage
the more affluent, settlers who would be using slave labour
themselves thereby contributing to the development of a
particular type of productive system,
Georgia
The fifteen year legislative prohibition of slavery in
Georgia ended in 175>0 when an. act was passed which stated that
from that date;
It shall and may be lawful to import or bring
Black Slaves or Negroes into the Province of
Georgia, ,.,
This first piece of .legislation formally recognising the legality
(•3)of slavery w/ made various regulatory provisions, such as
limiting the number of imported male slaves on any plantation to
four times the number of white male servants on the same
(h x
plantation 'J but it did not bring into effect the wide range of
slave regulations which already existed in South Carolina or
Virginia. Nevertheless, a "proprietor" possessed virtually
1. Cooper and McCord, 'Statutes at Large of South Carolina',
Act of 1706, Vol.2;280.
2. Candler, ed., 'Colonial Records of Georgia', Vol.1:56-62.
3- Slavery had, of course, as discussed in Chapter 3? been
recognised in legal practices.
1;. Candler, ed,, 'Colonial Records of Georgia', Vol.1:57*
complete authority over his slave under the 1750 statute as
long as he did not "endanger the limb" or take the life of his
(l)
property. v ' Moreover, the 1750 lav/ also specified
precisely how slave labour was to fit into the division of labour
in the colony * Slaves were prohibited, for example, from being
apprenticed to an "Artificer" v/here they might have been in
competition with white labour and all plantation slaves were
prohibited from being loaned to any other planter for any
employment other than "manuring and cultivating their plantations
(2)
in the country". And, while technically speaking the
provisions of the 1750 statute did not become law since the
British Privy Council never officially approved it, the legality
(?)
of the statute was recognised within the colony.
In 1750, the trustees of the colony at last made it possible
for larger land holdings to develop.- As was discussed in Chapter
3, the trustees hs.d restricted land tenure under the terms of the
original charter for the colony which gave them absolute ownership
of land for a period of 21 years. However, from 1750 onwards,
the tenure of land in the colony v/a.s increased to an absolute
inheritance and now Georgians could buy, sell, lease, exchange or
will land as .in any of the other North American colonies.
1. For a fuller discussion of this provision, see HiggLnbotham,
1973:250.
2. Candler, ed., 'Colonial. Records of Georgia', Vol.1:58.
3. Saye, 19k3'73*
i|. Boorstin, 1965:109.
This development occurred only shortly before the Georgia,
experiment was finally dissolved when, in 1752, the trustees
relinquished their control and gave the colony back to the
Crown. Georgia subsequently became a "model royal colony" .
theoretically ruled by the King sitting with his Rrivy Council
though in practice it was governed by the Board of Trade.
Under this new form of government, Georgia passed its
first compx'ehensive law regelating the legal status and nature of
slavery in the colony. By the Act of 1755 it was
unequivocally stated that all negroes, "Mulatos or Mestizos" and
Indians, except those who were already free, and their offspring:
Are hereby declared to be and remain for ever
hereafter absolute Slaves and shall follow the
Condition of the Mother and shall be deemed in
Law to be Chattels personal in the Hands of
their Owners and possessors and their Executors
Administrators and Assigns to all intents and
purposes whatsoever ...
The 1755 law effectively established the legality of claims to
chattel property in slaves and, in terms of its regulatory
provisions, was similar to the 17d0 Slave Code passed in South
Carolina.. The 1755 Georgia statute provided that the legal
presumption was that all blacks in the colony were slaves; the
legal burden of proof was on slaves to demonstrate that they were
not slaves; sla.ves, however, could only prosecute a suit for
1. For a fuller discussion of this, see Bcorstin, 1965:ilU;
and Saye, 19^3:109-12.
2. Candler, ed., 'Colonial Records of Georgia', Vol.18:102-3.
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freedom through, a non-black guardian; and, if any slave
unsuccessfully prosecuted such & freedom suit through a
guardian they were subjected to corporal punishment.
Moreover, under the 1755 law, the number of slaves permitted on
plantations wras dramatically increased from four to every white
male servant under the 1750 Act to twenty five to every white
male servant under the 1755 Act.
Idke many instances in the other Southern colonies, the
contradictory status in law of a slave as chattel property yet
also as a person is exemplified by the fact that laws and the
courts held slaves to be criminally responsible. Hie 3.755 law,
for example, established special crimes for slaves along with
special, punishments and also special trial procedures for slaves
accused of committing crimes. In particular, in order that a.
master would not lose the labour of his slave, the slave in
question had to be brought to trial within three days of his
apprehension. ^ ^
Under the 1755 Act, legal restrictions on the everyday
activities of slaves were extensive including the prohibition on
the slave ownership of property, the inability of slaves to trade
or to learn to read or write. J In order to ensure that these
provisions were effective, another 1755 statute, "An Act for
1.- Ibid., Vol.18:103-U.
2. Ibid., Vol.18:109-10.
3. Candler, ed., 'Colonial Records of Georgia5, Vol.l8:132-36,
1755 Slave Code.
Regulating the Militia of this province and for the Security and
better Defence of the same", stipulated how the Militia was
(2)
to be used to patrol the activities of slaves. v ' This act
granted, commissioned officers complete authority over slaves
discovered, outside their plantations and, at the same time,
required the enlistment of slaves in the arms'" to defend the
(3)
colony. K ' Moreover, the 1755 militia act required the
government to pay slave owners one shilling per day for each day
of service given to the army inducted slave and full
compensation was to be given in the case of injury or d.eath to a
slave. By contrast, the masters of white servants received
no compensation for their servants inducted army service nor for
(5)
any injuries caused to servants. Clearly, in this instance,
the law was working directly in "the interests of the master class
dependent on "the exclusive use of slave labour for the development
of the plantation economy.
Most of the provisions in the 1755 comprehensive slave law
ware continued in the 1765 ^^ and 1770 ^^ slave laws, with the
addition of more capital offences for slaves and the removal of
1. Ibid., Vol.18:7-1+8, 1755 Militia Act.
2. A further two patrol laws which imposed stricter- restrictions
on the supervision of slaves were passed in 1757-
3. Candler, ed., 'Colonial Records of Georgia', Vol.l8:39-lfl,
1755 Militia Act.
1+. Ibid,, Vol. 18:1+0-1+1, 1755 Militia Act.
5. Ibid., Vol.16:18-19, 1755 Militia Act.
6. Ibid., Vol.18:662, 1765 Slave Code.
7. Ibid., Vol.19, Part 1:222, 1770 Slave Code.
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some of the modest protections for slaves written into the
1755 statute. From 1755 onwards there were progressively more
laws limiting the type of occupations in which slaves could he
employed, thus ensuring an even stricter division of labour.
For example, a 1758 statute prohibited the hiring out of slaves
to be handicraft tradesmen; a 1773 statute prohibited
slaves from driving "any Horses or Neat Cattle from their usual
(2)
place of Feeding"; ' and a 1771+ statute regulated and
licensed the hiring of slaves as labourers or porters in
(3)
Savannah. Urns, by the late colonial period, the system
of slavery was as deeply imbedded in Georgia as anywhere else in
tile South. Legal institutions in Georgia had come to define,
just as clearly, the status of slaves as chattel property and,
through a series of legislative enactments, had effectively
protected the claims, of the planter class to this kind of property.
Georgia was now in a position to defend the legal right to slave
property as staunchly as any of the other Southern colonies.
CONS'IRUCTION AND TEE SIGNS OF LEOONSffiUCTION : THE NORTH
In Hie preceding section the construction of the slave status
as akin to that of chattel property was discussed with particular
x'eference to those Southern colonj.es where a plantation based
economy which became increasingly dependent on slave labour was
1. Ibid., Vol.18:277-82, 1753 Act.
2. Ibid., Vol.19, "Part 1:351-2, 1773 Act.
3. Ibid., Vol.19, Par-t 2:23-30, ITlh Act.
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developing. In the Northern colonies, however, slave labour
was of no importance to the developing- productive system yet,
as was discussed in Chapter 3? from the early colonial period
onwards, both Northern and Southern colonies differentiated in
law between 'slaves' and other persons held in bond-age. However,
it was only in "the later colonial period, that is from, the turn
of the l8th century onwards, that Southern Legislatures fully
constructed the property definition of slavery and, it might be
supposed that, given the different pattern of economic-
development in the North, there was no necessity for Northern
Legislatures to construct this property definition. Northern
Legislatures, however, did, directly or indirectly, create their
own definitions of the property rights in slaves during this
period, and it was only towards the close of the colonial era
that a process of deconstructing the slave status occurred in
judicial practices and in the beginnings of a counter-legislative
trend. The processes of construction and deconstruction in some
Northern colonies are now discussed in the context of the
particular patterns of economic, social, and political development
in these colonies.
Massachusetts.
As was noted in Chapter 3, while slave labour- was at no time
a critical factor in the productive system developing in Hie New
1. Hie colonies discussed are the same as those discussed in
Chapter 3? that is Massachusetts, New York and Pennsylvania.
2i|9.
England colonies, the importance of involvement in the
international slave trade to the- economic development of these
colonies should not he underestimated. In particular, New
England shipbuilding and shipping interests were centrally
concerned with obtaining a substantial part of the slave trade
and while, during the 17th century, New EngLanders took part in
a struggle for an interest in the trade with more powerful
European traders, after 1698, when the slave trading monopoly of
the English Royal African Company was broken, it became much
safer for the New England traders to procure slaves in West
(2)
Africa. Moreover*, when Britain secured the Asiento in 1713s
the new responsibility of importing i|, 800 slaves into the
Spanish South American colonies each year was so great that New
England merchants were welcomed into the slave tra.de as an
integral part of the Mother Country's plati to maintain commercial
(3)
hegemony in Africa and the New World. For their part, the
New England colonists regarded the slave trade as vital to the
economic life of their colonies.
1. For the last half of the 17th century the Royal African Company
not only dominated British involvement in the international, slave
trade but also it was the most important single group in the world
concerned with the slave trade. Independent British trader's had
opposed this monopoly for some time and it was finally broken in 1698.
2. For a full discussion of the Asiento and the regulation of the
international slave tra.de, see Chapter 6.
3. Franklin, 1969:101-111, discusses the impact of the securing
of the Asiento on New England slave trailers.
i|. In this context, it is significant that one of the main
objections the New England colonists made to the Sugar Act of I76U
(discussed in Chapter 5) was that the new duty of three pence on
foreign molasses, a measure designed to prevent smuggling, was
damaging to the slave trade and was therefore unacceptable
(Franklin, 1969:103).
The first half of the l8th century was the 5 golden age' of
the New England slave trade and its merchants were centrally
involved in the lucrative triangular trade which carried their
ships to Africa, then to the West Indies and finally back to the
North American colonies. Massachusetts was the leading slave
trading colony of New England throughout this period, and, while
it was the case that the vast majority of the slaves taken from
Africa by Massachusetts traders were left in the West Indies or
some Southern mainland colony, some slaves not only stayed in
Massachusetts, having been sold locally, but many passed through
the colony's ports. In this context, the Massachusetts
legislature defined the legal status of imported slaves and
regulated the trade within the colony.
By the early l8th century, however, prior to the escalation
of Massachusetts' involvement in the international slave trade,
the identification of the slave status with that of chattel
property had been recognised in legislation, in particular, in
the colony's tax assessment statutes. For example, while in I0I4.6
the legislature had passed an Act which taxed black slaves as
individuals (though their masters had to pay the charges), Acts
passed in 1692, 1696 and 1698, included slaves in the assessment
of personal property, and in a 1707 statute, slaves were classifie
as personal estate, v"~J This legislative practice of rating
slaves along with horses, cattle and other personal property,
1. For a discussion of these statutes and a detailed citation,
see Greene, 19l|2 :l69-?0.
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continued in all such legislation until the War cf Independence.
The first clear definition of the slave as equivalent to
chattel property, however, appeared in an Act of 1?05 which
imposed a duty of flj per head on imported slaves. If ship
captains did not list all imported slaves they were to "be fined
£8 for failing or refusing to make an entry. A rebate on the £h
duty paid per slave was granted if the slave died within six
weeks or was sold out of the colony within one year. This Act
therefore permitted the colony to raise some revenue on the
importation of slaves and, at the same time, by offering rebates,
it imposed some degree of limitation on the numbers of slaves
likely to reside in the colony. This legislative practice
continued for several decades as a means of raising revenue and
regulating the numbers of slaves in the colony despite opposition
from the British Government who thought that the imposition of such
a duty on slaves might impose limits on the slave trade.
Nevertheless, despite such measures, the tension between the
now formal institutionalisation of slavery in Massachusetts and
the concern to minimise the numbers of resident non-whites because
Massachusetts did not require a slave labour force itself were
already evident at the beginning of the l8th century. This
tension, was particularly apparent in Boston where one third of all
(9 N
blacks (free or slave) lived in the colony. Thus attempts at
1. See Greene, 1952:1.69-71; and G.W. Williams, "History of the
Negro Race in America from l6l9-lS80", New York, Arno Press and
The Hew York Times, 1968, Vol.1:1,88.
2. Greene, 1952:85.
a counter-legislative trend were set in motion as early as 1712
when a Bill was presented prohibiting the importation of slaves
because:
Divers conspiracies, outrages, barbarities,
murders ... have been perpetrated and committed
by Indians and other sla.ves within several of
her majesty's plantations in -America ... (to the)
discouragement to the importation of white
Christian servants.
This Bill did not, however, become operative and it was not until
1767 that another Bill "to prevent the unwarrantable and unlawful
Practice or Custom of inslaving Mankind in this Province and. the
importation of slaves into the same" was presented in the
Massachusetts House of Representatives. Again this proposal was
(2.}
defeated v ' and when the 1771 Bill "to prevent the Importation.
and purchasing of Slaves into this Province" was passed by the
(3)
legislature and Council, the Governor refused to sign it w/
thus representing the British Government's opposition to any
impediment, to the slave trade. After all, if Britain's
colonies were central to the development of her economic system
in the l8th century, then the slave trade was an important
(3)
cornerstone.
1. Charters and General Laws of the Colony and Province of
Massachusetts Bay, 7-U95 (Boston, l8lli) as cited by
Higginbotham, 1978:82-3.
2. George E. Moore, "Rotes on the History of Slavery in
Massachusetts", reprint edition., New York, Negro Universities
Press, 1968:126-8,
3. Moore, 1968 edition:131-2.
A. Greene, 19^+2; 56.
5. Pranklin, 1969:53-
Although none of the attempts to begin the process of
legislative deconstruction of the slave status were successful
in the pre-revolutionary period, the process of deconstruction
was set in motion through judicial practices in relation to
individual cases- Unlike the Southern colonies, 'there was no
legislative prohibition in Massachusetts against slaves bringing
civil suits for their freedom on their own behalf in the courts.
For example, in a 1737 case, Re Negro James, ^^ in accordance
with the provisions of his master's will, on the death, of his
master's wife, James was declared by the Court "to be absolutely
(2)
free". In Massachusetts, unlike Virginia for example, v ' the
legislature did not limit the right of slave masters to manumit
their slaves, thus in the James case the Court upheld the
deceased master's wishes.
There was, however, no general trend established in judicial
decisions concerning freedom suits of slaves dining the l8th
century colonial period. It was not until the period
immediately preceding the revolutionary war that the judiciary
began to develop a consistent approach towards the issue of
granting slaves their freedom. For example, by 1772, in the case
( 3)
cf Caesar- y Tayror, a slave's wife was not required to testify
against the slave and the defendant, the slave's master, was not
1. Re Negro. James, 1737j as cited in Higginbotham, 1978:7k*
2. The Virginia legislature strictly regulated by statute a
master's right to manumit his slaves. See Eening, 'Statutes at
Large of Virginia', Vol.3J87 ana Vol.l;:132, •
3' Caesar v Taylor, Essex 1772, as cited in Moore, 'Notes',
1968:118.
permitted to answer a general charge cf false imprisonment
simply by demonstrating his ownership of the slave in question.
And again, in the case of Caleb Dodge v Z, decided in 1774;
the Court granted a. verdict in favour of the slave Dodge who
had brought suit against his master for illegally restraining
his liberty. In this case the jury based its verdict on the
ground that there was "no law of the Province to hold a man to
(2)
serve for life". '
Notwithstanding this pattern of judicial decisions in the
3.770s and a further attempt in 3.77U to have a Bill passed which
would prohibit the importation of slaves into Massachusetts,
it was not until Massachusetts attempted to enact a state
constitution after the War of Independence that the issue of
slavery could be decided independent of the British Government.
As shall be dismissed in Chapter the 1780 Massachusetts
State Constitution and the Declaration of Bights in Massachusetts
were read literally in the case of Quock Walker where, in 1783,
the Court ruled that the legality of slavery would no longer be
upheld in Massachusetts.
New York
While legislation passed in Massachusetts recognised the
chattel property aspect of slavery, in particular through its
3.. Caleb Dodge v Z, Essex 177h> as cited in G. Williams,
'History', i960:231.
2. For a discussion of other cases decided in the 177Cs, see
Moore, 'Notes', 1968:118-9; and Williams, 'History', 1968:230-33-
3. Williams, 1968:233-37.
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statutes concerning tax assessment and those imposing duties on the
importation of slaves, such definitions of property rights in slaves
were indirect when compared with the explicit construction of the slave
status as akin to chattel property in New York, in legislation
beginning with the passage of the 1702 slave code and continuing
throughout the later colonial period. The 1702 statute, "An Act for
Iiegulateing of Slaves", explicitly defined slaves as property.
Apart from a clear desire to regulate the activities of slaves as
expressed in various provisions in this slave code, such as, the
prohibition stating that slaves co-aid not assemble in groups of more
than three, the section making it a criminal offence for anyone to
trade with a, slave, and the stipulation that slaves were forbidden to
testify "in any matter" except in cases of, for example, a conspiracy
amongst slaves to run away, the statute revealed the ambiguous position
of a slave in law where law could recognise slaves as property in
certain cases and as persons in others:
And Whereas slaves are the property of Christians,
and cannot without great loss or detriment to
their Masters or Mistresses, be subjected in all
Cases criminal, to the strict Rules of the Laws of
England, Bee it Enacted by the Authority aforesaid,
That hereafter if any slave by Theft or other
Trespass shall damnifie any p'son or p'sons to the
value of five pounds, or under, the Master or
Mistress of such slave shall be lyable to make
satisfaction for such damage tc the party injured,
to be recovered ... and the slave shall receive
Corporal Punishment ... and immediately thereafter
be permitted to attend his or her Master or Mistress
service, without further punishment. (2)
1. James B. Lyon, ed., 'Colonial Laws cf New York', Albany,
N.Y:l89U, Act of November 27, 17C2, Chapter 123:519-21.
2. Ibid., 519-21.
In this way the 1702 statute attempted to cope with "the
master's property interest in his slaves: to punish a slave in
accordance with the criminal law might deprive a master cx" the
slave's continued la,hour, whereas it would "be a negligible
economic loss if, on the other hand, the master simply
compensated the victim for damage caused. The master's rights
of ownership over slave property were considered of paramount
importance within the logic of the law.
This concern with the master's rights of ownership is also
evident in later legislation as, for example, the 1705 statute,
"An Act to Prevent the running away of Negro Slaves cut of the
City and County of Albany to the French at Canada"
demonstrates. Under this statute, any runaway slaves found hO
miles north of Saratoga were to be charged with a criminal
offence and, if found guilty, they Would be executed. By the
same statute, however, slave owners were protected from
incurring any loss in the value of their property. Appraisers,
appointed by a justice of the peace, were required to make an
appraisal of the value of the slave in question and, if the
slave was convicted and executed, the slave owner would receive
compensation from the public treasury. In 1708 this practice
was extended to cover all instances of the execution of slaves
pursuant to a judicial decree so that masters were always
(2)
compensated for any such loss. '
1. Jyon ea., 'Colonial Laws of New York', Act of August li,
1705, Chapter 149:582-5.
2. Ibid., Act of October jO, 1708, Chapter 181:631.
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Indeed, throughout the first half of the l8th century,
various legislative enactments concerning the master/slave
relation served to. underwrite the chattel aspect of the slave
status. In particular, within the criminal justice system,
legislation which specifically denied common lav; procedural
safeguards was applied to slaves. The 1708 statute, for
example, implied that a slave could he jailed on suspicion of
having committed a criminal offence and the right to a judicial
determination of guilt or innocence was limited in the ca.se of
(1)slaves. v J
Nevertheless, slaves had to he attributed with some degree
of legal personality if criminal acts were to he proceeded
against. It was necessary for the law to impute slaves with
personality in criminal cases in order that they may he
incriminated, thus making it possible for slave owners to
receive compensation or bring civil suits for damage to their
property against the owner of the slave convicted for an assault
on another slave. Indeed, what appears to have happened is
that the chattel aspect of slavery was invoked in litigation where
slave owners stood to lose. For example, a free man responsible
for making a slave woman pregnant was liable to pay damages for
any depreciation in the slave's value or for any loss of
services. Even when slaves were convicted of criminal offences
and sentenced to execution, it appears that the chattel aspect
1. Ibid., Act of October <0, 1708, Chapter l8l:o31.
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could be invoked at the last minute arid slaves were spared
execution if the master compensated the injured parties and
agreed, for example, to whip the slave publicly. Slaves were
regularly bought or hired as personal property and ordinary
bills of sale were executed to effect the transfer of title. In
addition, slaves could be mortgaged and assigned as collateral for
the debts of their masters and they could be taken from their
masters on wits of attachment and sold to benefit creditors.
Any interference with the property rights of slave-owners was
taken to constitute a trespass for which damages could be
recovered. ^^
The colonial government of New York further defined the
extent to which slavery in that colony was subject to legal
regulation when, in 1712, following an insurrection that spring
in hew York City, it_ passed a statute restricting a master's right
to manumit his slave. This legislative regulation of manumission,
while not perhaps as stringent as similar restrictions passed in
Virginia, for example, only permitted a master to manumit his
slave if the master posted a £200 bond guaranteeing the freed
slave's ability to be self-supporting and thereafter annually
paying the ex-slave £20 for the duration of the ex-master's
(9)life. v J Masters and slaves did work out individual arrangements
in an attempt to overcome such provisions: for example, some
1. For a full discussion of the instances in which legislation
specifically defined the chattel aspect of slavery, see
Higgihbotham, 1978:119-125.
2. Lyon ed., 'Colonial. Laws of hew York1, Act of December 10,
1712, Chapter 250:76k~S.
slaves were promised freedom after a certain number of years of
faithful service and others purchased their own freedom by
hiring themselves out and paying hack their owners by
instalments. Nevertheless, the courts tended to strictly
construe any manumission agreements by applying technical common
law contract doctrines and their related requirements regarding
the burden of proof in dealing with litigation involving
mansion transactions. <2>
Thus, starting in 1702, the New York colonial assembly, in
(3)
successive legislative enactments passed up to 17h!?f
constructed the slave status as that of chattel proper'by in a
manner similar to the process of construction in the Southern
colomes. And, while the 1760s and 70s witnessed a growing
opposition to slavery in New York, in part a reflection of the
growing opposition to British domination, this opposition to
slavery was to prove short lived and limited. Eras, as shall
be discussed in Chapter 5? while New York passed a statute
prohibiting the importation of slaves after 1785, the legality
of domestic slavery was re-affirmed by a 1788 statute.
1. McManus, 1970:11+35 discusses such manumission arrangements
in some detail.
2. See, for example, Nettletas v Fleet, 1 Antou's Nisi Pruis
Eepts. 36, New York, l8oB7~which is illustrative of just how long
Nov/ York courts persisted in defeating manumission agreements on
purely technical grounds.
3. The I7U5' statute was a re-enactment of earlier laws similar
to the 1705 statute concerning slaves running away to Canada,
Various other statutes passed between 1702 and 17liS imposed
restrictions on slaves including the Act. of 1730 ('Colonial Laws
of New York', Chapter 250:681+) which prohibited slaves acting as
witnesses except in cases where other slaves were accused of
capital offences.
PennBy1van!a
Prior to 1700 there was no unambiguous articulation within
lew concerning- the status of slaves and slavery in Pennsylvania.
Indeed it was only through legislation beginning with a statute
passed in 1700s "in Act for the better Regulation of Servants in
this Province and Territories", ^ that legal institutions and
practices in Pennsylvania indirectly upheld the legality of
slavery in that colony. This statute differentiated in the kinds
of punishments which could be given to white and black servants,
in particular by providing^ that white servants could be given an
addition of time to "their servitude whereas black servants could
only be subjected to physical punishments, presumably because
black servants were already serving for life. By another
(2)
statute, also passed in 1700, "An Act for the Trial of Negroes", v '
special courts were created for the trial of all blacks - slaves
or freemen. However, it was in a statute passed in 1725-6, "An
(3)Act for the better regulation of Negroes", J that the
Pennsylvania legislature made explicit just how legal institutions
and practices were tc regard both slaves and free blacks in that
colony.
Like the legislation passed in some of the other- colonies,
both Northern and Southern, the 1725-6 Act provided that if any
slave was executed, pursuant to a judicial decree, the master would
1. Pennsylvania Laws, Vol.I:13«
2. Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania', Vol.2:77-79•
3. Ibid., Vol.U:59-614.
be re-irabursed for the financial loss involved. Eroia that date,
when a "negro owned by any of the inhabitants of this province
shall hereafter be convicted of any capital crime", the justice
and freeholders who sat in the special negro courts as judges
were to appraise the value of the slave and pay that sum to the
owner from "the duties fees and penalties arising from this and
one other act laying a duty on negroes imported into this
it COprovince". J
Thus, from taxes imposed on the importation of slaves, the
master's property rights in slaves were to be protected. Just
as the legislatures of the Southern colonies, of Virginia, South
Carolina and Georgia, had resolved any conflict between the
punishment of criminal slaves and the potential loss in value
of a slave-owner's property, by the compensation of the owner,
so too had Pennsylvania adopted this solution.
Moreover, the 172^-6 Act regulated private manumissions of
slaves just as the legislature had. done in New York and some of
the Southern colonies. In particular the Act imposed
restrictions by requiring that "sufficient surities in the sum of
thirty pounds" be provided by every master before he could
manumit his slave in order to indemnify the government for "any
charge or incumbrance /"his slave] may bring upon the same in case
such negro by sickness or otherw.ti.se be rendered incapable to
1. Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania1, Vol.!}.:
60.
support him or herself".. ^
In addition to such regulations with regard to slaves, the
1725-6 Act also regulated the activities of freed blacks,
evidenced most strikingly by the provision that all children of
free blacks ox1 mulattoes were to be bound out until they reached
(2)21 years in the case of women and 2h( years in the case of men. K'J
Not surprisingly then, if free blacks could be made subject to
such restrictions, the restrictions on the geographical movement
of slaves and their ability to seek work were extensive under
this Act which is regarded as having established the foundations
of the Pennsylvania Slave Code. Not only did the legislature
authorise the whipping of slaves discovered more than 10 miles
from their masters5 homes without permission in writing, but
also masters were liable to the imposition of a. fine of 20
shillings for letting their slaves "ramble under pretence of
getting work [or forj givfingj liberty to their negroes to seek
their own employ".
1. Ibid., Vol. Ji: 6l. While Pennsylvania did not go as far as
New York which required a £200 bond sua an annual allowance
throughout the ex-master's life, nor as far as South Carolina in
requiring legislative validation of individual manumissions or
Virginia in requiring the exportation of freed slaves from the
colony, it did impose a restriction which was never imposed in
Georgia at all insofar as Georgia, at no time, prohibited or
limited manumission through legislation.
2. Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania5, Vol.1;:62.
3. Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania5, Vol
6>4.
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While the records of cases tried in the special courts fox-
negroes have all been lost or destroyed some records have
survived which make it possible to assess how the Pennsylvania
slave code was interpreted in practice. For example, in a
criminal case decided in 1707? two blank slaves (Toney and
Qnashy) were sentenced to death in the special courts after being
convicted of burglary. Their respective masters petitioned the
council (of the special courts) to spare the lives of the slaves
so that they could be transported out of the colony after the
masters had inflicted corporal punishment. Presumably this
request was made so that the masters could sell the slaves out
(2)
of the colony thereby suffering no financial loss. J The
Council agreed since:
LT>e Death of these Slaves would be a greater
Loss to The Owners than they could well bear,
and ... Theye is no Provision made for
restitution for The Loss by the Publick ... (3)
There is no reason to suppose that this was an. atypical decision
since in another case decided in 1737 a previous decision to
execute a slave was reversed by the court on an application by
the freeholders in the colony and the slave was ordered to be
transported out of the colony by his master.
1. HiggLnbotham, 1978:288, discusses the significance of this loss.
2. Prior to the Act of 1725-6 no provisions existed for
compensating- owners in the event of the execution of his slave
pursuant to judicial decree.
3. Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, Vol.2:l|2l-2, as cited by
Kigginbotham, 1978:290-91.
U. Colonial Records of Pennsylvania, Yoi.l+:259> as cited by
Higginbotham, 1978:292.
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The Pennsylvania judiciary also upheld the legality of
claims for the return of runaway slaves to other colonies:
thus in a 1738 case involving the theft of two slaves from the
governor of Bonavista the Pennsylvania Court required that the
slaves be returned to the governor before the defendant was
released from prison. Indeed, in a review of the records
available concerning the trial., of slaves in the Chester County
special court for the period 1762-1772 Higginbotharn concludes
that the overriding concern of the court was to protect the slave¬
owners' property interest in slaves.
The legislative recognition of the legality of slavery and
the institutionalisation of legislative definitions in judicial
practices was, however, paralleled by a counter movement.
Throughout the l8th century the social and political movement for
the abolition of slavery was gaining momentum and, as this
momentum grew, acts of manumission multiplied. While the
position of the Quakers, a group owning one third to one half of
(3)
all the slaves in the colony in the early l8th century, ; was
originally ambiguous, by the 173Cs the anti-slavery faction in
the Quaker movement contributed to a reduction in their
importation of slaves and by 17U5 the Quakers had virtually
ceased to import at all. Quakers also seem to have been
1. Ibid., Vol. 1*:289-96, as cited by Higginbotham, 1978:275-6.




effective in reducing the total numbers of slaves imported into
the colony by supporting the passage of numerous pieces of
legislation levying increasingly high taxes on imported slaves.
In 1700 the Pennsylvania legislature imposed a duty of 20
shillings on every black imported, this figure being doubled
in 1702, and dramatically increased in a statute passed in
(Y)
17-L2 to £20, J though this 1712 statute was not approved by
the Crown.
Indeed, it seems that between 1712 and 1727 the Crown and
the Pennsylvania legislature were involved in a conflict over
whose lav; would govern in the case of imposing duties on imported
slaves. The British Board of Trade in attempting to protect
British slave-trading companies disallowed most of the import
(d)tax laws drawn up by the Pennsylvania legislature. v'' The
Pennsylvania, legislature, however, appears to have circumvented,
at least to some extent, the Board of Trade8s vetoes. Tie
import tax laws were enforced before their technical rescission
and new tax laws were continuously being drawn up and instituted
before the previous law had been repealed. By 1729, with the
decline in the demand for and importation of slaves in
1. Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania', Vol.2:107.
2. Ibid., Vol.2:283.
3. Ibid., Vol.2:3i+3~U.
k. M.S. Board of Trade Papers, Proprietor IX, Q, pp.39j i|2, as
cited in Higginbotham, 1978:295*
5. See, for example, the Pennsylvania laws of 17l5» 1717-18«
1720-21, 1722, and 1725-6, in Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of
Pennsylvania' .
Pennsylvania, the import duty of £2 was not vetoed by the Crown
(l )and this rate remained effective for over thirty years. v
(2)
In 1761 the rate was raised to £10 v ' and this was renewed in
(3)1768. In 1773; "the import tax was made "perpetual" at the
rate of £20 por slave. By this time, however, the
importation of slaves to Pennsylvania was more or less non¬
existent nor was slave labour desirable in a developing
industrially based economy.
The repeated passage of legislation levying heavy taxes on
the importation of slaves must therefore be interpreted, in this
context, that is, in light of the fact that Pennsylvania, had no
need of slave labour nor was slavery an integral part of its
social and economic forms. And, as will be discussed in Chapter
5, when Pennsylvania, in 1780, became the first state to attempt
to abolish slavery by legislative enactment, through its passage
(?)
of the "Gradual Emancipation Statute", v ; slave labour was of no
importance to the social and economic forms which were developing
there. Nevertheless, the Pennsylvania colonial legislature did
construct a definition of slavery, which, while less restrictive
than the construction of the slave status in legislation in the
1. Turner, 1911:5*
2. Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania1, Act of
1761, Vol.6:105-110.
3- Beckman, ed,, 'Statutes at Large of Pennsylvania', Act of
1768, Vol.7:156, 159.
Ibid., Act of 1773, Vol.8:330-32.
5. Pennsylvania Laws, Act of 17^0, Vol.1:838.
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Southern colonies, was still a definition which recognised
the property aspect in the master/slave relation.
COKCLUSION
In this chapter it has been argued that in the later colonial
period in both Southern and Northern American colonies ambiguities
and inconsistencies in the status of slaves were subject to a
process of resolution. Law, in the form of legislation, was
effective in constructing the definition of slave as primarily
that of chattel property. This resolution of ambiguity was
necessary in legislation if slave labour was to be purchased as a
commodity; if slave-owners were to be able to obtain credit to
invest in slaves; and if masters were to be protected in their
property so that civil actions for damages to that property could
be pursued. In a critical sense legislation defined the nature of
the agents in the labour process based on slavery; it regulated
the basis upon which this labour process could be organised; it
provided the means whereby the market in slave labour could be
directly controlled; and it fixed the means of production. from
the enactment of the first slave code in the South, the 1705
Virginia slave code, through the enactment of the South Carolina
and Georgia slave codes, the exact legal status of slaves as
equivalent to chattel property v/as explicitly created in
legislation throughout the iSth century. And, while legislation
1. Arguably, the fact that colonial Pennsylvania never passed
the restrictive patrol laws evident in Southern legislation nor a
list of special justifications for the killing of slaves, was
because slave labour was never a significant factor in the
development of the colony nor were slaves a significant proportion
of the population.
in the North did not explicitly define slaves as chattels,
through its passage of tax laws, its statutes specifying import
duties on slaves, and its regulatory provisions concerning the
activities of slaves, such legislation implicitly created the
chattel definition of slavery. Both Northern and Southern
colonies recognised the legal personality in slaves in the
process of incriminating them for criminal acts and, at the same
time, invoked the chattel status in making it possible for slave¬
owners to receive compensation for their loss of value in
criminal siaves.
She process of construction in legislation then, where the
slave came to be defined as chattel property, was effective in
creating the basis upon which a slave mode of production could
develop. Since the law defined slaves as incapable of owning
property they were effectively separated from the means of
production and since claims to the legality of slave property
could be upheld in both Southern and Northern colonies slave¬
owners were provided with an effective form of protection for
their property in slaves. While slave production was not a
significant feature in the developing industrial economy of the
Northern colonies, these colonies recognised the legality of
claims to slave property to maintain a compatible interdependence
with Southern colonies though towards the end of the colonial
period some indications of a deconstruction of the slave status
in judicial practices and counter legislative trends were evident.
The significance of this process of deconstruction in the North is
discussed in the next chapter.
CHAPTER 5 : s FUGITIVES PROM LABOUR1 s CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
AND SLAVLRY
INTROBUCTION
SLAVERY IN THE REVOLUTIONARY PTRIOD
STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE LEGALITY OP SLAVIRY
THE US CONSTITUTION AND THE LEGALITY OP SLAVE




Through an analysis of the process of the construction of
the slave status in legislation in both Southern and Northern
colonies in the later colonial period, the previous chapter
demonstrated how effectively legal institutions and practices
created the master/slave relation as a property relation thereby
providing the basis upon which a specifically slave mode of
production could develop in the South. Towards the end of the
colonial period within the Northern colonies, however, it was
noted that some indications of a deconstruction of the sla;ve status
were apparent in both judicial practices and in eounter-legislaxive
trends. While this process of deconstructicn which was taking
place in Northern colonies throughout the revolutionary period can
in part be attributed to the colonists5 growing opposition to
British domination it was not to be immediately halted by the
Declaration of Independence in 1776. Indeed the Northern states,
(-
united with the Southern states by the Articles of Confederation, v
agreed to by Congress in 1777 ratified and in force in 1781,
continued to deconstruct the slave status in judicial practices
premised on state constitutions, and in legislative enactments
providing for the gradual emancipation of slaves within their own
state boundaries.
This process of deconstruction through Northern state legal
institutions and practices was antithetical, to the process
1. James D. Richardson (comp.), 1Articles of Confederation5, in
"A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789-
1897", Washington, 1897:1, 9-16.
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occurring in Southern states where, from the close of the
revolutionary war with Britain, the slave system became even
more deeply embedded in the social, political and economic
structures of the South. This antagonism between North and
South was not, however, an antagonism of capitalism versus
slavery. On the contrary, by the latter- part of the lStb
century slavery was an integral pact of the developing
capitalistic system, in North America. The system of production
developing in the South was dependent on international
capitalism: upon the world demand for the commodities it was
producing; sources of investment and so on. It was also
dependent on American capitalism in the sense that American
capital provided both the apparatus and the means of circulation.
Slave production in the South depended on the same forms of
commerce, credit and banking as the productive system in the
North - both used the same financial and commercial institutions.
This intersection of slave production with capitalist relations of
circulation provided an advanced commercial and financial
apparatus and tied it into the capitalist system. At the same
time commercial and financial capital in the North was tied into
slave production. No antagonism existed between the capitalist
system and slavery ~ the two were mutually interdependent.
The antagonism between North and South, over the issue of
the legality of slavery, was not, as shall be discussed in this
chapter, about the existence of slavery or the slave system, but
rather it was about which of these regions would govern the new
nation and how to ensure that each region had sufficient
political power to pursue its own interests, It was in
precisely this context that the new nation state was horn through
the framing of the US Constitution in 1787: a document
embodying, in a legal form, just how the antagonisms "between
North and South were negotiated. In order to define and
regulate the activities of the states and the antagonisms between
them, the regulation in question required an. agency which could
he presented as both external and 'superior® to the states.
This agency known as the federal government of the United States
of America, was created through the US Constitution, the
sovereign public power. The Republican State could thus he
given:
Coherence and limits in the legal form of a
constitution; as a doctrine of delegated powers
this defines away the problem of the state as a
complex organisation ox differentiated and
interacting agencies of decision. 8 Sovereignty®
defines the state as a homogeneous space of
realisation of the will of the sovereign subject
(Monarch, people-in-representation).
Moreover, this notion of 8 sovereignty' could resolve the somewhat
paradoxical issue that the US Constitution could be regarded as
'superior® to the activities it regulated in the sense that it
defined the 'state® and the limits to 'state action® while, at
1. In developing this line of reasoning I am indebted to Hirst
(l980:6l-o9) when he considers precisely what makes laws
effective as laws.
2. Hirst, 1980:69.
the same time, it could he regarded as subject to itself in the
sense that constitutional law is the will of the ' sovereign1".
As such, law could serve the ideological function of claiming
priority for certain agencies within the state which were held
to express the 8will' of the sovereign. Federal laws could he
effective as laws because they were produced or issued by those
institutions presented as a sovereign public power and because
their enforcement could be pursued through specific federal
legal institutions and practices.
The creation of the forth American Republican State, after
the Declaration of Independence, was therefore given both
coherence and limits in the legal form of the Constitution, througl'
the notion of the sovereignty of the people--in-representation.
The notion of the 'rule of law1 not of men was central to thi s
creation, yet what was to be regarded as constitutive cf this
rule of law was explicitly negotiated, full of political
compromises, and, an effective guarantee of slave property right.
Indeed, the founding fathers who met in Philadelphia in 1787 to
crea,te the Constitution were dedicated-to the proposition that
(n )
"government should rest upon the dominion of property". For
the representatives from the South this dominion of property meant
ensuring the legality of slave property right just as surely as it
meant establishing the legality of commercial and industrial forms
for the representatives from the North.
1. Franklin, IQoShl'J-i-*
2Jk.
In this chapter it will become clear that the series of
compromises within the US Constitution, which reflected a
negotiation of the antagonisms between North and South, resulted
in a more effective legal guarantee to the right to slave property
throughout the United States of America than had existed prior to
the birth of the nation state. The constitutional guarantees to
slave property were necessary in order to ensure that, given the
different patterns of development in relation to slavery both
within and between North and South, the legality of claims to
slave property could be upheld in a consistent and effective way-
through constitutional recognition. Moreover, given that many
of .the Northern states were in the process of deconstructing the
slave status in lav; through some statutes banning the importation
of slaves and others providing for the gradual emancipation of
slaves, a constitutional guarantee which provided for the return
of fugitive slaves from Northern to Southern states was necessary.
This chapter then, by focusing on how the slave status was
articulated in the Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary periods
provides en explanation as to why and how the legal title to
slave property was effectively guaranteed in the new Republican
state by the Constitution framed in 1787. In so doing, this
chapter also demonstrates just how legal regulation established a
relation between individual states and the public power since the
Constitution was to provide the legal basis on which the South's
later struggle over who would rule the United States would be
primarily fought. ^
1. See Chapter 8.
SLAVERY IF THE REVOLUTIONARY PIRIOB
We hold these truths to he self-evident, that
all men are created equal, that they are endowed
hy their Creator with certain unalienable Rights
that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit
of Happiness. That to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men, deriving
their just powers from the consent of the governed.
That, whenever any Form of Government becomes
destructive of these ends, it is the Right of the
People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute
new Government ...
Throughout the Revolutionary period Great Britain was indicted
by the American patriots for imposing the system of slavery
existing in the colonies through colonial legal institutions.
Toe patriots claimed that any colonial efforts to abolish the
slave trade had been effectively blocked consistently by Great
(?)
Britain's refusal to establish the legality of bills ' which
were drafted to prevent the importation of slaves or to impose
high duties on such slaves. When the first Continental Congress
met in 177-U an agreement was passed not to import slaves after
July 1, 1775; and Georgia, the only colony not present at the
177U Congress adopted a similar position in 1775- However,
as this chapter demonstrates, with British domination effectively
1. The Declaration of Independence, in Francis IT. Thorpe, ed.,
"The Federal and State Constitutions", Yol.l, p.3ff• The text is
taken from the version in the Revised Statutes of the United States
1878 ed., collated with the facsimile of the original, Washington,
1909.
2. Legally, every act passed by a colonial assembly could be
thrown out by the British Frivy Council.
3. Franklin, 1969:129.
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ended and the Republican State established; the legality of
slavery was more firmly established on a national basis than
at any time under colonial rule and the legal institutions of
the new Republican State, ironically enough, ensured that slavery
would have a longer life than it was to have in the British empire.
The antagonism which developed between the North American
colonies and the British colonial power became increasingly
evident at the end of the French and Indian War in 1763 when the
threat of the French was removed from the colonies and when Britain
began to adopt a new colonial policy which effectively attempted
to exert more control over the North American colonies.
Aspects of the new colonial policy which proved to be notably
provocative included: the Proclamation in relation to the Western
(2)
Territories issued in 1763; attempts to raise revenue through
(3)
direct taxation in, for example, the" Siigar Act I76I4 and the
1. Richard Hofstadter, William Miller and Daniel Aaron, "The
Structure of American History", Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall,
196U:il3~53.
2. Tiie restrictive Western policy was especially hard 011
Southern planters who, in the case of the Virginia tobacco planters
in particular, were already wanting to expand inland due to soil
depletion.
3. This Act seriously damaged the position of the American
colonists in the triangular trade. The Act prohibited the
colonies from obtaining iriol asses from the Prench islands where it
was cheaper and better for the distillation of rum (see, Donald
L. Robinson, "Slavery in the Structure of American Politics 1765-
1820", New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971:57-58 for a
discussion). The triangular trade involved shipping of products
(mainly molasses) from the West Indies to New England, New England
products (mainly rum) were then shipped to Africa in exchange for
slaves and the slaves were shipped to the American colonies. Erom
Britain's point of view the Sugar Act was an attempt to remedy the
fact that she was being cut out of the trade.
Stamp Act 1765; attempts to raise revenue through "external3
taxes on trade in the Townshend Acts of 176?; ant the
Parliamentary granting of a, monopoly on. tea to the East India,
Company tinder the 1773 East India Act.
Trie American colonists responded to these measures by
initially adopting a policy of non-importation of British goods
and latterly "by openly voicing their opposition through the
establishment of the Continental Congress which first met in. 177^4
f2)to declare the colonists' mutual grievances. v ' When the
Continental Congress met again in 1775 it was to adopt the
(3)
'Declaration of the Causes and Necessity of Taking Up Arms'.
Ironically enough, much of the rhetoric contained in this
Declaration, the precursor to the Declaration of Independence,
concerned analogising between the position of the colonists to
that of a state of slavery. For example, the colonists
condemned the legislature of Great Britain for "enslaving these
colonies by violence" and they resolved "to die free men rather
than live slaves". ^ '■ Despite this, when the colonists finally
adopted the Declaration of Independence-on July I4, 1776, no
1. Hofstadter et al., lS>6k'h7-^h-
2. For a discussion of this Congress, see, Perry Miller, "The
Life of the Mind of America: From the Revolution to the Civil War",
New York, 1965:3 et seq.
3. Hofstadter et al., 196k:5^4-55 •
h. "Declaration-of the Causes and Necessity of Talcing Up Arms', in
Henry Steele Commager ed., "Documents of American History", 8th ed.,
New York, Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968:92 et seq. For a discussion
of the colonists' perception of their political plight as one of
enslavement, see B. Bailyn, "The Ideological Origins of the American
Revolution", Cambridge, Mass., The Belknap Press of Harvard
University PTess, 1971:232-21*6.
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reference was contained in that document to the status of slaves
throughout the American colonies.
The original draft of the Declaration of Independence, as
prepared by Thomas Jefferson, as approved by the Committee of
Five - Franklin, Sherman, Adams, Robert Livingston and Jefferson
himself - appointed to prepare such a document, and as presented-
to the Congress on June 28, 1778, did, however, contain a
rhetorical reference to one aspect of slavery for which it held
Great Britain solely responsible -• the international slave trade.
Thus, in Jefferson's original draft the following appears as part
of the climax to the colonists' charges against King George III:
He has waged cruel war against human nature
itself, violating its most sacred rights of life
and liberty in the persons of a distant people who
never offended him, captivating and carrying them
into slavery in another hemisphere or to incur
miserable deaths in their transportation thither ...
Determined to keep open a market where MEN" should be
bought and sole, he has prostituted his negative for
supressing every legislative attempt to prohibit or
to restrain this execrable commerce ... he is now
exciting these very people to rise in arms among us, (2)
and to purchase that liberty cf which he has
deprived them, by murdering the people on whom he
also obtruded them ... (3)
1. For a. discussion of the drafting of the Declaration of
Independence, see Carl Becker, "The Declaration of Independence, A
Study in the History of Political Ides-s", New York, Knopf, 1958,
Chapter L.
2. The reference here is to Lord Duamore's Emancipation
Proclamation for slaves vaio joined the British Army - November 7>
1775 (Franklin, 1969:133).
3. Facsimile of the original text as cited in Ray Billington,
Bert Loewenberg, Samuel Brockunier and David Sparks, eds„, "The
Making of American Democracy: Readings and Documents", New York,
Holt, Rinehart and Winston Inc., 1962, Vol.1:122.
Yet in the version of the Declaration of Independence
adopted on July 1+, 1776, not even this comment on the international
slave trade remained, fax less any comment on the system of slavery
or the status of slaves as chattel property existing in most of the
colonies at that time. The sole reference to the slave trade in
the Declaration had been deleted in response to the Southern
interest in maintaining an adequate supply of slave labour and in
ensuring that slave property right would not be threatened and
in response to northern allies who still had an interest in the
lucrative trade. Thus, the Declaration of Independence remains
silent on the issue of slavery yet, it was within the space
created by this silence that the question of the legality of
slavery would be argued throughout the next century as to whether
the "self-evident truth" that "all men are created equal" was to
include slaves - were they men or were they property?
Despite the silence of the Declaration of Independence on the
matter of slavery and the slave trade, the presence of the British
Army and the existence of the War did have an unsettling effect on
slavery in general. Apart from numbers of slaves running away,
many joined the British with the promise of freedom following the
Dunmore Emancipation Proclamation of 1775- Many of the new
states responded to these measures by permitting the enlistment of
( r
slaves in the American Armj.es and, by the end of the War in 1733,
1. Loixis H. Polish (ed), "The Constitution and the Supreme
Court", Cleveland, World Publishing: Co., 1966, Vol.1:9«
2, The War ended officially by the signing of the Treaty of Paris,
on September 3, 1783, between the United States of America and Great
Britain ~ ratified in Philidelphia on January II4., 1784, (see,
Hofstadtar et a!., 19oi|;62).
most states as well as the Continental Congress, were enlisting
slaves with the understanding that they were to receive their
(!)
freedom at the end of their service. v
It was not, however, without considerable reluctance, that
slaves were permitted to fight in the state or Congressional
Armies. For example, the statute passed in New York in 1781
which permitted slaves to serve in the Army, offered freedom on
the completion of 3 years service and, a,t the same time,
authorised masters to receive up to £00 acres of unappropriated
(2)
public land for each slave delivered 3nd enlisted. v ' This
compensation to masters was typical in relation to the
enlistment of slaves where, fox* example, in New Hampshire masters
were given bounties as payment for the freedom of their slaves.
(V)
Only two states, Georgia and South Carolina, wy continued to
oppose the enlistment of slaves even with the Congressional plan
of 1779 which offered to pay the owners not more than 1,000
dollars for each slave recruited. The extent to which
promises of manumission, however, would be upheld and would affect
the institution of slavery, only became apparent as the
individual states began to adopt their own constitutional forms,
1. Franklin, 1969:135-38; provides an account of the enlistment
of slaves in the Continental Armies.
2. See Laws of New York, Chapter 32, P«-'+2, March 20, 1781.
3. For a full discussion of the issues here, see Benjamin Queries
"The Negro in the American Revolution", New York, V.¥. Norton, 1973
i|. Franklin, 1969:135-6.
legal institutions and practices, freed from the colonial power.
The next section of this chapter therefore discusses the issue
of the legality of slavery under state constitutions as
evidenced in the judicial practices and legislative enactments
premised upon them.
STATE CONSTITUTIONS AND THE LEGALITY OP SLAVIRY
In the introduction to this chapter it was noted that,
throughout the revolutionary period, a process of deconstructing
the slave status through Northern legs,! institutions and practices
was paralleled by a contrary process in the South where its legal
institutions and practices ensured a mcx^e detailed refinement of
the slave status as akin to chattel property. Both North and
South could no longer argue that British domination was responsible
for any articulation of the legality'of claims to slave property
since, by the mid-17703, the newly founded states were freed from
the constraints of the colonial power and it remained to be seen
just how they would regard slavery.
The independent states which eventually formed, the United
States of America were themselves established following the meeting
of the revolutionary central government known as the Second
Continental Congress, in 1775>« At that time four of the colonies
or states were conducting their affairs under makeshift
revolutionary administrations, and, it was the advice of the
Congress to these states to draw up permanent constitutions. With
the adoption of the Declaration of Independence by the Congress in
Jyly 17765 the legal basis on which most of the colonies had been
governed - their Royal Charters - was swept away and. the
remaining' states were advised to draw up their own constitutions.
Rhode Island and Connecticut, simply by deleting all reference to
the King, maintained their original corporate charters and by I78O
all the other states had written new instruments of government.
In most of the states, the legislatures drew up the new state
constitution without consulting the voters, and for the most
part, the new state constitutions followed the colonial
(2)
forms. v ' Trie most important single charge was a severe
reduction in the power of the Governor: in nine states he had no
right to veto and his term was limited to one year (although he
could be re-elected). Most of the constitutions also had bills
of rights guaranteeing social and political liberties such as the
right to .jury trial, freedom of speech and worship and so on.
One of the earliest and most influential of the bills 01
rights of an original state constitution was the Virginia Bill of
Rights adopted by the Virginia Constitutional Convention on 12
June 1776. As its first and most basic principle of
government, the Virginia Bill of Rights stated:
1. Massachusetts set an example to be followed by other states,
however, when it came to the question of re-writing the basic law.
The new constitution was drafted by a special convention elected
for that purpose alone (Hofstadter et al., 1961).:68).
2. Usually the legislature consisted of two houses (both elective
although Pennsylvania, experimented with a single house.
3. For the full text of the Virginia Bill of Rights,'see
Thorpe (ed) 1909, Vol.7':3813-381)4.
That all men are by nature equally free and
independent, and have certain inherent rights,
of which, when they enter into a state of
society, they cannot by any compact deprive or
divest their posterity; namely, the enjoyment
of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring
and possessing property, and pursuing and
obtaining happiness and safety.
The right to possess property by those who "enter into a state
of society" included the right to property in slaves. This is
(2)
clearly demonstrated in the case of Eudgins v Wrights, v ' where
the first clause of the Virginia Bill of Rights was explicitly
ruled on by the Virginia Court of Appeals. The case reached the
appeal court in l806 from the High Court of Chancery where the
Chancellor had ruled that the Wrights were entitled to freedom
since they could trace their genealogy, through female ancestors,
(-*)
to an old Indian K ' called Butterwood Ran. While the Virginia
Court of Appeals upheld this decision, the Appeal judges made it
quite clear that where white persons or native American. Indians
or their descendants, in the maternal line, were claimed as slaves,
the onus proband! lay with the claimant, yet clearly stated
that it was otherwise with respect to native Africans and their
descendants ~ the onus probandi in this case lay with them to
prove their freedom. Thus, Judge Tucker, in addressing the issue
as to the applicability of clause 1 of the Virginia Bill of
1. Clause 1, Virginia Bill of Rights, in Thorpe (ed) 190$,
Vol.7:3813.
2. 11 Va. 1 Hen & M. 133, I3I4 (l80o).
3. The issue of Indian, slavery was discussed in Chapter 3«
A. Onus Proband! = Burd.en of Proof.
Rights, "that all men are by nature equally free and independent"
framed the question as follows:
Suppose these persons, a black or mulatto man
or woman with a, flat nose and woolly head; a
copper coloured person with long jetty blank,
straight hair; and one with a fair complexion, brown
hair, not woolly nor inclining thereto, with a
prominent Roman nose, were brought together before a
judge upon a writ of Habeas Corpus, on the ground of
false imprisonment and detention in slavery: ...
How must a Judge act in such a case? ... He must
discharge the white person and the Indian, out of
custody, ... and he must redeliver the black or
mulatto person, with the flat nose and woolly hair to
the person claiming to hold him or her e,s his slave,
unless the black person or mulatto could procure some
person to be bound for him, to produce proof of his
descent, in the maternal line, from a free female
ancestor - But if no such condition should be
required on either side, but the whole case be left
with the Judge, he must deliver the former out of
custody, and permit the latter to remain in slavery,
until he could produce proofs of his right to
freedom. This case shews my interpretation how far
the onus probandi may be shifted from one party to
the o ther ...
Judge Tucker went on to claim that the first clause in the
Virginia Bill of Rights had been framed:
With a cautious eye to the subject, and was meant
to embrace the case of free citizens, or aliens only;
and not by a side wind to overturn the rights cf
property and give freedom to those very people whom
we have been compelled from imperious circumstances
to retain, generally, in the same state of bondage
that they were in at the revolution, in which they
hah no concern, agency or interest.
1. 1 Hen & M. luG - emphasis in original.
2. Ibid., - emphasis in original.
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The other appeal court judges concurred with Judge Tucker
and with his reasoning regarding clause 1 of the Virginia Bill
ox Rights. (Thus Judge Roane staled that "in the case of a person
visibly appearing to be a negro the presumption is, in this
country, that he is a slave, and it is incumbent on him to make
out his right to freedom". While the Appeal Court,
therefore, upheld the decision of the Chancellor in the lower court
granting freedom to the Wrights, it denied the Chancellor's
reasoning when he ruled that the Virginia Bill of Rights had
established a presumption of freedom for all human beings, thereby
placing the burden of proof of ownership on the person who wanted
(2)
to enslave a negro. ' The Virginia Court of Appeals' ruling
in Hudgins v Wrights in l8o6 was therefore a definitive holding
that Virginia law placed the burden of proof in suits for freedom
on negroes. The legality of slave property right was therefore
affirmed in Virginia and the pattern was established for other
Southern states to follow.
Throughout the revolutionary and posterevolutionary periods,
Southern states were unanimous in affirming the legal right to own
slave property under their own state constitutions. At this time,
(o)
over 90% of the slaves in North America lived in the South and,
given the immense amount of Southern capital invested in slaves and
the ma.jor social., political and economic upheavals created in the
1. Ibid., U4I.
2. For a thorough discussion of this case, see R.M. Cover,
"Justice Accused: Anti-slavery and the Judicial Process", New
Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1975'50--55-
3. Jordan, 1968:13.
war and post-wax yeaxs, the slave-owners of the South can "be
xegaxded as having adopted a rational approach in ensuring
adequate legal protections for their investments particularly
when a new economic significance was already "being attached to
Ci"\■the institution of slavery. v In the period immediately
(.2.)
following the Treaty of 1783 the areas where the slaves
were concentrated experienced a severe depression: the tobacco
plantations were already suffering from problems of soil
exhaustion and a glutted market and rice and indigo productions
yielded a low profit margin to the planters of these commodities,
lhe price of slaves was also declining but the planters attempted
to sustain their losses until a new raw commodity could be
produced. Already a system of producing cotton textiles was
undergoing revolutionary changes in Britain, and, with the
inventions of spinning and weaving- machinery, the manufacturing-
process was so cheapened that the demand for cotton goods was
greatly stimulated. The demand for cotton fibre to feed the
newly developed machinery came at a time when the Southern planters
needed some a'orm of economic and productive reorganisation to
(3)
inject new life into the plantation system. w'
A.s early a,s 1786 planters on the Georgian-Carolina coast





The Trea.ty of Paris between the "USA and Britain in 1783.
Franklin, 1969:ll|7.
crops employing more slaves. With the invention of a cotton
gin in 1792 the Southern states were well on the way to making
the transition to a new productive system exclusively based on
slave labour. Although the cultivation of cotton did not require
large capital investment, the most economically affluent planters
were able to purchase more land and more slaves, thereby forcing
the small-scale farmers to yield to those planters who ware able
to carry on large-scale cultj.va.tion. The invention of the
cotton gin, therefore, and the extension of the area of cotton
cultivation, ushered in a period of economic change in the
Southern states which manifested itself in the increased demand
for slave labour. Thus, in the latter part of the l8th century
importations of slaves into the United States increased rapidly
- in 1803, for example, it was estimated that at lea.st 20,000
(2)
slaves were imported' into Georgia and South Carolina. v ' The
merchants of New England supplied the Southern planters with this
human cargo, thus ensuring that Northern capital was also deeply
implicated in maintaining the Southern system based on slave
production. However, for the North, involvement in the slave
trade was not the same as affirming the legality of slave property
right under their ovrn state constitutions and the legal practices
premised upon them. How then did Northern states regard the issue
of the legality of slavery in the context of independence?.
1. Ibid., lli8-9.
2. Ibid., II4.9.
In Massachusetts, the new constitution was drafted "by a
(i )
special convention elected for that purpose alone. '*~"J The
Constitutional Convention first met in 1778 hut that version of
the state constitution was defeated when submitted to the vote
primarily "because it contained restricted suffrage requirements
(2)
and had no Bill of Bights. v ' This was remedied in the new
constitution adopted in 1780 by the extension of suffrage to all
males and the addition of the Declaration of Rights. Thus
article 1 guaranteed that:
All men are born free and equal, and have
certain natural, .essential and unalienable
rights; among which may be reckoned the right
of enjoying and defending their- lives and
liberties; that of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property; in fine, that of seeking
and obtaining their safety and happiness.
But did this guarantee of rights extend to the right to possess
and protect slave property? There was no explicit emancipation
clause nor any language authorising legislative action effecting
emancipation in the new constitution. Yet, in 1769, in the case
of James v Lechmere, the Superior Court of Massachusetts argued
that the plaintiff, a negro, was entitled to his freedom under the
1. Massachusetts set the precedent for the convention that later
wrote the Federal Constitution and for the special state
conventions that later ratified it (Hofstadter et al., 1961+:68).
2. Eiggihbotham, 1973:89-90•
3. Article 1, Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, in Thorpe
(ed) 1909, Vol.3:1889.
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laws of the province and the terras of the Royal Charter.
Exactly how the silence of the new constitution on the issue was
to "be broken was decided in the case of Commonwealth v Jermison
(2)
in 1783. This case itself was premised on two earlier cases
( 3)
concerning an alleged slave known as Quock Walker, ' the legal
proceedings involving the issue of the freedom of Quock Walker
representing the first application of the Massachusetts Bill of
Rights of 1780 to the status of black slaves.
Litigation involving Quock Walker began in 1781 after Walker
had escaped from his master, Nathaniel Jennison, and fled to Seth
and John Caldwell's farm. The Caldwells were brothers of
Walker's former master, whose vridow had subsequently married
Jennison. Jennison and seme friends attempted to force Walker to
return, and when he resisted, they severely beat him and took him
back to the Jennison. farm. Qiock Walker then brought an action
of trespass against Jennison, suing him for damages for the assault
(<)
and battery. In the case of Quock Walker v Jennison, x / "Walker
1. James v Lechmere, 1769 s as cited in Moore, 1968:116. This
was not5 however, a definitive holding since the decision to free
the negro, James, was based on an insufficiency in lav; on Lechmere's
part.
2. Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society, lS73~
1875:293 (April 1783) - hereafter referred to as Eroc. Mass. Hist.
Soc.
3. The "case" of Quock Walker has been regarded as an American
counterpart of Sommersett - the English ca.se discussed in Chapter 2,
"especially in its ambiguity and the resultant misunderstanding about
its impact" (Wiecek, 1974:l2h).
1|. The Massachusetts State Constitution of 1780 was ratified and
in force in 1781.
5. Rroc. Mass. Hist. Soc., 1873-75:296 (September 1781).
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was declared a free man and. the jury awarded £50 damages to him.
Jennison filed an appeal but failed to appear when the case was
called for argument and the lower court's decision was affirmed.
Jennison then filed suit against the Caldwell brothers in
Jennison v Caldwell by bringing an action of trespass against
the Caldwells and claiming damages because the Caldwells "seduced
Quock Walker from JJca.sJ service ... and caused ... to absent
himself ... and retained said negro for 6 weeks /for their own
benefit^/'« Jennison was awarded £25 damages.
Clearly, the judgments in these two cases are contradictory.
If, as the judgment in the case of Quack Walker v Jennison implies,
Quock Walker was not a slave but a free man. then on what grounds
could Jennison sue the Caldwells for damages? The Caldwells
appealed the verdict in Jennison v Caldwell and the Supreme
Judicial Court found them not guilty on appeal and had judgment
(2)
for costs made against Jennison. v '
Hie last in the series of cases involving Quock Walker began
in April 1783 before the Supreme Judicial Court. In the case of
(3)
Commonwealth v Jennison, ' Jennison was indicted and charged
with the assault and battery committed on Quock Walker in 1781.
The prosecution argued that Jennison had attacked a free citizen
(Walker) not a chattel slave, producing testimony to the effect
1. Eroc. Mass. Hist. Soc., 1873-75:296 (September- 1781).
2. Eroc. Mass. Hist. Soc., 1873-75:297 (September 1781).
3. Eroc. Mass. Hist. See., 1873-75:293 (April 1783).
that Walker's former mastar had promised to manumit him when he
reached 25' years old? that his widow had renewed that promise
and that Jennison knew this prior to his marriage to the widow.
The defence argued that there was a master-slave relation and that
Jennison's act was a proper disciplinary measure. However, Chief
Justice Cushing in his charge to the jury directed them to find
Jennison guilty on the "basis of the facts and, in doing this, he
argued not on the "basis that Walker was a free man "because of the
manumission promise "but because article 1 of the Massachusetts
State Constitution made it quite clear that, "the idea of slavery
is inconsistent with our own conduct and constitution ^^
Jennison was convicted and, although the case did not abolish
slavery in Massachusetts, it was one of several freedom suits in
the post-revolutionary period where the legality of slavery was
undermined.
In the same year (l7$3) that Gushing found slavery incompatible
with the rights granted under the Massachusetts State Constitution,
tiie legislature was considering- one of the most straightforward
abolitionist bills proposed anywhere. The bill claimed that
chattel slavery had never been legal in Massachusetts, it provided
compensation for masters whose claims to property were undercut by
outlawing slavery, and it enabled help to be given to destitute
(9)
blacks fkeed in consequence. J And, while this bill did not
1. Proc. Mass. Hist. Soc.s l87>75:27U (April 1783).
2. Economically, this plan was quite feasible - blacks
constituted less than. 2% of the total, population (Robinson, 1971s
28-29), and domestic slavery was of no consequence to the system
of production developing in Massachusetts.
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pass through the Senate, the judgment in Commonvrealth v Jennison
indicated that, whatever the legislature proposed to do, the
courts would no longer affirm the legality of claims to slave
property in Massachusetts.
Pennsylvania, on the other hand, was the first state to
abolish slavery in the l8th century by legislative enactment, when,
(2 )
in I78O, it parsed "An act for the Gradual Abolition of Slavery". ^
Hie provisions of the Act for the gradual emancipation of negro
slaves, was to provide a scheme which other states would imitate
in their attempts to reconcile the claims of slave property right
and bourgeois notions of legality.
The gradual emancipation statute did not free those who were
already slaves when the Act was passed - only negro and mulatto
children born after the passage of the law were to be freed and
(3)those only after serving their mother's master for 28 years. K '
Nevertheless, several aspects of this law are significant.
Firstly, section 9 of the Act required all slave owners to register
1
their slaves with the county clerk before November 1, I78O. This
registration requirement provided substantial penalties for non¬
compliance from slave owners. Unregistered slaves were
1. Technically, a 1632 Act passed in Providence and Warwick,
before Rhode Island came under one jurisdiction by a 166} Charter,
banned lifetime servitude in the colony. However, scholars agree
that this prohibition was not in force in the l8th century and
later 18th century statutory enactments regulating slavery in Rhode
Island did give legal sanction to slavery, (see, Catterall, 1968 ed„,
Vol.L|.siii+8; and Higginbotham, 1978:U59i3 -or i&ore concise detail on
this issue.)
2. Act of 1780 Pennsylvania Lavs, Vol.1:838.
3. Act of 1780, Section li, Pennsylvania Laws, Vol. 1:839-^0.
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automatically emancipated because "no negro or mulatto now
within this State shall ... be deemed a slave or servant for
life ... unless his or her name shall be entered as aforesaid
on such record". The regi.strat.ion clause resulted in
substantial litigation between master and slave, mostly
(2)
initiated by Pennsylvania abolition societies v ' and some judges
held masters to strict technical compliance with the law in
(3)
registration cases. w/ The presumption of freedom for
unregistered slaves was of profound importance since now, within
iav/; the burden of proof lay with the master to demonstrate that
the blank in question was his slave.
The 1730 Act also made provisions to ensure that the statute
could not be evaded by people 'visiting' the state with their
slave. Exempted from the obligation of registration and the
related freeing of slaves for non-compliance with section 5 were
the "domestic slaves attending on members of Congress ... and
persons passing through or sojourning in this State, and not
(<)
becoming resident therein". K1 Residency .was defined as more
than a 6 month stay in Pennsylvania, thus a person could not visit
Pennsylvania for more than 6 months without the slave or slaves who
1. Ibid., Section 5>j Vol.l:8i),0.
2. Catterali, 1968 ed., Yol.k'.2kS.
3. Ibid., 21.7.
h. Compare the totally contrary position adopted by the judiciary
in the Virginia case of Eudgins v Wrights (l Hen & M. 13l+, I806),
discussed earlier in this chapter.
5. Act of I78O, Section 10, Pennsylvania Laws, Vol.1:81^1.
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accompanied him becoming free. Visitors who came to
Pennsylvania after November 1, I78O (the last day of registration
■under the I78O Act) could not register their slaves (if they
intended to stay more than 6 months). If the legislature had
allowed visitors to register slaves after the residents1 deadline,
there would have been easy options for the evasion of the statute
thereby making the process of 'gradual' emancipation more difficult
(l)
to achieve in Pennsylvania. v J
Another significant provision in the I78O Statute granted
(2.x
slaves all the privileges of indentured servants. ^ Thus,
al"though slaves born before March 1, 1780 were denied freedom
under the Act, and children to slave mothers after that date had
freedom delayed for 28 years, the status of slaves was, for the
first time in law, defined in terms of a. service obligation rather
"^an a property obligation.
The Act, however,was not passed without considerable
opposition particularly from those who argued that its provisions
(3)
were an affront to the Southern States. KJ . Not surprisingly
then, many slave owners found ways of subverting the 1730 Statute
and in 1788 the legislature passed another act "explaining" the
1. Eigginbo tham, 1978:299-300.
2. Act of 1730 Pennsylvania Laws, Vol.l:8kl. See also Chapter 3
supra, which outlines some of the privileges of indentured servants
guaranteed in law.
3. The final vote in 1780 showed 3k assembly men in favour;
21 opposed (Robinson, 1971•3d)•
1780 Act for the graxlual abolition of slavery. rI!he 1788
Act attempted to remedy some of the defects in the I78O Act.
For example, the first section of the 1788 Act clarified the
tenth section of the I78O Act which dea.lt with the status of
visitors1 slaves. Thus, section 3. of the 1788 Act provided that:
All and every slave and slaves who shall be brought
into this State by persons inhabiting or residing
therein or intending to inhabit or reside therein
shall be immediately considered, deemed and taken to
be free to a3.1 intents and purposes.
There is no mention made here of the 6 month residency requirement
in section 10 of the 1780 Act but clarification is giver, in the
(3)
case of Commonwealth v Ohambre in 1794 where the C.ourt held
that a 6 month stay in Pennsylvania would still operate to free
a visitor's slave. Moreover, the intention to reside in
([,)
Pennsylvania was now sufficient proof to free slaves. v '
Section 2 of the 1788 Act dealt with the efforts of slave
owners to subvert the 1780 statute. For example, in order to
avoid registering births to slave mothers, slave owners had
developed the practice of removing pregnant slaves to another area
where slavery for life was sanctioned, until the child was born.
The 3.788 Act therefore provided, that no pregnant slave could be
1. Act of 17885 Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of Pennsy3.vania
Vol.13:52.
2. Ibid., Section 1, Vol.13:52.
3. 1+ Dallas II1.3 (179I4), as cited in Higginbotham, 1978:30^-
I4. Higginbotham, 3.978:30k.«
removed from the State -until the delivery of her child. N ~J
Another ploy was to sell slaves outwith the state, thus the
statute prohibited this practice when "such a slave or servant
would lose those benefits and privileges" of the gradual
emancipation statute. ^ ^
Section 3 provided that all children born to slaves after
March 1, I78O must be registered before April 1, 1789 or "within
(3)6 months next after the birth of any such child". K J This
registration would guarantee the right to freedom at 28 years and
eliminate the possibility that masters could hold such children
in slavery for life. The penalty for the non-registration of
these children within the time limit was their immediate
freedom.
Thus, in passing the 1780 Gradual Emancipation Act,
Pennsylvania had set in motion the process of deconstructing the
slave status in legislation. The preamble to the 1780 Act
indicated that the revolutionary rhetoric contained in the State
Constitution could be used by the legislature to begin a process
of denying the legality of slave property right. ¥hile this
process was, as the Act was termed, 'gradual', since slaves were
still reported in Pennsylvania in I.8I1.O, two generations beyond
1. Act of 1788, Beckman, ed., 'Statutes at Large of
Pennsylvania', Vol.13:52.
2. Ibid., Vol.13:53* ^he penalty was a fine of £75.
3. Ibid., Vol.13:53-
l'r. Higginbotham, 1978:305-
the passage of the 1780 Act, and while such emancipation
occurred in a state where blacks represented only 2§% of the
total population and where the productive system based on a
developing free wage labour economy did not require or benefit
from slave labour, Pennsylvania had set a precedent in
legislation which other Northern States followed. In 1781+
Connecticut arid Rhode Island both passed laws for the gradual .
(2)
abolition of slavery v and the process of deconstructing the
slave status in lav; had effectively begun throughout the
Northern States.
This process, however, was by no means unambiguous. At New
York State's first Constitutional Convention held in 1777 the
Convention was reluctant to include a suggestion of future
(3)
emancipation in the new constitution. Governor Morris,
while proposing that the new constitution include a promise of
abolition to be achieved as soon as practicable "consistent with
the public safety and the private property of individuals"
concluded that "it would at present be productive of great
dangers to liberate the slaves within this State". Although
1. Robinson, 1971 * 31• These slaves must either have been more
than 60 years old or have been born since 1812 to women born
before 1780.
2. Franklin,
3. Slavery was a more solidly entrenched economic institution
in New York than some of the other Northern States and blanks
constituted about 10% of the total population there.
k. Philip S. Foner, "History of Black Americans: From Africa to
the Emergence of the Cotton Kingdom", Wesport, Conn., Greenwood
Phess, 1975:366.
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no emancipation provision was passed, the delegates did adopt
Morris's anti-slavery resolution that: "every human being who
breathed the air of the State shall enjoy the privileges of a
free man".
It was not until 1785 that a Bill for gradual emancipation
(2)
was approved though this plan was not made effective. v ' The
legislature did., however, succeed in 1785 in passing a, sts,tute
(3)
prohibiting the importation of slaves. wy This statute
provided that violaters were to be fined £100 and any slaves
illegally imported were freed. The statute was ineffective
because masters who brought slaves in for their own use were
exempted and technically, slaves could he brought in for the
present owner's use and thereafter sold with impunity. 1
Others were able to evade the lav; by hiring out imported slaves
under leases that were usually disguised sales cancellable only
with the consent of a hirer or his heirs. There is evidence
to show that the courts-upheld the legality of such 'hirings', as,
(6)
for example, in the case of Soble v Hitchcock, v y where an
1. Ibid.
2. See Franklin, 1969:ll|l| 3rd Higginbotham, 1978:138-1^0.
3- 1785 Act, Laws of hew York, Chapter 19:85.
]+. Higgihbothan, 1978:li|0.
5. Compare the practice of the courts upholding this kind of
•leasing' system during Georgia's anti-slavery period when slaves
were hired on 99 year leases from South Carolina. - see Chapter 3•
6. 2 Johnsons Cases 68 (NY Su.p. Ct. l800) - as cited in McManus,
1970:169.
importer brought in a 1 free1 man from New Jersey under a 99
year indenture.
In 1788, the legislature, still unable to ant on the issue
of emancipation, passed a slave code which attempted to eliminate
some of the loopholes in the 1785 Anti-Slave Ttade Bill, but which,
at the same time, affirmed the legality of slave property.
For example, the statute made it illegal to sell any slave
imported into the state after 1785 declaring that all improperly
imported slaves "shall be free"; it precluded sales where both
buyer and seller claimed to be permanent residents but where one
was actually an agent receiving the slave with the intention of
transporting the slave out of the state for sale. At the same
time, however, the statute restated settled principles of slavery
lav?: for example, it provided that all who were slaves for life
when the statute was passed (February 22, 1788) were to remain
in that condition unless properly manumitted; and children "shall
(2)
follow the state and condition of the mother". v '
Despite the legislature1s confirmation of the legality of
slavery in New York, manumissions increased throughout the I78O3
and 90s. This period saw the influx, in rapidly increasing-
numbers, of free white labourers who were providing the labour
needs of a developing commercial and industrial economy. Not
surprisingly then, in 1799 the New York legislature passed a bill
1.
2.
1788 Act, Laws of New York, Chapter 1^0:85 (February 22, 1788).
1788 Act, Laws of New York, Chapter I4.0:85 (February 22, 1788).
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which gradually eliminated the system of slavery. This
statute was essentially similar to the gradual abolition statute
passed in Pennsylvania in I78O. The hew York Act of 1799
provided that all male children born to slave mothers after July
1799 were to be freed at 28 years and all female children at
25 years; these children were to serve their mothers' masters as
indentured servants until freed; masters were required to register
births and failure to do so resulted in a fine against the master
and freedom for the child.
(2 )
Again, an in Pennsylvania, masters x attempted to subvert
the statute by measures such as sending pregnant slave mothers out
(o)
of the state to give birth and so on. Thus in lSOl, the
legislature enacted that New York residents could not take slaves
0 N
out of the state unless they also returned with the slaves; ''
and in 1807 an Act was passed which only permitted those persons
who had resided in New York for 10 years and who were planning to
(<)
move permanently out. of Hie state, to take their slaves with them.
From the foregoing discussion of the development of legal,
institutions and practices in relation to slavery in the
revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods, it is clear that
1. 1799 Act, Laws of New York, Chapter 62:338-89 (March 29, 1799)-
2. Masters also assisted in the subterfuge which followed the
passage of the 1799 Act when New York became a mecca for slave
traders from other states. These traders came to purchase slaves
at bargain prices in order to sell slaves out of the state.
3. Higginbotham, 197S: llt.3 -
i;.. 1801 Act, Laws of New York, Chapter 188:615 (April 8, l80l).
9- 1807 Act, Laws of New York, Chapter 77:92-93 (March 31) IS07).
Southern and northern states, freed from the colonial power,
were going in different directions. throughout this period
the slave mode of production was rapidly forming the basis of
the Southern economy while, in the North, with its developing
commercial and industrial base, any slave labour at all was
becoming progressively less desirable. Yet both North and
South had adopted virtually identical!, state constitutional
frameworks based on ideological notions of liberty and other
civil rights, including the right to acquire and possess property.
Both founded their interpretation of the legality of slavery on
these constitutional frameworks but they did not reach the same
conclusions. For Northern states, their constitutions were
used to argue that slavery was inconsistent with the principles
behind them and the process of deconstructing the slave status
proceeded effectively in legislation and judicial, practice. For
Southern states, however, their constitutions and the principles
behind them did not apply to slaves ~ slaves were a separate
category and not entitled to any state constitutional rights.
This separate category was progressively defined as 1 different1
through the Further refinement and regulation of slavery by legal
institutions ana practices. It was against this background that
efforts viere Dis.de to frame a United States Constitution when the
first convention met in Hiiladelphia in 1787 where, as will be
discussed in the subsequent section to this chapter, the issue of
slavery featured as the ideological site where various political
bargains were struck.
THE US CONSTITUTION AND THE LEGALITY OF SLAVE KIOPERTY RIGHT :
FUGITIVES IROM LABOUR
After the period of upheaval during the War of Independence
the newly independent states moved toward a point of political
and economic consolidation culminating in the writing of the
United States Constitution in 1787 and its adoption in 1789.
The Constitution was, however, as indicated earlier in 'this
chapter, written in the context of a growing antagonism between
Northern and Southern states about the legality of slavery within
their own state boundaries, an antagonism which reflected political
struggles over whose interests would be effectively represented in
the government of the new republican state. In the event, as will
be argued in the discussion which follows, the US Constitution was
drafted in the context of a competition between various interest
groups over various issues, though the voting was clearly sectional
in character over those sections in the document pertaining to
slavery. The document as finally produced and ratified by the
states reflects the negotiation of the antagonisms between North
and South, and the political compromises made are evident in those
clauses concerning commerce, where Southern delegates to the
Convention agreed to provisions which were primarily in the interest
of the North in exchange for the agreement of Northern delegates to
recognise the legality of the slave system in the South and to
participate in upholding this legality by apprehending and
returning fugitive slaves to their owners, by allowing slaves to be
counted fox' representation purposes in the national government, and
by conceding the legality of the slave trade for a specified period.
In fact, the compromises made in producing the US Constitution
resulted in a. more effective legal guarantee to slave property
right throughout the United States of America than had existed
prior to the birth of the new nation by providing federal legal
institutions which would ensure that, notwithstanding differences
in the extent to which individual state legal institutions upheld
or recognised the legality of slavery, slave property right could
he upheld in a consistent and effective way in constitutional law.
Prior to the framing of the US Constitution, from the period
between the Declaration of Independence until 1781, when the
Articles of Confederation were eventually in force (having
been written in 1777)? the delegates to the various sessions of
the Second Continental Congress had come into conflict over the
(2)
need for a. central government. v ' In an attempt to compromise
between the expressed need for a central administration and the
demand for the independence of the various states, the Articles of
Confederation had given the new national government considerable
(3)
powers K J as 'well as ensuring mutual respect for state rights and
privileges. For example, -under Article IY the guarantee was
given that:
1. 'Articles of Confederation1, in Richardson (comp) 1897? 1:9-16.
2. Billington et al., 1962:131.
3. Congress mighb (i) make wax or peace and fix state quotas o:
men. and money for the national army; (ii) make treaties and
alliances; (iii) decide inter-state disputes, limit state
boundaries and admit new states; (iv) borrow money and regulate
standards of coinage and weights and measures; and (v) establish
post offices. But the rights to levy taxes, raise troops and
regulate commerce were denied to Congress - in these areas the
states retained sovereignty.
The free inhabitants of each, of these states,
paupers, vagabonds and. fugitives from Justice
.excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges
and immunities of free citizens in several states;
and that:
If any Person guilty of or charged with treason,
felony, or other high misdemeanour in any state,
shall flee from Justice, and be found in any of
the United States, he shall upon demand of the
Governor or executive power, of the state from
which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the
state having jurisdiction of his offence.
As well as having certain, powers and ensuring state rights.
Congress was also given the power to establish how the western
territories (ceded from Pennsylvania, and Connecticut in l?8l)
(2)
would be governed and settled. Congress used this power for
(3)
the first time in the Ordinance of 1785 which set up a method
for tiie division and sale of public territories. While this was
a non-controversial measure, the same cannot be said of the
Northwest Ordinance, adopted by the Continental Congress on July
13, 1787j meeting in New York City. As will become clear in this
and subsequent chapters, the Northwest Ordinance was to become
/]
central in the struggle for power as to who was to rule the USA,
1. 'Articles of Confederation', Article XV, in Richardson (comp)
1897, 1:9.
2. Hofstadter et al., 19&k, 69-70.
3. 'Ordinance of 1785', in ¥orthing-ton C. Ford et a.l (eds),
"Journals of the Continental Congress 177^4-1789"9 Washington,
1933s 28:375-378.
1|. 'Northwest Ordinance of 1787', in Pord et al (eds), 1933'32:
337-339. For a full discussion of. the significance of this measure,
see Siraughton Lynd, "Class Conflict, Slavery and the United States
Constitution", in Political Science Quarterly LXXXI, 1966:225-250.
By the terms of the Ordinance, the Northwest Territory,
that is, the lands north of the Ohi.o and east of the Missippi
rivers, were to "be initially set up as a single unit with a
Governor to he appointed by Congress. When. 5,000 free male
inhabitants had settled in the territory, those who owned at
least 50 acres a piece were to elect a territorial legislature
whose acts would be subject only to the Governor's veto. The
voters would also send a non-voting delegate to Congress. No
less than three and no more than five states were to be carved out
of the territory, and the boundaries of three future states were
tentatively laid out. When a potential state had 60,000 free
inhabitants, it v/as to be admitted to the Union on an equal
footing with the original states.
In addition to these specifications concerning the political
administration of these lands, the Northwest Ordinance contained
a Bill of Rights which not only provided for certain basic civil
rights, including the right to jury trial, but also, in its Sixth
article, stated that:
TIiere shall be neither Slavery nor involuntary
Servitude in the said territory otherwise than in
the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall
have been duly convicted ...
However, although slavery was prohibited in the territory and the
states to be carved from it, through the second clause it was
provided that:
1. 1Northwest Ordinance of 1787: Bill of Rights5, in Jbrd et al.
(eds), 1933:3^3* This provision is remarkably similar to the
13th Amendment to the IIS Constitution discussed in Chapter 9-
Any person escaping into the j~teirritox-j~l from
whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in
any one of the original States, Such, fugitive
inay be lawfully reclaimed and conveyed to the
person claiming his or her labor as aforesaid.
Thus while the Northwest Ordinance had outlawed slavery in the
Northwest Territory it had affirmed the legality of slavery in
other regions by undertaking to return any fugitives from labour.
Nevertheless, exactly why the Continental Congress of l'(d7
voted to prohibit slavery in the Northwest has been a puzzle to
historians for a number of reasons, the most significant one
being that at the time Congress adopted the Ordinance it was
(2)
con-broiled by the South. v ' The Clause respecting slavery
(in the Ordinance) was agreed to by the Southern members "for the
purpose of preventing tobacco and indigo from being' made on the
N.W. side of the Ohio as well as for sev'1 other political
reasons" - so wrote William Grayson to James Mun.roe on August 8,
(,)1787. What were these several other political reasons and
why did the Southern majority of the Continental Congress unanimously
vote for the Northwest Ordinance despite its anti-slavery clause?
One answer which has been given to this question is that the
South expected that the Northwest would be settled mainly by
1. Ibid,, 343.
2. For a fuller discussion see, for example, S.A. Hinsdale, "The
Old North West: the Beginnings of our Colonial System", New York,
18995266; J.M, Merriam, "The legislative History of the Ordinance
of 1787". Proceedings of the American Antiquarian Society, New
Series, Worcester, 1889rSs33^; and Lynd, 1966:186.
3- See Edmond C. Burnett, ed., "Letters of the Members of the
Continental Congress", Washington, 10, 1921-1936:8:632 - cited in
lynd, 1966:190.
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Southernerss "by an outcropping ox the migrants then moving over
the mountains into Kentucky and Tennessee, who would vote with
the South in any ensuing sectional conflict. Thus, the
South could believe that, even without slave-holding, the
Northwest would be a support in national politics. Coupled
with this was the fact the Ordinance referred, only to the Northwest.
What then was implied as to the status of slavery south of the line
(?)
that became the Southwest territory? v ' In, for example, North
Carolina's cession of the area (later called Tennessee) it stated:
Provided always, That no regulations made or to
be made by Congress shall tend to emancipate
slaves, otherwise than shall be directed by the
Assembly or legislature of such State or States. (3)
Thus, in legislating against slavery in the Northwest, the
Ordinance only legislated against slavery in that part of the West
where it did not exist, while leaving it alone in the Southwest
where it already existed ana where its legality was already
established, ^ ^
The Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was not only the last but also
the most important act passed by Congress under the Confederation
which bore on the issue of the legality of slavery. In May of 1737
1. Both North and South could hope for the allegiance of the 3
states to be formed under the Ordinance, (see Lynd, 1966:190-192).
2. For a fuller discussion of this issue see R. Hilldreth, "The
History of the USA", New York, 181+9:3:523-29.
3. Walter Clark, ed., "The State Records of North Carolina",
Goldsboro, North Carolina, 1905:2l+;563 - cited by Lynd, 1966:
193, Note 21.
k. Lynd, 1966:192-3.
delegates had already "begun to arrive in Philadelphia for the
Constitutional Convention which was to establish in law the
parameters of the Federal Republican State. In
contradistinction to the Northwest Ordinance, the US Constitution
did not mention slavepy by name, ^ yet several clauses were
(2)included to assure the perpetuation of slavery ' and the
(3)
maximisation of political power for the Southern slaveholders.
These Constitutional clauses, which refer to slaves as 'other
persons1 (Article I, Section 2(3)) and "persons held to service
or labour" (Article IV, Section 2), guaranteed title to slave
property right more effectively than any previous action at a
national 1evel.
The delegates from the states who attended the Constitutional
Convention were almost unanimous on what the sovereign powers of
=ly
(5)
the national government should be and they were mostl agreed
on what the states should no longer be permitted to do.
Issues nevertheless did arise in the Convention which were subject
1. Until it was abolished in 1865 by the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment. *
2. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3; Article I, Section S, Clause
1; Article IV, Section 2, Clause 3.
3. Article I, Section 2, Clause 3«
1|. Congress should have (i) the power to levy and collect taxes,
tariffs and excises; (ii) it should be able to coin and borrow
money; (iii) it should be able to pay all debts contracted by the
US before the adoption of the Constitution; (iv) it should be able
to raise and maintain an army and a navy; (v) it should be able to
regulate inter-state and. foreign commerce, (see US Constitution,
Article I, Section 8; and Hofstadter et al., I96I1:7k) •
5. States should be forbidden to coin money; to make anything but
gold and silver legal' tender for the payment of debts; to make laws
impairing the obligation of contracts; or to levy duties on imports
or exports, (Article I, Section 10, US Constitution).
to consId.era.ble opposition and which were central to the
maintenance of the system of slave production in the Southern
(l)sta.tes. As has been argued earlier, v ' slave production
presupposes the legal institution of slavery, thus the new
federal republican state must be made to guarantee the legal title
to slave property. thus, for the legality of claims to slave
property to be upheld and effectively guaranteed, the slave-
owning class must either be politically dominant or it must make
alliances with classes not opposed to compromise over the slavery
issue. Since the USA was in the process of establishing itself
as a bourgeois democratic republic, the slave-owning class must,
to be politically effective, have an effective majority in the
representative institutions of the state. This majority,
however, did not necessarily have to be a popular majority based
on the votes of the citizens. In the USA, the dominance of the
Southern slave party interest was made possible by a number of
compromises made in the framing of the US Constitution,
One of the central issues to slave-owning interests and over
which there was considerable conflict concerned the relative
power of large and small states. After considering various plans,
(2)
principally the Virginia Plan v ' which proposed a two house
national legislature with membership allotted among the states in
1. See Chapter 1 in particular.
2. Max Farrand (ed) "The Records of the Federal Convention of
1787", Hew Haven, Yale University Press, 1966 rev.ed., (originally
published 1911) 1:20-22.
proportion to their population, 'thus favouring the larger
states, and the Hew Jersey Plan ^^ which, proposed a single
house where all states had one vote each, thus favouring the
smaller states, the issue was resolved, after extended debate
(2)
by the measure known as the 'Great Compromise'. v J This plan
proposed a two house legislature, with membership in the lower
house, the House of Representatives, apportioned according to
population (satisfying the large states), and with membership of
the upper house, "the Senate, equal for all states (satisfying the
smaller ones), The House .of Representatives was regarded as the
'people's branch' of government with members being elected by all
eligible voters in each state. The state legislatures, in turn,
were themselves to elect the members of the national Senate, to
ensure the election of members most satisfactory to property
interests. While the South expected to dominate the House of
Representatives, the Worth looked to the Senate for its security,
(3)
thus making this Great Compromise acceptable.
The existence of the upper chamber, the Senate, based not
upon, numbers of electors but upon the fixed ratio of two Senators
to each state, meant that by keeping the number of slave states at
1. Ibid., l:2l£.
2. Largely devised, by Benjamin franklin.
The Northwest Ordinance, in particular its provisions regarding
the admission of new states from the Northwest territory, appeared
to promote Southern interests in the House while protecting
Northern interests in the Senate. Moreover, Worth as well as South
could hope for the political allegiance of at least some of the
Northwest states to be carved up (Lynd, 1968:203-210).
least equal to the number of free states, the slave party
could maintain its bargaining powers. The South could also
hope to dominate the House of Representatives if the Southern
states could count slaves for the purposes of representation.
Indeed, it was over the issue of the representation of slaves
in Congress that another compromise, the 1 Three-Fifths
Compromise' was made. The issue was whether slaves should be
counted in determining the number of representatives to which
each state was entitled and in measuring the extent to which
Congress could levy taxes on the several states.
The underlying legal issue was whether the slave was a
person, and thus entitled to political representation, or chattel
property, and as such entitled to be counted solely for the
purposes of tax assessment. Hie representatives from the South
wanted slaves to be fully counted in apportioning representation,
but counted as less than free men in assessing taxes. The
North wanted them to be given less weight only in apportioning
congressional representation. Thus, while Georgia and South
Carolina delegates demanded that for representation purposes,
slaves should be counted equally with free persons, delegates from
the North, ironically enough, argued that slaves were property and
therefore not entitled to representation. Paterson of New
Jersey said he could regard negro slaves "in no light but as
property ... and if Negroes are not represented in the States to
which they belong, why should they be represented in the Gen'l
Govt?" ^^ The compromise which was finally accepted, the
1, Farrand, 1966 ed., 1:560.
1 Three-Fifths Compromise' specified that for both taxes and
representation, three negro slaves were to be counted as
equivalent to five non-slaves. Thus, Article 1, Section 2,
Clause 3 °f the US Constitution reads:
Representatives and direct Taxes sha.ll be
apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union, according to their
respective Numbers, which shall be determined by
adding to the whole number of free persons,
including those bound to service for a term of
years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three-
fifths of all other persons ... (emphasis added).
Through this compromise, the slave states were guaranteed
representation in the lower chamber far greater than was
warranted by their free population. Indeed, in every election
between 1790 and the Civil War, fcom a quarter to a third more
representatives in Congress were given to the South than her
free population entitled her to have.
A third major compromise, which assured increased political
power for the South (for at least the foreseeable future),
concerned the international slave trade and the return of
1 fugitives from, labour' (fugitive slaves). Opposition to the
slave trade was more deep-seated among delegates to the
1. The coalition of state voting which secured the three-fifth
compromise at the Convention was not a combination cf 'large
states' bit was rather an instance of the sectional pattern of
Southern and Northern interests. If South Carolina is placed
in the 'aye' column, despite its voting against to start with
(because it wanted slaves counted as equal to free persons for
representation purposes), then Virginia and the Southern states
formed a solid block (Lynd, 1968:200).
Constitutional Convention than opposition to slavery itself.
This opposition was not sectional in the sense of Southern
versus northern interests, hut was based on a complex
geographical division of economic interest. Georgia and South
Carolina, who strongly opposed any restriction on the slave
trade, had witnessed the ravaging of their plantations during the
Revolutionary War and required assurance that they could build up
their slave laboiir force for the developing rice economy and the
beginnings of the production of cotton. To some extent, they
were supported by Massachusetts and Rhode Island, states which
were anti-slavery in terms of their own productive systems, though
economically centrally involved in the slave trade as financiers,
merchants, ship builders, captains and seamen, These interests
were noted by General Pinckney, South Carolina, when, in the
debate on this issue he contended that:
The importation of slaves would be for the
interest of the whole Union. The more slaves,
the more produce to employ the carrying trade;
the more consumption also, and the more of this,
'
the more of revenue for the common treasury.
The Constitutional debates on the slave trade centred on two
questions: whether the Constitution would recognise the legality
of the slave trade; and, if so, whether import duties should be
imposed on slaves as with any other merchandise. On the first
of these qiiestions, South Carolina, North Carolina and Georgia
1, James Madison, "Notes of Debates in the Federal Convention",
Athens, University of Georgia Press, i960 ed., $0b*
were united in their view that any attempt by the federal
government to outlaw the trade would make it impossible for
these states to join the Union. Thus Mr Baldwin from Georgia
noted that Georgia's physical distance from the seat of national
government would:
Preclude her from equal advantage and that she
could not prudently purchase it by yielding
national, powers. Prom this it mig^it be
understood in what light she would view an
attempt to abridge one of her favorite
prerogatives (jthe right to slave labourJ7.
In making the case for non-interference by the national
government with the right to import slaves, these states argued
that the slave trade and slavery were not national questions over
which the national government had any power, but were strictly of
a local nature. This view was upheld by certain Northern states,
thus Mr Gerry of Massachusetts noted that the national government
(2)
"had nothing to do with the conduct of the States to slaves"
and Mr KLsworth of Connecticut supported this view when he argued
that:
As slaves also multiply so fast in Virginia and
Maryland that it is cheaper to raise than import
them, whilst in the sickly rice swamps foreign
supplies are necessary, if we go further than is
urged, we shall be unjust towards South Carolina




Hie slave trade was opposed by the Middle Atlantic states
(hew York, hew Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware) who argued, for
example, that;.
The true question was whether the national
happiness would be promoted or impeded by the
importation, and this question ought to be left
to the National Government, not to the States
particularly interested;
and by Virginia and Maryland because the latter Southern states
had depleted tobacco lands and surpluses of negro slaves and
envisaged themselves as 'breeding* grounds for slave labour and
(2)
thus able to supply slave labour at high prices. v ' Thus,
Colonel Mason for Virginia could argue that the slave tra.de must
be stopped and that the national government had the power to do
so since, ,:by an inevitable chain of causes and effects,
providence punishes national sins, by national calamities".
Pinckney, South Carolina, however, warned that outlawing the
slave trade would mean "an exclusion of S. Carols, from the Union"
and noted that "as for Virginia she will gain by stopping the
importations. Her slaves will rise in value and she has more
than she wants". ^ '
(<)
In the context of this kind of opposition, v y Mr King of
1. Ibid., Mr Dickenson (Delaware) at $Q6.
2. Ibid., 503.
3. Ibid., 503.
I4. Farrand, 1966 ed., 3:371.
5. -The Convention was united however in its opposition to
integration of the negro in American society on any basis of
citizenship.
Massachusetts suggested that "the subject should be considered
in a political light only" and, in doing so, he focused on the
second of the questions concerning the slave trade confronting
the delegates, namely, whether import duties should be .imposed
on slaves.
Thus:
He remarked on the exemption of slaves from duty
whilst every other import was subjected to it,
as an inequality that could not fail to strike
the commercial sagacity of the Northern and
middle states.
The delegates from South Carolina, North Carolina and Georgia
were, however, apparently prepared to agree to an import duty
as long as the slave trade was regarded as legitimate, "thus
General Pinckney of South Carolina:
Moved to commit the clause that slaves might be
made liable to an equal tax with other imports
which he thought right and which would remove
one difficulty that had been started.
Having reached this point in the debate on the slave trade
Governor Morris, Pennsylvania, suggested that:
The whole subject ... be committed including the
clauses relating to taxes on exports and to a
navigation act. These things may form a bargain








Delegates from the commercial North had urged that the
federal government be granted full power to regulate inter¬
state and foreign commerce and to make "treaties which the states
must obey. While the Constitutional Convention agreed on "these
points, the South, fearful of being' ou'fc-voted in "the new Congress,
demanded that commercial regulations and all treaties require the
consent of a two-thirds majority in the Senate rather than a
simple majority. The Southerners were particularly concerned
about taxes on exports, for they were heavily dependent on
selling their tobacco and other staples in competitive world
markets. The upshot of "the debate on these provisions and the
issue of the slave tra.de was reference to a committee of eleven
delegates, the members of which represented Northern shipping
interests and Southern slave holders. ^^
On the basis of the report of the committee of eleven, the
Constitutional Convention negotiated the third major compromise.
While the Northerners won their point on a simple congressional
majority for acts regulating commerce, the South won the
provision requiring a. two-thirds vote in the Senate for the
ratification of all treaties. The Constitution also prohibited
(2)
all taxes on exports v ' and, by Article I, Section 3, Clause 1,
it guaranteed that for at least 20 years there would be no ban on
the importation of slaves:
1. Madison, 1966 ed., 509«
2. Hofstadter et al., 136k:77,
The migration or importation of such persons
as any of the States now existing shall think
proper to'admit, shall not be prohibited, by the
Congress prior to the year l808, but a tax on-
duty may be imposed on such importation, not
exceeding 10 dollars for each person.
A further aspect of this 'bargain' seems to have been the
(2)
insertion of the fugitive slave clause, under Article IV,
Section 2, Clause 3 which reads:
No person held to service or labour in one State,
under the laws thereof, escaping into another,
shall, in consequence of any law or regulation
therein, be discharged from such service or
labour, but shall be delivered up on claim on the
party to whom such service or labour may be due.
The obligation to return fugitive slaves had already been
established under the terms of the Northwest Ordinance and the
(3^
clause adopted in the Constitution vtas virtually identical,
which arguably explains why, at the Constitutional Convention,
this clause was insarted wTith very little debate, despite
Sherman of Connecticut's view that the Constitution could not be
burdened with petty details concerning the return of stolen
CO
goods. Ironically enoughj as shall be discussed, in Chapter 8,
1. Note that this provision did not necessarily prohibit the
slave trade after l808. This drafting and its consequences
are more fully discussed in Chapter 6.
2. Hofstadter et al., 1961+: 77.
3- See p.306 of this chapter.
It. Madison, 1966 ed., 552; Franklin, 1969:lJ+3.
5. Madison, i960 ed., 510.
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this provision regarding 'fugitives from labour', which was
hardly discussed at the Convention, was not only the basis for
two federal statutes concerning fugitive slaves, but was also
at the centre of the conflict prior to the Civil War over the
legality of claims to slave property.
The Constitution then, and the federal laws enacted to secure
(2)its ends as ' the supreme lav; of the land', - ' was unambiguous
about the issue of slave representation, the legality of the slave
trade (at least for 20 years), and on the duty to catch and i"eturn
a fugitive slave. By regarding slaves, in law, as three-fifths
of other persons, Madison wa,s able to comment that the Constitution
recognised a dualism rather than a. contradiction in law. Thus he
argued that slaves were considered by the law;
In some respects, as persons and in other respects as
property. In being compelled to labor, not for
himself, but for a master; in being vendible by one
master to another master; and in being subject at all
times to be restrained in his liberty and chastised in
his body, by the capricious will of another - the slave
may appear to be degraded from the human rank:, and
classed with those irrational animals which fall under
the legal denomination of property. In being
protected, on the other hand, in his life and in his
limbs, against the violence of all others, even the
master of his labor and his liberty; and in being
punishable himself for all violence committed against
others - the slave is no less evidently regarded by the
law as a member of the society, not as a part of the
irrational creation; as a moral person, not as a mere
article of property. (3)
1. The fugitive slave lav;s of 1793 1800, which are
discussed in Chapter 8,
2. The Constitution also set up a federal judicial system, under
Article "VI, Section 2, topped by the US Supreme Court, and while it
set u.p no specific provision for judicial review, Chief Justice
Marshall established this (see Chapter 7).
3. Madison in Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James Madison, "The
Federalist Papers", Mew Bochelle, Modern Library edition, 1965:^2:266,
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Hie South then, had secured its political dominance, through
Constitutional provisions and through a policy of compromise with
Northern interests. Slave property right and "bourgeois property
right were clearly not, in essence, contradictory. Hie
compromises and bargains struck between North and South showed no
antagonism between capitalism and. slavery, nor was there any
obstacle in the way of the continuance of the Southern productive
system based on slave labour. Indeed, as General. Pinckney told
the South Carolina House of Representatives in January 1788 in his
speech urging ratification of the US Constitution:
By this settlement we have secured an unlimited
importation of negroes for 20 years. Nor is it
declared that the importation shall be then stopped;
it may be continued. We have a security that the
general government can never emancipate them, for no
such authority is granted; and it is admitted, on
all hands, that the general government has no powers
but what are expressly granted by the Constitution,
and that all rights not expressed were reserved by
the several states, (l) We have obtained a right
to x*ecover our slaves in whatever part of America
they may take refuge, which is a right we had not
before. In short, considering all the
circumstances, we have made the best terms for the
security of this species of property it was in our
power to make. We would have made it better if we
could; but, on the whole, I do net think them bad. (2)
All delegates to the Constitutional Convention were agreed that
the system of government should be based on representing the
1. The Tenth Amendment, passed in 1789, made this
Constitutional Doctrine explici "1/ • first ten amendments
were, in fact, to be regarded as the Federal Constitution's Bill
of Rights.
2. Farrand, 1966 ed., 3:2
(
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interests of properly and, as such, were able to frame a Constitution
which assured the legality of both slave property right and bourgeois
property right. And, to ensure that claims to slave property were
upheld in the courts, legislation was instituted to implement the
constitutional provision for the rendition of fugitive slaves.
In 1793 "the first fugitive slave law was enacted to implement Article
17, Section 2, Clause 3? of the US Constitution. } The 1793
Fugitive Slave Law made clear just how 1 fugitives from labour* could
be reclaimed, thus Section 3 states:
And be it so enacted, that when a person held to labor in
any of the United States, or in either of the territories
on the Uorthwest or South of the River Ohio, under the
laws thereof shall escape into any other of the said
states or territory, the person to whom such labor or
service may be due his agent or attorney, is hereby
empowered to seize or arrest such fugitive from labor,
and to take him 03: her before any judge of the circuit
district courts of the United States, residing or being
within the state or before any magistrate of a county,
city or town corporate, wherein such seizure or arrest
shall be made, and upon proof to the satisfaction of such
judge or magistrate, either by oral testimony or affidavit
taken before and certified by a magistrate of any such
state or territory, that the person so seized or anrrested
doth, under the laws of the state or territory from which
he or she fled., owe service or labor to Hie person
claiming him or her it shall be the duty of such judge, or
magistrate to give a certificate thereof to such claimant,
his agent or attorney which shall be sufficient warrant
for removing the said fugitive from labor to the state or
territory from which he or she fled. (3)
1. Following the slave insurrection led by Touissaint L'Overture,
(see C.L.R. James, "The Black Jacobins", New York, Vintage Books,
1963) in 1791 on the Island of Santo Domingo, many negro slaves from
the Caribbean escaped into the United States during the conflict in
Haiti. This encouraged more slaves on the US plantations to escape,
thus provoking the federal government to take action regarding
fugitives in 1793-
2. To ensure that constitutional sovereignty would not be impaired
by technicalities, the framers added an 'elastic clause' which enabled
Congress, "To make all laws which shall be necessary and pr-oper for
carrying into execution the foregoing powers, and all other powers
vested by this Constitution in the government ox the United States, or
in any department or officer thereof" (Article I, Section 8, Clause 18,
US Constitution).
3. Act of February 12, 1793? Chapter 7, 1 Stat. 302 - my emphasis.
This law therefore required no trial by jury arid required,
conviction as a 'fugitive from labour' only on an oral testimony
of the claimant or on an affidavit certified by a magistrate of
the state from which the negro was alleged to have fled, As
such> the Act was not only a manifestation in federal law of the
constitutional guarantee of slave property right but was also to
be used, as shall be discussed in Chapter 8, in critical
litigation concerning slavery prior to the outbreak of Civil War.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter it has been argued that throughout the
revolutionary and post-revolutionary periods, the process of
deconstructing the slave status through Northern legal institution
and practices was paralleled by an antithetical trend in the South-
where the slave status as akin to chattel property was further
refined and entrenched through the practice of law. This
antagonism between North and South over the legality of slavery,
an antagonism upheld under the new state constitutional frameworks
was not an antagonism of capitalistic versus slave systems but was
rather symptomatic of the struggle for power as to which region's
interests would predominate in the government of the USA. It was
within this context that delegates from the Northern, and Southern
states met in 1787 to draft a national constitution which would be
regarded as definitive of national governmental powers, and the
1. Erahklin, 1969:151.
primary task at the Constitutional Convention was to draft a,
document which all states could find acceptable. Such a task
inevitably involved a prolonged process of negotiation where the
commercial interests of the North were explicitly used as
bargaining counters with the slave interests of the South.
In "the event, through & series of compromises over slave
property right subsequently embodied within the text of the US
Constitution, notably that for representation purposes, slaves
were to be counted as three-fifths of other persons, that the
slave trade could not be prohibited for twenty years, and that
fugitive slaves could be reclaimed from any part of the USA, a
mere effective legal guarantee to hold property in slaves was
created than had existed prior to the birth of the new republican
stale. These constitutional provisions constituted a more
effective basis within law upon which a slave mode of production
in the South could fully develop since they guaranteed that,
notwithstanding the different patterns of development occurring
in Northern and Southern states, federal legal institutions and
practices would ensure that slave property ri^it was not only
not under threat but was also, and more importantly, more firmly
established throughout the USA. Indeed, as will be discussed
in the following chapter, it was precisely this constitutional
basis for the legality of claims to slave property which ensured
the expanded reproduction of the slave system in the early 19th
century.
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INTRODUCTION
In the previous chapter it was argued, that the legality of
claims to slave property right was effectively established in
constitutional law in the process of negotiating the form and
nature of government for the USA. The guarantees to slave
property under the US Constitution ensured that the federal
republican state would defend the right to this kind of property,
as it would any other kind of property, despite any measures
individual states took with regard to the legality of slavery
within their own boundaries. Thus, within the body of the new
•state' it was possible for a specialist agrarian commodity-
producing region based on a slave mode of production to continue
to exist, given that the new political and legal orders regarded
slaves (labourers) as the legal property of masters (non-
labourers).
This developed form of chattel slavery, in which the slave
was regarded as a variant of private property and where a system
of exchange existed corresponding to this type of property, had
developed in the South by the late l8th century and was dependent
on the existence of private property as a general institution.
From the late l8th century onwards, the Southern states were the
major producers of cotton as a commodity to supply the demands of
1. In their analysis of whether it is possible to construct the
concept of a distinctively slave mode of production, Hindess and
Hirst (1975^113) have argued that the master's relation to the slave
is a proprietal one which is dependent on the existence of laws and
a political order which makes the possession of human beings as
chattels possible.
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capitalist industrial production in both Europe and the Northern
states. The South, as a specialist agrarian region, had firmly
established its productive system on the basis of slavery and, by
the turn of the 19th century, it was clear that the expanded
reproduction of the Southern economy meant the expansion of slave
production on plantations which produced agricultural commodities
for sale on the national and international markets.
Many scholars, however, have argued that it was precisely in
attempting to develop economically through a slave rather than a
capitalist mode of production that the expanded reproduction of
the Southern economy was limited since the slave mode of
production resulted in economic backwardness in the South in
relation to the capitalistic North and ultimately resulted in the
break up of the Union and the Civil War. This reasoning, however,
takes for granted what it fails to explain and, given that,
as was argued earlier, no necessary antagonism existed between the
capitalist system in general and slavery in North America, where
slave production appeared under specific conditions as a
subordinate form to the capitalist mode of production, the
development of the Southern economy could only have been limited by
specific factors. These factors - the demand for the commodities
produced in the South by the capitalist world market; the
political and legal support for the expansion of the slave system;
1. Thus, Genovese (1961+; 1967; 1971) in. particular assumes an
opposition between capitalism and slavery and then explains the
future conflict (the Civil War) in terms of this assumed
opposition.
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and. the supply and price of slave labour power through the
internal, domestic trade and the international trade - did not
only not impose limits but, as will be argued in this chapter,
positively encouraged the expanded reproduction of the Southern
economy based on slavery in the early part of the 19th century.
The demand for the commodities produced in the Southern
states, in particular the demand for cotton, was more or less
insatiable in the world market. Thus, the years immediately
following the close of the War of 1812, witnessed an unparalleled
movement of the population westward into the Gulf region to
cultivate extensive crops of cotton on this rich soil. In
(2)
Louisiana, v ' for example, cotton and sugar cane rapidly became
the profitable crops of the slave holding planters. Numerous
planters from the South Eastern states such as Virginia and South
Carolina moved into the new lands of the 'Cotton Kingdom' following
earlier, unsatisfactory, attempts to grow cotton in Virginia and
North Carolina. While at the beginning of the 19th century the
South Eastern states had grown most of the cotton, by the 1820s
( 3)
the South Central states were taking over. w/
This geographical expansion of the plantation system into new
lands in order to produce sufficient cotton to meet the demands of
the world market can be attributed to a variety of conjunctural
1. The lands of the Louisiana purchase sold by the Erench to the
USA in 1803. The significance of these lands to the expanded
reproduction of the slave system of production will be discussed in
a later section of this chapter.
2. Which became a state in 1812.
3. Eranklin, 1969:171-72.
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factors. There is little doubt that the South suffered from
serious soil exhaustion and that the system of production
which had developed in the Southern states required to expand
itself geographically if it was to minimise the costs of
production. To stay in the same lands, without geographical
expansion, when these lands had experienced a significant fall
in productivity due to soil exhaustion, would have meant
additional expenditure in terms of labour time, technique and
raw materials, to restore the level of productivity. In the
absence of the monopoly possession of land, however, planters
could work a particular piece of land until it was exhausted and
then move on. The soil exhaustion experienced in the Southern
states was therefore not simply a function of the particular
labour system involved but was primarily a function of the fact
that where land was cheap, planters, wanting to minimise the
costs of production, would not engage in the conservation of land
by more costly measures, such as crop rotation and fallowing, but
(2)
would rather buy cheap new land. x ' Slave labour was the primary
investment and to make use of this labour most profitably meant
geographical expansion.
1. See, Genovese, 1967:99* where he discusses the extent to which
the effects of soil exhaustion are still manifest in the South.
For example, in 1930, the South accounted for two-thirds of the
tonnage of fertilisers consumed in the USA but represented only one-
sixth of the nation's cropland.
2. Hindess and Hirst (1975:168-9) have thoroughly argued the
point that soil exhaustion is primarily a function of the planter's
relation to the land and the process of production and that such
conditions and relations to the land are not specific to slave
production but rather occur "wherever there is commodity production
for the world market on a large scale in conditions where there is
ample surplus land" (169).
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The slave system of production, however, could only expand
in this way into new territories if slavery could be both
politically and legally guaranteed in these new territories.
Indeed, it was within the context of the geographical expansion
of the slave system in the early 19th century that the basis of
the future conflict, which would eventually lead to the break up
of the Union and Civil War, was established: a conflict not of
capitalism versus slavery ^^ but rather of slave holders who
wanted to expand into the new territories and free settlers who
wanted their own land. Only a presentiment of this conflict, which
(2)
became critical in the l850s, v ' was evident in the early 19th
century when, with the expanded reproduction of the slave system,
the federal republican state guaranteed and defended the legal title
to slave property in at least some of the new territories. As will
be discussed more fully in the next section of this chapter,
throughout the first part of the 19th century the legality of
expansion was firmly established despite some opposition and the
planter class secured numerous concessions of territory to the slave
system. Such territories included the lands of the Louisiana
Purchase (1803), the Acquisition of Florida (1819) and, under the
terms of the Missouri Compromise of 1820, the lands up to the
1. The plantation economy of the South was closely allied with
important sections of northern banking, commercial and industrial
capital. For example, most of the marketing and carrying of the
staple crops produced in the South was performed by New York and
New England commission merchants, or 'factors', who also served,
for an additional fee, as the planters' purchasing agents,
(Hofstadter et al., 196U:155-156).
2. See Chapter 8.
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parallel 36"30 North.
The expansion of the slave system, however, required not
only land but also slaves. Expanded reproduction, then,
required an adequate supply of slave labour, that is, it
required a viable market in slaves as a commodity. And, for a
viable market in slaves as a commodity to exist meant that there
could be "no effective legal prohibition of the alienation of or
the trade in slaves", so that the slave had a value as a
(2)
commodity hence in circulation. v ' Slave labour had to be
capable of being bought and sold in the commodity market and, for
an adequate supply of slave labour to be maintained in the
Southern states this meant that there must be no effective legal
prohibition on either the international or the internal,
domestic slave trade. To supply the Southern plantations, in
the early 19th century, with enough slave labour, breeding was
C r>\
either insufficient or impracticable therefore the renewal of
the labour force through the international slave trade was
necessary in addition to the slaves bred in Virginia and Maryland.
In this chapter, it will be argued that in spite of the
legal prohibition of the international slave trade from 1808
1. Hindess and Hirst, 1975sll-jl.
2. Hindess and Hirst (1975*128-138; llpL-2) have argued that the
slave must have a value in circulation if the central
contradiction constitutive of the forces of production in the
slave mode of production, that is, between the slave as a labourer
and as a form of property, is to exist.
3. Breeding raises the price of slaves due to the cost of
maintenance during the unproductive period and where the
consumption of a slave's labour power is exhausted in less than a
generation, breeding is not possible as a major source of supply.
onwards, v ' this legislation, and subsequent refinements were
by no means effective. While by 1835 "the international slave
(2)
trade had been legislated to death", v ' the effectiveness of
the legislation depended on both the circumstances and motives
surrounding the abolition of the international slave trade and
the effectiveness of the system of law enforcement in relation
to national and international law. As will be discussed later
in this chapter, the 1legal technicalities' inherent in the
federal legislation of the United States, the inadequate
resources for policing the prohibitions, and the complexity at
international law, were some of the critical factors which
rendered any legislation in this area almost totally ineffective.
Thus no real limitation to the expanded reproduction of the slave
system, because of an inadequate labour supply, was imposed by
the legislative prohibition of the international slave trade.
Moreover, the internal domestic trade in slaves was not
prohibited and soon became an extremely profitable and well-
organised trading activity in and of itself. In the economic
reorganisation forced upon Maryland, Virginia and the Carolinas,
at the turn of the 19th century with the movement into the Cotton
1. Federal restrictions against the international slave trade
were expressly forbidden (re the importation of slaves) by the
US Constitution until the year l808. Many abolitionists and
anti-slavery reformers argued that by outlawing the international
trade, slavery itself would gradually be abolished. This, of
course, did not happen.
2. Warren S. Howard, "American Slavers and the Federal Law",
New York, International Publishing Co., 1963:i+.
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Kingdom, slave trading took its place along with diversified
farming as solutions to the problem of economic readjustment.
Even before 1800 the domestic slave trade in Maryland and
Virginia was well developed. States like South Carolina which
had prohibited importations from Africa for a time, encouraged
their citizens to purchase slaves from other states, thereby
stimulating the domestic traffic considerably. The inter¬
state traffic thus became a profitable economic activity, and
the consequent rising value of slave property had the effect of
quietening any anti-slavery sentiment in Maryland and Virginia
at the turn of the century. ^^ With the official closing of
the international trade in 1808, the domestic trade became even
more profitable. By about l8l5, around the time of the great
movement of the population into the Cotton Kingdom, it had
become a major economic activity in the country and the machinery
(2)
for handling the domestic traffic in slaves developed rapidly. v '
The significance of these developments in relation to the
international and domestic trade in slaves is discussed more
fully later in this chapter, but, despite the complexities
involved, there is no doubt that an adequate supply of slave
1. As was mentioned in Chapter 5» both Virginia and Maryland had
suffered from an excess of slaves in the late l8th century, but the
.inter-state trade became highly profitable for them.
2. Erahklin, 1969:175- Slave breeding was also practised on
some scale in the states of the upper South such as Virginia and
Maryland. In fact, slave breeding was one of the most approved
methods of increasing agricultural capital. Breeding was fairly
profitable and slave girls became mothers at about 13 years old.
Bounties and prizes were offered for great proflicacy, and, in
some instances, fteedom was granted to mothers who had enriched
their masters to the extent of bearing 10 or 15 children
(Eranklin, 1969:178).
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labour was maintained and that a viable market in slaves as a
commodity continued to exist. When Congress officially
closed the international trade in 1808 there were approximately
one million slaves owned in the country. And, while it is not
possible from the records available to estimate what proportion
were subsequently smuggled into the country and how many slaves
were bred from slave populations already established from
Virginia to Georgia, the fact that on the eve of Civil War there
were approximately four million slaves owned in the South,
demonstrates that the market in slaves as a commodity was
maintained. Thus, the distribution of slaves to the units of
production through the commodity market ensured that the status
of the slave as a form of property and as a labourer was
maintained.
As will be discussed in more detail in subsequent sections
of this chapter, from the turn of the 19th century, the expanded
reproduction of the slave system was made possible by the
extremely rapid growth in the demand for commodities, in
particular cotton, produced on Southern plantations, by the
capitalist world market; by the South's maintenance of political
dominance in the representative institutions of the federal
republican state, thereby securing numerous cessions of territory
to the slave power; and by the federal state's recognition of
the legality of the internal domestic trade in slaves and its
failure to make legislative prohibition of the international trade
effective, thereby ensuring that the sources of slave labour were
adequate to meet the demands of the slave system.
LEGALITY" AMD EXPANSION
As was argued in the introduction to this chapter, the
expansion of slave production to new territories as opposed to
forms of production based on free labour meant that slavery must
be legally/politically guaranteed in the new territory. The
purchase of Louisiana by the United States from Erance in 1803
almost doubled American territory, ^ and, at the same time,
facilitated the expansion of cotton and sugar cultivation by the
planters of the Southern States and the deepening entrenchment of
(2)
the slave system in the region. s ' Prior to the Louisiana
purchase, that area, whether in the hands of the Erench or the
(3")
Spanish, KJ was already a centre of sugar cane cultivation.
Slaves had been introduced by the Creole planters and by the late
18th century some were being brought into Louisiana from the
Caribbean. The acquisition of Louisiana by Erance in 1800
(5)
had greatly disturbed the United States, since in 1795 the
new republic had negotiated a satisfactory arrangement with Spain
for the navigation of the Mississippi River. More than one
third of the produce of the United States was transported via New
Orleans. Thus, to ensure continued navigation of the river for
1. Hofstadter et al., 1962+:98•
2. Eranklin, 1969:152.
3. Erance acquired the area from Spain in 1800 (Hofstadter et al.
19614.: 97).
I4. Spain had held Louisiana from 1762-1800 (Hofstadter et al.,
196h:97).
5. See Eranklin, 1969:152.
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western farmers, the United States purchased the territory from
France. This purchase also ensured a vast area for the
expansion of the slave mode of production.
In the early 19th century the United States could thus
appraise its unsettled western lands as one of its most valuable
assets, particularly after the purchase of Louisiana. And,
although many of the settlers in the 'frontier lands' were imbued
with the revolutionary principles of liberty, this ideology was to
be rendered ineffective by the power of the slave-holding class
intent on securing new lands for the Cotton Kingdom. Moreover,
the greater portion of the people who moved from the Atlantic
Coastal states to the attractive lands of the Southern Gulf states
(2)
were committed to slavery, ' the migration of slaves with
Virginian and Carolinian planters to the Kentucky and Tennessee
(i.)
regions in the 1790s setting the pattern of the expanded
reproduction of the slave mode of production in the 19th century.
The acquisition of Florida by the United States from Spain
in 1819 led to a further expansion of the slave system. Shortly
before the beginning of the War of 1812, the doctrine which came
to be known as 'Manifest Destiny', summarised by Adams' statement
1. There were several reasons for Napoleon's decision to sell
Louisiana (see Hofstadter et al., I96I4:97-98; Franklin, 1969:
152), but there can be little doubt that Napoleon's failure to
crush the slave revolt led by Toussaint L'Ouverture in Haiti,
was a significant factor (see James, 1963).
2. Franklin, 1969:166-67.
3. Although neither Kentucky nor Tennessee were actually states in
1790, migration was so rapid, that they soon qualified for statehood
(Franklin, 1969:1^6).
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that the absorption of all North America by the United States
was "as much a law of nature ... as that the Mississippi should
flow to the sea" ^^ became increasingly expressed by slaveholders
and Northern industrialists alike. The declared motivation behind
expansionism was to extend the area of freedom - 'the Empire of
Liberty1. Southern slaveholders who expounded this doctrine were
able to contain the contradiction of slave owning at the same time
as expounding the doctrine of Manifest Destiny by constructing an
ideology which viewed the enslavement of blacks as essential to
(2)
the white man's freedom. v ' With the acquisition of Florida,
which now safeguarded slave owners against the possibility of
losing slaves through their escape to Spanish soil, and the lands
of the Louisiana purchase, the planter class had already secured
a monopoly control of a vast amount of new territory acquired by
the United States but effectively ceded to the slave system.
This rapid expansion of the slave system into new territory was
temporarily interrupted by the controversy over the admission of
Missouri. While it had been straightforward enough to guarantee
the legality of claims to slave property in the new lands of
Louisiana and Florida, the controversy over whether Missouri could
be admitted as a slave state opened up the question of just how
far the slave system could be allowed to extend. This "momentous
1. As cited by Hofstadter et al., 196i|.:107.
2. A parallel argument was also made at a later stage in relation
to the genocide of North American Indians - another manifestation
of the notion of 'Manifest Destiny'.
337-
question", wrote Jefferson in 1820, "like a firebell in the
night, awakened me and filled me with terror". ^
(2)
Under the terms of the Northwest Ordinance, x ' slavery had
been legally prohibited in the Northwest Territory from 1787
onwards. The conflict over the extension of slavery occurred
just beyond the Northwest Territory in the so-called Upper
Louisiana Territory, whose settlers first applied for admission
to the Union under the name of Missouri in l8l8. In the House
of Representatives, James Tallmadge of New York offered an
amendment to the Missouri 'Enabling Act' which would prohibit
the introduction of additional slaves into the new state, and
further, that all children born of slaves in that region would
be freed when they reached the age of 25 years. Although the
Tallmadge Amendment narrowly passed the House of Representatives
it was defeated in the Senate by 22 votes to 16, even though the
number of free states outnumbered slave states 11 to 10 at the
time the Amendment was proposed in 1819.
This deadlock over Missouri's admission carried over to the
next session of Congress which opened in December 1819. Now,
along with Missouri's petition for admission as a slave state,
came Alabama's application also. There was no issue about the
admission of Alabama as a slave state under the terms of the
Northwest Ordinance, thus on December ll*, 1819, Alabama entered
1. Letter to John Holmes, April 22, 1820, cited by Billington
et al., 1962; 1:21*9-50.
2. Discussed in Chapter 5.
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as a slave state and re-established the balance of power
between slave and free states at 11 each. Missouri would have
made a twelfth slave state, thereby giving Southern senators a
virtual veto of all legislation enacted by a preponderantly
Northern House of Representatives.
The Northern majority in the House therefore insisted on
keeping Missouri closed to slavery. When the North Eastern
part of Massachusetts applied for admission to the Union as the
independent state of Maine, however, many members of Congress,
led by Henry Clay, attempted to break the deadlock. In a
series of measures, known as the 'Missouri Compromise', ^
they arranged for the temporary preservation of the balance of
power in the Senate by admitting Missouri as a slave state and
Maine as a free one. The most significant provision of the
compromise permitted slavery in Missouri but prohibited it
"forever ... in all territory ceded by France to the United
States ... which lies north of y)'... not included within the
(2)
limits of /jthatT1 state". ^ J The legality of slavery in
Missouri was thus ensured by the terms of the Compromise of 1820.
Clearly then, in the first part of the 19th century, there
1. As cited by Hofstadter et al., 1961;: 111.
2. President Munroe hesitated to sign the compromise measures
on the grounds that the Constitution nowhere sanctioned the
power to exclude slavery from a territory (Hofstadter et al.,
1961;:111). Ex-President Jefferson concurred in this view in
his letter of April 22, 1820 to Senator John Holmes of
Massachusetts, by noting that the issue of slavery was the
"exclusive right of every state, which nothing in the Constitution
has taken from them and given to the General Government", as cited
by Billington et al., 1962:1:250.
were no political limits to the expansion of the slave system
and the numerous concessions of territory to the slave power
along with the federal republican state's guarantee to defend
the legal title to slave property ensured the development of the
Southern economy. Only in the controversy over the admission
of Missouri as a slave or free state were there any signs of
the sectional conflict which was to become explosive. This
conflict was not a conflict between different economic systems
but rather a conflict within the development of the new territory.
With the development of new economic and productive interests in
the early 19th century, in particular large scale manufacturing
and inter-state transportation, new markets and the speedy
exchange of commodities were created. Many yeomen were
transformed into intensively commercial farmers producing wheat
and corn in the Middle West, while the Southern planters produced
cotton and the North Eastern farmers, dairy products.
The struggle over the expansion of slavery into the hitherto
unoccupied Western lands, such as Missouri, was not an
opposition of slavery to capitalism but was rather a struggle
over the right to occupy those lands which were the property of the
federal republican state. Would the USA. be governed by
representatives of the planter class or not? At the centre of
this struggle was a determination of the political representatives
of the planter class to obtain a land monopoly thereby excluding
1. Hofstadter et al., 1961j.:108-lll|.
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the free farmers who wanted to settle in the same regions.
This was not however evidence of any essential contradiction
between slave property right and "bourgeois property right.
After all, the property of the free farmers of the North
Eastern states was not threatened by the existence of slave
property right - the two were interdependent and co-existent.
What it was evidence of was a struggle which would continue up
to the outbreak of Civil War, that is, whose interests were to
be paramount in the government of the USA.
Paradoxically enough, in the struggle over who would rule
the USA, the political representatives of the planter class made
several notable attempts from the 1820s into the 30s "to gain the
support of the West. From the 1820s on the West had campaigned
for cheap public lands and for the protection of the 'squatter'
who claimed government land before it had been officially opened
to settlement. The squatter who had improved his land during
his illegal' tenure, demanded the right to buy it at the minimum
rate when it was finally planed on the open market. But even
the minimum rate of $1.25 seemed excessive to many and Senator
Benton of Missouri proposed, in 1824, that unsold government land
be reduced gradually to 75 cents an acre and then to 50 cents.
If no takers appeared, he argued, the lands should be given away
free. This proposal, known as 'graduation' was resisted by
Easterners who regarded it as likely to reduce the supply of wage
labourers thereby forcing wage costs up, ^ but political
1. Easterners suggested that the West should be closed altogether
for a time and that any future sales should be limited to lands
already on the market.
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representatives of the slave holding South supported Benton
in the hope that they could achieve the support of the West in
attempting to destroy the protective tariffs which favoured
Eastern manufacturers and industrialists. ^
By a Tariff Act in 1821;, Congress had raised the duties on
a number of key manufactures and these duties were further raised
(2")
by an Act of 1828. The political representatives of the South '
had argued that the 1828 tariff reduced the South to a state of
serfdom to Northern industrialists since they were forced to
pay exhorbitantly for Northern manufactures or manufactured
imports from Europe. Europe had reacted against the American
tariffs by raising their own against Southern rice and cotton.
The Southern attitude was summed up by Vice-President Calhoun
himself when he argued that no free government would permit the
transfer of "power and property from one class or section to
)
another", and suggested that this tyranny of the majority
could be neutralised by the constitutional right of each state to
nullify an unconstitutional Act of Congress. This doctrine of
nullification expounded in the South was held to be against the
principles of sovereignty upon which the federal republican
state had been created. No single state had the right to
determine whether or not an Act of Congress was constitutional.
1. Hofstadter et al., 196^:121-122.
2. Vice-President Calhoun published anonymously an anti-tariff
essay in 1828 (Hofstadter et al., 1961;: 122).
3. As cited by Billington et al., 1962:1:26$.
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A struggle between the South, and South Carolina in particular,
and the Congress ensued but the West did not support
nullification theory and in 1833 when a new Tariff Act was
passed, which reduced duties gradually, South Carolina withdrew
her nullification ordinance.
This failure of the South to gain the support of the West
over the issue of the nullification of federal action however
only served to intensify the South's aggressive policy over
the expansion of slavery into the Western lands. Arguably the
South perceived it as necessary to use its effective political
dominance in the institutions and apparatuses of the federal
republican state to ensure that sufficient lands could be
secured for the expanded reproduction of the Southern economy.
In managing to achieve this in the early part of the 19th
century, notwithstanding the conflict over the admission of
Missouri, the South also managed to maintain its effective
political dominance in the USA by keeping the number of slave
states at least equal to the number of free states.
LEGALITY AND THE TRADE IN SLAVES
If the expanded reproduction of the slave system required
that the federal republican state guaranteed and defended the
1. This ordinance was passed in South Carolina a few months
earlier - November 1832. It ordered the legislature to prohibit
the collection of duties in state ports and asserted that the use
of federal forces to collect duties would be followed by
secession. See, Cooper and McCord (eds) 'Statutes at Large of
South Carolina8, Nullification Ordinance, 1832, Vol.1:329-331*
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legal title to slave property in new territories it also
required, as was argued earlier, that a viable market in slaves
as a commodity was maintained. For such a market to have
existed there must have been no effective legal prohibition of
the trade in slaves as commodities, thus ensuring that an
adequate supply of slave labour was maintained.
Many of the anti-slavery reformers and abolitionists in
both Britain and North America, in campaigning for the abolition
of the international slave trade, had hoped that abolition would
lead to the death of slavery itself. Slavery itself,
however, could not be seriously damaged (if at all) unless the
legal prohibitions on the international trade were effective and
the internal domestic trade in slaves could be stopped. However,
both the circumstances and motives surrounding the abolition of
the international slave trade and the effectiveness of the system
of law enforcement in relation to national and international
prohibition created the situation in which there was effectively
no obstacle to the expanded reproduction of slave labour in terms
of the international trade nor was there any legal prohibition of
the domestic trade.
Federal restrictions against slave importation were, as was
discussed in Chapter expressly forbidden by the US
1. See, for example, Patrick Medd, "Romilly: A Life of Sir
Samuel Romilly: Lawyer and Reformer", London, Collins, 1968;
and Samuel Romilly, "The Life of Sir Samuel Romilly", eds. His
Two Sons, London, John Murray, 3^8 ed., 181+2, for a discussion
of the British view;and Loren Miller, "The Petitioners", New
York, Pantheon Books, 1966; for a discussion of this view in the
USA.
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Constitution until the year 1808 (Article I, Section 9»
Clause l). While this constitutional prohibition was
regarded as a major concession to Southern interests, some
Southern states voluntarily prohibited slave importation by
state statute before and after the ratification of the US
(2)
Constitution. K ' In 1783 Maryland prohibited the importation
of negro slaves as did South Carolina in 1787* The South
Carolina law was renewed from time to time until 1803 when it
(3)
was repealed on the grounds that it was unenforceable. '
The fact that there were prohibitory state laws in the
South reflects the somewhat curious dilemma in which the slave
interests found themselves. On the one hand, Southern planters
required an adequate supply of slave labour to cultivate cotton
as the slave system expanded into new territories, yet on the
other, the South feared the wholesale importation of slaves for
a number of reasons. DaBois, for example, places considerable
emphasis on the fear in the South of slave insurrections. In
commenting on the role of Toussaint L'Ouverture's uprising
(which began in Haiti in 1791) DuBois comments, "... A waive of
horror and fear swept over the South, which even the powerful
slave traders of Georgia did not dare withstand ...". And
1. See, in particular, pp.312-316 supra.
2. Many Northern states had done this earlier of course - see
Chapters 1+ and 5-
3. Eranklin, 1969:1^0.
1+. W.E.B. DuBois, "The Suppression of the African Slave - Trade
to the United States of America, I638-I87O", New York, 1896:70-71-
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Phillips argues that "the distinctively Southern considerations
against the trade were that its continuance would lower the
prices of slaves already on hand, ... that it would so increase
the staple exports as to spoil the world's market for them; ...
No doubt there were a number of complex reasons for the
prohibitory state laws but there is also no doubt that these
laws were totally ineffective. In defiance of local laws,
New England traders carried on a large traffic while Southern
planters were willing to receive slaves from whatever source
possible. Thus, despite prohibitory state laws, in both
Northern and Southern states, the international slave trade to the
US continued.
The first federal statute which attempted to regulate the
slave trading activities of the United States was passed on
(2)
March 22, 1794- In substance this statute made the fitting
out, building or preparation of an international slave ship in the
US a criminal offence subject to fine and forfeiture of the slave
vessel. Theoretically, the impact of this statute would be to
curtail New England shipbuilding activities in support of the
international trade, but since the statute did not seek to prohibit
other American involvement in slave trading the legislation was
1. Phillips, 1966:133-34.
2. Act of March 22, 1794* Chapter 11. This legislation was
"the first action against the trade by any nation", (Howard,
1963:3).
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arguably a political move to placate abolitionist elements
and. the general public concern over any further rise in the
slave population (and. the fear of insurrections).
The Act of 1800 prohibited. American citizens from
carrying negroes for sale from one foreign country to another and.
gave commissioned United States vessels the right to seize vessels
(2)
operating illegally. v ' In spite of a good deal of debate over
slavery, this measure to strengthen the 179U regulation of
American participation in the international trade was passed by
(3)
a vote of 67 to 5 in the Congress. K '
A further federal statute passed in I8O3 placed policing
activities in the hands of customs officers and collectors.
Although this legislation provided a federal penalty for
violations of state laws on importations and Section 1 of the Act
provided informer bounties, it appears that public knowledge of
such bounties was at best limited. The following extract from
a report made by a customs collector on May 22, 1817 indicates
that the practice of giving out informer bounties was so uncommon
that even those responsible for policing the trade were ignorant
1. See Jordan, 1968:327; regarding the impact of petitions
from Abolition Societies to the Congress prior to the Act of 179^4 •
2. This legislative action against the slave trade by Congress
in 1800 followed the introduction of a petition by representative
Robert Wain, a wealthy Philadelphia Quaker. The petition asked
for a restriction of the slave trade, modification of the fugitive
slave law passed by Congress in 1793> a^l also expressed hope for
eventual, general emancipation (Jordan, 1968:325-330)•
3. Jordan, 1968:380.
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of the bounty provision in the 1803 Act:
Collector Bullock. He reported, May 22, 1817:
I have just received information from a source on
which I can implicitly rely, that it has already
become the practice to introduce into the state of
Georgia, across the St Mary's River, from Amelia
Island, East Florida, Africans, who have been
carried into the Port of Fernandina, subsequent to
the capture of it by the Patriot army now in
possession of it ...; were the legislature to pass
an act giving compensation in some manner to
informers, it would have a tendency in a great
degree to prevent the practice; as the thing now is,
no citizen will take the trouble of searching for
and detecting the slaves. I further understand,
that the evil will not be confined altogether to
Africans, but will be extended to the worst class
of West India, slaves. (l)
For a customs collector to suggest that legislative provision
for giving bounties to informers should be made 14 years after
such provision exists in statute, suggests that such bounties
were rarely given out.
When South Carolina reopened her ports to the legal
importation of slaves in 1803 (by an Act repealing previous
legislation which prohibited slave importations) the anti-slavery
forces began to press for action. Resolutions were introduced
in the following Congress condemning the slave trade but no
conclusive steps were taken. In December 1805, Senator Bradley
of Vermont introduced a Bill to prohibit the slave trade after
January 1, 1808, but, after a second reading, consideration of
1. Historical Records, Doc. Ho.42, 10-11, 16 Cong. 1 Sess. Ill
(l8l8) - my emphasis.
2. This interpretation is supported by material cited in DuBois,
1896:108-109; and Howard, 1963:320.
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the measure was postponed. In February 1806 Representative
Bidwell of Massachusetts introduced a similar measure but
again nothing was done. In his message to the Congress,
December 2, 1O06, President Jefferson called the attention of
the Congress to the approaching date on which the slave trade
could be prohibited. He suggested that measures be taken to
"prevent expeditions to Africa that could not be completed before
January 1, 1808".
On March 2, 1807, the law prohibiting American involvement
in the African slave trade was passed, after heated debate on
every provision in the Bill between representatives of the slave
holding and non-slave holding states and interests, and most of
the voting on the specific provisions was sectional in
(2)
character. ^ ' Persons convicted of violating the Act were to
be fined and imprisoned. The fines ranged from 800 dollars for
knowingly buying illegal negroes to 20,000 dollars for equipping
a slaver. The disposition of the illegally imported negroes was
left to individual state legislatures. Finally, the Act gave
the President authority to order US naval cruisers along the US
coast to intercept illegal slavers.
From the beginning the law went unenforced and while some
Southern states passed the supplementary acts concerning the
disposal of illegally imported negroes, others did not even
1. As cited by Franklin, 1969:l53*
2. Franklin, 1969:15>4-
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construct this appearance of attempting to follow the federal law -
they enacted no supplementary legislation at all. Where
supplementary laws were enacted, providing for the sale of illegally
imported negroes, the proceeds were to be paid into the public
treasury and to the informer.
The constantly shifting responsibility for the enforcement of
the law prohibiting American involvement in the international slave
trade and the importation of slaves also made it unlikely that the
legislation would be effective. As DuBois observes:
It is noticeable, in the first place, that there
was no especial set of machinery provided for the
enforcement of this act. The work fell first to
the Secretary of the Treasury, as head of the customs
collection. Then, through the activity of the
cruisers, the Secretary of the Navy gradually came to
have oversight, and eventually the whole matter was
lodged with him, although the Departments of State
and War were more or less active on different
occasions. Later, ... the Department of the
Interior was charged with the enforcement of the
slave trade laws. It would indeed be surprising if,
amid so much uncertainty and shifting of
responsibility, the law were not poorly enforced. (l)
The legislative drafting of the 1807 statute also contributed
to the ineffectiveness of enforcement. Erom the wording, it
was assumed that most of the policing activities would take place
in the various US ports or along the coast where vessels would
attempt to unload directly into US jurisdiction. Such an
assumption about how to enforce the prohibition can only be
1. DuBois, 1896:108-9.
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regarded, as a deliberate evasion given the methods used to
smuggle slaves into US territory. Consider the following account
of smuggling activities:
... I was offered a chance to accompany one of the
consignees on a land trip during which our negroes
were to be sold. The kaffle in charge of negro
drivers, was to strike up the Escambia river and
thence across the boundary line into Georgia, where
some of our wild Africans were mixed with various
squads of native blacks and driven inland until sold
off, singly or by couples, on the road. At that
time the United States had enacted laws declaring
the African slave trade illegal, but the Spanish
possessions were thriving on the inland exchange
of negroes and mulattoes. (l)
Moreover, the scarcity of records on enforcement operations in US
(2)
ports suggests that the legislation was of marginal effect. v '
A further Act passed in l8l8 again relied on informers in
order to prosecute offenders. A factor which made the informer
prosecution mechanism of enforcement particularly ineffective was
the fact that the informer was not anonymous. In order to collect
his bounty he was forced to publicly expose himself, and, as
reported to Congress in July of l8l8, informing could be a very
dangerous occupation. And, while Section I4. of the Act of 1819
sought to correct this !technical defect1 in the legislative
drafting, by protecting the informant's identity from public
disclosure, the problem remained of there being no immunity from






Historical Records, Doc. No.100, 9» 15 Cong. 2 Sess VI (l8l8).
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activity. Finally, although the Act of 1820, which was the
most severe slave trade Act of any nation, made any US citizen
who was a crew member of a ship involved in the slave trade
liable to be adjudged a pirate, with piracy being punishable by
death, there was again a singular lack of enforcement.
Given the ineffectiveness of this legislation and the fact
that, after the official closing of the international slave trade
from 1808, the domestic internal trade became more developed, it
is hardly surprising that the Southern slave system experienced
no difficulty in procuring an adequate supply of slave labour for
its expanded reproduction. In Maryland, Virginia and the
Carolinas, the domestic trade took its place along with
diversified farming. Many business firms that dealt in farm
supplies and animals frequently carried a 'line1 of slaves and
auctioneers who disposed of real estate and personal property sold
slaves along with the other commodities. Slave breeding was also
common in the upper South and the slaves in these centres were
often shipped to the Cotton Kingdom via the Atlantic Ocean.
The prices of slaves in the domestic trade reflected all the forces
operating to create supply and demand. In the early 19th century
the prices were modest and, as the demand increased in the lower
South with the expansion of the slave system, the prices on both
the Northern and Southern markets tended to rise. Slave trading
and hiring were integral and essential parts of the economic and
social fabric of the South and New England shipbuilders and masters,
Middle Atlantic merchants, and Southern planters all consistently
352.
ignored federal and state legislation. v '
Any US legislation against the international slave trade
was also largely ineffective owing to the complexities involved
in enforcing- the law at an international level. The multi¬
national character of the African slave trade made the
enforcement of domestic statutes outside of coastal jurisdictional
limits extremely complex. For example, a slaving vessel could be
built in the US, sold in Cuba, manned by a multi-national crew
and be of Spanish registry. Ownership and registry of slave
vessels could be altered as often as necessary to suit the
requirements of any situation.
The British, following the Act to Abolish the Slave Trade of
(2")
March 25, 1807, were the first to send out naval patrols into
international waters and along the coast of Africa to intercept
slavers. This Act provided for the forfeiture of vessels owned
by British residents or citizens engaged in the trade. To
1. Franklin, 1969:152-51+; 175-82.
2. 1+6 Geo. 3. c. 36. Britain, "the world's foremost slave
trader for generations" (Howard, 1963:3)> finally outlawed the
trade in 1807 and became a leading advocate of international
suppression. Despite the fact that this Act was passed after a
dedicated abolitionist campaign (see, for example, Romilly, 181+2,
Vol.2), it should not be forgotten that in relation to domestic
issues the abolitionists were certainly not radicals (see, for
example, Williams, 1966:178-196), and moreover that the evolution
of moral opposition to the slave trade was by no means the sole or
even the most significant factor in explaining abolition of the
slave trade. By 1807 the West Indian British colonies had
acquired a sufficient population of slaves. Limitation of British
participation in the trade would protect the West Indian colonies
against an excessive concentration of slaves and, at the same time,
deny to Brazilian and Cuban planters one source of slaves. British
merchants and industrialists also wanted to rationalise the
conditions of trade with Africa (Howard, 1963:3-5).
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enforce the Act, two British naval vessels, one frigate and one
sloop, were ordered to patrol some 3>000 miles of African coast.
By 18I|7 this number had expanded to 1 six rate man'o war, 22
sloops and brigs and 7 steam vessels - some 30 vessels in total.
In order to establish an effective policing effort which
could overcome legal obstacles to enforcement, Britain made treaty
arrangements with various nations involved in the trade. For
example, in l8li| in the Treaty of Ghent (which ended the War of
1812) the United States agreed with Great Britain to "use their
(2)
best endeavours" for the abolition of the trade. ' Similar
arrangements were made with Russia, Prussia, Austria and France
in l8l5, and in 1817 Britain and Portugal made a treaty allowing
each country the mutual right to search merchantmen. A similar
treaty was made between Britain and Spain in 1820. Under these
treaties, prize courts of mixed commissioners were established
at convenient ports in order to adjudicate the legal issues.
For this policing effort to be effective required not only a
more or less constant vigilance by the navies involved in
patrolling the African coast but also an agreement to permit
mutual rights to search amongst the nations involved. The United
1. See, C. Lloyd, "The Navy and the Slave Trade", London,
Collins, 191+9, Appendix.
2. American State Papers, Foreign, III, No.271:735-1+8.
3. Sierra Leone, St Helena, Barbados, Loando, Rio de Janiero,
Surinam and Havana (Howard, 1963:18).
h. It should be emphasised, however, that neither Spain nor
Portugal had outlawed slavery in their colonies.
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States, however, refused to permit British cruisers to board
and search American vessels. The US argued that this position
was necessary because of the British naval practice of
impressment, that is, the policy adopted by the British Navy of
impressing into service, during times of war, crew members of
American merchantmen who were of British origin. ^ Thus,
while the treaty arrangements with other nations provided for a
mutual right of search, the fact that the US was not a signatory
to this kind of agreement meant that international efforts to
suppress the African slave trade through naval operations were
likely to be particularly ineffective. Slavers could avoid
being searched by simply hoisting an American flag thus making
them legally immune from search by any foreign navy and at no
risk of search from the American Navy since the US had no navy
(2)
patrolling the vicinity. v ' Even when the US finally sent its
own patrol of 5 chips into the area, this made little difference.
Since the US had not agreed to the treaties, the US Navy could
not search foreign vessels. As a consequence of this, the
slavers would carry flags of several nations thus, if an American
naval vessel approached, the slaver would hoist a Spanish or
other foreign flag, and if a British vessel approached, the slaver
would hoist the American flag. The issue of registry of the
1. The negotiation of Jay's Treaty in 179U was an unsuccessful
effort to abolish this practice which was also an issue in the
War of 1812 (Hofstadter et al., 1961+).
2. See M. Mannix and D. Crowley, "Black Cargoes", London,
Macmillan, 1962:200-1.
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vessel was irrelevant in this situation since the navy in
question could not board in the first place in order to demand
a showing of registry.
In addition to this kind of difficulty created by the
international character of the trade, there were many practical
difficulties involved in detecting slaving vessels. For
example, most of the seizures were likely to be made when the
(2)
vessel was en route to the African coast v ' or following the
coast in search of slaves since the ship made all possible speed
to leave the patrolled area once its holds were filled.
Nevertheless, an empty slaver could be detected as such, once
boarded, as there were distinctive signs of slave trade
involvement. For example, slavers generally carried
disproportionate amounts of food, water and medicine; there was
a slave deck or at least planking that could be used to construct
one; and slavers also tended to have larger crews to guard the
(3)
slaves as well as shackles and other immobilising devices. w/
1. For examples of these practices and detailed accounts, see
Mannix and Crowley, 1962:201; Howard, 1963:7U*
2. From the evidence available it appears that most seizures
were in fact made when the slavers were empty (see Mannix and
Crowley, 1962; Howard, 1963).
3. See United States v The Isla de Cuba, 26 F. Cas 55^+ (No.l5,
J4i+9) (lC Mass. i860). In this case the Court found that these
'signs1 were sufficient evidence in determining whether a vessel
was intended for the slave trade - it found the explanation of the
amounts of supplies, planking and iron rods, unconvincing and said
that they provided conclusive evidence. For a discussion of the
extent of these practices, see Mannix and Crowley, 1962:205.
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Sometimes, however, auxiliary vessels were used to carry the
necessary equipment and cargo to use in slaving operations.
This practice, in and of itself, was not illegal thus the slaver
was only subject to risk when loading- and carrying back its
contraband. ^^
If the purpose of the United States federal legislation was
to prohibit American involvement in the slave trade and to
prohibit importation then much depended on the effectiveness of
enforcement at international level. The effectiveness of
enforcement depended on the status of the slave trade under
international law and the appropriate powers and rights of nations
to control the involvement of their citizens and citizens of other
nations in the international slave trade. In the case of The
(2)
Antelope v ' the US Supreme Court demonstrated the lack of
coherence and consistency surrounding the issue of the status of
the slave trade at international law. The Antelope case came,
on appeal, to the US Supreme Court from the Circuit Court of
Georgia and the principles at issue were based on allegations filed
by the Vice-Consuls of Spain and Portugal claiming certain
Africans as the property of subjects of their nations.
Briefly, the factual background to the Antelope case began
when a privateer, called the Columbia, sailing under a
1. Howard, 1963:22. On the use of whaling vessels, see
United States v The Augusta, 25 F. Cas 892 (No.li|.) i-t-77-
2. 23 US 66 (1825):112-132.
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Venezuelan Commission obtained a crew of mostly American citizens
from Baltimore in 1819, and proceeded to sea under the Artegan
Flag, renaming itself the Arraganta. Off the coast of Africa
the Arraganta captured an American vessel from which she took
25 Africans; and she captured several Portuguese vessels from
which she also took Africans; and she captured a Spanish vessel,
the Antelope, from which she took a further considerable number
of Africans. The Arraganta and the Antelope sailed in company
to off the coast of Brazil where the Arraganta was wrecked and
Metcalf, the Master, and many of his crew in the Arraganta were
made prisoners and transferred, with armaments, to the Antelope.
The Antelope, thus armed and under the command of John Smith, a
US citizen, was renamed General Ramirez and, on board this vessel
were all the Africans captured by the Arraganta in the course of
her voyage. The General Ramirez (Antelope) was found off the
US coast by the revenue cutter Dallas under the command of
Captain Jackson and was brought into the port of Savannah, Georgia,
for adjudication. At the time of her capture there were
"upwards of two hundred and eighty" ^ ^ Africans on board.
On their arrival, the vessel and the Africans were libelled
and claimed by the Portuguese and Spanish Vice-Consuls
reciprocally. They were also claimed by Smith as captured jure
belli. They were claimed by the US as having been transported
from foreign parts by American citizens, in contravention to the
1. 23 US 66 at 112.
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laws of the US, and. as entitled to their freedom by those laws
and by the law of nations. Captain Jackson, Master of the
revenue cutter, filed an alternative claim for the bounty given
by law if the Africans should be adjudged to the US; or to
salvage, if the whole subject should be adjudged to the
Portuguese and Spanish Consuls. The Circuit Court ^ of
Georgia dismissed the libel and claim of John Smith; they
dismissed the claim of the US except as to that portion of the
Africans which had been taken from the American vessel; and the
residue were divided between the Spanish and Portuguese claimants.
Since some of the Africans had died and no evidence was adduced
to show which had been taken from which vessels, the Court
declared a proportionate share-out thus designating 16 "by lot"
of the original 2£ to the US.
In the appeal before the US Supreme Court the US asserted no
property in the Africans but insisted on their right to freedom,
whereas the Consuls of Spain and Portugal demanded the Africans
as slaves obtained through "legitimate commerce" and acquired
"as property" by subjects of their respective sovereigns. Thus,
Chief Justice Marshall characterised the basic conflict presented
by The Antelope as the conflict between "the sacred rights of
(2)
property". v '
1. A federal court. For a discussion of the federal court
structure, see Chapter 7-
2. 23 US 66, lli|. Note that throughout the report on The Antelope
case there are numerous references to the "Africans which" - when the
issue is re property - and "Africans who" - when the issue is re
liberty.
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In considering what the legal limits to the international
slave trade were, the US Supreme Court cited judicial
precedents ^ which held that the legality of the capture of
a vessel engaged in slave trade depends on the law of the
(2)
country to which the vessel belongs. Thus, The Amedie, v '
which was an American vessel involved in the slave trade
captured by a British cruiser, was held to be -unlawfully involved
in the trade because "the laws of the claimant's country allow
of no right of property such as he claims"(slaves) . The same
(3)
principle was affirmed in The Fortuna. However, in The
Diana, a case involving a Swedish vessel, captured with a
cargo of slaves by a British cruiser, the ship and cargo were
restored on the principle that the trade was allowed by the laws
(<)
of Sweden. In The Louis K ' a British cruiser had captured this
French vessel on a slaving voyage before she had purchased any
slaves. On appeal to the Court of Admiralty in England, the
principle was laid down that the right of search was confined to
a state of war except against pirates but slave trading was not
piracy nor was the slave trade contrary to the law of nations.
Thus, the right of visitation and search could not be exercised
on the vessels of a foreign power, unless permitted by treaties.
1. The precedents relied
2. 1 Acton's Rep. 2ij.O.
3. 1 Dodson'sRep. 8l.
I|.. 1 Dodson's Rep. 95-
5. 2 Dodson's Rep. 238.
on were all British cases.
The reasoning in this case went on to suggest that, in British
Courts of Admiralty, the vessel of even a nation which had
forbidden the slave trade, but had not conceded the right of
search, mast, if wrongfully brought into a prize court for
adjudication, be restored to the original owner. The Louis was
returned to the Erench owners.
It was against this particular background that the central
issue confronted in The Antelope case, that is, the question of
the precise status of the slave trade at international law, was
before the US Supreme Court for the first time. Chief Justice
Marshall answered this question by arguing that the legal solution
was to be found:
In those principles of action which are sanctioned
by the usages, the national acts, and the general
assent of that portion of the world of which Zidie
jurist^ considers himself as a part, and to whose
law the appeal is made. If we resort to this
standard as the test of international law, the
question ... is decided in favour of the legality
of the slave trade.
Marshall argued that every nation sanctioned this "commerce" and
that the right to participate in it remained lawful to those
nations who had not relinquished it. Recognising the perfect
equality of nations at international law and relying on the
British precedents to argue that the slave trade was not piracy,
Marshall concluded that:
It follows, that a foreign vessel engaged in the
African slave trade, captured on the high seas in time
of peace, by an American cruiser, and brought in f°r
adjudication, would be restored.
1. 23 US 66, 121.
2. Ibid., 123.
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Other Supreme Court Justices, however, dissented from this
view and the Court, being equally divided, did not offer any
binding principles to resolve the status of slavery at
international law. For this reason, that is, because the
practice of the Supreme Court is to affirm the decree of a lower
court when the Justices are equally divided in their view of the
appeal, the order of the lower court directing restitution to
the Spanish ^ claimants of the Africans found on board The
Antelope was affirmed.
The Court, however, still faced the problem of determining
the particular Africans subject to restitution under the decree
of the lower court. The Court, in adjudicating between "the
sacred rights of liberty and property" were only concerned that
the Spanish receive a proportionate number of Africans in
restitution for those on board The Antelope prior to its capture
by the Arraganta. The question of liberty versus slavery for
individual Africans was deemed irrelevant. The Spanish were
awarded a proportionate share and "all the remaining Africans are
to be delivered to the United States to be disposed of according
(2)
to law", v ' that is, to be transported back to Africa pursuant to
the Act of 1819, (or to be sold and the funds paid into the public
1. No Portuguese subject appeared to assert title to his property
in any of the Africans - the appeal being 5 years after the original
plunder, led the Court to hold to the view that the real owner
belonged to another nation.
2. 23 US 66, 132.
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treasury). Thus, even with the official outlawing of the slave
trade in 1807, the US Supreme Court could, in 1825, still regard
African slaves as items of property capable of being restored to
Spain or held by the US in proportion to the original quantity of
the 'slave cargo*.
In another case decided on appeal to the US Supreme Court in
1825, Tne Piattsburish the issue of the legality of the slave
trade at international law was simply evaded by citing The Antelope
as precedent in the arguments of counsel, and by the fact that a
lower court, the Circuit Court for the Southern District of New
York, had determined the present case exclusively upon the facts
respecting the alleged sale of the Plattsburgh and change of
voyage. The libel was founded on several Acts of Congress for
the prohibition of the 3lave trade, in particular, the Slave Trade
Acts of 179U (Chapter 2) and 1800 (Chapter 205). In delivering
the opinion of the US Supreme Court, Mr Justice Story argued that
the whole case turned upon the question of fact, that is, whether
(2)
the voyage to Africa v ' was originally undertaken from the United
States or whether it was undertaken by the claimant, a Spanish
subject (Mr Marino), from Cuba, after having made a bona fide
purchase of the ship altogether unconnected with the original
enterprise. The Court held that the Plattsburgh was equipped in
the US for the slave trade and that even if the facts did not support
1. 23 US 66 (1825): 133-11*6.
2. The Plattsburgh was seized by a US vessel prior to obtaining
any slave cargo.
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'this, it was acting in concert with the auxiliary, the Eros,
which carried, the necessary supplies etc. Moreover, the
asserted purchase by Marino could not be proven and even if it
could, under the Act of 179U» if a vessel was prepared in the
US for participation in the slave trade, then it was forfeited
no matter who the current owner was. Thus, the US Supreme
Court held that "the reality of the asserted sale to Marino is
not established by the proofs, and our conclusion is, that the
unlawful enterprise had its origin in Baltimore". ^ The
Plattsburgh was forfeited and Marino's claim dismissed.
(2)
The case of The Amistad, v ' however, did confront most
of the central issues of legality involved in the international
(3}
slave trade. w/ The litigation in this case began in the
lower courts of Connecticut and the current case before the US
Supreme Court was an appeal from the decree of the Circuit Court
of the district of Connecticut (sitting in Admiralty).
On 27 June l839> "the Schooner L'Amistad, "being the
property of Spanish subjects", left the Port of Havana, Cuba,
1. 23 US 66, II4.6.
2. United States, Appellants v The Libellants claimants of the
Schooner Amistad, her tackle, apparel and furniture, together with
her cargo, and the Africans mentioned and described in the several
libels and claims. Appellees, lj.0 US (15> Pet) 5l8 (I8I4.I).
3. This case is also the most famous/infamous reported on
concerning the international slave trade. Contemporary with the
decision, it received international reporting and within the US it
became "a trial of one president by another" with John Quincey
Adams for the alleged slaves (the Mendis), President Martin Van
Buren siding with the slave interests (see, William A. Owens,
"Black Mutiny", New York, International Publishing Co., 1971:
foreword by Wesley A. Hotchkiss, vii-xi).
1+. L'Amistad means The Priendship - a singular irony.
for Puerto Principe, Cuba. On board were the master, Ramon
Ferrer, Jose Ruiz and Pedro Montez, all Spanish subjects.
Ferrer had a negro boy with him, "claimed to be his slave".
Ruiz had forty-nine negroes with him, "claimed by him as his
slaves, and stated to be his property, in a certain pass or
document, signed by the Governor-General of Cuba". Montez had
four other negroes with him, claimed as his property as slaves
in a similar pass or document.
On the voyage, and before the arrival of the vessel at her
port of destination, the negroes rose, killed the master and
took possession of L'Amistad. On 26 August, l839> the vessel
was discovered by Lieutenant Gedney of the US brig Washington
at anchor on the high seas about half a mile from Long Island
(2)
shore. The vessel, with the negroes v ' and the other persons
on board, was brought into the district of Connecticut by
Lieutenant Gedney, and was libelled for salvage in the District
Court of the US. On 18 September 1839 Ruiz and Montez filed
claims and libels in which they asserted their ownership of the
negroes as their slaves (and of certain parts of the cargo).
On 19 September 1839 the attorney of the US for the district of
Connecticut filed an information or libel explaining that the
1. I4O US (15 Pet) 518.
2. Lieutenant Gedney had found some negroes on shore - he
seized them and took them back on the vessel.
3. Various other claims and libels were filed re salvage and
cargo but these will not be discussed since they are not of
central importance to the legal issues involved in the case re
slave trading.
Spanish minister had officially presented, to the proper
department of the Government of the US, a claim for the
restoration of the vessel, cargo and slaves, as the property of
Spanish subjects, pursuant to the Treaty of Spain with the
United States of 1795 - if the claim was legally well-founded,
(if, however, it appeared that the negroes were transported
from Africa in violation of the laws of the US and brought
within US jurisdictional limits contrary to the same laws, then
the Spanish minister asked that the court make an order to
remove the negroes to the coast of Africa under US law. This
second part of the first US libel was removed in the second libel
filed by the attorney of the US on 19 November).
Vega, the Vice-Consul of Spain for the state of Connecticut,
filed his libel on 19 November 1839 claiming that Antonio was a
slave, the property of the representatives of Ferrer (the master
of L'Amistad who had been killed). This libel asked that
Antonio be delivered to the Vice-Consul so that he might be
returned to his lawful owner in Cuba.
On January 7> I8I4.O, the negroes, namely Cinque and others
(with the exception of Antonio), filed an answer denying that they
were slaves or the property of Ruiz and Montez, or that the latter
Could under the constitution of the laws of the
US, or under any Treaty, exercise any jurisdiction
over their persons, by reason of the premises
offered and praying (l) that they mi^it be dismissed.
1. "Fraying" means asking - terminology used in the libels.
2. i|0 US (15 Pet) 521-2.
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In this answer the negroes insisted that they were native born
Africans, born free and not slaves; that they were unlawfully
kidnapped in April 1839 Emd forcibly taken on board a certain
vessel on the African coast unlawfully engaged in the slave
trade; that they were unlawfully transported in the same vessel
to Cuba where they were unlawfully sold as slaves; that Ruiz and
Montez made a pretended purchase of them and that "without law or
right" they were placed on board L'Amistad to be transported
somewhere and there to be enslaved for life. They took
possession of L'Amistad with the intention of returning to Africa
or to "seek asylum in some free state". ^
The District Court gave its judgment on 23 January, I8I4.O.
This included various decrees on salvage and cargo but the
important decrees in relation to the legal issues involved in the
slave trade were:
(i) it dismissed the libels and claims of Ruiz and
Montez, with costs, as being included -under the
claim of the Spanish minister;
(ii) it allowed the claim of the Spanish Vice-Consul,
for Antonio, on behalf of Ferrer's representatives;
(iii) it rejected the claims of Ruiz and Montez for the
delivery of the negroes (but admitted them for
cargo);
(iv) and it rejected the claim made by the attorney of the
1. 1+0 US (15 Pet), 522.
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US on behalf of the Spanish minister for the
restoration of the negroes under the 1799
Treaty but, it decreed that the negroes should
be delivered to the President of the US to be
transported to Africa, pursuant to the Act of
3 March, 1819. ^
Prom this decree, the district attorney on behalf of the US
appealed to the Circuit Court of Connecticut except so far as
related to the restoration of the slave Antonio. Wo appeal was
made by Ruiz or Montez, nor on behalf of the representatives of
owners of L'Amistad. The Circuit Court, by a pro forma decree,
affirmed the decree of the District Court, and from that decree,
the present appeal was brought to the US Supreme Court.
The only parties before the US Supreme Court then were, on
the one side, the United States, intervening for the sole purpose
of procuring restitution of the property, as Spanish property,
pursuant to the Treaty of 1795* on "the other side, as
(2)
appellees, the negroes ^ ' (Cinque and others) asserting themselves,
in their answer, not to be slaves but to be free native Africans
kidnapped in their own country and illegally transported by force
from that country, and now entitled to maintain freedom.
1. Ibid., 523.
2. Lieutenant Gedney was also an appellee on his libel for
salvage - this is not discussed here as it is not central to the
issues.
The central issue before the Court was whether the negroes
were the property of Ruiz and Montez and ought to be delivered
up to the Spanish minister. It had been argued by the US,
that the Court were bound to deliver the negroes up, according
to the Treaty of 1795 with Spain which had been continued in full
force by the Treaty of 1819. The Treaty with Spain provided:
That all ships and merchandize ... which shall be
rescued out of the hands of any pirates or robbers,
... shall be brought into some port of either state ...
in order to be taken care of and restored, entire, to
the true proprietor, as soon as due and sufficient
proof shall be made concerning the property thereof.
On this ninth article the US placed reliance for the restitution
of the negroes and for the case to be brought within this
article required the establishment of the following facts:
(i) that the negroes fell within the description of
merchandise in the sense of the Treaty;
(ii) that the negroes had been rescued on the high seas
out of the hands of pirates and robbers, which,
could only be established by showing that the
negroes themselves were pirates and robbers; and
(iii) that Ruiz and Montez, the asserted proprietors,
could establish their title by competent proof.
In relation to (i), the Court argued that if the negroes were
lawfully held as slaves under the laws of Spain, and recognised
1. bO US (15 Pet), 527.
"as property", then, within the terms of the Treaty, they must
"be included under the denomination of merchandize". However,
on point (iii) the Court argued that from the facts it was clear
that the negroes never were the lawful slaves of Ruiz, Montez
or any other Spanish subject, but that they were kidnapped from
Africa in violation of the laws and treaties of Spain against
the slave trade. Thus Ruiz and Montez had no competent proof
of ownership, and the negroes, not being slaves, could not be
regarded as merchandise. Moreover, if they were not slaves but
were kidnapped Africans, then there could be no pretence that on
point (ii) they could be regarded as kidnappers or robbers. ^
Thus, on the facts, the Court argued that the negroes were
not the property of Ruiz and Montez and could not be delivered
to the Spanish minister. However, the US had also argued that:
The ship and cargo, and negroes, were duly
documented as belonging to Spanish subjects, and
this court /{had,~J no right to look behind these
documents; that full faith and credit is to be
given to them; and that they are to be held
conclusive evidence ... even although it should be
established ... that they have been obtained by the
grossest frauds ... upon the constituted authorities
of Spain.
The Court, however, argued that while public documents of a
Government, accompanying property found on board of the private
ships of a foreign nation, was deemed prima facie evidence of the
1. 1+0 US (15 Pet), 528-30.
2. Ibid., 530.
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facts they purported to state, they "are always open to he
impugned for fraud" and if fraud was established then it
destroyed such documents as proof. At international law a
ship's papers were "hut prima facie evidence" and, if shown to
he fraudulent, they were not proof of any valid title. The
documents which Ruiz and Montez used to assert their proprietory
interest in the negroes were fraudulent thus "these negroes ought
to he deemed free" and the Court ordered for provision to he
made to return them to Africa.
Thus, although in I8J4.I, thirty four years after the official
closing of the international slave trade, some native horn Africans
who had heen kidnapped in the trade were declared legally free in
The Amistad case, it is clear from the arguments and consideration
of the legal iosuos involved that these Africans gained their
freedom because no proof could he offered that they were the legal
property of any Spanish subject, and, not being slaves, they could
(2)
not he legally considered 'merchandize8. ' If proof could have
been offered that they were legally purchased as slaves, then the
conclusion follows that they would have heen regarded as
merchandise which could he bought, sold or transported anywhere at
1. Ibid., 53U. These negroes, accompanied by a few white
missionaries, on hoard 'The Gentleman8 (a ship procured by the
Amistad Committee) did, in fact, return to Africa. On landing
hack in their native territory, Cinque and the other Mendis (negroes)
found their tribe decimated by inter-tribal warfare, and, by yet
another twist of fate, Cinque turned procurer for the slave trade
(see Wesley A. Hotchkiss, foreword, xi, in Owens, 1971)-
2. Under the terms of the 1795 Treaty as discussed earlier.
the owner's will. Moreover, the fact that this particular
case excited so much national and international attention in
181+1 ^ only -underlines the earlier argument in this chapter
that the legislation aimed at outlawing the international slave
trade was, to any significant extent, ineffective.
With the demand for slaves increasing in the 19th century
and the prices going up, merchants and traders continued to
engage in the slave trade, despite its closure by federal
legislation in 1807. Ihe long unprotected coast, the certain
(2)
markets and the prospect of immense profits, v ' coupled with all
the loopholes in the legislative and enforcement efforts, ensured
that the trade would continue. It was generally known and
admitted that American capital, American ships and American
sailors were carrying on an extensive slave trade between Africa
and the New World. Almost every year witnessed an appeal of the
President or some public leader for a more rigid enforcement, but
nothing was done, nor could flagrant violation be used to create
opinion to bring action against those profiting from the trade.
In this instance, there was no evidence of any sectional conflict
New York merchants as well as those of New Orleans were
1. For a detailed and interesting account of L'Amistad and the
circumstances, nationally and internationally, surrounding it,
see Owens, 1971.
2. The balance sheet of the ship, La Fortuna, which was fitted
out in 1827, indicates the profitability of slave trading.
Total expenses reached 39,980.1+6 dollars; total returns equalled
81,1+19-00 dollars (77>U90.00 dollars from the proceeds of 217
slaves). Net profit equals 1+1,1+38.^1+ dollars. It is
interesting to note, that under expenses, the following appears:
"Government officers at 8 dollars a head ... 1,736.00 dollars"
(see Howard, 1963:236).
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benefiting from the trade.
CONCLUSION
Throughout the first part of the 19th century then the
slave power was able to engage in a self-conscious movement for
the expanded reproduction of the slave system. Despite
legislative attempts to outlaw the international slave trade,
these attempts were almost wholly ineffective and, even in those
(2)
rare instances, such as L8Amistad, where Africans were freed, v '
there was no threat to the trade in slaves as long as it could
be proven that the negroes in question were, in fact, the legal
property of someone. Moreover, as was also noted earlier, the
internal domestic trade in slaves was quite legal and flourished
in the first part of the 19th century. Taken together, it is
clear that the domestic trade and the ineffectiveness of attempts
to outlaw the international trade, ensured that a viable market
in slaves as a commodity was maintained and that an adequate
supply of slave labour for the expanded reproduction of the slave
system was ensured. This supply of labour, coupled with the
assurance of the legality of claims to slave property in the new
1. franklin, 1969:182-83.
2. In the L! Amistad case, when arguing before the US Supreme
Court on behalf of the Africans, John Quincy Adams (former US
President) said: "The moment you come, to the Declaration of
Independence, that every man has a right to life and liberty, an
inalienable ri^at, this case is decided. I ask nothing more on
behalf of these unfortunate men, than this Declaration",
Argument of John Quincy Adams, Before the Supreme Court of the US,
Appellants v Cinque and Others, Africans, Captured in the Schooner
L1Amistad, by Lieutenant Gedney, reprint edition, New York, Negro
Universities Press, 1969:89.
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territories ceded to the slave power under the terms of the
Missouri Compromise, the Acquisition of Florida, and the lands
of the Louisiana Purchase, and the national and international
demand for the commodities, in particular cotton, produced on
the Southern plantations, promoted the full-scale development
and expansion of the Southern economy based on slavery in the
first part of the 19th century.
The consequences of this expanded reproduction for the legal
regulation of the slave system in the 19th century South are
discussed in the next chapter. Indeed, it was within the
context of this fully developed slave economy that legal
institutions and practices exerted their own unique effects in
containing the apparent contradictions inherent in the legal
recognition of both property and personality in the chattel slave.
This containment of contradiction was accomplished within law
through the development of a special form of Southern pleading in
terms of the master/slave relation when, for example, the criminal
responsibility of slaves was at issue: a form of pleading which
was compatible with the property aspect of slavery.
CHAPTER 7 : PROPERTY GR PEHSOK : THE CHATTEL SLATE
IN LAW
INTROHODTICK
CONrLICT WITHIN THE LEGAL STATUS : COMMON
LAW f STATUTE
PROPERTY v PERSONALITY ? HIS SIAVE STATUS




The prisoner /_a slave! is a hitman being, degraded
indeed by slavery, but yet having 'organs,
dimensions, senses, affections, passions', like
our own.
Gaston, J. in State v Will.
It will be the imperative duty of the Judges to
recognise the full dominion of the owner over
the slave ... All this we do upon the ground,
that this domirdon is essential to the value of
slaves as property,
(2 )
Ruffin, J. in State v Mann. v -
In the previous chapter it was argued that, despite the official
closure of the international slave trade from l808 onwards, there
were no effective limits to the expanded reproduction of the slav
system during the first part of the 19th century. One legality
of the internal domestic trade and the ineffectiveness of
legislative attempts to control the international trade in slaves
guaranteed an adequate supply of slave labour. This supply of
slave labour, coupled with the assurance cf the legality of claim
to slave property in the new territories ceded to the slave
power ^ and the national and international demand for the
commodities produced on the Southern plantations positively
encouraged the rapid development and expansion of the Southern
1. 18 W 121 (18310.
2. 18 K3 268 (1828).
3. The lands of the Louisiana Purchase; the Acquisition of
Florida and the territory granted under the terms of the Missouri
economy based on slavery in the first part of the 19th century.
Indeed .from the turn of the 19th century the slave system
of production expanded as rapidly as the wider acceleration of
international capitalism. rfhe first agricultural staple
produced in the South was tobacco and the first slave labour
plantations were devoted to' growing the leaf in tidewater
Virginia and Maryland. After 1800, the tobacco culture spread
westward across the upper South, and by mid-century this newer
area was raising more tobacco than the old. Other Southern
staples which could be profitably grown on plantations were rice
and sugar, though these were grown only in limited regions where
soil and climate permitted. However, by 1.820, the South' s
cotton crop had become more valuable than all its other crops
combined. >3y 1835 the cotton culture had spread from the
seaboard into the new lands of the Gulf states, and by i860 the
Gulf area had become the greatest cotton growing region in the
„ (2)world. x •
Paralleling this expansion was a. dramatic expansion in the
slave population. In ±79C, for example, there were less than
700,000 slaves, whereas by 183O there were well over 2 million.
1. R.V. Fogel and S.L. Engerman, '"Time on the Cross: The
Economics of American. Negro Slavery", Nevj York, Wildwood House,
1975, demonstrate conclusively that the slave system was
economically viable and efficient as a productive investment,
comparing favourably with other" forms of agriculture.
2. Hofstadter et al., 136lt:lSh-
3. Ey 3.860 this figure had increased to over ii million
(.Eranklin, 1969; 186 ).
Given the immense productivity of the large plantations v ' and
the fact that only about a quarter of the whites in the South
were slave-holders at all, and of these, approximately SCP/o fell
into the category of being small slave-holders (owning1 20 slaves
%
or less), it is hardly surprising that the social and political
(2)
influence of large owners was enormous. x '
This accelerated development of the Southern slave system
demonstrates that the impact of legislation directed towards
controlling the international slave trade was of no material
consequence in relation to the ownership of slave property,
nevertheless, as will be discussed in this chapter, the turn of
the 19th century and the official closure of the international
trade do mark the beginnings of a new 'mature' phase of the
Southern slave system. The implications of the closing of the
international slave trade (however ineffective the legislation
in this area was to be) and of the domestic expansion of the slav
system coupled with the tensions occasioned by the practice of
slavery in a nation, at least ideologically committed to liberty,
1. Missippi, Alabama, Louisiana and Georgia, the states at the
top of the list in the number of large slave-holders, produced
the majority of the cotton crop.
2. Franklin, 1969:185-187; and Hofstadter et al., 1961;.: 151-2.
3. Southerners such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, had.
assisted in forging an American liberal philosophy in. the late
l8th century which posited not only the inalienable rights of lif
liberty and the pursuit of happiness but also the legitimacy of
insurrection if men were deprived, of these rights.
f1)
tended to curb the level of exploitation of slaves ' ' and led
to some attempts to conserve their labour power.
Thus, while the federal state, in its constitutional form,
had undertaken to guarantee the security and legal title to
(2)
slave property, v ' the nature of this guarantee was by no means
consistent in either legal definitions or practices. Where the
\
slave system of production was developing, as in the lower South
in the late l8th and early 19th centuries, regulatory laws were
being enacted which were in force in the ordinary courts or
through specially constituted slave tribunals where the guilt
or innocence of slaves was adjudicated. At the same time,
these same courts asserted that a slave could not be party' to a
tl)
suit of lav.7; he could no fc testify; his irresponsibility
meant that his oath was not binding thus he could make no
contracts; and his ownership of property was generally
forbidden.
1. At the same time, slaves became increasingly subject to
control over every facet of their lives. All over the South, a
body of laws, known as the Black Codes, began to emerge in the
late iSth into the early 19th century. This body of laws,
aimed explicitly at protecting; the ownership of slave property,
and covered every aspect of the life of the slaves. For a
discussion of the Black Cedes, see Franklin, 1969:187-189.
2. This was discussed in Chapter 5>.
3- Except against another slave or a .free negro.
i+. See, for example, Franklin, 1969:188.
In law, the chattel slave is clearly a, contradictory
being - as a chattel, the slave is denied legal personality,
yet in being held responsible for his actions by the criminal
(2)
law, the slave is accorded the attributes of a legal subject. v
Moreover, the value of the slave, as property, as a chattel,
depends on the fact that, while being denied the status of a
legal subject (such as the chattel definition involved), the
slave, of necessity, must have many of the attributes of a human
subject, such as the capacity to act under supervision and so on.
(3)
This necessary recognition of the ruffian aspect of the
chattel slave posed the specific problem of how law could
1. For an excellent discussion of the conception of the chattel
slave in Roman private lav/, in its differentiation between things
(res) and persons, and the issue of legal personality, see
Hindess and Hirst, 1975.'110-112. See also, WjW. Buckland, li;ihe
Roman Law of Slavery", Cambridge University Press, 1970:3-6.
It must be emphasised however that the legal form ox slavery in
North America, did not grow cut of Roman 'Law but rather out. of
Anglo-Saxon traditions (see Chapter 2), For a discussion of the
colonial forms of slavery in Latin America which grew out of
Roman Law traditions, see 3. ETLkins, "Slavery: A Problem in
American Institutional and Intellectual Life", Chicago, University
of Chicago Press, 1968 ed.; F. Tannenbaum, "Slave and Citizen",
New York, Random House, 19b7; and Degler, 1973.
2. See Davis, 1975} for his discussion of the chattel slave as a
"man-thing", a concept which he uses to describe the contradiction
between man. as subject and as chattel.
3. The contradiction between subject and tiling inherent in the
legal status of chattel slave is also evidenced by the fact that
laws were, from time to time, created in order to mitigate some
of the excessively harsh treatment of slaves (see Chapter 1+).
While, as Stampp, 1955, has argued, many of these laws were
ineffective because of technical drafting where, for example, a
slave might ' accidentally'• die after being 'rightly5 punished by
his master, or because of lack of enforcement the fact that such
laws were passed at all is a recognition of the slave as more
complex than a simple chattel.
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attribute both property and personality to the sar.no legal status.
As will become evident in the subsequent discussion in this
chapter, Southern legal institutions and practices developed
their own unique form of legal reasoning to accommodate these
apparent contradictions, a form of reasoning absent in Northern
states and from which the latter1s legal institutions and
practices would diverge, ultimately leading to a conflict in law
requiring resolution through the legal institutions and practices
H \
of the federal republican state.
Tiriis forta of legal reasoning which was able to uphold the
slave system, and regard the legal rights of property in slaves
as paramount, was most clearly articulated in relation to the
(2)
criminal law v * where issues of criminal responsibility were
central to the protection of slave property in that owners had to
be protected from criminal damage to- their slaves and from their
slaves disturbing the 'public peace' and so on. When dealing with
the issues of the alleged criminality of slaves or the commission
of criminal acts against slaves, Southern courts evaded the issue
of personality by arguing from the institutional arrangements of
slavery. In other words, issues of guilt, innocence, provocation
and the like, were decided on in terms of the legal, nature of the
master/slave relation, not in terms of the alleged acts c:c omissions
1. See Chapter 8 for a discussion of this conflict in law.
2, This contradiction was referred to in Chapters 3 and it
concerning the colonial period. Indeed, the creation of the
special negro courts to deal with the criminal, offences of slaves
clearly demonstrates some recognition of legal personality.
of the individuals concerned. Slaves and other persons could
be viewed as criminally liable through reference to the
institutional conditions of slavery and through, analogising
with, other relations such as those of lord/villein; master/
apprentice; and parent/child.
In this way, Southern legal institutions and practices were
able to create a form of legal reasoning which could contain any
apparent contradictions inherent in the legal status of chattel
slave and which could, at the same time, regulate the kinds of
protections to be given to slaves which would ensure their
value as property without giving them legal rights which might
threaten the slave system. Ems, in the cases discussed in
this chapter it is clear that common lav? protection was
attributed to the slave status when deciding on property rights,
but when the 1human1 rigrits of slaves were at issue, common law
protection was denied by arguing that slavery, being unknown at
common law, had been created by positive law and that any
rights accruing to slaves as persons were therefore wholly
predicated upon statutory law. One status in the relation, the
master, was protected by the common law as well as any statutory
enactments, whereas the other was dependent on statute alone for
any legal rights.
Nevertheless, whatever the contradictions in both definition
and practice in the process of negotiating this cultural artefact,
1. The English precedent of Sommersett, 20 How. St. Tr. 1,
discussed in Chapter 2, was extensively relied on for this argument
this chapter illustrates that both the legal institutions and
practices of the Southern states in the first part of the 19th
century and those of the federal republican state regarded the
slave, in the last instance, as property not subject. Despite
the fact that the issue of the expansion of the slave system was
a contestable question between Northern and Southern states,
throughout the first jjeriod of the 'rule of law', l800-l835>
established under the auspices of the US Supreme Court, ^ the
property interest in slaves was consistently upheld and freedom
suits consistently denied.
During this early part of the 19th century, the US Supreme
Court was presented with a. number of instances in which a ruling
could have been made which would limit the expansion of the
slave system. The Court was presented with various opportunities
where the freedom of an individual 'slave' could have been
declared but it consistently exercised its discretion in favour of
upholding the system of slavery. This pattern, however, was
established in the sane period that the US Supreme Court played a
particularly active role in expanding its power to decide on
constitutional issues in other areas. In a number of cases before
1. See this chapter, p.iplpj Note 1, for the constitutional
establishment of the US Supreme Court under Article III of the
US Constitution.
the IIS Supreme Court, Chief Justice Marshall demonstrated
that the Court was not concerned about whether or not its
opinions offended some powerful interests in the country, while
reserving for the federal judiciary broad powers in adjudicating
(2)
rights of citizens, states and the federal government. '
Yet despite this expansion of its power, the US Supreme
Court made no fundamental rulings in any of the slavery cases
before it but simply reiterated and emphasised that the legal
title to slave property was guaranteed in constitutional as well
as state law, thus maintaining and containing the tension between
the ideology of liberty upon which the new states had been founded
and the continuing practice of slavery. ffihe system of slave
production was not only more firmly entrenched and expanded in the
Southern states throughout the first part of the 19th century, but
was also given an effective guarantee in constitutional law by a
1. Practically every historian of the US Supreme Court has called
Marshall one of the ten great judges to preside there. See, for
example, A, Beveridge, "Hie Life of John Marshall", Houghton Mills
Co., 1916; Charles Warren, "The Supreme Court in United States
History", Vol.1, 1789-1821, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1923;
and Bollak, 1966.
2. For example, in Marbury v Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803), a
case which "represented the determination of Marshall and his
associates to interfere with the authority of the executive"
(Warren, 1923, Vol.1:4), Chief Justice Marshall announced the
Court's power to declare Acts cf Congress (federal statutes)
unconstitutional, a doctrine which became perhaps the raost
fundamental decision in the American system of federal
constitutional law. In deciding a number of other cases -
Fletcher v Peck (6 Cranch 87, 1821); MoCulloch v Maryland (ii
Wheaton 316, 1.819): Si-urges v Crowninshleid (T7 US 122, 1819);
Dartmouth. College v Woodward "(l7 US 518, 1819); Cohen v Virginia
(6 Wheaton 2645; Gibbons v Ogden (9 Wheaton 1, 182I4.); and Og&en
v US Bank (22 US 733)" - Chief Justice Marshall further expanded the
authority of. the Court while limiting the scope of the states by-
setting aside state laws as contrary to the US Constitution.
consistent exercise of discretion in favour of affirming the
legality of claims to slaves as items of private property,
thereby ensuring that the basis of the Southern economy was
consistent with the. process of capitalist development throughout
North America.
CONFLICT WITHIN THE LEGAL STATUS : COMMON LAW v STATUTE
As was mentioned earlier, the contradictory nature of the
chattel slave in law is perhaps most clearly evident in relation
to the criminal law. In the 19th century South, when legal
institutions confronted the issue of the commission of criminal
acts against slaves, conflict arose over whether or not to afford
legal protection to slaves because they were human beings or
because of the property interest of" the owner. - In making these
decisions, courts were faced with the issue of whether or not the
common law could be applied to slaves. If it could, then this
could provide a doctrinal foundation for the recognition of other
aspects of the legal personality of the slave under the common la
in particular, the right to basic procedural fairness in criminal
proceedings, unless common law protection was very carefully
limited to the particular case and to specific aspects of slavery
The question of whether or not there could be en application
of the common law to the slave was not only a question of
doctrinal right but was also a question of which institutions
would be effective in shaping Hie status and conditions of the
slave. If it was asserted that there could be no application of
common law to 'the status ox slavery, then the issues surrounding
the development and nature of slavery would be determined by slave
owners and legislatures (when the latter chose to intervene)•, In
this case the role of the courts would be restricted to the
interpretation of legislative enactments and cut off from the
tradition of judge made common law. On the other hand, if the
courts did establish that there could be an appld.cat.ion of common
law to the condition of slavery, then the courts could assert their
own specific institutional effectivity in relation to the
development of slavery.
Nash has argued that an appreciable volume of litigation
concerning the "personal rights of slaves" did not reach the
(l)
appellate courts ^ ' of the Southern states until the end of the
l8th century and it was, therefore, not until the early years of
the 19th century that these courts had occasion to consider,
"the first and most fundamental question of black criminal
jurisprudence: bid the slave fall under the protection of the
1. She courts of the individual states and of the Federal
Government are divided into two principal branches - trial and
appellate courts. With very few exceptions, all lawsuits,
both civil and criminal, begin in the trial courts by the filing
of a complaint in civil actions or by indictment or information
in criminal actions. Following final judgment in the trial
court, a party may seek review in an appellate court of the
rulings of law which he challenges as incorrect. unless,
however, he alleges that the evidence relied on in the trial
court was legally insufficient, a party may not appeal the
accuracy of the findings on fact. In some states there are two
levels of appellate court - intermediate and ultimate. The
courts of record in the Federal system are the US District
Court (the trial court), the Court of Appeals, and the United
States Supreme Court (see p,ip.3>, Note 1 for detail on. the federal
system) <
h )
common law ♦..". v * While the answer of the South Carolina
Supreme Court, for example, was unequivocal:
There can he .... no offense against the State for
a mere heating of a slave .. The peace of the
State is not thereby broken; for a slave is not
generally regarded as legally capable as being
within the peace of the State; (2)
other Southern states witnessed the development of an application
of common law protection, albeit inconsistently applied. In the
discussion of the cases which follow, it will become clear that
apparent inconsistencies in the application of common law to the
status of slaves can be attributed in part to the degree to which
courts attempted to reconcile the formal contradictions between
the ideological basis of the North American republican state and.
the legal recognition of slavery and its effective guarantee by
that state, coupled with their ability to develop a special form
cf legal reasoning which, arguing from the institutional
arrangements governing the master/slave relation, limited the
application of common law to the property aspect of the slave
status.
for example, in. the case of State v Boon, ^ which was
decided before the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1801, the issue
of whether or not statutory or common law should be applied in the
1. A.E, Keir Nash, "fairness and Formalism in the Trials of
Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the Old South", in 56
University of Virginia Law Review, 1970:67.
2. State v Haner, 2.2 SCL, (xS3U)•
3. 3 .N.C. Taylor, 21x6 (l80l).
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case of the killing of a. slave by a third party (not the
owner) was confronted. The lower court had found Boon guilty
of murdering a slave under an Act of 1791 which stated that:
If any person shall 'be hereafter guilty of
wilfully and maliciously killing a slave, such
offender shall upon the first conviction thereof
be adjudged guilty of murder, and shall suffer
the same punishment as if he had killed a free
man, any law, usage or custom to the contrary
no twithstanding. (2 )
rIhe judge in the lower court had directed the case to the
Supreme Court to obtain the letter's opinion on whether any, or
what, punishment could ba inflicted on Boon. Adopting a
strictly constructionist view of the enacting clause, Judge Hall
for the Supreme Court argued that, because the phrase "as if he
had killed a free man" vras subject to differing interpretations
depending on the circumstances of the killing, he was unable to
inflict any punishment on Boon, "without using a discretion and




The State •Ur/ had also argued, however, that independent of
any legislative Act the offence with which Boon was charged was a
felony at common law. Judge Hall denied the applicability of the
common law to the case of slavery because, he argued, no such
1. When I refer to a "third party" I am. referring to a person who
does not stand in any particular relationship to the slave. The
significance of this will become apparent as my argument develops.
2. 1 N.C. Taylor, 21*6.
3. Ibid.,. 21*8.
1*. When I use "State" with a capital "S" I am referring to the
party in a litigation.
-J p. p30u.
status of slave existed in England, nor was there any resemblance
in law between villenage and slavery since villeins had legal
rights whereas slaves did not. Moreover, the fact that various
Acts had been passed, in particular those of 171+1* 177U and
1791* in relation to the killing of slaves suggested that the
(2)
offence was not a felony at common law. v ' If it had been.
Hall argued, there would have been no need to pass legislation.
For these reasons Judge Hall had "little doubt" that Boon must
be discharged.
While Judge Macay, relying solely on the statute, argued
that Boon must be discharged, and Judges Johnston and Taylor
agreed with the verdict on the grounds that the language of the
1791 Act was open to interpretation, these latter two judges
also argued that the killing of a slave was murder at common law.
There was, however, no need in State v Boon to rule on the issue
of the applicability of common law to the status of slaves since
ail judges agreed about the lack of clarity in the 1791 statute
and chose to premise their verdict on that basis,
However, the question about the protection of a slave under
the common law was not to be evaded in another case before the
1. This statute, dealing with the circumstances in which slaves
night be killed (runaways, for correction etc.), stated that civil
damages could be claimed by the owners. To sustain this action,
said Hall, slaves must be considered as chattels.
2. On the relationship of the English Common Law to post-
revolutionary development of law in the United States, see Perry
Miller, "The Life of the Mind in America: From the Eevolution
to the Civil War", Lev/ York, 1963. See also Chapter 2 for a
discussion of villenage and its relevance to the common law
debates re slavery.
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North Carolina Supreme Court, In the 1823 case of State y Heed. K~'
the appeal was against the sentence passed on a third party on
conviction for the murder of a. slave at corcmon law. Judge Hall,
as in State v Boon, argued that slavery was unknown to the common
(?)
law s ' while Chief Justice Taylor, as in his opinion in State v
Boon, argued that the murder of a slave was an offence at common
law. Judge Henderson, who held the decisive vote on the three man
tench, concluded that a slave's life was protected at common law.
In defining murder as l!ihe killing of any reasonable creature,
within the protection of the Law, with malice prepense", and
asserting that, "a slave is a reasonable, or more properly a
human being" and by claiming that English common law had been
incorporated into the jurisprudence of North Carolina, Henderson
argued that a slave, being a reasonable creature, within the
(3)
protection of the law, could in fact" be murdered, v J
Henderson denied the argument that:
fa slaveJ being property .., is not within the
protection of" the law, and therefore the law regards
not the manner of his death; that the owner alone
is interested, and the State no more concerned
independently of* the acts of the Legislature on
that subject, than in the death of a horse. (ij)
1. 9 11, 2 Hawks, hSh (1823).
2. Keedss defence counsel cited State v Soon as precedent and
Sommersett v Stuart (20 How. St. Tr), in England which argued that
slavery was not known to the common law (see Chapter 2, p,125 et sen.)
3. 9 11, 2 Hawks, kBS-
k. Ibid., 16$.
What the law did. do, .in establishing slavery, was to vest in the
master:
The absolute and uncontrolled right to the
services of the slave, and the means of
enforcing those services follow as necessary
consequences ...: but the life of a slave being
no ways necessary to be placed in the power of the
owner for the full enjoyment of his services, the
law takes care of that... (l)
In conclusion, Henderson suggested that the death penalty should
be pronounced against Reed.
Henderson's reasoning in State v Heed is indicative of the
desire to establish a precedent for a common law basis for the
protection of the slave status. There is no reason, for
example, why the Court co-old not have arrested judgment, allowing
the prosecutor to bring- a new indictment under a clearly
applicable statute, rather than attempting a more uncertain
common law argument. Henderson's statement, "I disclaim all
rules or laws in investigating this question, but the Common Law
(?
of England, as brought to this country by our forefathers
can only be read as a determined attempt to establish some common
law be,sis in relation to the status of slavery. Moreover, with
1. 9 EC, 2 Hawks, 1£6. The distinction made here between the
legal right to the services of the slave as opposed to the
person of a slave can be compared with the English slavery cases
discussed in Chapter 2 where the correct form of common law
pleading for the services of the slave had to be adopted.
2. 9 KC, 2 Hawks, l&$.
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this decision in State v Heed in favour of protecting the life
of the slave under the common lav,7, it would become necessary in
subsequent cases to define- the scope of this common law
protection. Hie occasion for the further definition of the
slave's protection under the common law was the case of State v
h )
Hale, - ' an appeal from a conviction for the assault and battery
on a slave which reached the North Carolina Supreme Court in 1823.
Chief Justice Taylor stated that the issue before the Court
in State v Hale was, "whether a battery, committed on a slave,
no justification, cr circumstances attending it, being shown, is
(2)
an indie table offence", v ' and he went on to deliver his opinion,
by immediately stating the premises on vrhich his argument was
casedz
As there is no positive law, decisive of the
question, a solution of it must be deduced from
general principles, frcm reasonings founded on the
common law, adapted to the existing condition and
circumstances of our society, and indicating that
result, which is best adapted to general
expedience. (3)
Although Stats v Reed was not specifically referred to as precedent,
the influence of that decision is clear. In the present case the
applicability of the common lav.7 to protect the slave was no longer
a, principle in dispute, V/hat was at issue in State v Hale was
1. 9 NO, ?. Hawks, 582 (1.323).
2. 9 HO, 2 Hawks, 582
3.' Ibid., 582 - my emphasis.
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the extent of the application of the common law to the
protection of a slave and, in this case, the Court stated its
intention to play an active role in the resolution of this
issue. Thus, Judge Taylor stated:
It would be a subject of regret to every
thinking person if Courts of Justice were
restrained, by any austere rule of judicature,
from keeping pace with the march of benignant
policy, and provident humanity, which for many
years, has characterised every Legislative act,
relative to the protection of the slaves, and
which Christianity, by the mild diffusion of its
light and influence, has contributed to promote;
and even domestic safety and interest equally
enjoin.
In commenting' upon the development of legislation in relation
to slavery Taylor noted that it had. secured:
To this class of persons, milder treatment and
more attention to their safety; for the very
circumstance of their being brought within the
pale of legal protection, ... has rendered them
of more value to their masters, and suppressed many
outrages ...
It was therefore the law, Taylor claimed, which had been, able to'
contain the contradiction between subject and thing by offering
seme form of protection for the subject, while, at the same time,





Counsel for Kale, ho-.fever, had argued that no offence had
"been committed "because the person assaulted was a slaves
Who is not protected by the general criminal
law of the State; but that, as the property of
an individual, the owner may be redressed by a
civil action. (l)
Judge Taylor, however, rejected this argument and, basing his
opinion on the common law, he concluded that while the private
injury caused by an assault and battery could be redressed by a
civil action, the act was still a crime by its breach of "that
social order which it is the primary object of the law to
maintain". J
However, the public peace was apparently only broken by the
assault on a slave by a stranger (third party) not by an owner.
Thus;
The instinct of a. slave may be, and generally is,
tamed into subservience of his master's will, and
from him he receives chastisement, whether it be
merited or not, with perfect submission; for lie
knows the extent of the dominion assumed over him,
and that the law ratifies the claim.. But when the
same authority is wantonly usurped by a stranger,
nature is disposed to assert her right, and to
prompt the slave to a resistance ... (3
1. 9 KG, 2 Hawks, 5^3- In Chapter J* the fact that suits for civil
damages by owners were permissible in the case of damage to their
property (slaves) was discussed. And, in many states, the state
itself paid compensation to owners whose slaves were killed in the
revolutionary war.
2. 9 EG, 2 Hawks, 581}..
3. Ibid., 581*.
The reason that a stranger's assault on a slave was
considered a crime at common law was because as well as
rendering the public peace insecure:
The value of slave property must be much impaired,
for the offenders can seldom make any reparation in
damages ...|_sincej ... these offences are usually
committed by men of dissolute habits, hanging loose
upon society, who, being repelled from association
with well, disposed citizens, take refuge in the
company of colored persons and slaves.
Thus, Taylor could arrive at the conclusion that while the law
secured to the master a complete authority over the slave "to
render him useful as property", this right of property could be
more effectively guaranteed, "when the slave is protected from
<2.)wanton abuse from those who have no power over him ■ '
However, even this judgment against a stranger's assault on a
slave was limited by the qualification that:
Many circumstances which would not constitute a
legal provocation for a battery committed by one
white man on another, would justify it, if
committed on a slave, provided the battery were
not excessive.
Therefore, while Taylor in this case, because Hale did not show





the assault and "battery of a slave was maintainable, he left
the issues of provocation by a stranger and what constitutes
excessive battery open to case by case resolution. Both Judges
Hall and Henderson concurred that "much depends on the
(i )
circumstances of the case". ' In other words, sometimes an
assault and battery on a slave cculd be maintained as an
indictable offence and sometimes it could not.
The issue as to when an assault and battery on a slave could
be maintained as an indictable offence was again confronted in
(2)State- v Mann v ' decided before the North Carolina Supreme Court
in 1829. She defendant, Mann, had been indicted for an assault
and battery upon Lydia, the slave of Elizabeth Jones. Mann had
hired the slave for one year and during that time, the slave
"committed some small offence" and Mann chastised her. In. the
act of chastising her the slave ran off and when she refused to
stop, Mann shot and wounded her. Mann was found guilty in a
lower court because "he had only a special property in the slave"
s.s a. hirer. On appeal to the Supreme Court. Judge Ruffin noted
that the central question before the Court was, "whether a cruel
and unreasonable battery on a slave, by the hirer, is
indictable". ^
()
Ruffin rejected the precedent of Stats v Hall w/ since that
case only referred to an assault end battery on a slave by a
1. Ibid., 537.
2. 13 1€, 263 (1829)
3. Ibid., 26h.
ii. This is the same case as State v Hale discussed immediately
before the present case.
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stranger. The defendant, Mann, was the hirer and, as such,
was entitled not to a special property relationship but to the
same property relationship which existed between master- and
slave:
Our laws uniformly treat the master or other
person having- the possession and command of the
slave, as entitled to the same extent ox
authority ... In a criminal proceedings ... the
hirer and possessor of a slave, in relation to
both rights and duties, is, for the time being,
the owner. (1)
Thus, in order to decide whether the hirer (as owner) could be
indicted for an assault and battery on 'his4 slave, Judge Ruffin
argued that, "the Court is compelled to express an opinion upon
the extent of the dominion of the master over the slave in North.
Carolina". ^1
The prosecuting Attorney General had, in the lower court,
argued, by analog!sing between the master/slave relationship and
other relations of authority (parent/child; master/apprentice
etc.), .that the assault and. battery of a slave was an. indictable
offeree and that the present case was no different in principle
to State v Hall. The implication here could have been that an
owner could be indicted for an unreasonable and brutal assault and
battery. Ruffin, however, denied that there was any likeness
between say the relation of parent/child and that of roaster/slave.




With slavex^y it is far otherwise. The end
is the profit of the master, his security and
the public safety; the subject, one doomed in
his own person, and his posterity, to live
without knowledge, and without the capacity to
make any thing his own, and to toil thai another
may reap the fruits. (l)
To achieve this end required obedience and:
Such obedience is the consequence only of
uncontrolled authority over the body. There is
nothing else which can operate to produce the
effect. 'flie power of the master must be
absolute, to render the submission of the slave
perfect. (2)
Tins discipline, argued Euffin, ,:is inherent in the relation of
ty)
master and slave".
The only place where the law could legitimately intervene
to limit the uncontrolled authority was, according to Ruffin, ^
through legislation. He therefore rejected the common law
argument and denied that the courts had any active role in
relation to the definition of slavery:





Note that Ruffin himself owned over 100 slaves at the
Civil War "nearly dl of whom were born his ana raised
time of
oy
him", (see sPublications of the North Carolina Historical
Commission5, Vol.8, Part h, "The Papers of Thomas Huffin", IV).
We Qudges] are forbidden to enter upon a train
of general reasoning on the subject. V/e cannot
allow the right of the master to be brought into
discussion in the Courts of Justice ... The
Court therefore disclaims the power of changing
the relation, in which these pacts of our people
stand to each other ... ("and . J ... I would
gladly have avoided this ungrateful question.
But being brought to it, the Court is compelled
to declare, that while slavery exists amongst us
in its present state, or until it shall seem fit
to the Legislature to interpose express enactments
to the contrary, it will be the imperative duty of
the Judges to recbgnise the full dominion of the
owner over the slave, except where the exercise of
it is forbidden by statute. All this we do upon
the ground, that this dominion is essential to
the value of slaves as property.
Thus, in the absence of any statute protecting a slave from an
unreasonable and cruel assault and battery from his owner (cr
quasi-owner such as Mann) and by the Court's refusal to argue
from the general principles of common law, the decision of the
lower court was reversed and the legality of the absolute
authority of the owner over his slaves was affirmed. The lav;
would not interfere in the co.se of a master shooting his slave.
Common lav; protection had, in Stale v Hale (or Hall)
expanded to the point where an assault and battery on a. slave by
a stranger was held to be an indictable offence but in State v
Mann it was clearly articulated that a master (or one in his
position) could not be held criminally liable ~ the master/slave
relation was, after all, first and foremost a property relation.
Even in the case of strangers, it will be recalled, however, -thai
1. 13 IE, 267-8.
399.
the ruling was for every case to "be judged on its merits
and one interpretation of State v Hale is that Hale was held
criminally liable because of an offence against property when,
in his case, presumably because he had no means, civil restitution
to the owner was not possible. In these circumstances, common
law protection was afforded to the slave but this was no
guarantee that another slave, being brutally assaulted by another
stranger, would be afforded such protection. This would appear
to depend not only on the circumstances of the case but also on
the circumstances of the stranger. Common law protection then,
was apparently granted when the property interests in slavery
would benefit but it was denied when attempts were made to apply
it to the personal rights of slaves.
One of the clearest statements of the position that there
could be no application of the common law to the question of any-
personal rights of slaves was that of Judge Nesbitt ox the
(l)
Supreme Court of Georgia in heal v Farmer- decided in l85l.
While many of the Southern appellate courts had., between the
1820s and l8p0s, permitted the application of common law to the
(?.)
slave status K J in protecting the rights of property and the
1. 9 Ga, 595 (1851).
2. The Supreme Courts of Alabama and Tennessee, for example,
could argue that even where statutes existed, they simply
speci-fied particular penalties for the commission of a pre¬
existing- common law offence. Per a fuller discussion of such
cases, see Wash, 1970:66-77.
'public peace', the most conservative of the ante-bellum
appellate courts, South Carolina and Georgia, had consistently
rejected any application of common law. ^ This consistent
rejection of the applicability of the common law to the slave
status can be attributed to the fact that these states, where
the slave mode of production was most deeply entrenched, had,
through legislative enactment, developed an extensive degree of
control over the slave system, a degree of control premised on
•the power wielded by the slave owners to secure such
legislation in order to limit the power of the courts in .
relation to slavery. Nowhere is this inability of the courts
to. exert their own specific influences on the slave status,
through an appeal to common law, more articulately stated than
in Judge JJesbitt's reasoning in Neal v Farmer.
/o \
In Neal v Farmer, the precise issue 1 before the Court was
(3)"is it a felony at Common Law to kill a slave?" ' This issue
had to be resolved before any civil damages could be awarded in
connection with the killing of the slave in question, because if
it was a felony at common law then the, present civil case had to
be suspended until the offender was convicted or acquitted. In
1. For a. fuller discussion of these cases, see Nash, 1970:76-77
2. This case involved fairly complex litigation due to an
attempt to gain civil damages for the killing of a slave with one
party arguing that it was not a felony at common law to kill a
slave and the other arguing that it was.
3. 9 Ga, 560.
delivering the opinion of the Court, Judge Nesbitt, citing
Hargrave1 s argument in Sommersett v Stuart as precedent,
argued that the "Common Law recognises hut one species of
slavery as having existed in England under its sanction at any
(2)
time, and that is villenage." v J And in reviewing the English
cases on villenage, Nesbiti concluded that since the last
recorded case of villenage was in 1617 and Georgia- ws,s not
settled until 1732, villenage was:
No part of the Common Law in 1732 •••7^tlmsj? ...
all the reasoning of the counsel, drawn from the
fact that slavery was recognised by the Common.
Law, in the form of villenage necessarily falls
to the ground.
Moreover, even if villenage was still in force, said. Nesbiti,
the 1egal velations between master and slave and lord and villein
were so dissimilar that an argument by analogy could not be
sustained. A villein, argued Nesbitt, was not unconditionally
a slave. A villein, although the subject of property, had civil
and political rights; he could bring suits in the court; and,
as a subject under the protection of the Crown, his lord could not
Oi)
kill him or maim him. v
1. For a discussion of the significance of this case, see
Chapter 2.
2. 9 Ga, 562. For a discussion of villenage and its importance
to the legal status of the slave, see Chapter 2.
3. 9 Ga, 566.
1;. Ibid., 567. Arguably Nesbitt could have approached the issue
of the applicability of common law to the slave status. To assert
that villeins were not slaves because villeins were entitled to
common law protection begs the question of whether the status of
slavery was incorporated in the common law so as to protect the slav
against murder.
In reviewing the decisions of the English Courts, Lesbitt
concluded that the question of the status of a slave in England
was-settled in Soramersett v Stuart when the issue of "the right
of the master to control a person of the slave" in England was
confronted. ^^ Although Lord Mansfield recogni.sed the master/
slave relation and admitted that a "contract for the price of a
(2)
negro slave, was good, in England", he denied the right of the
master to control the person of the slave in England. A slave
could not exist in England - the "moment he set foot on the soil
(°)
of England, he was free".
This doctrine had been upheld in subsequent English and
Lorth. American cases, thus:
We hold it, therefore, settled upon authority that
African slavery does not, and never did exist in
England. What then, is the inevitable conclusion?
It is that such a thing as killing a negro slave in
England, is a legal impossibility, and could not be
a felony under the Common Law. In other words,
the Common Law has no application to the condition
of slavery in England, or in Georgia.
1. 9 Ga, 577 - W empbasi . s»
2. Ibid.. 577.
3. Ibid., 577.
!i. Hesbitt relied on the fo3lowing prec edents: in
Forbes v Cochrane, 2 Band and Cres, L|li8; 1 Act on R. 2i|0; Hie
Slave Grace, 2. Hagg. Adm. R, 9ui and in the USA (Massachusetts) --
Se.ul v His Creditors, 17 Martin's R, 598; Butler v Kooper,
3 Wash. CR, 1^99 S Ex -parte Simmons, U Idem., 390; Butler v
Delphanie, 7 Serg and Rawle, 378: Commonwealth v Avea, 18 Pick, 15
$. 9 Ga, 5?8' Nesbitt points out that if a white man killed an
African in England he would be guilty of a felony because the
deceased would not be a slave but a free man.
Indeed, in spelling out the consequences for the slave system
of permitting common lav; protection, Nesbitt noted:
If it protects the life of the slave, why not
his liberty? and if it protects his liberty, then
it breaks down, at once, the status of the slave ...
pfhe colonies received the common lawj ... as
slaveb.old.ing communities and as applicable to them
as slaveholders. It is absurd to talk about the
Common Law being applicable to an institution which
it would destroy.
In concluding his rejection of the applicability of common law
to the slave status, thereby affirming the judgment of the lower
court that it was not a felony at common law to kill a slave,
Nesbitt argued, that statute alone could define any personal
rights that a slave might have because where:
Two races of men £arej living together, one in the
character of master and the other in the character
of slave, ftheyj cannot be governed by the same
laws ... Tand any personal rights for slavesjj ...
must be defined by positive enactments, which,
whilst they protect the slave., guard, the right of
Common law then, was apparently only regarded as being
applicable to the slave status when, as in the North Carolina
cases discussed earlier, the protection of the property rights
1. 9 Ga, 579-80 - emphasis in original. Hesbitt emphasised
that property rights in slaves had existed in Georgia since 1751•
Ms right to property had been confirmed by statute; recognised
by the stats constitution; and by the compromises of the US
Constitution.





inherent in the master/slave relation was regarded as paramount.
VJhere the issue of the human rights of slaves was at stake, as
in heal v Farmer, the common lav/ was regarded as inapplicable end
the only appeal was to statutory law. Courts apparently decided
on which rights were at issue on the basis of the extent to which
civil restitution could be expected for damage to slave property.
As the North Carolina cases demonstrate, common law protection
was afforded to slaves when they were assaulted or killed by a
certain class of persons (poor "strangers"), but this was not so
when owners or quasi-owners committed the same acts. On the
other- hand, in Heal v Farmer the Court was aware just how well
developed the legal regulation of slavery was in Georgia, and that
civil restitution was possible in that instance through statutory
law regardless of whether or not the killing of a slave was held
to be a felony at common law. However, even Nesbitt when he
stated that, "the laws of Georgia, at this moment, recognise the
(l)
negro as a man, whilst they hold him property", could not
totally deny the human aspect of the chattel slave.
Thus, even in those cases,, such as State v Mann and Heal v
Farmer, where there was an explicit denial of common law protection
to the slave status, this denial was coupled with the assertion
that statutory law did recognise the person in the status as well
as the chattel. The issue of the extent to which the legs,!
personality of slaves would be recognised, and, if so, how it
1. 9 C-a, 582 - my emphasis.
would be recognised, by statute or at common law, was, as the
subsequent discussion demonstrates, even more problematic when
the law attempted to deal with criminal slaves as opposed to
those committing alleged criminal acts against slaves.
IRQPERT¥' v PERSONALITY: : ORE SLATE STATUS
As was argued earlier, if common law protection could be
applied to the status of slaves when criminal acts were committed
against them, then this could provide a basis within legal
discourse from which it could be argued that other aspects of the
legal personality of slaves should be recognised under the common
law. Southern courts of law, however, managed to evade the
issue of defining the extent to which the legal personality of
slaves was recognised in such instances either by strictly
limiting the nature of common law protection to the property right
inherent in the master/slave-relation, in those cases where common
law applied, or by categorically rejecting the applicability of
the common law to any aspect of slavery, in those cases which
argued that statute alone defined the nature cf the slave status.
However, while this kind of legal reasoning obfuscating the issue
of legal personality could be adopted when the alleged offender
was not a slave, to try a slave for an alleged commission of a
criminal, act required that the law regard him as criminally
responsible, a status which required a recognition of the person
rather than the chattel aspect of the slave. Exactly how the law
coped with the contradictory nature of the slave, a 1man-thing*,
is discussed in relation to the following criminal cases where
the defendant was a slave.
In State v Negro Will ^ the defendant, Will, a slave, had.
been indicted for -the murder of Baxter, his overseer. Hie judge
(2)
in the lower court, on a special verdict, J decided that Will
was guilty of murder and pronounced the death sentence. Will
then appealed to the North Carolina, Supreme Court on the basis of
the following facts: Will, a slave, "was under subjection to the
deceased"s his overseer. In response to a complaint of "some
act of petulance and impropriety" of Will4s, the deceased, Baxter,
"formed a resolution of punishment or violence" and, if necessary,
(■>)"to shoot the prisoner". ' Baxter told Mill cf his intention
and Will ran off whereupon the deceased shot him and "lodged the
whole load in the prisoner* s back, and inflicted a wound likely
to occasion death". ^ Will flea and was involved in a struggle
with Baxter (and other negro slaves sent to catch him). Will
struggled to cut himself free and "in the struggle inflicted two
(o")
wounds" on Baxter, one of which proved fatal.
Judge Gaston, in delivering the opinion of the Supreme Court,
noted that, "the crime charged is that of murder at common law",
1. 18 NO, 121 (183)4).
2. Hie special verdict was rendered because the jury were
"altogether ignorant" of whether Will was guilty of the murder with
which he was charged.
3. 18 NO, 121, 135.
lj. Ibid., 136.
p. Ibid., 136.
and that, on the facts, if this incident had occurred "between
two free men, whatever their "relative condition [_ say master/
apprentice/" the homicide coiild not have been more than
manslaughter". ^ ^ However:
It must be admitted ... that the relation which
exists between the owner or temporary master, and
his slave, is in many respects strikingly
dissimilar from that which the law recognises
between a master aiid his apprentice ...
Unconditional submission is the general duty of
the slave; unlimited power, is the general, the
legal right of the master. Unquestionably there
are exceptions to this rule. It is certain that
the master has not the right to slay his slave,
and I hold it to be equally certain that the slave
has a right to defend himself against the
unlawful attempt of his master to deprive him of
life.
Gaston argued that, "there is no Iegal limitation to tine master'
power* of 7?uR.ish'sent, except that it shall not reach the life of
Cl)
his offending slave", " ' and that only the legislature could
limit this power any further - this was not the province of the
In considering the facts of the case, Gaston therefore
argued that the overseer was acting within the limits of his
rightful authority when he told Will that he would punish him -
Will's act was a breach of duty. Nevertheless, the overseer's
"barbarous" acts could not be justified and the Court had to
1. Ibid., 135.
2. Ibid., 3.36 - emphasis in original.
3. Ibid., 137 - emphasis in original.
Uo8.
legal provocation in relation to the
subsequent struggle? which took place between Will and the
overseer. Gaston rejected the State's argument that State v
Maun was a precedent on the issue of provocation, thus the question
remained:
If the passions of the slave be excited into
unlawful violence, by the inhumanity of his
master or temporary owner, or one clothed with
the master's authority, is it a conclusion of law,
that such passions must spring from diabolical
malice? (l)
Gaston reminded the Court that the appeal was to the common law
which declared:
Passion not transcending all reasonable limits,
to be distinct from malice. Hie prisoner is a
human being, degraded indeed by slavery, but
yet having 'organs, dimensions, senses, affections,
passions', like our own; (2)
end, on the basis of this direction, the jury were unable to
find express malice therefore Will was found guilty of manslaughter
(a)
instead of murder.
The issue of what constituted provocation in determining
whether the crime committed was murder or manslaughter when the
party killing was a slave was elaborated further in the appeal
case of State v Caesar, A Slave. ^ Judge Pearson, in delivering
1. 18 PC, 121, IJ4I - emphasis in original. Diabolical malice
was necessary to prove murder in this case.
2. Ibid., Ui1.
3. Ibid., lUl.
li. 9 Iredell Rep. 17?, 391.
his opinion noted that the question was:
Whether the rules of law, 'by which manslaughter
is distinguished from murder, as between white
men, are applicable, when the party killing is a
slave. If not, then to what extent a difference
is to be ma.de?
Pearson stated that this issue was before the Court for the
first time since in State v Negro Will the person killed was the
(2)
overseer, v J whereas the slave Caesar had been convicted of
murder in killing a white man who was not his master or anyone
standing in the master/slave relation to him - the deceased was
a stranger.
Briefly the facts of the case were as follows; two slaves
were talking together when approached by two white strangers
(one of whom was the deceased). The white jnon started heating
the slaves when a third slave approached. The white men
ordered him to get a whip so' they could whip the slaves. When
the slave refused the two white men star-ted beating him severely
whereupon one of the other slaves (Caesar) intervened and knocked
the two white men down with a fence rail and the three slaves
ran away. Trie blow to one of the white men proved to be fatal.
Judge Pearson noted that if this incident had occurred
between white .men then it would have been a case of manslaughter.
1. Ibid., 39--•
2. Ee also ruled out Jarrott's case as relevant precedent.
In that cs.se the general question was discussed, but the decision
did not turn upon it. See State v Jarrott, 1 Iredell Eep. B3,
86.
However, "the same rules are not applicable"
because of "the nature of the institution of
Indeed:
Insolent words from a slave are as apt to provoke
pa,ssion, as those from a white man. Hie same
reasoning, by which it is held, that the ordinary
rules are not applicable to the case of a white
man, who kills a slave, leads to the conclusion,
that they are not applicable to the case of a
slave, who kills a white man..
Q2his, he stated was "merely a new application of a well settled
principle of the common law", a principle settled in connection
with other relations such as parent/child; master/tutor; and
master/apprentice. Legal provocation, in the case of a slave,
could, only be constituted by "bodily pain or unusual
circumstances of oppression", since, "one or both is sufficient
(h)
to account fox' passion". v " On this understanding of provoeatio
Judge Pearson suggested that a slave could be guilty of
manslaughter instead of murder. However, in the present case it
was not the slave receiving the blows who killed the white man but
another slave. nevertheless, in this .case Pearson extended the
principle on the precedent of State v Hale, where common law
1. He cited State v 'Jacket, 1 Hawks, 217, end primary principles
as precedent.
2. 9 Iredell Rep. HC, 392.
3. ibid., 332,
It. Ibid., 39I4. In relation to this issue Pearson discussed the
cases of State v Will; State v Mann and State v Hale: which were
held to support his view here.
(1) in this case
(2)
slavery"» '
protection was given to the status of a slave when the slave was
assaulted by a. stranger, and concluded that the judge in the lower
court was wrong in convicting for murder warning, "great caution
is required to protect slave property from wanton outrages, while,
at the same time, due subordination is preserved".
While Judge Wash agreed with Pearson in asking for a new trial
and based his argument on common law. Chief Justice Ruffin
dissented, stressing the total "dissimilarity in the condition of
(2)
slaves .from anything known at the common law". • ' The
consequences of an application of common law in extenuating the
present offence to manslaughter worried Ruffin:
It seems to me to be dangerous to the last degree
to hold the doctrine, that negro slaves may assume
to themselves the judgment as to the right or ;
propriety of resistance, by one of his own race, to
the authority taken over them by the whites, and,
upon the notion of a generous sympathy with their
oppressed fellow servants, may step forward to
secure fhern from the hands of a white man, and much
less to avenge their wrongs. First denying their
general subordination to the whites, it may be
apprehended that they will end in denouncing the
injustice of slavery itself, and, upon that pretext,
band together to throw off their common bondage
entirely. 1
1. 9 Iredell Rep. EC, 395. Rote that in this case the doctrine
was reasserted that "the law allows of the infliction of blows. A
master is not indictable for a battery upon his slave; ... whereas
the law doss not allow a white man to inflict blows upon a slave,
who is not his property" J$i Iredell Rep. IK, 393 ~ emphasis in
originaTJ.
2. 9 Iredell Rep. EC, i|02.
3. Ibid., U10.
Notwithstanding such divex-genees in the opinions of judges,
however, it is clear- that all recognised at least some degree of
legal personality in slaves in holding them criminally
responsible. Moreover, in both State v Negro Will and State v
Caesar the criminal charge of murder against- the slave in question
was brought at common law. Hone of the judges objected to common
lav/ charges being brought in the case of allegedly criminal slaves,
whereas, in the cases ^ discussed earlier whore non-slaves were
accused of committing criminal acts against slaves, the issue was
whether or not the charge itself could be maintained at common law.
In those cases it was only when a s stranger* offended against the
slave that the common law charge was upheld. Vixen a slave-owner
or quasi-owner offended against 'his1 slave the applicability of
common law was denied and statutory law was relied on exclusively.
Common law was clearly only regarded as applicable when it could
be used to protect slave property.
Thus, even in those cases where slaves were tried for criminal
offences and where the common law charge was not in dispute, courts
were clearly primarily concerned with the protection of slave
property while recognising the legal personality of the slave
accused. In establishing the degree of legal provocation, for
example, courts reasoned in terms of the institutional
arrangements governing the master/slave relation. Hot only did
courts hold that what was constitutive of legal provocation differed
as between slaves and free whites but also that this differed when
1. State v -Boon; State v Reed; State v Hale; State y 'feia and
Heal v 3?sniter
hi3
the victim was an owner or quasi-owrier (as in State v Wegro ¥.111;
as opposed to a stranger (as in State v Caesar)..
VJhen confronting the issue of the commission of criminal acts
against or "by slaves, it is evident that law recognised both
property and personality in chattel slaves, albeit in a strictly
limited way. Courts were extremely cautious in deciding how far
common law protection would extend to the slave status, limiting
each judgment to the specific case and relationship in question.
Some courts and judges were, as has been noted, so cautious that
any common law protection was denied ^ because of the perceived
dangers of permitting arguments relating to slavery to be drawn
from general principles. The denial of common law applicability
meant a reliance on statutory law as the sole guide to the
definition of the slave status regarding personal rights. And,
even where the common law was excepted, judges constantly
emphasised that only the legislature could alter the law. However,
where a legislative act had not been passed judges, on the whole,
developed a line of common law reasoning by arguing that if one
says that a slave is not entitled to the rule of the common lav/
then, at the same time, one establishes another rule (the opposite
to what is denied) and that to do this is the province of the
(2)
legislature not the courts. J And, while there can be little
1. See Hash, 1970s for a discussion of the development of common
law in the trial of slaves (and free negroes). His work details
the extent to which slaves, as criminal defendants, were recognised
as having rights ana emphasises that procedural fairness and
formality was the norm. .. Such procedural formality, of course, could
only serve to 'underline the presumed 1 legality* of the slave system.
2. See, in particular. Judge Hash* s opinion .in State v Caesar, A
Slave (9 Iredell Hep. HO, 391).
doubt that the development of common law reasoning did recognise
aspects of the person in the slave, it is also clear that this
reasoning was used as a more effective means of protecting slave
property than relying on statutory omission.
This overriding concern to protect slave property was not,
however, solely evident in the legal practices of the Southern
states. Within the legal practices of the federal republican
state itself, during the first part of the 19th century, the
property interest in slaves was consistently iipheld, as the
following discussion demonstrates, and this constitutional guarantee
of the primacy of slave property right over liberty provided a sound
legal basis for the expanded reproduction of the Southern economy
based on slavery despite the fact that Northern states were
beginning to contest the issue ox the expansion of the slave
f (1)system. '
THE BIOPERT! INTEREST UPHELD IN THE ITS SUPREME COURT
As was noted earlier, throughout the first part of the 19th
century, slave property right was effectively strengthened through
1. Chapter 8 discusses how this contestable question developed
into a totally divisive issue.
the practices of the US Supreme Court. In an era which
became famous for the activist role adopted by the Court in
(2)relation to other constitutional issues, v • so much so that by
the end of Chief Justice Marshall's term of office, the authority
of the Supreme Court and the powers of the federal government had
considerably expanded thereby limiting the scope of the states,
on the issue of slavery, the Court did not confront any of the
fundamental constitutional questions. The Court simply
reiterated and emphasised that the legal title to slave property
was guaranteed in constitutional as well as in state law.
The first case, involving a slave, to come before the US
Supreme Court, was that of Scott v ITegx-o London. ^ London had
brought an action of assault and battery against Scott, his
purported owner. Assault and battery actions were the pleading
1. The United States Supreme Court was established by Article III
of the US Constitution. The US Supreme Court has ultimate
authority for determining the applicability of the federal
constitution and the federal constitutional law. The Courts of
Record in the federal system are the United States District Court
(the trial court), the Court of Appeal and the US Supreme Court.
In most instances,' the United States Supreme Court has the right- to
decline appeals from, either the District Courts or the US Court of
Appeal. However, in eases raising questions of unusual importance
under the US Constitution or federal law, an appeal may be filed from
the highest state court or from the federal Court of Appeal to the
US Supreme Court. (For an analysis of the procedural, historical
and jurisdictional aspects of the federal judicial system, see
Charles Allen Wri^it, "Law of Federal Courts", 2nd ed., West, 1970).
2. See, Beveridge, 1916; and Warren, '1.92j, Yol.l.
3. 7 us (3 Cranch) 32i( (1806).
mechanisms which blacks most often used to challenge the
validity of their enslavement. In substance, the master's
restriction or punishment of the negro became an assault and
battery if the latter was net the former's slave.
London's claim was grounded on a 1792 Virginia statute, ^
under Section 2 which provided that slaves brought
Virginia after that date for a year "or so long at
times as shall amount to one year, shall be free",
under Section 1+ that:
Nothing in this Act contained, shall be construed
to extend to those who may incline to remove from
any of the United States, and become citizens of
this, if, within 60 days after such removal he or
she sha.ll take the following oath ... 'I, A..3., do
swear, that my removal into the state of Virginia
was with no intent of evading the laws for




This oath had to be made within 60 days of arriving in Virginia
otherwise domestic, slaves who came with their master could be
freed after residing in Virginia for one year.
Briefly the facts of the London c-ase were as follows: in
July 1802, London had been brought from Maryland to Virginia, by
Scott's father and hired out until the father died at the end of
l802. In March 1803, Scott got "possession" of London and
1. Act of Assembly of Virginia, 17 December 1792, 186.
2. See Chapter h regarding Southern statutes passed restricting
importation of slaves.
3. Act of .1792, 186.
moved to Virginia in June 1803. On 5 July 1803, Scott took
the oath described above. The trial court held that the
owner's oath ought to have been taken within 60 days after
London's July 1802 removal into Virginia, thus London was freed.
The US Supreme Court, however, were unanimous in reversing
the lower court's decree of freedom by reading the statute
differently, setting aside the failure of Scott's father (his
agent) to take the oath as oversight and in not holding Scott
responsible for this negligence. The Court did not apply the
agency doctrine, that owners are bound, and liable when through
negligence or failure their agent does not, comply with statutory
legal requirements, where its application would result in
freeing a slave.
In the case of Scott v Negro Ben, Ben claimed Ms freedom
on the basis of a Maryland statute of 17S3 which prohibited the
importation of slaves into the state, with certain exemptions for
owners. The exemption at issue in the case was that prior to a
slave coming into Maryland proof had to be given to a naval
officer or collector of tax, that the; slave had been residing in th
United States for at least three years immediately preceding his
importation to Maryland.
In the view of the lower court there was an ambiguity about
whether the statutorily required proof of residence had been given
to a naval officer or collector of the tax prior to Ben's
1. 10 US (6 Cranch) 3 (l8l0).
importation. The US Supreme Court, however, reversed the lower
court's holding in favour of freedom and Chief Justice Marshall noted:
The majority of the court is of the opinion, that the
property of the master is not lost "by omitting to make
the proof which was directed, before the naval officer,
or the collector of the tax ...; (l
and considerably diluted the effect of the Maryland statute by
advancing the view 'that proof of residence could still be considered
legitimate if offered at the time the slave claimed his freedom, even
though the statute had required "antecedent" proof.
In Mima Queen and Children, Petitioners for Freedom v
fo)
Hepburn the petitioners were attempting to establish their
freedom on the ground that their mother was free. This case,
involving the issue of how one establishes bis pedigree on
ancestry, turned on the question of the admissibility of hearsay
evidence to prove the freedom of the ancestor from whom the
petitioners claimed their freedom, The lower court in Maryland
had admitted hearsay evidence but Chief Justice Marshall,
delivering the opinion of the US Supreme Court, argued that the
exceptions ^ to the prohibitions on hearsay evidence, such as
cases of pedigree or boundary, could not be permitted in the case
where the plaintiffs were, in substance, attempting to prove their
1. Ibid,
2. 11 US (7 Cranch) 289 (1813).
3. At the time of this decision there was ample authority for the
admission of those declarations sought by the plaintiff within the
pedigree exceptions (see, for example, Wigmore on Evidence (3rd ed.)
Section 1501 and 1^02 in particular).
freedom through, pedigree. Hie basis for Chief Justice Marshall'
conclusion was that:
If the circumstances that the eyewitness of any
fact be. dead should justify the introduction of
testimony to establish the fact from hearsay,
no man could feel safe in any property, a claim to
which might be supported by proofs so easily
obtained.
Only Justice Duvall dissented, noting that:
The reason for admitting hearsay evidence upon a
question of freedom is much, stronger than ... in
controversies relative to the boundaries of land ..,
the right to freedom is more important than the
right to property.
The US Supreme Court, however, ruled that the right to property
was paramount.
Another freedom suit, Regress Sally B.'enrj, try William Henry,
her father and...next friend v Ball ^ ' in l8l6 was denied. .Sally
claimed hex* freedom because her importation was purportedly in
violation of a 1796 Maryland statute. Sally was Ball's slave
when he granted her to a lirs Rankin for a year. Mrs Rankin took
Sally to Washington (where the 1796 Maryland statute was in force
for a few months, then Ball took Sally back to Virginia and
subsequently to Washington. Sally's counsel argued that if Ball
knew of Mrs Rankin's intended importation of Sally and did not
1. 11 US (7 Cranch) 289 (1813).
2. Ibid.
3. lU us (l Wheat) 1 (l8l6).
object then Sally would be entitled to freedom under the 1796
statute. Chief Justice Marshall for the Supreme Court concluded
that under Section k of the 1796 Act, Sally ^ ^ was merely in a
temporary status, sojourning in Washington, thus her freedom must
he denied.
While in Negress Sally v Ball the US Supreme Court arguably
simply adopted a strictly constructionist interpretation of the
1796 Maryland statute, their denial of freedom in the case of
(2)
Negro John Davis et ai v Wood v ' was made by a systematic
rejection of each ground on which it could have exercised its
discretion in favour of freedom. John Davis, and apparently
other children, were attempting to prove that they were not slaves
but were free by establishing the lineal parentage of Davis'
(■))
grandmother (Mary Davis) and his mother (Susan Davis). He
i
offered to prove that competent witnesses had heard old persons
now dead declare that Mary Davis, also now dead, "was a white
woman, horn in England" and that Susan Davis, his mother,was
descended in the female line from Mary Davis. Susan Davis, in an
earlier suit, had gained her freedom. Davis wanted his mother's
prior case record to be admitted in evidence so that he could prove
his freedom from being descended, in the female line, from a free
1. See, Miller, 1966, for a discussion of the significance of the
London, Ben and Sally cases.
2. 1)4 US (1 Wheat) k (1816).
3. It will be recalled from Chapters 3 and k that the status
'slave' was passed through the maternal line. If the mother was
free then so were her children.
woman. He also wanted evidence admitted to prove that his
purported owner (Wood) had sold his mother to tier previous
owner so that he could demonstrate a privy relationship between
the two purported owners thereby allowing the verdict against
Susan Davis* owner to be admissible in evidence.
Hue ITS Supreme Court, however, sustained the lower court*s
exclusion of Davis' mother's 'records'. Chief Justice Earsha.ll,
delivering the opinion of the Court, commented:
Hie record was not between the same parties. Hie
rule is, that verdicts are evidence between parties
and privies. Hie court does not feel inclined to
enlarge the exceptions to this general rule, and,
therefore, the judgment of the court below is
affirmed.
By not feeling 'inclined' to admit any of the evidence, the
Court had clearly exercised its discretion in favour of upholding
the property interest to the exclusion of liberty.
Hiese early cases before the US Supreme Court, and the cases
reviewed earlier in this chapter concerning the commission of
criminal acts against or by slaves illustrate the ongoing tension
in law between the extent to which slave were regarded as chattel
property and the extent to which they were recognised as human
beings. Hie determination of the legal status of a black child
depicts just how far the legal status was analogous to that of
chattel property rather than human beings. This status was
derived from the concept of partus sequitur ventrem:
1. lb US (1 Wheat) (l8l6).
The offspring follows the mother,* the "brood of
an animal "belongs to the owner of the darn; the
offspring' of a slave "belong-s to the owner of the
mother, or follows the condition of the mother.
A maxim of the civil lav;, which has been adopted
in the law of England in regard to animals, though
never allowed in the case of human beings.
While the common law doctrine that the status of a child follows
that of the father was not adopted in the slave owning states
with regard to blacks, it is arguable that the common law
oriented US Supreme Court could have challenged this position.
(2)
However, in Williamson v Uaaicl, v ' a complex dispute about
which groups of heirs had inherited certain slaves in the
distribution of an estate, Chief Justice Marshall said that with
regard to the children of the slaves named in the will, it was:
Well settled .. ,£andj ... universally considered
fthat those children foilowj the mother unless
they be separated from each other by the terms of
the instrument which disposes of the mother.
As was noted, this civil law doctrine was by no means univers
and, in the United States a white child5s status, under common
law, followed the father. Though the US Supreme Court regarded
•as settled1 the civil law principle that in relation to slavery
1. 2 Blackstone1s Commentaries, 1768 ed.:390*
2. 25 US (12 Wheat) 563 (1827).
3. Ibid.
the child's status followed that of the mother, the North
American courts had rejected those other civil laws (from
Continental Europe) which purportedly granted slaves many
rights not. allowed to slaves in the US. If the North American
courts, however, had followed the common law doctrine regarding
the children of slaves then those children born of white fathers
and slave mothers would have been free. The consequences of
this for the slave system would have been highly significant
given the number of mulatto slaves in the US. 'It would appear
then, in relation to slavery, that the North American legal
system adopted a common law view or a civil law view in
accordance with what doctrinal base could most effectively
(? )
guarantee slave property right.
1. By the Census of iBs'Q there were 2lj.6,569 persons classed
as mulatto slaves.
2. While it goes beyond the purpose of this work to discuss the
debate between historians, sociologists and. anthropologists about
the differences between the European civil law system as applied
-to slaves in Latin America and the legal system of slavery in the
US, Tarmenbaura5 s seminal work (19I+7) notes that in Latin America
slaves had considerably more civil and legal rights. Tannehbaua's
interpretation has received considerable support, most notably
from Stanley Elkins, "Slavery: A Problem in American Institutional
and Intellectual Life", Chicago, Chicago University Press, 2nd ed„,
1968. The critics have included Arnold Sio, "Interpretations of
Slavery: The Slaves Status in the Americas", in Comparative Studies
in Society and History, VII, April 1968: 289-308; David Brion
Davis, "The Problem of Slavery in Western Culture", Ithica, New
York, Cornell University Press, 1966; and Degler, 1971- The
literature on Brazil is abundant though perhaps the three most
important works are; Gilberto Peeyre, "The Masters and the Slaves;
A Study in the Development of Brazilian Civilisation", New York,
19)46; Donaif Pierson, "Negroes in Brazil, A Study of Race Contact
at Bahia.", Chicago, 19)42; and Arthur Ramos, "The Negro in Brazil",
Washington, 3.939 -
Clearly then* for the ITS Supreme Court to have rejected
partus seguitur ventrem in Williamson v Daniel could hardly be
expected given the interests of the slave system. However,
in McCutchen v Marshall ^ the Court was presented with an
opportunity to establish a doctrinal ba.se in support of
manumission without interfering with partus sequitur ventrem.
McCutchen, in his will, had bequeathed his slaves to his wife
during her natural life and provided that, upon her death, they
should "be forever and entirely sat free? except those ...
fwho had not reached} twenty one years at the death of his wife".
The latter were to be subject to McCutchen's brother and
brother-in-law until they reached 21 years. Two of the female
slaves, however, had children after McCutchen5 s death but before
his wife's death. The heirs to the McCutchen estate argued
that these children could not be set free because they were born
before their mothers had been freed, and the Court upheld this
claim by noting that these children must be considered absolute
(2)
slaves according to the laws of Tennessee. The Court could
have argued that had the children been born before McCutchen
died, he would have made the manumission clause apply to them
also.
1. 33 US (3 Pet) 220 (183I.) .
2. The case was based on these laws.
COHOLUSIOU
In this chapter it has been argued that the turn of the
19th century marked a new 'mature' phase of the Southern slave
system in the sense that the legal regulation of slavery had
to confront the implications of a rapidly developing economy
based on slave labour. To effectively regulate the massive
expansion in the slave mode of production, legal institutions
and practices in the Southern states had to develop a way of
recognising the contradictory nature of the chattel sieve - as a
person and as an item of private property. The property rights
of slave owners in slaves could only be guaranteed effectively if
law could protect this property from violation by strangers
committing scriminal8 acts against slaves and, at the same time,
regulate the behaviour of slaves themselves.
In responding to these social demands Southern legal
institutions and practices developed their own unique form of
legal reasoning, a form of reasoning which evaded the
contradictory natiu?e of the chattel slave status by arguing in
terras of the institutional arrangements governing the Blaster/slave
relation. Issues of guilt, innocence, culpability and legal
provocation were determined in tarns of the precise relationship
between the slave and the other party involved. Thus, when the
property rights of slave owners could be best protected at common
lav*, courts articulated the view that common law could be applied
to the slave status. On the other hand, where the issue at
stake was the extent of a slave's protection against abuse from
his owner or quasi-owner, courts maintained that since slavery
was unknown at common law, a slave could only appeal to
statutory la.w for any personal rights«
It was not, however, only Southern legal institutions and
practices which regarded the claims to property rather than
personality in slaves as paramount. '.Hie cases decided by the
US Supreme Court in the first part of the 19th century
demonstrate those instances in which a. ruling could have been
made which would, to some extent, limit the expansion of the
slave system, if only in declaring the freedom of individual
slaves yet the Court consistently chose to exercise its
discretion in favour of upholding the property rights of slave
owners against the liberty of individuals. The.Court chose
to re-emphasise the constitutional guarantee to slave property
right thereby ensuring that not only was the system of slave
production more firmly entrenched and expanded in the Southern
states throughout the first part of the 19th century, but also
that slave owners could, depend, on a constitutional guarantee
that was effective.
At the same time, however, as the legal institutions and
practices of the Southern states and the federal republican stat
were producing a more effective legal guarantee to slave propert;
northern legal institutions and. practices were developing what
would become an antagonistic form of legal reasoning which was
articulated In relation to sojourners2 slaves, fugitive slaves
and slaves in transit from one state to another. ffhis contrary
form of reasoning which argued that any slave's entry into
a free state accomplished liberation, would, as will be
discussed in the next chapter, eventually come into direct
conflict with the legal reasoning adopted in Southern states
and by the ITS Supreme Court over the extent of the expansion of
the slave system - a conflict which would itself lead to the
abolition of the slave system in the aftermath of Civil War.
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IMHOUJCTION
In the previous chapter it was argued that, despite an
apparent conflict created by the recognition of humanity .in
slave property, this contradiction was contained within law by the
development of a distinctive form of Southern legal reasoning
where issues of criminal liability were decided on within the
context of the institutional, arrangements governing the master/
slave relation. Litigation concerning criminal acts committed by
or against slaves did not centre on the broad legal rights accruing
to a 'person' at common law but rather focused on arguments from
the 'institution of slavery'. In sc doing, courts could evade the
relevance of the issue of personality and argue that the rights of
slaves, if any, were defined by statute. This form of legal
reasoning, evident within Southern legal institutions and practices,
a form which iterated that the slave was a piece of private property
■thereby making the slave system consistent with capitalist
development,was also upheld in constitutional law by the US Supreme
Court's consistent exercise of discretion in favour of upholding
the property rights of slave owners against the liberty of
individuals. The right to slave property then was not only
guaranteed by the legal institutions of the slave-owning states of
the South but also by the legal institutions of the federal
republican state itself.
Indeed, in this chapter, the centrality of the role of the US
Supreme Court in making the legal status of slavery nationally
enforceable will become clear. In the years preceding the Civil
War5 the US Supreme Court, when faced with the question of the
legality of slavery under the US Constitution, either, made very
conservative decisions regarding the Constitution or avoided the
constitutional issues altogether' "by relying on legal
technicalities. At a national level, the legal status slave was
not only recognised but strengthened by these decisions.
However, the US Supreme Court's attempts to ensure that the
legality of slavery was recognised at a national level were by no
means unproblematic. Northern and Western interests began to
question whether the principle of 'judicial review', enshrined in
the US Constitution, was being used politically, by a Supreme
Court dominated by Southern Justices, to foster the interests of
the slave—owning minority in the USA. 'Hie USA had. been created
as a democratic republic where the view of the majority was to be
the basis of government, but this fundamental principle was being
subverted by the slave power.
The conflict which developed between North and South then was
not a conflict over the existence of slavery per se, nor was it a
conflict, as was argued in earlier chapters, between capi u. sin 3T3 cl
slavery. Indeed, whilst Northern states were not slave-owning
1. As has been argued in earlier chapters, the plantation economy
of the South was centrally involved with Northern commercial and
industrial institutions. Northern manufacturing centres were heavil
dependent for their livelihood on Southern commerce and the sport of
manufactures to the South, and, right up to the outbreak: of Civil War
Southern planters remained active customers of North. Eastern and
Western farmers (Eofstadter et al. I96I4.:153-16l). Indeed the slave
mode of production was quite consistent, as a specialist agrerian
region. with capitalist development and was central to the specific
pattern of development in the USA.
they did not deny the legal status 'slave*. What was of central
concern to Northern interests, however, was whether or not the
slave-owning class would dominate the political institutions of
the federal republic state and whether or not the slave mode of
production would become the dominant economic form. As was
argued in Chapter 6, by the early part of the 19th century, there
were no effective legal or political limits to the expanded
reproduction of the slave system to new territories since the
Southern interest had been able to maintain an effective dominance
in the representative institutions of the federal state. However,
by the 1830s the migration of free settlers to the hitherto
unoccupied Western lands, which were federal state property,
(1 )
reached an unprecedented level, and those free settlers came
into conflict with a slave-owning class .intent on obtaining a land.
monopoly for the expanded reproduction of the slave system. The
future conflict, which eventually led to both Civil War find the
abolition of the slave system by the 13th Amendment to the US
(2)
Constitution, v ' was not a conflict over the existence of slavery
in certain parts of the USA but was a conflict over the extent of
its expansion.
1. Franklin, ■ I969:166-185.
2. The 13th Amendment was passed by Congress on February 1, 1865,
and ratified on December 18, 1865. It states:
"Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude
except as a punishment for crime whereof the party
shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within
the United States, or any place subject to their
jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this
Article by appropriate legislation".
U32.
Although an active abolitionist movement did develop in the
North which made certain political gains in relation to the
slavery issue from the 1820s onwards, ^^ these gains were not-
premised on a principled opposition to the fact of slavery but
rather on the issue of expansion. Institutionally, slavery had
been confined to one particular race - negroes. Ideological
support for slavery wa.8 not only evident in a, specifically
(2)
Southern defence of the slave system, 1 which had begun, to
1. In 1821 Lundy began his newspaper, 'The Genius of Universal
Emancipation35 in 1828 Garrison wrote his first anti-slavery
editorial; in 1829, Walker, a militant free negro, published his
''Appeal5 urging .slaves to revolt against their masters; and on
1 January 1831 Garrison founded his anti-slavery newspaper 'fixe
Liberator1,
lire beginnings of abolition are discussed in Alice lb Adams,
"Hie Neglected Period of Anti-slavery in America, I808-I83I", Boston,
1908. One of the bast discussions of the abolition movement is
Gilbert E, Barnes, "The Anti-slavery Impulse, l83G-l8ijlj.,!, New York,
1933*- A good compilation of papers can be found in Martin 1.
Luberman, ed.? "The Anti-slavery Vanguard", Princeton, 19o5»
Herbert Aptheker1s article "Militant Abolitionism", in Journal of
Negro History, XXVI, October 191)1, is excellent; and the history of
black abolitionists is well covered by Herbert Aptheker, "Hue Negro
in. the Abolitionist Movement", New York, IJi^l. For the best
account ox resistance to slavery, see Herbert Aptheker, "American
Negro Slave Revolts", New York, 1969.
2. This defence took the fox-m of claiming a paternalistic concern
for the siave% by his master in contradistinction to the 'free wage1
type of J slave1 allegedly existing in the indue.trial North.
According to this view, tine free wage labourer was exploited to the
full value of his labour aid then discarded, whereas in the South,
the slave population was cared for until death. This defence,
however, did not develop until the 1830s, following the Missouri
Compromise and a series of slave uprisings, culminating in the Hat
Turner rebellion in Virginia in 1831. In the early 19th century
public discussion and debate on slavery was simply repressed.
For a full discussion of the development of the Southern defence of
slavery, see George M. Frederickson, "The Black image in the White
Mind", New York, Harper and Row, 1971 •
develop during the confrontation over the admission of Missouri
(j )
as a slave state, culminating in the Missouri Compromise, v"/
(2)
but was also evident in the development of racism " in the
(3)
North and West. Abolition in the North was not coupled with
any appreciable change in the social and political status of the
negro, so much so that, as will be discussed later in this
chapter, Northern legal institutions and practices, developed a
form of legal reasoning which maintained that the rights of free
blacks were only granted by statute since blacks were not citizens
a line of reasoning remarkably similar to that developed by
Southern legal institutions and practices in the case of slaves.
Moreover, even within the abolutiorist movement, there was a
conflation of anti-slavery and racist thought. This denial of
civil and political rights to free Northern negroes, coupled with
the development of racism, was taken by Southerners as a
confirmation of the 'correctness1 of the slave system. It was,
therefore, only within the context of the struggle over- the extent
of -fche expansion of the slave system that pro- and anti-slavery
ideologies could be effectively used to' make political gains.
1. See Chapter- 6.
2. Racism is' here defined as a. rationalised ideology grounded
in what were and are thought to be the facts of nature -
biological, psychological, moral or whatever. For a discussion o
racist rhetoric, see Erederickson, 197"J-»
3. See Chapters k and
k. The problem of the free negro in the North is dealt with by
Leon Litwack, "North of Slavery , The Negro in the Free States,
1790-1860", Chicago, University of Chicago Fcess, 1961.
Central to the struggle over the extent of the expansion
of the slave system was the issue of whether the federal
republican state would guarantee the importation of the legal
title to slave property into the. Western lands, where free
settlers and slave-owners were competing to occupy the same
regions. Sinoe these regions were federal property and the
decision regarding the legality of slavery in these regions would
he taken within the representative institutions of the federal
state, the Southern interest could he assured of expansion if it-
could maintain a dominant political power within these institutions.
This it effectively managed to achieve well into the nineteenth
century and. it thereby secured, a monopoly of land reserves against
free settlement. As was discussed in Chapter 6, there were
numerous concessions of federal state territory to the slave system
.including the lands of the Louisiana Purchase, the Florida
peninsula, and the territory up to the parallel 36 30 Forth 'under
the terms of the Missouri Compromise. These land reserves ceded
to the slave power were further expanded hy the Annexation of Texas
from Mexico in l8ii5 V"L*' - slavery being- explicitly permitted hy the
terms of the Missouri Compromise.
Hue balance of power had been effectively maintained hy a
constant negotiation process, which kept the number of free and
slave states equal, up to l8f>0 when California was admitted as a
1. For a di.scussion of the Annexation of Texas, see Hofstadter
et al. 196^:137-139; as also Franklin 1969:172,
free state. The 'Compromise of l85>Of which admitted California
as a free state represented the outcome of a complex political
struggle between the * free soil' movement and the planter class.
In return for ceding California to the free labour system, the
slave power won a critical legal victory in having the 1850
Fugitive Slave Law passed, a law which extended the legal rights
of the slave owner into the free states.
(l)
This 'Compromise5, however, was extremely tenuous, with
Northerners arguing- for majority rule and the ability of Congress
to ban slavery from the territories and Southerners insisting on
constitutional limitations to majority rule in the case of slavery
Only four years later, open hostility took the place of compromise
with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of I85I4. This Act,
introduced by a Northern Democrat, Senator Stephen Douglas of
Illinois, provided that the people of the West, in particular
Kansas and Nebraska., should determine whether or not they wanted
slavery, independent of national control, and explicitly repealed
the Missouri Compromise of 1820 as "inconsistent with the principle
of non-intervention by Congress with slavery in "the States and
(o)
Territories" as recognised by the I85O Compromise. v '
As will be discussed later in this chapter, the Kansas-
Nebraska Act precipitated a desperate struggle between the free
settlers, backed by Northern interests, and the planters, backed Iry
1. Georgia, Mississippi, Alabama-and South Carolina had seriously
considered secession and many Southerners agreed to staying in the
Union only if there "was strict adherence to the enforcement of the
Fugitive Slave Act (Franklin, 1969:266).
2. Kansas-Nebraska Act, May 30> l85it» US Statutes at Large, X,
277. 282-288.
Southern interests, for the control of Kansas. If free
settlers predominated and obtained a political dominance in the
territorial legislature, then the legality and existence of
slavery might be threatened by the passing of laws which
favoured free small scale cultivation rather than slave production.
Moreover, to be cost effective,'slave production relied on an
effective monopoly of land in order to minimise the costs of
production and to increase profits. Thus, the slave owning class,
in attempting to achieve and maintain the political/legal
conditions necessary for the effective existence of slave
production in Kansas, came into direct conflict with the free
0
settlers. v ' And, it was in the midst of this conflict that the
(2
Republican Party, opposed to the extension of slavery, was born. v
The re-alignment of political power within the United States
was further accelerated by the decision of the US Supreme Court in
the case of feed Scott y Sandf'ord, 1857♦ ^ In effect that
decision, which is discussed in detail later in this chapter, made
the whole of the USA a slave holding domain since not only could
slave owners legitimately pursue and retrieve slaves who ran away,
under the Fugitive Slave Act of i8£0, but also a slave owner could
reside in free territory with his slave held in bondage. And,
while the instrumental victory for the slave power was very short¬
lived, given that civil war was imminent, this victory, at a
1. Tie nature and significance of this conflict are more fully
discussed at p. li.78~I4.83 of this chapter.
2. See, Franklin, 1969: 267 j and Hofstaciter et el, 1961i:173«
3. 60 us, 393 (1857).
symbolic level threatened the free states with having to enforce
slavery under the US Constitution and with the influence of
planter class.
Thus, the conflict which resulted in the Civil War and the
abolition of slavery was not based on an opposition to the
existence of slavery on the part of the North, but rather on 'the
complex political struggle surrounding whether or not limits
could be placed on the expansion of the slave system. It was
within this context that the legal institutions and practices of
the federal republican state played a critical role since law,
which could have imposed limits, in fact did the contrary, in both
US Supreme Court decisions and federal legislation, by recognising
the legality of expansion. The South was therefore able to
pursue its aggressively expansionist policy, a policy which
eventually led to its own downfall when Northerners and Westerners
came to perceive that the South was so intent on maintaining a
dominant political power in the USA that the interests of the other
sections might be sacrificed. The following sections of this
chapter articulate just how the conflict in law and ideology was
created and how this contributed to the development of the complex
political struggle reaching crisis level after the i860
(j )
Rces.iden.tial elections, ' resulting in secession and Civil war,
and., at the same time accomplishing the only thing which could
destroy the slave owning class - the abolition of slavery itself.
1. This election resulted in a victory for Abraham Lincoln, the
first Republican President (see, p.503 of this chapter).
b
LEGALITY" MB TELE COJfFLICT IN IDEOLOGY
The prejudice of z'aoe appears to "be stronger in
the states that have abolished slavery than in
those where it still exists; and nowhere is it
so intolerant as in those states where servitude
has never been known.
As was discussed in Chapter $, by the turn of the 19th century,
"almost every Northern state had either abolished slavery outright
(2)
or had provided for its gradual extinction". v • rIhe slave mode
of production had never developed to any significant extent in the
Northern states, and with the acceleration of the development of
the capitalist mode of production in these states, ideological
support for the abolition and/or gradual extinction of slavery had
not presented any particular problems. ^J In abolishing slavery
in the forth, it became possible for these Americans to argue that
slavery was a moral wrong, an ideological inconsistency in their
own Revolution, in the foundation of their own Republic. ^
Nevertheless, their concept of society's relationship to the former
slave, now free, did not necessarily extend, beyond formally
abolishing the lege! status of slavery. Removing the legal status
'slave1 in no way implied that Northerners did not recognise the
1. Alexis de Toqueville, "Democracy in America", trans. G.
Lawrence, ed., J.P. Mayer, New York, Doubleday and Co., 1969:373*
2. Litwack, 196.1:3.
3- Indeed, throughout the latter part of the 18th century, there
had been increasing hostility from white workers to competition with
negro slaves (see Litwack, 1961:1-5).
ii. See Chapter 5-
legal status of slavery as it existed in other regions nor did it
imply any commitment to social and political equality for free
blacks in the North.. ^^
On the contrary, in creating a new status fcr former slaves,
Northern legal institutions and practices developed a form of legal
reasoning which denied citizenship, with all Its privileges, to free
blacks, on the grounds that blacks, being slaves at the time the US
Constitution was framed, could not be regarded as citizens within the
meaning of that term in the Constitution. fhe only civil rights to
which blacks were entitled were those specifically created by statutory
law, just as Southern legal institutions and practices argued that the
personal rights of slaves were defined by statute. In this way
Northern courts and legislatures were able to effect a re~definition of
the former slave status so that law could exert its own specific power
over the extent to which blacks would be integrated into Northern
society.
One area in which this legal re-definition of the slave status was
particularly effective was that of educational opportunity for free
(2)
blacks. v ' In Connecticut, for example, two attempts were made in the
I83Q3 to establish independent educational institutions for blacks: the
first was an abolitionist proposal to establish a negro college in New
Haven; the second was an attempt to establish a school for negro girls
in Canterbury,
1. Litwack, 196l:l5~l6.
.2. A fundamental demand i.n the struggle of free blacks for survival
and improvement in 19th century Northern society.
hko.
The attempt td establish a negro college in New Haven, coincided
with the advent of Garrisonian abolitionism. ^ ^ In. June 1831,
three abolitionist leaders - Simeon S. Jocelyn, Arthur Tappan and
(2)William Lloyd Garrison v J - proposed, to the first national, negro
convention, that such a college should be established to "cultivate
habits of industry and obtain a useful mechanical or agricultural
(3)
profession". J However, while the Convention endorsed the
proposal, the town of Hew Haven firmly rejected, it arguing that the
(h)
founding of colleges would thwart the policy of 5colonization8, 1
1. For a general background to the history of abolitionism, see
references cited in Note 1, page i*32» In addition, see Louis Filler,
"The Crusade Against Slavery, 183G-I86O", Hew York, I9SO; and Dwight
L« Dumond, "Anti--slavery: The Crusade for Freedom in America", Ann
Arbor, 1961.
2. A. Yale graduate and white minister in a Hew Haven church, a
Hew York merchant and philanthropist, and the editor of.'The
Liberator' (an anti-slavery newspaper), respectively.
3. See, 'Minutes and Proceedings of the First Annual Convention of
the People of Colour', Philadelphia, 1831:5-7, as cited in Litwack,
1961:123-1*.
1*. 'Hie term 'colonization5 refers to the idea, which originated as
early as 17lU» of sending negroes back to Africa. In 1777, the
Virginia Legislative Committee, headed by Thomas Jefferson, set forth
a plan for the gradual emancipation and exportation of slaves. The
idea of colonization was central to the objectives of many
emancipation societies and following Paul Cuffe's voyage to Africa
with 33 negroes in l8l5, the American colonization society was.
organised in I817. Plans were made to establish a negro colony in
Africa and by I83O the Society had settled 1,1*20 negroes in Liberia.
While some advocates of colonization wanted an end to slavery and the
return of all negroes to Africa, slave holders hoped to drain off the
free negro population thereby giving greater security to the
institution of slavery. The great majority of negroes who did
return to Africa, approximately 12,000 through the Society, were in
fact, from the slave holding states. After 1831, however, the
abolitionists led by Garrison (originally a friend of colonization)
turned on the scheme and it fell into complete desuetude in the decade
prior to the Civil Y/ar. For a full discussion of colonization, see
Phillip J, Straudenraus, "The African Colonization Movement, 1816-
1865", Hew York, 1961.
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that such a college was destructive to the interests ox the city
and that no such college could "be imposed on a eonmrunity without
that community's consent, For the tine "being, Connecticut
had denied educational opportunities to free blacks.
Hie second attempt., to establish a negro school for girls in
*
Canterbury, began in 1832 when Miss Crandall, a Quaker schoolmistress,
agreed to admit a negro to her popular girl's boarding school.
After most parents withdrew their children, Crandall consulted
Garrison and other abolitionists about opening her school exclusively
(2)
to negro girls, v ' On March 2, 1833? 8 The Liberator * announced
the establishment of "a High School for Young Colored Ladies and
Misses" and published a list of 'sponsors8 which included virtually
every prominent negro and white abolitionist leader in the North.
Canterbury responded to the news of the proposed school with
meetings, delegations of protest and warnings about the consequences.
Despite tremendous pressure, Crandall and her abolitionist backers
refused to abandon the project and in April 1833 "the school opened
and attracted, students from various Northern states. Hie town
responded with harassment and finally appealed to the state
(3)
legislature for appropriate measures.
1. See, Litwack, 1961:126.
2. Ibid., 127.
3. See Samuel J. May, "Some Becollections of our Anti-Slavery
Conflict", Boston, 1.8o9;U0-42, 50-51» as cited in Litwack, 196I:
127-8. The terrible consequences which were argued as being likely
to follow included that there would be a depreciation in property
values, that local negroes would claim equality with new arrivals
which, in turn, would lead to claims of equality with whites and so on.
£he legislature responded by passing an Act on May 21* which
prohibited the establishment of "any school, academy or literary
institution, for the instruction or education of coloured persons,
who are not inhabitants of this state", and further forbade anyone
to instruct, harbour or board such persons without the approval of
local authorities. ^^ rfhe preamble to the Act notes that a
school, in attracting pupils, would "tend to the great increase of
the coloured population of the state, and thereby to the injury of
the people". Clearly, the coloured population were not regarded
as part of "the people". Crandall, however, refused to close the
school and was duly arrested or. charges of violating the new law.
The controversy was new transferred to the courts.
At her first trial, on August 23, 1333? before the Windham
County Court, the jury failed to agree on a. verdict despite the
judge's instruction to the jury that the 1833 statute was
(2)
"constitutional and obligatory on the people of the State". v
The jury was duly discharged and a second trial was held, two months
( V'
later. At the second trial. Crandall v Connecticut, " y Chief
Justice Daggett's charge to the jury upheld that of the judge in th
1. Section 1, Act of 1833? in Hurd, 1858:2:•
2. See, "Report of the Trial of Miss Prudence Crandall before
the County Court for Windham County, August term 1833? On An
Information Charging Her with Teaching Colored Persons not
Inhabitants of this State", Brooklyn, Connecticut, 1833? en cited
by Litwack, 1961:130.
3. 10, Conn. Rep., 339-372 (1833).
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first "trial. ^ Daggett did not find the i8'33 statute in
viola,tion of any US constitutional provision. In particular,
contrary to Grandall's defence counsel's argument, Daggett said
that the 1833 Connecticut statute did not violate the fprivileges
(2)
and immunities1 clause (Article IV, Sec. 2, cl<1), of the US
Constitution since this constitutional provision applied to
citizens and free "blacks were not citizens within the meaning of
that term in the US Constitution.
In arriving at this conclusion Daggett began, with posing the
(?)
question "are. slaves citizens?" He argued that they were not,
because at the time cf the framing of the US Constitution, certain
clauses recognised slavery in fact if not in name; other' clauses
- (3)
recognised a distinction between free men and 'all other persons';
and all states were slave states in the sense that at least some
"persons" within the-states were slaves. Daggett argued that "a
citizen means a free man" therefore slaves could not be citizens. (6)
1. Chief Justice Daggett's charge to the jury anticipated much of
the logic of the US Supreme Court's decision in Dred Scott v Sandford
more than two decades later, see pages l$$-$OQ of this chapter.
2. Article IV, Sec.2, cl.l, states: "The citizens cf each State
shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of citizens in
the several. States".
3. 10, Conn. Rep., jhk - emphasis in original.
I4. Article PI, Sec.2, el.3 - Fugitives from labour.
5. Article I, Sec.2, cl»3 - Representatives and direct taxes to be
apportioned according to the number of free persons plus three-fifths
of all other persons.
6. Daggett also held that Indians were not citizens within the
meaning of the term.
1M
On the basis of this logic Daggett arrived at the question
"are free blacks citizens?" ^ In considering this question
(2)
he dismissed the defence arguments for citizenship v and instead
relied solely on the authority of Chancellor Kent• s Commentaries
that:
In most of the United States, there is a
distinction in respect to political privileges,
between free white persons and free coloured
persons of African blood .... rfhe African race
are essentially a degraded caste, of inferior
rank and condition in society. (3
Thus Chief Justice Daggett concluded that free blacks were not
citizens within the meaning of the US Constitution.
In concluding his summing up to the jury, Daggett .instructed
them that the only issue before them, was whether the 1833 statute
was unconstitutional. While his opinion on the law was quite
clear, he argued that, even if free blacks were citizens, this still
did not make the 1833 statute unconstitutional. Education, he said,
was a fundamental privilege, but the 1833 statute did not prohibit
schools, it simply placed, them under civil authorities. This, he
said, was within the state legislature's power to do and did not
offend the US Constitution. The jury returned a verdict against
1. 10, Conn. Rep., 3bS - emphasis in original.
2. He dismissed, for example, as irrelevant, federal statutes which
provided that a, free black navigating a vessel was under protection if
he raised the American flag:, and the defence contention thai because
coloured persons could be held responsible for treason then they must-
be citizens (Vol.10, Conn. Rep., 3^d)«
3. Kent's Commentaries, at 258, cited by Daggett in Yol.lQ, Conn.
Rep., 346 - emphasis in original.
I 1 r-fmS*
Crandall and she subsequently appealed.
On appeal, the Supreme Court of Errors heard Crandall1 s
argument that free blacks were citizens within the meaning of
the US Constitution ^^ and that the lower court5s logic,
arguing from the status 5 slave5 was wrong:
Pupils are not slaves. rfhe reason why slaves are
not citizens is, because they ace held to be property,
and not men, and hence have not freedom of choice or
action.. 'the reason does not reach these pupils. (2)
Tbe state however argued that the intention of the fraaex*s of the
US Constitution was to make a distinction between whites, who were
citizens, and "all ether persons" who, at that time, were slaves.
If the whole instrument was regarded in to to then it was
impossible to use the term citizen in relation to the coloured
/ j \
race. In delivering the opinion of the court, however, Judge
Williams felt "no disposition to volunteer opinion on that subject
- (5')
[the rssue of citizenship v ' but instead reversed Miss Crandall5 s
(6)conviction on a technical defect in the information.
1. And were therefore entitled to the protection of Article IT,
Sec.2, cl.l. 1'nis being the argument, the judge should have
directed the jury in the lower court to rule that the 1833 statute
was unconstitutional and void.
2. 10, Conn. Rep., 35'2 - emphasis in original.
3. It was argued that in construing certain sections of the US
Constitution, the document must be considered as a whole.
I{. 10, Conn. Rep., 35^1-65•
5. Ibid., 367.
6. rfhe information had omitted to note that the school was not
licensed. Judge Williams argued that this was a 'fatal., defect1 as the
onus was on the State to sat forth every fact to bring the case within
'the statute (10, Conn, Rep,, 3&9)* Chief Justice Raggett dissented from
the other judges by arguing that Crandall had not noted this defect as
a cause of error (Vol.10, Conn, Rep., 372).
While the Canterbury school finally closed on September 10,
iS^, due to constant harassment and attempts to burn it down,
in May 1838, the state Senate repealed the 1833 statute under
(2)
which Miss Crandall nad been tried, as unconstitutional * ' and
schools for black pupils were now legal in Connecticut.
Nevertheless, the schools which were established were based on
segregation and it was to this issue that abolitionists now turned.
By 181(5, Massachusetts' negroes could send their children to public
(r>\
schools in various towns and only Boston w/ maintained a policy of
segregation. Black and white abolitionists began to attack the
policy of the Boston Primary School Committee (since it assumed
responsibility for the classification and dj.strii/ation of students)
who responded by issuing reports in l8i+6 and I8I19 condoning their
policy of segregation on the grounds that racial mixing was degradin
that integration, in other Massachusetts communities had failed, and
that separate schools had demonstrated their superiority in
Philadelphia, New York and Providence. Even assuming the
correctness of integration "in principle, the Committee felt that any
attempt to implement it would be disastrous "under the present state
of public feeling and sentiment". She Committee concluded that
1. Litwack, 1961:131.
2. Kurd, 1858:2:1(6.
3. It must be emphasised however that the vast majority of negroes
lived in Boston (see Litwack, 1961:11(3).
legislation could neither regulate social customs nor compel
association.
In I8I4.95 Benjamin Roberts, a Boston negro,■ decided to test
the legality of the Primary School Committee's power to enforce
(2)
segregation, In "the case of Roberts v The City of Boston, '
which was an. appeal from the Court of Common Pleas, Benjamin
Roberts had brought suit in the name of his $ year old daughter,
Sarah, who had been excluded from five white primary schools on
her way to her legal school, under an 1.845 statute which provided
that, "any child, unlawfully excluded from public school
instruction in this commonwealth, shall recover damages therefor
against the city or town by which such public instruction is
(3)
supported". v- ' Pile issue before the Court was whether the
Primary School Committee's power to enforce segregation,
constituted an unlawful exclusion of Sarah Roberts from public
school instruction under the 1845 statute.
Charles Sumner, counsel for the 5 year old plaintiff,
(3)
argued that the Massachusetts' State Constitution and the
"Spirit of American Institutions" recognised that "all men,
1. City of Boston, Report of the Primary School Committee, I8I1.6;
and Report of 3. Special Committee of the Grammar School Board, 1S49
as cited in Litwack, 19ol:144-46•
2. 5 Gush., (59 Mass.) 193-210, (I8U9).
3. 1845 Statute, c.2l4, cited in Roberts v Pile City of Boston,
5 Cush., 193.
4- Subsequently an anti-slavery leader in the US.
5. See Chapter 5 for a discussion of the Massachusetts State
Constitution.
without distinction of color or rare are equal before the law"„ K'J
In arguing that Sarah Roberts was asking for her personal rights*
he went on to demonstrate just how segregated schools violated
the principle of equality before the law. Although the Committee
could rightly classify scholars, it could not assume:
(2)Without individual, examination, that an entire race "
possess certain moral or intellectual qualities,
which render it proper to place them all in a class
by themselves.
Such an assumption, argued Sumner, was a violation of the principle
of equality before the law, therefore the "bye-law of the Committee
providing 'separate but equal.' schools must be held to be
unconstitutional - a school devoted exclusively to negroes could
in no way be regarded as equal. Moreover, since slavery had been
abolished in Massachusetts through the Bill of Rights in the
Massachusetts State Constitution, "the same words, which are
potent, to destroy slavery, must be equally potent against any
1. 5 Gush., 201,
2. Many later cases, extending well into the twentieth century,
would use "scientific" evidence to support the contention that
negroes were, -in fact, intellectually inferior. For a selection
of these cases see, 1. Emerson, 35. Saber and N. Dor sen, "Political
and Civil Rights in the United States", Boston, Little, Brown and
Co., 1967: Vol,2:123O-I3OO.
3. 5 Cusrx., 203.
I4. See Chapter $ for a discussion of the relevance of the Bill
of Rights to the abolition of slavery in judicial practices.
institution founded on caste".
In delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, Chief
Justice Shaw, however, upheld the Committee* s pew er to enforce
(2)
segregation. In arriving at this decision, Shaw considered
Sumner * s argument that segregation violated the principle of
equality before the law. This principle, said Shaw, was sound
"as a broad general principle" but it did not mean the same in
all circumstances. For Shaw, what the principle of equality
before the law meant was that;
The rights of all, as they are settled and
regulated by law,' are equally entitled to the
paternal consideration and protection of the law,
for their maintenance and security. "what those
rights are, to which individuals ..« are entitled,
must depend, on laws adapted to their respective
relations and conditions.
In interpreting the principle of equality before the law in this
manner, Chief Justice Shaw, argued that the question before the
Court was whether the regulation which provided separate schools
for coloured children was a violation of their legal rights. These
legal rights, said. Shaw, depended upon the "provisions of law" not
"broad principles", thus the rights of individuals, in regard to
1. 5 Cush., 2Oh. Sumner concluded his argument by appealing' to
the court on behalf of Sarah Roberts. On the other side, P.M.
Chandler, on behalf of the City of Boston, confined his argument
largely to a legal defence of the powers of the Primary School
Committee, declining to discuss any of the substantive issues
involved in segregation.
2. The plaintiff, Sarah Roberts, was therefore nonsuited (i.e.
suit denied).
3. 5 Gush., 206.
schools, had to he ascertained in relation to statutory law. v '
By adopting this line of reasoning Shaw had accomplished what
Southern legal practices had managed in relation to the question
of the personal rights of slaves. He had denied the
applicability of "broad principles" and argued that the personal
rights of free blacks were exclusively dependant on statute, just
as Southern judges had argued that the personal rights of slaves
(2)
depended wholly on statutory law. s ' And, from a consideration
of the statutory lav/ on the subject, Shaw concluded that the
Primary School Committee did have the power to decide on whether
or not separate schools were in "the best interests of both classes
(h)
of children placed under their superintendence" and since Boston
provided for the instruction of negro children, it had discharged
its duty.
The importance of the decision in Roberts v The Clt.y of Boston
transcended the local struggle for integration. Chief Justice
Shaw's legal argument in favour of segregated schools on the basis
of the 1 separate but equal' doctrine established a. controversial
precedent in American law which would be argued in courts
throughout the United States, in cases relating not only to
1. 5 Gush., 206-207.
2. This line of reasoning, as developed within Southern legal
practices, is fully discussed in Chapter 7»
3. 3 Cush., 209c
education, for well over' a century.
After the Roberts decision, Boston negroes turned to
legislative appeals through the Equal School Rights Committee and
on April 28, 1855, & Bill was approved to prohibit racial or
religious distinction in admitting students to any public school.
This achievement inspired activists throughout the North in their
campaigns for integration in schools but by i860 there were only a
1. Roberts v City of Boston, $ Cush., 198, in which the Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that the primary school
committee of Boston had power to make provision for the instruction
of coloured children in separate schools established exclusively
for them, and to prohibit their attendance upon the other schools,
was one of the earliest cases stating the legality of 'separate but
equal1 facilities. Tne argument regarding equality before the law
pre-dated the passage of the ll+th Amendment to the Constitution,
passed by Congress on June 16, 3.866, and ratified on July 28, 1.868,
which states that: "Section 1. Ml persons born or naturalised, in
the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, ore
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside.
No State shall, make or enforce any law which shall, bridge the
privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law; nor deny to any person, within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the law". Later cases
contesting the 'separate but equal' doctrine were largely premised
on the 11+th Amendment, equal protection and due process clauses.
See for example, Plessy v Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537» 16S. Ct. 1138,
I4I L.Ed. 256 (l89Sly Buchanan v Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 38s. Ct. 16,
62 L.Ed. 11x9 (1917); Gong hum v"Rice, 275 U.S. 78, ItSS. Ct. 91,
7'2 L.Ed. 172 (1927). For other early US Supreme Court Cases, not
squarely ruling on the separate but equal doctrine, yet deciding
the issues within this framework see, Gumming v Board of Education,
175 U.S. 828, 203. Ct. 197, 44 L.Ed. 262 Ilo99); Berea College v"~
Kentucky. 211 U.S. 45, 29s. Ct. 33, 53 L.Ed. 8l (1908J. See also,
"Missouri ex rel Gaines v Canada, 3^5 U.S. 337, 598. Ct. 232, 83
L.Ed. 208 (1938); ""Sweatt v Painter, 339 U.S. 629, 70S. Ct. 548,
94 L.Ed. 1114 (1950); Molaurin v Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
637, 70S. Ct. 851, 94 L.EdT 1149 ?1950) { "~Brow~4 v"Board of Education,
347 U.S. 483, 74S. Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (1*954)! and Boiling"v~~
Sharpe, 34? U.S. 497, 743. Ct. 693. 98 L.Ed. 884 (195477 For a
fuller discussion of the separate but equal doctrine, see Chapter 9«
few small and scattered communities v ' which agreed to
integration while the larger cities, including Hew York,
Philadelphia, Providence, Hew Haven and Cincinnati, persisted
(2)
with the policy of rseparate hut equal1. 1
nevertheless, despite the fart that free "blanks in the North
(3)
were clearly regarded as a separate species to whites, ' from
the 1830s onwards blacks (slave or free) were migrating North and
West from the South. And, while some of the Northern abolitionists
made concerted efforts to assist Southern slaves to escape,
particularly by means of the underground railroad, ^Jy certain
Northern states, such as Indiana and Ohio, which bordered on slave
holding states, enacted legislation which prohibited the further
emigration of free negroes. In the Indiana case of Berkshire v
CO
State, ' for example, decided in l8£6, Berkshire, a negro, had
1. It should be noted that freo negroes (h6% in the North; Ipfvo
in the South; the remainder in the South C.antral and Western
States in i860, Hr&nklin. 1969:21'/) were-concentrated in urban areas.
2. Litwack, 1961:1149-151.
3. Evidenced by the fact that laws against int.ex-marriage existed;
that free negroes were not able to testify against whites in a,
criminal action; and other such restrictions.
I4. The origin of the Underground Railroad, goes back to the l8th
century where people assisted runaway slaves, and by the end of the
War of Independence, organised resistance was taking shape with
slaves being 'purchased' and brought North etc. Stations,
conductors and. means of conveyance had been organised by the I83OS
(though originally most of the fugitives travelled by foot), and
with the emergence of Garrison and other militant abolitionists,
the Underground Railroad operated in flagrant violation of federal
fugitive slave laws (Eranklin, 1969:25>-26o).
5. 7 Indiana, 389-I4I (l856).
appealed against "being convicted for "bringing a negro woman (as
his wife) into Indiana in June I85I4, and harbouring her -there,
in contravention of -the Constitution and laws of Indiana.
In delivering -the opinion of the Court, Judge Stuart argued
that, on the basis of the 13th Article to the Indiana State
Constitution of l85l, which provided that, "no Negro or Mulatto
shall come into or settle in the State; that all contracts made
with those coming in, contrary to such prohibition, shall be
void", and the subsequent Act of 1852 passed to enforce this
Article, Berkshire*s conviction must be upheld and the
(2.)
marriage v ' declared void. He noted that "the policy, of the
State is ... to exclude any further ingress of Negroes and to
( o\
remove those already among us as speedily as possible".
Stuart also noted that in inaugurating this policy, the people ha
voted overwhelmingly in favour under the title "Exclusion and
(h)
Colonization v ' of Negroes". Free negroes, of course, were no
part of the popular voice.
This denial of civil and political rights to free blacks in
the Northeast coupled with the policy of Northwestern states to
1. Which provided a fine of from 10 to $QG dollars as a penalty
for violation of the Act (7 Indiana:3^9)*
2. Marriage was, said Stuart, a civil ceremony, thus a contract
therefore no execution could be taken to the statute (7 Indiana:
389).
3. 7 Indiana:390.
h. Another Act of 18^2 Had been passed which set aside 5rCOO
dollars for a rxLan to colonize negroes out of "the Stats.
exclude blacks altogether was held to be consistent with
abolitionism. Indeed, the dynamics of national territorial
expansion and frontier settlement demonstrated that the support of
abolitionism under the banner of free soil could be combined, not
simply with ambivalence and paternalism towards trie negro, but with
(l)virulent racism. At the same time, the status attributed to
free blacks in the North and West undercut the force of any
Northern criticism of the Southern slave system and was viewed by
Southerners as confirming the correctness of the racial caste
system of the South.
By -the 1830s a specifically Southern defence of the slave
system had developed and the ideological battle against Northern
(2)
anti-slavery rhetoric had begun. v ' ihe pro-slavery defence
argued that slaves in the South were better off than the 'free-wage-
slaves' in the North. Moreover, not only was it argued that slave
labour was absolutely essential to the economic prosperity and
development of the South but also that social upheavals in the
free states were to be attributed, directly to unregulated capitalism
and Northerners were called on to accept slavery as a means of
1. For a discussion of the racist elements in the denial of
civil and political rights and in abolitionism, see C.. Yarn
Woodward, "!Ehe Strange Career of Jim Crow", 3rd rev.ed., New York,
Oxford University Press, 197'4-
i
2. For a fuller discussion of this point, see Franklin, 1969:
260; and Hofstadter et al, 1961j.;156.
repressing upheaval. The virtues of slave labour versus
free labour were constantly expounded by Southerners, who noted,
in. particular, that, "where slavery exists labor and capital never
come in conflict, because they are in the same hands, and operate
(2)
in harmony". v y In sum, it was argued that slavery permitted
the development of a higher culture in the South than in the North.
One of the most powerful ideological weapons, however, was
the fact that, as Southern ideologues constantly argued, the US
Constitution itself guaranteed the legal right to slave property,
and, while the international slave trade had been legally prohibited
in l8o8, ^ the .inter-state commerce in slaves was quite legal and
continued to flourish. No federal statute nor US Supreme Court
decision had interfered with this source of slave labour and, as
ffill be discussed in the next section, the US Supreme Court had no
desire to either question the .legality of the inter-state slave-
trade or to place its regulation firmly in the hands of the federal
government.
1. For a statement of an extreme view of this kind, see George
Fitzhugb, "Sociology for the South or the Failure of Free Slavery",
Richmond, Ya, iSSIj..
2. Judge Ruffin's address before the State Agricultural Society of
North Carolina, October* 18, 1855s i£ 'Publications of the North
Carolina Historical Commission', Vol.8, Part 1;., "The Papers of
Thomas Ruffin", IY, 333~h • Judge Ruffin decided the case of
State v Maun, referred to in Chapter J.
3- See Chapter 6 for a discussion of the ineffectiveness of this
legislation and subsequent legislative efforts to prohibit the
international tra.de in slaves.
h56 •
INTER-STATE COMMERCE IF 'SLAVES : STATE v CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Mien the early slavery eases ^ were argued before the US
Supreme Court, between 1810 and 1816, the Court was not dealing
with the issues in a climate of political opinion divided' over the
question of the extent- of the expansion of the slave system.
However, by the l8ii0s, there had been a considerable escalation in
(2)
the ideological straggle between pro- and anti-slavery forces,
so •that any US Supreme Court decision relating to slavery would
have considerable political and legal significance for these
struggles. Thus, the Supreme Court Justices, in the I8I4I case of
(3)
Groves v Slaughter, v • recognised.that they had been brought into
'bontact with a dangerous political issue" ^ but, rather than
confront the major constitutional issues involved in "the subject
of the respective powers of the State and the Federal Government
/V\
over the introduction of slaves within State borders", the
Court chose to evade these issues by reaching its decision on
technical grounds.
1. Negro London, Negro Ben, Mima Queen and Negress Sally -
discussed in Chapter 7-
2. In addition to the problems of intersectional strife between
Forth and South, many contemporary figures thought the black/white
conflict unsolvable. Alexis be Toequeville reports that John
Latrobe of Maryland, a leading Colonizationist, had said: "The
black arid 'white population are in a state of war. Never will they
mingle. One of them will have to yield place to the other", as
quoted in Frederickson, 1971:21




Hie litigation issues in the case of Groves v Slaughter date
from 1835 when a Louisiana, slave trader, Robert Slaughter, entered
into a contract with John W. Brown of Mississippi for the sale of
slaves who were to be transported from the state of Louisiana to
Mississippi. Slaughter delivered the slaves to Mississippi and,
in exchange, accepted two promissory notes from Brown which were
due and payable at a future time. ¥hen the notes matured,
Slaughter demanded payment, and Brown defaulted. Slaughter then
demanded payment from Moses Groves, ^ who had endorsed the
promissory notes, thus accepting legal responsibility for payment
to Slaughter in the event of Brown's default.
Groves, however, refused to honour his endorsement ana
Slaughter- brought suit against Groves in the Circuit Court of the
(o)
US for the Eastern District of Louisiana - ' for a breach of
contract. Groves defended the suit on the grounds that the
contract upon which the note was based was illegal and therefore
unenforceable. Hie contract was illegal, argued Groves' lawyer,
because its subject matter was illegal under the Mississippi State
Constitution. By an amendment to the Mississippi State
Constitution, passed at a convention on September 2, 1832, hie
introduction of slaves as merchandise, or for sale, into that
1. Who subsequently became the plaintiff in error before the
US Supreme Court.
2. For an explanation of the federal court system, see Rote 1,
p.J|l5, Chapter 7«
(1 )
state, oil or after 1 May 1833 was prohibited, VL' Since the
contract was entered into in the state of Mississippi, after 1 May
1. The constitutional amendment read as follows: "The
introduction of slaves into the State, as merchandize, or for
sale, shall he prohibited, from and after the 1st day of May 1833:
provided, that the actual settler or settlers shall not be
prohibited from purchasing slaves in any state of this Union, and
bringing them into this state for their own individual use, uat.il
the year l81{5", Miss, Cons. Art. Section 2 (1832) . The
general concern about the commercial traffic in slaves .in
Mississippi dated back to 1808, when, still a territory,
Mississippi regulated the traffic to protect itself against
"dangerous or convict slaves". It will be recalled from Chapter
that many Southern states, around this time, adopted similar
measures for a. variety of conjunctural reasons including; the fear
of escaped slaves following Toussaint IIOaverture*s revolt in
Haiti and to prevent glutting the market in slaves. Mississippi
had not enacted legislation under its first State Constitution
which granted the General Assembly power to prohibit the
introduction of slaves, as merchandise, from outvith the state,
thus the new constitutional provision was adopted in 1833, Why
the state adopted this provision in 1833 is again attributable
to a complex of conjunotural factors including the fear of slave
rebellion, given that in the 1830 Census whites outnumbered slaves
by as little as 5000.and the introduction of new slaves was
rapidly increasing (with some counties reporting an outnumbering
of slaves to whites at 3 ;1), and the fact of the Nat Turner slave
insurrection in Virginia in 1831. Perhaps more importantly,
however", this constitutional provision was an economic measure
adopted by Mississippians to avoid paying some 2 million dollars
in debts owed to Northern financial interests as a result of loans
and debt accruing from purchasing slaves, "Owing to the great
financial difficulties into which that State had been p'lxmged, its
Governor had recommended such prohibition in order to cheek the
drain of capital away from the State, through, withdrawal to other
States of the^purchase price of slaves so introduced", Warren,
3.923:2:68, footnote 1
1833? the laws of that state were controlling, ^ ! argued Groves
("2>The Circuit Court, however, gave judgement for Slaughter, v J
upholding the validity of the notes in question, and Groves
subsequently appealed to the US Supreme Court on the ground of
states rights thereby raising the issue of the extent to which
the US Congress had control over the inter-state commerce in
slaves.
The case of Groves v Slaughter was argued before the US
Supreme Court for 7 days, received enormous public attention,
and was heard by leading politicians including Clay who emphasis
that more than 2 or 3 million dollars would be affected by the
Court's judgement. The contemporary view was that:
1. If the Court had upheld this argument the promissory
notes would have beep declared, void because the contract was
illegal under the Mississippi Constitutional Amendment of 1832.
Had that been the cane, then all such contracts would have been
void and, according to a Natchez newspaper this would "have an
important bearing on Northern negro debts to the amount of at
least 2 million dollars" as cited in Warren, 1923:11:68, footno
1 . Contracts made regarding the purchasing of slaves were
typically made on a, 'pay later' basis - the consequences of a
decision which upheld the controlling authority of state law,
thereby making such contracts void in Mississippi, for Northern
and Southern capital, would have been enormous.
2. In the amount of 1^000 dollars plus interest and costs.
The case appeared to present questions of a
most explosive nature, and to require the Court
to decide whether, if negro slaves were articles of
commerce, the State Constitution was repugnant to
the Commerce Clause (l) of the Federal Constitution;
or, if slaves were persons, whether they were
citizens of the United States whose constitutional
rights had been infringed by the State Constitution.
A decision on the latter question would have caused
the Court to confront, in l8Itl, the same mighty
problem which was to come before it, ly years later,
in the Urea Soot Case.
In the event, however, the Court chose neither to address the issue
of whether or not the Mississippi State Constitution was
"repugnant" to the commerce' clause of the US Constitution, if slaves
were articles of commerce, nor to address the issue of whether
1. Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 cf the US Constitution, gives
Congress the power: "to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and
among the sevex'al States, and with the Indian tribes". The issues
raised by Groves went to the core issues involved in the birth of
the national Constitution. The drafters of that document were
particularly concerned about states excluding or penalising the
commerce from other states. Several legal historians have
concluded that the Constitutional Convention was called specifically
to give the national government the power to regulate commerce.
See, for example, Beveridge, 1916. There is little doubt that the
commerce clause of the Constitution, as finally drafted, was
designed to eliminate the state-created legal impediments to the free
flow of commerce among fie States, particularly where the motiviation
for such state legislation was the protection cf a state's own
domestic economic interest. Alexander Hamilton, John Jay and James
Madison, in their essays in support of the US Constitution emphasised
the need for national regulation of inter-state commerce otherwise,
"each State, or separate confederacy, would pursue a system of
commercial policy peculiar to itself" (The Federalist Papers, 37,
Modern Library Edition, 1965)«
2. Warren, 1923, 2:70 - emphasis in original.
slaves, if persons, were citizens of the US whose constitutional
rights had been infringed by the State Constitution. Instead,
the Court confined its argument to a precise understanding of the
Mississippi State Constitution and found that, since no additional
statutory legislation had been enacted subsequent to the 1832
constitutional amendment prohibiting the introduction of slaves as
merchandise, or for sale, into that state, on or after 1 May 1833,
the constitutional amendment was ineffective and therefore ruled
that the decision of the Circuit Court in favour of the validity
of the notes in question was correct and must be upheld. Judge
• Thomson, in delivering the majority® s opinion, pointed cut that the
court's holding made:
... it unnecessary to enquire whether this article
in the constitution of Mississippi is repugnant to
the constitution of the United States; and indeed,
such enquiry is not properly in the case, as the
decision has been placed entirely upon the construction
of the constitution of Mississippi.
By reaching a decision on technical grounds regarding the
construction of the Mississippi State Constitution, the Court had
evaded the central US Constitutional issues.
Nevertheless, many of the Justices did express their views on
the underlying federal constitutional issues almost, as if, they
wanted their interpretations 'on the record'. For example,
Justice McLean, an anti-slavery proponent said:
1. J4O US (15 Pet.), 503.
Ii62.
As one view of this case involves the construction
of the Constitution of the United States in a most
important part, and in regard to its 'bearing upon a
momentous subject, ... under existing circumstances,
I deem it fit and proper to express my opinion upon
it ... Each State has a right to protect itself
against the avarice and intrusion of the slave dealer;
to guard its citizens against the inconveniences and
dangers of a slave population. The right to exercise
this power by a State is higher and deeper than the
Constitution.
While McLean8 s comments represented the strongest statement yet made
by a Supreme Court Justice on the slavery issue, both pro- and anti-
slavery factions regarded his comments as supporting their respective
positions. Hie slave states took his words as supporting their
position that the states had exclusive power to regulate all questions
affecting- slavery within their borders and those against the expansion
(o)
of slavery argued that McLean8 s view precluded such expansion. v
Not surprisingly then, oilier pro-slavery Supreme Court Justices
concurred with the view that the individual states, not Congress, had
the power to regulate the traffic in slaves. Thus, Chief Justice
Taney argued;
In my judgement, the power over this subject is
exclusively with the several states; and each of
them has a right to decide for itself, whether it
will, or will not, allow persons of this description
to be brought within its limits, from another state,
either for sale, or for any other purpose ... (3)
1. As cited in Warren, 1923:2;71-7'-*
2. Warren, 1923:2:72.
3. i+0 US (15 Pet.), 503.
(1)
k&3<
Only Justice Baldwin dissented from this view because he felt
"bound to consider slaves as property".^^ The US Constitution
guaranteed the right to such property and gave it protection
from violation - it was for the states to declare "what is
(2)
property capable of ownership" and, having declared that slaves
constituted such property, Congress alone had the power to regulate
(3)
inter-state trading in that property.
Thus, in Groves v Slaughter, although, a decision was reached
which evaded ruling on the federal constitutional issues, the
Supreme Court Justices had revealed how they would have voted on
these issues. This chance came, as will be discussed in the next
section, in the l8JLj.2 case of Bcigg v Pennsylvania, ^ concealing
fugitive slaves, when the US Supreme Court were not able to




3. It is difficult to understand how the inter-state traffic in slaves
could be regarded as anything other than -a commercial activity within the
meaning of the commerce clause of the US Constitution. For example,
"One Hundred and Twenty Negroes for Sale - The Subscriber has just
arrived from Petersburg Virginia, with one hundred and twenty likely
young Negroes of both sexes and every description, which he offers on the
most reasonable terms ... Planters and traders are earnestly requested to
give the subscriber a call previously to making purchases elsewhere ..."
Benjamin Davis, Hamburg S.C. September 28, 1838. Adverts of this kind
were a typical, feature of Southern society, as the inter-state trade
flourished, (as cited in William Goodell, "The American Slave Code in
Theory and Practice", 1853; rep.ed., New York, New American Library,
1969:51*-#).
!u la US (16 Pet.) £39 (18^2).
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FUGITIVES FROM LABOUR ; THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE TO THE OWNERSHIP
OF SLAVE PROPERT! AFETRMEN
If the US Supreme Court, in Groves v Slaughter, had held that
Mississippi could restrict the traffic of slaves, as merchandise, into
its state, Northern states would have teen provided with a general
principle which could have been applied in prohibiting Southerners from
bringing slaves into Northern states when slave owners were visiting
these states. ^ ^ Moreover, if the Court had held with Groves5
constitutional argument, such a holding might a],so have shed light on
the Northern states5 power to set up standards which would deter the
capture of fugitive slaves. The issue of fugitive slaves was very much
alive in the l8li.0s with slave owners becoming increasingly frustrated by
(2)
the lack of enforcement of the 1793 federal statute enacted to render
the US Constitutional provision for the recapture of fugitives (Article
IV, Section 2, Clause 3) effective. This lack of enforcement was
primarily due to the fact that the subsequent state statutes passed
in the 'free5 states, which specified definite procedures for the
reclaiming of fugitives, were either not enforced or, for some
technical reason, state courts refused to grant reclamation. Not
surprisingly then, when the case of Prigg v Commonwealth of
(q)
Pennsylvania. the first case to come before the US Supreme Court
1. See, for example, Commonwealth v Aves, 35 Mass. (l8 Pick).193
(1836); Jackson v Bulloch, 12 Conn. 39 (l837); and, for a
discussion of the issues, see Wiecek, 1975J131-3*
2. Act of February 12, 1793, Ch.'(, 1 Stat.302. This Act, which
established procedures through, which slave owners or their agents
could get certificates permitting removal of alleged fugitive slaves,
was discussed in Chapter 5*
3. 51 US (16 Pet.) 539 (1852).
involving fugitive slaves, was being heard in l8i|2, both pro-
and anti-slavery factions were anticipating a decision of profound
political and legal significance.
Edward Prigg had pled not guilty to his indictment Tinder an
1826 Pennsylvania statute ^^ for the forceful abduction of a
negro with the intention of delivering her up to her Maryland owner,
Margaret Ashmore. The 1826 Pennsylvania statute had established
(2)
a specific procedure v ' for the claim and delivery of ifugitives
from labour1 and Prigg was alleged to have violated Sections 6 and
7 of the Act which required that a state magistrate issue a
certificate for the removal, of the fugitive from Pennsylvania.
The state magistrate had not, in fact, issued a certificate fcr the
removal of Margaret Morgan, the Maryland runaway slave, from
Pennsylvania, thus the lower court in. Pennsylvania found Prigg
guilty of the offence. •-JJ This judgement was later upheld by the
1. Act of March 25, 1826, 1Pennsylvania Laws', titled, !An Act to
give effect to the provisions of the constitution of the United
Sta/tes relative to fugitives from labor for the protection of free
people of color and pre event kidnapping' .
2. This procedure required the claimant to obtain a warrant from
a state magistrate, and then to bring the fugitive before the
magistrate pursuant to the warrant (3). Upon proof to the
magistrate of the legitimacy of the claim (U-5) a certificate would
be issued permitting the removal of the fugitive from the state
(6-7) and the magistrate was required to keep a record of all such
certificates (10). Section 1 specified criminal, penalties for
violation of any of these provisions,
3. Morgan was a slave, according to the laws of Maryland, to
Margaret Ashmore; the slave escaped and fled to Pennsylvania in
1832; Prigg, the legally constituted agent for Ashmore, took the
negro woman, in lS37> &s a fugitive from labour, before a state
magistrate after obtaining the correct warrant but the magistrate
refused to grant the certificate required by the 1826 Pennsylvania
statute.
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania and the case before the US Supreme
Court was based on a writ of error from that judgement.
In Prigg v Pennsylvania the central argument presented to the
US Supreme Court Justices by counsel was as to the constitutionality
of the 1826 Pennsylvania statute. In discussing the constitutional
provisions at issue in the case, Prigg5s counsel argued that the
precise issue before the court was the interpretation of Article IY,
Section 2, Clause 3:
Ho person held to service or labour in one state
under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall,
in consequence of any law or regulation therein, he
discharged from such service or labour but sh3.ll be
delivered up on claim of the party to whom such
service or labour may be due.
Hie constitutional purpose behind this clause was argued counsel,
To secure to the citizens of the slave-holding
states the complete right and title of ownership in
their slaves, as property, in every state in the
Union into which they might escape ... /.since the_/
... full recognition of this right and title was
indispensable to the security of this species of
property in all the slave-holding states.
Because the state of slavery was a municipal regulation, founded
(2^
upon territorial laws, ^ 1 it was necessary to .insert a specific
1. hi US (16 Pet.) 5h3-
2. Counsel cited Somaersett v Stuart, (20 Howell1s State Trials),
as precedent for this position, arguing that since Sommersett
was decided prior to the Revolution, this view of the status of
slavery was the position when the Constitution was drafted.. .For
a discussion of the Sommersett Case, see Chapter 2.
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clause in the US constitution, otherwise "every non-slave
holding state in the Union would have been at liberty ... to
have declared free all runaway slaves coming within its limits". ^^
In developing this line of argument, Eeiggss counsel arrived
at the conclusion that -Article I¥, Section 2, Clause 3 granted an
unqualified "right on the part of the owner of the slave, which
no state law or regulation can in any way qualify, regulate, control
(2)
or restrain". v ' This being the case, an owner had a right to
repossess this property which local state laws conferred upon him.
However, for this constitutional right to be effective required
legislation, and "this was provided by the 1793 federal statute
which provided for the repossession of a fugitive slave, and
"the legislation of congress, if constitutional, must supersede all
state legislation upon the same subject; and by necessary
implication prohibit it".
1. 1(1 US (16 Pet.) Skh-
2. Ibid., 51(5.
3. Act of February 12, 1793s Ch.7> 1 Stat. ^02: "Sec„3- And be
it so enacted, that when a person held to labour in any of the United
States, or in eithar of the territories on the Ubrthwest or South of
the river Ohio, under the laws thereof shall escape into any other of
the said states or territory, the person to whom such labour or
service may be due his agent or attorney, is hereby empowered to seize
or arrest such figutive from labour, and to take him or her before any
judge of the circuit or district courts of the United States, residing
or being within the state or before any magistrate of a county, city
or town corporate ... and upon proof ... either by oral testimony or
affidavit ... that the person so seized and arrested doth, under the
laws of the state or territory from which he or she fled, owe service
or labour to the person claiming him or her, it shall be the duty of
such judge, or magistrate to give a certificate thereof to such
claimant, his agent or attorney, which shall be sufficient warrant for
removing the said fugitive from labour, to the state or territory from
which he or she fled".
1(. 1(1 US (16 Pet.) 556.
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3he State of Pennsylvania argued, on the other hand, that the
1793 federal statute was unconstitutional because it did not fall
within the scope of any of the enumerated powers of legislation
conferred upon Congress by the US Constitution, and, that being
the case, the Act of Congress was null and void and the Pennsylvania
statute was therefore legally binding.
Justice Story, however, in delivering the majority opinion of
the US Supreme Court, noted that the State of Pennsylvania5 s
argument, in effect, was that unless the power to enforce
constitutional rights could be found among- explicit powers of
legislation enumerated in the Constitution then these rights could
not be enforced. But, said Story, "such a limited construction of
the constitution has never yet been adopted as correct, either in
theory or practice". ^^ Hot only did the fact that Congress pass
V
the 1793 statute demonstrate that they had held a different
interpretation of the Constitution, but also the fact that various
state courts ^^ had upheld the validity of the 1793 statute,
demonstrated that the Act was within the scope of the constitutional
authority conferred on the national legislature. But even if the
Act had just recently been passed, Justice Story made it clear that
"we hold the act to be clearly constitutional". 'J
Phe only remaining point at issue, said Story, was "whether the
power of legislation upon this subject fof fugitive slavesJ is
1. ifL US (16 Pet.) 618.
2. Virtually all of the decisions were rendered in Southern
state courts.
3. i|l US (16 Pet.) 622.
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exclusive in the national government, or concurrent in the
states". In the opinion of the US Supreme Court "it is
(2)exclusive" v ' and, in giving his reasons for this opinion,
Justice Story noted, firstly that:
The right to seize and retake fugitive slaves and
the duty to deliver them up, in whatever state of
the Union they may he found, and, of course, the
corresponding power in congress to use the
appropriate means to enforce the right and duty,
derive their whole validity and obligation
exclusively from the Constitution of the United
States ..o Before the adoption of the constitution,
no state had any power whatsoever over the subject,
except within its own territorial limits; (3)
and secondly that, in order to provide en. effective guarantee
for this "absolute right", the control of fugitive slaves had to
be undertaken by;
One and the one will, and act uniformly by
the same system of regulations 'throughout the Union ...
fsincej The legislation of one state may not only
be different from, but utterly repugnant to and
incompatible with, that of another. (h)
Because some non-slave-holding states maj not have chosen to return
fugitives, if there had been a concurrent power in the states to
act on the question of fugitive slaves, and because this power would
have amounted to the "power to destroy the rights of the owner",
1. Ibid.
2. Story Cited the opinion of Chief Justice Marshal 'I in Sturges v
Crowninshield as binding precedent for this view -17 US (i| Wheat.
Rep.Jl22 XlSl9) . For a discussion of the decisions of the US
Supreme Court in the Marshall era, see Chapter 7*
3. ia US (16 Pet.) 623.
k- Ibid,
Story concluded that "such a state of things could never have been
intended" and that the right of legislation on the subject must be
construed as exclusive in Congress to provide the owner with
security for his property. For these reasons, the US Supreme
Court held that the 3.826 Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional
and void since, "it purports to punish as a public offence against
the state, the very act of seizing and removing a slave, by his
master, which the Constitution of the United States was designed to
(2.)
justify and uphold". v '
This holding, however, was qualified, by what Justice Story
regarded as a. major concession to the anti-slavery interest, insofar
as he argued that state officials were not obliged to assist in the
enforcement of the federal law. Thus, Congress had no power to
require the state magistrate in Prigg v Pennsylvania to issue a
certificate for the removal of Margaret Morgan (the slave) from, the
state of Pennsylvania. While state magistrates could issue a
certificate for removal under, the 1793 federal statute, if they did
not do so federal courts existed in all the states where such a
certificate could be obtained.
The judgement of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was, however,
reversed on the grounds of the unconstitutionality of the 1826
Pennsylvania statute; Prigg was therefore found not guilty of the
offence since, legally, no offence hod. been committed; and the case
1. ill US (16 Pet.) 62U-5.
2. Ibid., 626.
if71.
was remanded from the US Supreme Court back to the state court
for the judgement to be carried into effect. Bcigg could then
seek a certificate from a federal judge and remove the slave bank
to Maryland.
While the majority of the US Supreme Court concurred with the
main holdings, and Justice Wayne concurred with the entire opinion
on the grounds that at the time when the US Constitution was framed,
the protection of all property (including slave property) was of
paramount importance in protecting the "institutions of the states",
(2)
Chief Justice Taney v 1 wanted to go further than the majority of the
Court in protecting the master1 s rights of ownership by requiring
state officials to assist in the rendition of fugitive slaves. w'
Only Justice McLean dissented from the majority in arguing for the
validity of the 1826 Pennsylvania statute, noting that the critical,
issue in Pnlgg v Pennsylvania was: "whether the claimant ox a
fugitive from labor may seize and remove him by force, out of the
state in which he may be found, in defiance of its laws". In
this context he was not referring to the laws of a state which were
in conflict with the US Constitution or the 1793 federal statute.
1. 41 US (16 Pet.) 6i|3'.
2. See Deed Scott v Sandford, discussed in the next section of this
chapter, for Taney's views on the legality of slavery. Note also that
two other justices agreed with Taney on the point of his dissent.
3. hi US (l6 Pet.) 633.
h. Ibid., 666. McLean'-s argumentation on this point is entirely
consistent with the views he expressed earlier in the case of Groves
v Slaughter, discussed at pJ|62 of this chapter. McLean was one of
the two Northern justices of the Court.
He agreed that such state laws were void. What he was referring'
to were "those laws which regulate the police of the state ...
and Twhich"] preserve its territory and jurisdiction from acts of
violence". By looking into the circumstances which led to the
(?)
passage of the 1793 federal statute, v McLean argued that there
was nothing in that statute which could defend the US Supreme
Court's opinion that a right existed to take the fugitive, as in
the present case, "by force and remove him out of the state* Hot
only did such a right not exist "but to remove a slave forcibly from
a state was an expressed violation of the 1793 federal statute.
McLean went on to note that while:
The rights of the master, so far as regards the
service of the slave, are not impaired by /jfcbe slave's
flight to another statej ... the mode of asserting them
is essentially modified. In the state where the
service is due, the Blaster needs no other law than the
law of force, to control the action of the slave. But
can this law be applied by the master, in a state which
makes the act jof slavery/ unlawful? Can the master
seize his slave and remove him out of the state, in
disregard of its laws, as he might take his horse which,
is running at large?
He therefore argued that the majority of the US Supreme Court had,
in fact, held to hie view that there was no difference in -principle
between a runaway slave and a. runaway horse. He, however,
1. Ibid., 666.
2. The 1793 federal statute had been passed in the context of a
conflict between Pennsylvania, and Virginia over the forcible removal
of persons claimed as fugitive slaves (see Chapter p, p.321).
3, lfL US (16 Pet.) 663.
maintained that there was a difference:
Hie slave as a sensible human being, is subject to the
local authority into whatsoever jurisdiction he may go;
he is answerable under the laws for his acts, and he may-
claim their protection; the state may protect him
against all the world except the claim of his master ...
and should the slave commit murder, he may be detained
and punished fox' it by the state, in disregard of the
claim of the master. Being within the jurisdiction of
a. state, a slave bears a very different relation to it
from that of mere property.
On this basis, Justice McLean argued that there was no conflict
between the 1826 Pennsylvania Statute and 1793 federal statute -
both were in accord. In a slave state, every coloured person was
assumed to be a slave, whereas in a non-slave holding state, like
Pennsylvania, every coloured person was assumed free. It was on
this principle that all states, slave or free, legislated. Thus,
Pennsylvania could clearly prohibit and punish the forcible removal
of a coloured person out of the state. This was compatible with
the 1793 federal statute which "authorises a. forcible seizure of the
slave by the master, not to take him out of the state, but to take
(2)
him before some judicial officer within it". v J
In addition, however, the majority of the US Supreme Court had
argued that the 1826 Pennsylvania statute was in conflict with the
US Constitution because it interfered with the constitutional
guarantee afforded to the master as to the protection of his slave
property-, if fugitive slaves could not be forcibly removed from other
1. hi US (16 Pet.) 66Q.
2. Ibid., 670.
klh'
states. But, said McLean, this guarantee only applied to slaves
and in Pennsylvania, since all coloured persons were assumed free,
the master could not forcibly remove a claimed slave, he must prove
that the said slave was, in fact, a slave;
She presumption, in a non-slave holding state, is
against the right of the master, and in favor of the
freedom of the person he claims. Phis presumption may
be rebutted, but until it is rebutted by the proof
required in the act of 1793? and also, in my judgement,
by the constitution, must not the law of the state
/rather than the masterl be respected and obeyed? (l)
For McLean the answer was unequivocal; the laws of a state must
(2)
prevail over the 1rights* of the master. v ' Thus, while in his
(7)
view, the state magistrate was obliged, v- ' though he could not be
coerced, to issue a certificate for the removal of the fugitive
slave upon proof, the fact that the magistrate refused did not
justify Pcigg's action in forcibly removing the fugitive from
Pennsylvania. Pcigg could have taken the claimed fugitive slave
before a federal judge.
Nevertheless, while Justice McLean? s opinion, in favour of the
1826 Pennsylvania statute, vras only one voice of dissent from an
1. Ibid., 672.
2. Ibid.
3. Justice McLean had dissented from Story's majority opinion that
state officials were not obliged to assist in the enforcement of
the federal law. McLean argued "where the constitution imposes a
positive duty on a state or its officers to surrender fugitives,
Congress may prescribe the mode of proof and the duty of the state
officers" (Ifl US (l6 Pet.) 666).
otherwise unanimous US Supreme Courtj the question of the lack of
enforcement of the 3.793 fugitive slave provisions, coupled with
the slave power*s aggressively expan.sion.ist policy, became
increasingly divisive to the Union throughout the l8ij.0s, reaching
a critical juncture after the admission of Texas as a slave state
in I8J45. This vast expanse of land, explicitly ceded to the slave
system under the terms of the Missouri Compromise, was annexed
from Mexico, primarily in response to a generation-long struggle
by Southerners for the acquisition of thi.s territory for their
cotton kingdom.
In this context, the issue of whether or not Congress had the
authority to determine if slavery would exist in a territory
obtained by the United States became critical. The slave interest
argued that since the Constitution recognised and protected property
in slaves, owners of such property cduld not lawfully be
discriminated against by being prohibited from carrying such
property wherever they went. The anti-slavery interest argued
that, ever since 1789, when Congress confirmed the clause in the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787 which excluded slavery from the Northwest
(3)
Territory, Congress had exercised its prerogatives over property
(M
and territory as the Constitution ^ said it could. Another inters.
« .<
1. Hie territory lay Sorith of 3° 30 > "the critical latitude,
(Hofstadter et al, 196IP138-9).
2. Franklin, 1969:172-3.
3. For a discussion of the Northwest Ordinance, see Chapter 5»
k' See, Article IV, Section 3? Clause 2, US Constitution.
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arising out of this conflict, put forward the doctrine of 'squatter'
or 'popular' sovereignty. The spokesmen for this view, Cass of
Michigan and Douglas of Illinois, argued that there was a long
established precedent in the ITS for communities to act as the best
judges of their own interests. Let the new territories be set up
with the question of slavery open and then let the people decide
for themselves. Exactly how this was to be done was vague, and,
as shall be discussed later in this chapter, when tried out in
Kansas, the results were disastrous.
By l8L8, the issue of the extension of slavery to new
territories had become so inflammatory that both major parties
evaded it in preparing fox* the presidential election, thus
creating the space for the birth of a. new party, the Free Soil
Party, drawn largely from defectors from both major parties,
committed to "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, and Free Men" and
(2)
to addressing the slavery issue head-on. v ~J In 1850, all of these
questions ware debated by Congress in a series of debates over the
admission of California as a state, whether free, slave or open,
resulting in what is known as ' The Compromise of 1850'. Despite
(O)
heated debate from free soilers on the one hand and secessionists v
1. Democrats, and Vhigs. Do ill of these parties were committed to a
policy of negotiation and compromise over the expansion of slavery.
2. See Hofstadter et al, 196I4-:li+6—• 7«■
3. Georgia., Mississippi, Alabama and South Carolina all considered
secession at this time (Franklin, 1969:266).
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on the other, a somewhat tenuous agreement was reached and the
Compromise of 18^0 contained five separate measures. Under the
provisions of" the Compromise, California entered the Union as a
free state; two new territories, New Mexico and Utah, were created
with explicit 'squatter sovereignty' rights on the issue of slavery;
Texas was to cede certain lands to New Mexico and be compensated;
the slave trade, but not slavery, was prohibited in the District of
Columbia; and lastly, an extremely severe and more stringent
fugitive slave law was passed. ^^
For the time being then, sectional animosities had been deflated
and in the 1802 presidential elections, Franklin Pierce, the
Democratic candidate,, easily defeated his Whig opponent with the Free
Soil party making a, very poor showing (much poorer than in iSqS).
Nevertheless, following the death of Unionists such as Webster and
Clay in the same year, the Whig party itself began to break up with
some Southern Whigs joining the Democrats. The rest of the Whigs
would soon form the backbone of a new Northern party, committed to
prohibiting any further expansion of slavery in the territories,
Ironically enough, as will be discussed in the next section, the
slave power, by its adoption of an aggressively expansionist policy,
1. The 1850 Fugitive Slave Act was passed with many Northern
congress men abstaining from the voting (Hofstadter et al, 1964:
148-9). The Act placed enforcement in the hands of US Marshals and
Deputy Marshals, who could call on any private parson's assistance,
and provided severe penalties for their failure to carry out their
duties properly (5)1,000 fine) as well as even severer penalties for
any obstruction cf the provisions (01,000 plus 6 months
imprisonment). For details see, Fugitive Slave Act 1800, US,
Statutes at Large, IX, 462 ff.
created the basis upon which a political force explicitly
opposed to the expansion of slavery could emerge. That force
was the Republican party.
CONFLICT WITHIN THE RULE OP LAW
The sectional truce brought about by the Compromise of 1850 was
short-lived and by l0p2 there were signs of increased Northern
resistance to complying with the 18.50 Fugitive Slave Act, in
particular with those provisions which made private persons liable
(p_
for assistance in recapturing fugitives, even in the free states.
Mob attacks on federal officers trying to reclaim fugitive slaves
became increasingly common while Southerners considered such
incidents as evidencing Northern hostility to Southern institutions
and as representing clear violations of their constitutional
(3)
property rights. x •' The South's drive to secure more slave
territory, however, was undeterred by such resistance and in l85ii,
with the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska. Act which re-opened the
question of the expansion of slavery in the Western territories, the
truce was effectively destroyed and the Northern determination to
1. Eofstadter et al, 196)1 :il|8-9«
2. Resistance was intensified by the publication of "Uncle
Tom's Cabin" by Harriet Beecher Stowe, 1852. The book sold
300,000 copies in its first year and was dramatised in theatres
throughout the North {Franklin, 1969:266).
3. Hofstadter et al, 1961+:l68-9.
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stem the spread of slavery throughout the Union intensified.
Many issues, open and concealed, lay behind the Kansas-
Nebraska, Act. Railroad extension, private political ambitions,
sectional bargaining, the expansion of the slave system and the
aspirations of the 'free soil5 western settlers 'were all involved.
The central figure in the drama, Senator Stephen A. Douglas of
Illinois, who introduced the Kansas-Nebraska Bill into the Senate,
no doubt had his own reasons for doing so, ^ ^ but whatever the
motives of Douglas may have been, the passage of the act on May
1854 > was to precipitate a desperate and violent struggle over the
control of Kansas, and at the same time, lead to the development of
the Republican Party as an effective political force. As passed,
the Act provided that two territories, Kansas and Nebraska,, would
be organised out of a section of Western territory; that the
residents of the two territories, and not Congress, should determine,
by 'popular sovereignty', whether or not they would permit slavery
when they became states; and. that:
Being- inconsistent with, the principle of non¬
intervention by Congress with slavery in the States
and Territories, as recognised by the legislation
of eigfiteen hundred and fifty, commonly called the
Compromise Measures, (2)
1. Douglas, an ardent supporter of land grant aid to western
railroads and a leading spokesman for the planned transcontinental
railroad, needed the Nebraska Territory to be settled before the
railroad could be built. To organise this territory, Douglas had
to make deals with Southern interests, and the Northern democratic
allies of the Southern interest (Hofstadter et al, 1964:170*)
2. Section ll(, Kansas-Nebraska Act, May 30, l854s bS Statutes at
Large, X, 277, 282-231;.
the Missouri Compromise was "hereby declared inoperative and
void". Both territories, in fact, lay North of the latitude
G I
36 30 where slavery had been explicitly prohibited under the
Missouri Compromise, "forever".
The Kansas-Nebraska Bill, while it passed the Senate by 37
to 1)4 votes, had a much harder time in the House of Representatives,
which was up for election in l85U> s-iid finally squeesed through by
113 to 100 votes. Everyone of the IS Northern Whigs in the House
voted against the Bill and this group received the support of
almost half the Northern Democrats plus a few Whig and Democratic
border-state votes. A solid bloc of Southern Democrats and half
the Northern Democrats, on the other hand, together with the
majority of the Southern Whigs, had put the measure through. The
1 anti-Nebraska5 men ^ began to form a. new political organisation
committed to preventing the expansion of slavery, through adhering
to the principle that Congress had the right to keep slavery out of
the territories and thus the Republican Party was born.
As noted earlier in this chapter, the central reason for the
Republican Party5s opposition tc the expansion of slavery was not
founded on a matter of principle but was rather to be explained in
terms of the political struggle over the right to occupy territories
which were federal state property - it was a struggle about who
would rule the USA. The central tenet of the Republican ideology
3 . This group a3.so included the Pree Soiler 'Conscience Whigs'
and abolitionists. For a general survey of the groups, see,
R.A. Billington, "Westward Expansion", New York, Holt, Rinehart and
Winston Inc., i960.
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was not freedom for slaves "but freedom for free men to farm the
land. ^ At issue was the question of whether slave-holders
would rule the free men of the rest of the nation or not - not
(2)
whether slavery should or should not he abolished. v '
Events subsequent to the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska. Act
added to the political power which the Republican Party had already
achieved through the split in the Democratic Party over the terms
of the Act. Since Nebraska Territory lay wholly separated from
■fche slaveocraoy, Southerners ignored it, but not so with Kansas.
(
Kansas K lay adjacent to the slave state of Missouri and became
a battle ground where the issue of 'popular sovereignty® was
resolved in a class war between planters and free settlers. The
free settlers were backed by the Republicans and some of the more
1. See generally, Eric Jbner, "On free Soil, Free Labour, Free
Men: the Ideology of the Republican Party before the Civil War",
New York, Oxford University Press, 1970 •
2. Indeed: "inherent in the anti-slavery outlook of many
Republicans was a strong overtone of racism. For the whole free
labor argument against the extension of slavery contained a crucial
ambiguity. Vas it the institution of slavery, or the presence of
the Negro which degraded the white laborer? Some times the
Republicans clearly stated that the institution itself, not the
race of the slave was to blame ... Often, however, Republicans
indicated that they made little distinction between free negroes
and slaves, and felt that association with any black degraded the
white race. *1 want no tiling to do with either the free Negro or
the slave Negro ...5 3 said Lyman Trumbull. 'We wish to settle the
Territories with free white men1 . Simon Cameron of Pennsylvania
stated that he wished to keep Negroes out of the Territories because
the white laborer 'must be depressed wherever the Negro is his
competitor in the field or workshop®" (ibner, 1970 ® 266-26'/)<
3. The climate of Kansas was not particularly conducive to cotton
production (Eofstadter et al, 1961|.:3-7l)•
radical Northerners attempted to block Southern designs on
Kansas by sending free state men there, through 4 emigrant aid
societies4, in such numbers that popular sovereignty would win
the area for freedom. Hie slave power, however, was able to act
as a more effective organised conspiracy since they could use poor
whites from bordering Missouri to pour into Kansas on the day votes
were cast for the election of the first territorial legislature.
Thus, on election day, March 30: l855> although only 2,000 Kansans
were registered to vote, 6,000 ballots were cast and the slave
power gained a majority on the territorial legislature. The new
legislature immediately passed a series of repressive laws which
prescribed the death penalty for anyone aiding a. fugitive slave
and simply to question the legality of slavery in Kansas carried a
(2)
sentence of two years of hard labour-. v J
f o)
Hie free settlers ' responded by drawing up their own
constitution which banned slavery from Kansas, and adopted it in an
election in January l8£6, in which planters refused to participate.
Partisans from both sections fought for their respective
administrations and by the 1806 presidential election over 200
people had been killed in the guerilla war in "bleeding Kansas".
Hie events occurring in this battleground dramatically politicised
1. Billing-ton et al, 1962:362.
2. Hofstadter et al, 196U:iyi-2.
3« They received no assistance from the federal government
which had refused to disqualify the results of the first rigged
election.
the issue of the expansion, of slavery at a national level, giving
('! )the Republican Party tremendous support " J at the 1856 elections
and demonstrating that voting was becoming truly sectional in
character. ^
As the sectional controversy intensified, Northern state
courts increasingly denied that they had any legal responsibility t
uphold the slave status when master's brought -their slaves into a
free state - the slave status only applied where the municipal law
upheld it. For example, in Anderson v Polndexter, 1857?
the Ohio Supreme Court held that a. slave coming into a. free
jurisdiction for a temporary stay was automatically freed because
slavery was "repugnant to reason and the principles of natural law"
citing Sommersett v Stuart as binding precedent. Moreover,
notwithstanding the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act, in another 1857 case,
(<)
Rodney v Illinois Central Railroad, x ' which involved a suit by a
Missouri slaveowner against the railroad for letting a fugitive
slave ride on its train to freedom, the Illinois Supreme Court
denied a remedy on the ground that Missouri's toleration of
slaveholding was repugnant to Illinois .policy.
1. Not yet enough? but the party was only two years old.
2. Although a Democratic President, Buchanan,was elected, the
lines were being drawn.
3. Sommersett v Stuart, discussed in Chapter 2, was held to be
precedent for this view, in particular, Lord Mansfield's comments
on the municipal character of the slave status.
h. 6 Ohio St. 623 (1857).
5. 19 111. ii2 (1857).
Southern state courts, on the other hard, increasingly
developed a line of reasoning which totally repudiated Soaaiersett
v Stuart as precedent on the issue of slavery. Thus Chief
Justice Lumpkin, of the Supreme Court of Georgia, in the 1855 case
of Cleland v Waters stated;
I utterly repudiate the whole current of decision ...
from Sommersett's case dovm ... which hold that
the hare removal to a free country ... will give
freedom. This fungus has been engrafted upon
/free statej Codes by the foul and fell spirit of
modern fanaticism. (l)
More alarming, however, for those against the further expansion
of slavery and for Northern states attempting to preserve their
freedom, were the decisions made by a US Supreme Court dominated
by Southern Justices. Chief Justice Taney held for the
majority in Strader v Graham l850, that every state had power to
determine the status of persons within its jurisdiction:
Except in so far as the powers of the states in
this respect are restrained, or duties and
obligations imposed on them, by the Constitution
of the United States. (2)
This qualification implied the same clause or construction of the
US Constitution might be held, in a later decision, to limit or
prohibit the .ability of free stales to prevent the intrusion of
1. 19 Ga. 35} h1-42 (1855).
2. 51 us (10 How.) 82, 93 (1850).
k&$.
slavery into their jurisdictions, by declaring that no state
could interfere with, a master's legal ri^at of property in his
slave.
'the significance of these trends had hardly become apparent
when the US Supreme Court, in l857j handed down a critical
decision in the case of Bred Scott v Sandford. Briefly, the
facts of the case were as follows: from I83U to 1836, Bred Scott,
a slave, who had. been taken by his master, Br Emerson, from the
slave state Missouri to the free state Illinois, was in the
service of Br Emerson in Illinois. He was then taken from
Illinois to Wisconsin Territory, North of the latitude 30' where
he lived with Emerson from 1836 to 1838. Slavery and the talcing
of slaves to this part of the Louisiana Purchase (then known as
the Wisconsin Territory) had been prohibited by the Act of Congress
(2)
in 1820 known. a.s the Missouri Compromise. v ' In 1838 Scott and
his family moved with Br Emerson back to Missouri and Scott and his
family were subsequently sold to Sandford. It was through Sandford1 s
attempts to exercise what he thought were his rights of ownership over
Scott and his family that Scott brought an action for trespass against
Sandford in the US Circuit Court for the district of Missouri,
asserting his right to freedom under state and federal law.
The anti-slavery group who backed Scott's suit for freedom hoped
to prove that Scott's sojourn in free Illinois and in a territory
1. 60 US (19 How.) 393 (1857)'
2. Act of March 6, 1820. US Statutes at Large, III, 5Uh,
discussed in Chapter 6.
1|.8 6.
where slavery was made illegal by the Missouri Compromise had made
him a free man. By a complicated route ^^ the Scott case
finally reached the US Supreme Court in May 1856 and was decided
March 6, 1857 < As will become clear in the discussion which
follows, the Supreme Court Justices could have simply dismissed the
Bred Scott case on the grounds thai Scott, a negro, was neither a
citizen of Missouri nor of the United States and hence was not
entitled to sue in the federal courts. However, while this was
part of the decision they handed down, the Justices chose to go
much further and rule on whether Congress had a right, under the
(2)
US Constitution, to exclude slavery from the territories. '
Thus, the two major constitutional issues which the US Supreme
Court considered in the Bred Scott case were: firstly, whether a
negro, whose ancestors were brought to the United States and were
treated as slaves, was conceived of as a citizen under the
(■3)Constitution of the United States, ' and secondly, whether-
Congress had the Constitutional authority to prohibit taking slaves
into territories administered by the United States,
In delivering the majority opinion ^ of the Supreme Court,
Chief Justice Taney noted that the first question was "very serious"
1. This route involved various suits and counter-suits in the
lower courts.
2. President. Buchanan had taken the exceptional step of indicating1
to two Supreme Court Justices that he expected them now to settle the
question of slavery in. the territories - this is precisely what the
Justices did.
3« If not a US citizen then Bred Scott would not be entitled to sue
in a federal court.
if.. The Court voted 6 to 2 against Scott in this opinion.
and that the statue of negroes, descended from slaves, could not
be ascertained in comparison to Indians, who, like any other
foreign people, could be naturalised and entitled to claim
citizenship on that basis. In considering whether negroes were
0)
US citizens, Chief Justice Taney maintained that the words
"people of the United States" and "citizens" were synonymous terms,
therefore, the question before him was whether negroes were a part
of that people which formed the basis of sovereignty:
We think they are not, and that they are not
included, and were not intended to be included,
under the word "citizens" in the Constitution, and
can therefore claim none of the rights and privileges
which that instrument provides for and secures to
citizens of the United States. On the contrary ...
{negroes were considered! ... a subordinate and
inferior class of 'being ... £whqj had no rights or
privileges but such as those who held the power
and the Government might chose to grant "them.
In arriving at this conclusion, Chief Justice Taney argued that:
It is not the province of the court to decide upon
the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of"
these laws. The decision of that question belonged
to the political or law-making power; to those who
formed the sovereignty and framed the Constitution.
The duty .of the court is, to interpret the instrument
they have framed .,. and to administer it as we find
it, according to its true intent and meaning when it
was adopted.
1. The specific constitutional provision a,t issue is Article IY,
Section 2, Clause 1: "The Citizens of each State shall be entitled
to all Hie privileges and immunities of citizens in the federal
states" „
2. 60 US, 395.
3. Ibid.
Thus, in interpreting sovereignty, "we the people of the United
States", as the definition of "citizenship", Chief Justice Taney
dismissed the question of individual state citizenship as
irrelevant. While states might confer citizenship as they
pleased, the right to establish a uniform rule of naturalisation
had been exclusively grafted to Congress by the US Constitution.
This being the case, argued Taney, the question then arose:
did the US Constitution confer on a negro, freed by the laws of a
particular state and made a citizen of that state, all the
privileges of a citizen in every other state (as a US citizen)
including the right to bring suit in the federal courts? Taney
thought not, therefore Urea Scott, "could not be a citizen of
the State of Missouri, within the meaning of the Constitution of
the United States, and, consequently, was not entitled to sue in
its courts".
At the time when the Constitution was adopted citizenship was
conferred on those who were citizens of each state but there was
nothing to support the view that negroes were considered as
citizens:
In the opinion of the court, the legislation and
histories of the times, and the language used in the
Declaration of Independence show, that neither the class
of persons who had been imported as slaves, nor their
descendents, whether they had become free or not, were
then acknowledged as part of the people, nor intended to






They had lor more than a century before been
regarded as beings of an inferior order ..» so
far inferior, that -they had no rights which the
white man was bound to respect; and that the negro
might justly and lawfully be reduced to slavery for
his benefit. He was bought and sold, and treated
as an ordinary article of merchandise and traffic,
whenever a profit could be made by it. (l)
(2)
In referring, in particular, to the legislation of the colonies '
Taney noted that all the colonies had regarded slaves "as
property". Moreover, both the clause in the US Constitution
guaranteeing the right to import slaves until 1808, and the clause
relating to fugitives from labour supported his interpretation that
negroes were not considered part of the people or citizens of the
(X)
government then formed. K '
Further support to his contention that negroes could not he
citizens within the meaning of that term in the US Constitution,
was drawn from the fact that all negroes, fcee or slave, were
regarded as a separate class of persons; from the opinion of
Chief Justice Daggett for the Connecticut Supreme Court in the case
(<)
of Crandall v Connecticut ' who had held that negroes were not
1. Ibid.
2. For a, discussion of the legislative construction of the slave
status as akin to that of chattel property in the later colonial
period, see Chapter ii.
3. 60 US, 398—ijli.3.
h. He cited the existence of state statutes prohibiting inter¬
racial marriage, requiring negroes to have passes and so on.
5. 10 Conn. Hep., 339, 3^0 (1833)5 discussed at pages klj-l-W+S
of this chapter.
citizens within the meaning of the word in the US Constitution
and were not therefore entitled to the privileges and immunities
associated with US citizenship; and from the Articles of
Confederation, which predated the Constitution, where the
provision defining citizenship used a different language:
That the free inhabitants of each of the States,
paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives from justice,
excepted, should he entitled to all the privileges
and immunities of free citizens in the several
States.
By free inhabitants, however, was meant white inhabitants, v '
since, at that time, some negro slaves would have been freed, and:
It is impossible ... to believe that the great men
of the slaveholding States, who took so large a
share in framing the Constitute on of the United
States, and exercised so much influence in procuring
its adoption, could have been so forgetful or
regardless of their own safety.
To "all this mass of proof", Taney added that the repeated
(<)
legislation of Congress K ' supported his construction of the
meaning of citizenship under the US Constitution and his view that
1. For a discussion of the Articles of Confederation, see
Chapter 5*
2. 60 US, I4J48 - emphasis in original.
3. See Article 9S Section 5 the Articles of Confederation.
h. Go us, 14*7.
5. Ibid., 14+9. In particular, ho cited the naturali nation law
of March 26, 1790 which confined the right of becoming citizens
"to aliens being free white persons": the militia, law of 1792
which used the term "white male citizen" to exclude negroes; and
the 1813 lav: on employment on board vessels which drew a
distinction between citizens and persons of colour who were not
citizens.
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This class of person //negroesT were governed
"by special legislation directed expressly to them,
and always connected with provision for the
government of slaves, and not with those for the
government of free white citizens. (l)
Thus, Chief Justice Taney, with the majority of the US Supreme
Court held that:
Ured Scott was not a citizen of Missouri within
the meaning of the Constitution of the United
States, and not entitled as such to sue in its
courts; and, consequently, that the Circuit Court
had no jurisdiction of the case. (2)
At this point, the US Supreme Court could have simply dismissed
the Dred Scott case on grounds of lack of jurisdiction. The
Court, however, chose to extend its judgment into other areas of
law, thus Taney noted that not only did the Circuit Court make
an error in jurisdiction in hearing the case but also, given that
it had heard it, the US Supreme Court, as an appellate court, must
correct any further errors in the argument Scott, made claiming his
(3)freedom. • ' The Court must therefore inquire whether the facts
relied upon by Scott entitled him to has freedom. .In doing this,
two questions arose: firstly, whether Scott and his family were
free in Missouri because' of their previous removal to Wisconsin
1. 6o us, kSo.
2. Ibid., 453,
3. This discussion at this point centred on the technicalities of
pleading and while they could have chosen to stop here, the
Justices wanted to get the record clear on the Missouri Compromise.
h
Territory (North of 3^ 30' ); arid secondly, if they were not,
whether Scott himself was free because of his removal to Eock
fl)
Island, in the free state of Illinois. v '
In examining the first of these questions, Chief Justice
Taney noted that what was at issue was whether the Missouri
Compromise of 1820 was constitutional:
Whether Congress was authorized to pass this law
under any of the powers granted to it by the
Constitution; for if the authority is not given
by that instrument, it is the duty of this court
to declare it void and inoperative, and incapable
of conferring freedom upon any one who is held as
a slave under the laws of any one of the States,
Scott's counsel had argued that the Missouri Compromise was
constitutional because Article IT, Section 3? Clause 2 of the US
Constitution conferred on Congeess the "power to dispose of and
make all needful rules and regulations respecting the territory
or other property belonging to the United States".
Chief Justice Taney, however, in delivering the opinion of the
US Supreme Court, argued that, on the basis of precedent and the
intention behind the clause, this constitutional provision was
irrelevant since it was confined to territory which was part of the
United States'at that time. The Missouri Compromise wa.s over the
lands later acquired Accm France under* the Louisiana Purchase. ^
1. Note that Scott was in Illinois first - I83I+-36 ~ then
Wisconsin Territory - 1836-38. The twist in chronology had
consequences for the issue of the freedom of Scott's family.
2. 60 US, 1+53'.
3- See Chapter 6,
k 93.
The constitutional provision which must "be relied on by the
Court in reaching its decision on the issue of the constitutionality
of the Missouri Compromise was not Article IT, Section 2, Clause 3,
but rather the "due process" clause of the Fifth Amendment' to the
US Constitution vdiich provides that no person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law. Slave
property, argued Taney, was no different from other property.
Indeed the US Constitution recognised the right of property of the
master in a slave:
And makes no distinction between that description
of property and. other property owned by a. citizen,
pfchusj no tribunal, acting upon the authority of
the United States, whether it be legislative,
executive, or judicial, has a right to draw such
a distinction, or deny to it the benefit of the
provisions and guarantees which have been provided
for the protection of private property against
the encroachments of the Government. (2)
For that reason, said Taney, the US Supreme Court was of the opinion
that the Missouri Compromise was, and always had been,
unconstitutional and void.
In siim. not only had the US Supreme Court held that negroes
were not citizens of the US and therefore that Deed Scott's suit
must be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, but also they had
declared the Missouri Compromise unconstitutional thereby affirming
the legality of the Kansas-Nebraska Act of 185U and making it
1, Passed by Congress on September 25, 1789 and ratified
December 16, 1791•
2. 60 US, Ij.66. Note the change in terminology from "person" in
the Fifth Amendment to "citizen" in Taney's argument. Ee has, of
course, already said that negroes are not citizens.
possible for roasters to take their slaves anywhere in the
territories and retain title in them.
Only two of the Supreme Court Justices dissented from
that opinion. Cheir dissent, and in particular the argument of
(?)
Justice McLean, v y merits attention not only because it
demonstrates that within law an entirely different holding was
(3)
possible, v ' but also because it demonstrates that the Justices
were all aware of the central political significance of the Lred
Scott case.
Justice McLean began his dissenting opinion by noting that
strict technicalities hah been used in the majority opinion of the
Court, in dismissing the case due to lack of jurisdiction. However
said McLean, if the Co-art wanted to argue on technicalities it was
the majority who were wrong - the rules of pleading themselves
forbade the Court to.reach the conclusion it did. Che majority
had to assume that Hred Scott was a slave yet Sandford's pleat
Chat the plaintiff/hhred ScottJ is a negro of
African, descent, his ancestors being of pure
African blood, and were brought into this country,
and sold as Negro slaves
did not show Hred Scott to be a slave, and "it does not follow that
(5)
a man is not free whose ancestors vrere slaves", said McLean. '
1. Justice McLean and Justice Curtis, both Northern Justices.
2. Justice McLean had also dissented in two other Supreme Court
decisions discussed in this chapter: Groves v Slaughter and
Prlgg v Pennsylvania.
3. And arguably more 'correct' within the rules of procedure etc.
h. 6o us, 581.
5. Ibid,, 582.
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What was at issue was Ifed ScottSs freedom - to deny jurisdiction
because it was assumed that he was a slave when no proof of this
was asserted in Sandford's plea was an injustice.
Moreover, remarked McLean, for the Court to argue that even
if bred Scott were free and a citizen of a state, he could not sue
in a. federal court because negroes, free or otherwise, were not
citizens of the US, was not warranted. There were, he said,
several fundamental principles involved in the Dred Scott case
which should have been considered by the Court in reaching a
decision.
The first of these related to the locality of slavery as
settled by the US Supreme Court itself and the state courts. In
arguing that "slavery is limited to the range of laws under which
it is sanctioned" ^ and was therefore a municipal regulation,
bounded and limited to the range of territorial laws, McLean cited
(2)
the precedent of Prigg v Pennsylvania * ' as "the great arid leading
case" on this issue. Moreover, the conclusion in Prigg was
supported by Somaersett v Stuart "considered, by this Court as the
highest authority"' and upheld in subsequent English decisions. The
civil lav? of Continental Europe had established that "slavery can
exist only within the territory where it is established". ^ Even
the slave states of the USA had consistently recognised that slavery
1. Ibid., 586.
2. Jil US (l6 Pet.) 539 (l8Jp2), discussed, at pages i|61|-li75 of this
chapter,
3. 20 How. St. If.79 (1771-72) discussed in Chapter 2.
k. 60 US, 581*.
was governed "by municipal regulations; thus Judge Mills, for
example, speaking for the Court of Appeals of Kentucky in the
1820 case of Rankin v LyAia had argued that slavery was a right
existing only "by positive law, "without foundation in the law of
nature, or the unwritten and common law".
Having established that slavery was a municipal status,
McLean went on to discuss the second principle at issue in Lred
Scott : the relation "between the federal government and slavery in
the states. Slavery, he said, "is emphatically a Sta.te
institution". This position had been recently upheld by the ITS
Supreme Court's decision in the case of Groves v Slaughter which
found that "Congress had no power to interfere with slavery as it-
exists in the States, or to regulate what is called the slave
(2)
trade among them". ' The only connection which the federal
government had with slavery in a state related to the
constitutional provision requiring the rendition of 'fugitives
from labours.
This being the case, McLean considared the third principle:
thc power of Congress to establish territorial governments which
prohibit the introduction of slavery to that territory. Relying
on earlier decisions by the US Supreme Court McLean argued that
1. 9 Kv. (2 A.K. Marshall) 1+6? (l820).
2. 1.0 US (l5 Pet.) 119 (18J4I), discussed at pages 156-163 of
this chapter.
3. In particular, Ciii.ef Justice Marshall's holding for the
majority in HoCulloch v Maryland, 1 Wheat. 316 (1819).
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Congress had the power to exclude slavery from a US territory.
Moreoverj this power could he justified on the grounds of "sound
national policy". The argument that this would he unfair to
Southern slave-holders could not he sustained since:
It is only necessary to say that, with one-fourth
of the Federal population of the Union, they have
in the slave States a larger extent of fertile
territory than is included in the free States. (l)
McLean's argument proceeded to what he regarded as the fourth
principle at issue: the effect of taking slaves into a. state or
territory, and hoIding them there, where slavery was prohibited.
(2)
Citing the precedent of Prigg, Sommersett, Slave Grace end the
authority of the US Constitution, for his position that slavery-
was limited to territorial laws, he asked "by virtue of what law is
it that a master may take his slave into a free territory, and
(3)
exact from him the duties of a slave?" Ee answered that
neither the laws of Wisconsin Territory nor* the US Constitution or
any federal statute sanctioned it. To argue that the slave was
property and that the master had a right to do what he wished with
that property, just the same as any other property he owned was
wrong; "coloured persons are made property by the law of the State
and no such pov/er has been given to Congcess". Thus by taking a
slave into a territory where slavery vias prohibited, the slave
1. 60 US, 591.
2. Rex v Allan, 2 Hagg-91}, 116 Eng. Rep. 179 (Adm.182?). This
English case, slave Grace, was discussed in Chapter 2.
3. 60 US, 592,
h9Q,
"became free in that territory.
From this conclusion, Justice McLean, considered the fifth
principle: whether the return of a clave under the control of his
master, after being entitled to his freedom, reduced him to his
former condition. The decisions of the Supreme Courts of the
Southern states, said McLean, had consistently upheld the
constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise and had declared that
coloured persons must be adjudged s.s entitled to their freedom when
their' masters held them in slavery in territories or states in which
(2)
slavery was prohibited. ' The Supreme Court of Missouri had
itself upheld the constitutionality of the Missouri Compromise.
Moreover, it "was the settled law" that "on return of the slave to
(3)
Missouri, his former condition of slavery did not attach". - '
This consistent precedent, however, had been overturned for the
first time in Missouri in the 18$2 case of Scott v Emerson, an
earlier suit concerning Bred Scott which involved the identical
questions currently before the US Supreme Court, Emerson having,
since that decision was made upholding his ownership of Scott, on
the grounds that "times are not as they were when the former
(h)
decisions on this subject were made," w' sold Scott to Sandford.
1. Ibid., 593-U.
2. e.g. Mississippi, Virginia, Louisiana, Maryland and Kentucky as
well as some others. For example, in Betty v Horton (5 Leigh. Hep.
6l5) and Commonwealth v Pleasants (10 Leigh. Rep. 697), both
decided in South Carolina, the principle was upheld that a slave,
being taken to a free state, became free. See McLean's argument
at 60 US, 596-602.
3. 60 US, 598.
h. 15 Mo. 576 (1852),
This overturning of precedent led McLean to a consideration
of the final principle at issue in Dtred Scott: whether the
decisions of the Supreme Court of Missouri were "binding- on this
court. The decisions of state courts were only followed by the
US Supreme Court "where they give a construction to the state
statutes". This was not the issue in the present case
therefore there was no obligation on the part of the US Supreme
Court to follow the Supreme Court of Missouri*s decision in Scott
v Emerson, particularly since that decision "refused to notice" the
legality of the Missouri Compromise and the Illinois Constitution
under which Ltred Scott and his family claimed their freedom. To
uphold this line of reasoning; argued McLean, was a fundamental
(2^
erosion of the rule of law % / and "if a State court may do this,
on a question involving the liberty of a. human being, what
protection do the laws afford?" ^
Despite Justice McLean1s eloquent argument in favour of a
consistent application of the arule of law, Chief Justice Taney had
a different interpretation of the rule of law, and his
interpretation; which allowed him to hold for the majority that the
Missouri Compromi.se was unconstitutional, that negroes (free or
slave) were not US citizens and that masters could take their
slaves anywhere in the territories and retain legal title in them,
1. 60 US, 602.
2. If not completely illegal under the 25'bh section, of the
Judiciary Act (60 US, 603) <
3. 60 us, 603.
5oo,
was regarded as a clear-cut victory for the slave power. v '
And, even though this victory was short-lived in an instrumental.
sense, it was a critical symbolic victory for the sieve power.
If the opinion in Reed Scott v Sandford were to hold, then a
fundamental objective for which, the Republican party itself had been
organised was unconstitutional. Even a. significant section of the
(2 ^
Northern Democrats, ' traditional allies of the slave power, were
troubled by the decision, If Congress did not have the
constitutional power to exclude slavery from, tire territories, "then
neither did any of the territorial legislatures which existed by
Congressional author!sation,
CONCLUSION
If the decision in Deed Scott v Sandford represented a symbolic
victory for the slave power, any satisfaction was very short-lived.
At the state constitutional convention at Lecompton, Kansas, in
185?s pro-slavery delegates named in a rigged election not only
wrote a constitution explicitly guaranteeing slavery but also
refused to permit the electorate as a whole to vote en. it. This
( 3)
"Lecompton Constitution", - ' when presented to Congress as a
document on which Kansas sought admission as a state, produced a
stalemate between the Senate (which accepted it) and the House of
Representatives where the *Douglas Democrats5 voted with the
1. Franklin, 1969:268.
2. Hofstadter et al, 1961+:17U.
3> The "Lecompton Constitution" was adopted 011 September li, 1857 •
For its content, see Thorpe (ed) 1909s 11:1210-1218.
Republicans to defeat .it* This stalemate was broken in May 1858
when Congress passed the English Bill which would grant Kansas
immediate statehood together with a federal land grant if hex-
voters accepted the lecompton Constitution, or which would continue
territorial status if they decided to reject it. In the event,
Kansans voted down the Lecompton Constitution, 11,812 to 1,926 and
remained as a territory and in a state of conflict between
slave-owners and free settler's.
Sectional hostilities were further intensified in the following
year in the aftermath of John Brown's raid on the federal arsenal at
Harpers Perry, Virginia, October 16, 1859» which was regarded by-
Southerners as a Northern backed abolitionist conspiracy to foment
slave revolt. ^^ Chis event dramatically highlighted the
divisions over the question of slavery and, coming just prior to
the i860 presidential elections, it helped to sway many voters to
(3)
the Republican party w/ and, at the same time, deepened the secession
sentiment already taking hold in the South.
In April i860, the Democratic national convention assembled a.t
Charleston, South Carolina, at the centre of secession territory.
Some Southern Democrats wanted to have a platform which unequivocally
1. Kansas remained a territory until 1861 when it entered the
Union as a free state (Hofstadter et a!, 1961|.:175-6).
2. Brown was not, in fact, backed by Northern abolitionists.
However, when he was hanged on December 2, 1869> he was ensured of
martyrdom in the anti-slavery movement (Franklin, 1969:268-9).
3. Franklin, 1969:269.
declared that neither Congress nor a territorial government could
abolish slavery or impair the legal title to the ownership of
slave property. When it became clear that their desire to argue
for federal protection of the legality of slavery in the
territories would not be adopted by many of the Northern Democrats
and, in particular, those who supported Douglas on his 'popular
sovereignty' platform, most of the Southern Democrats withdrew,
thus making it impossible for Douglas to get the two-thirds of
the ballot necessary to win the nomination. On June 18, when the
Democrats reconvened at Baltimore, and the same thing happened,
this convention went ahead to nominate Douglas on a 'popular-
sovereignty' platform. Independently, the Southern Democrats
nominated John C. Breckenridge of Kentucky to represent the
Southern position on slavery in the territories.
This formal split in the Democratic Party represented the br-e
in the last unionist political bond between Worth and South, and,
on May 3.8, when Abraham Lincoln won the Republican nomination, on
a platform which denied "the authority of Congress, of a,
territorial legislature, or of any individuals to give legal
existence to Slavery in any Territory of the United States" ^■ as
well as making a commitment to a protective tariff, free homestead;
and a Pacific railroad, all measures which would undermine the
power of the slaveocracy, it was evident that the results of the
i860 elections would reveal a divided nation.
1. As quoted in Hofstadter et al, 196i4.:178«
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Just how divided the nation was is evidenced "by the fact
that two separate contests were fought for the presidency. In
the South, the fight was "between the Southern Democrat,
Breckenridge, and Bell, the candidate for the Constitutional Union
(l)
Party, and in ten Southern states Lincoln's name was not even
placed on the ballot. In the North the contest was between
Lincoln the Republican and Douglas "the Northern Democrat. Although
Lincoln had the majority required for president in the electoral
college, he carried less than of the nationwide popular vote,
(?)
and a sectional candidate had become US President. '
Southern political leaders had repeatedly threatened that a
Republican, victory would result in secession. Secession was
attractive for a number-of reasons: it would mean, that the South
would no longer have to pay the federal taxes and tariffs which
largely benefited the North ana perhaps the international slave trade
could be re-opened and the South could have its own federal state
based exclusively on. the interests of the planter class. Thus, as
a result of the South.5 s aggressively expansionist policy, on
December 20, i860. South Carolina withdrew from the Union and by
February 1, l86l, Mississippi, Florida, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana
and Texas bad followed. On February Ij. these states formed a new
1. His platform was "to recognise no political principle other
than the Constitution of the country, the Union of the States,
and the enforcement of the laws" (quoted in Hofstadter et al, 196ii,
178).
2. Eofstadter et al, 1961+s 179•
5oIt.
f i. \
government, ^ ' the Confederate States of America, and despite
(2)
various attempts at comjrorsi.se "by "border states, open wax
began when, after Confederate forces had reduced Fort Sumter in
Charleston harbour in April l86l, Lincoln issued a proclamation
for the militia to put down the 5 insurrection'. Virginia, seceded
(3)
in May and was followed by Worth Carolina, Tennessee and Arkansas. K '
The outbreak of Civil ¥ar, following the Republican victory,
did not however result in the emancipation of slaves throughout the
Union. Only those slaves who lived in the Confederacy were to be
considered as free after January 1, 1863, under the terms of
Lincoln1 s Emancipation Proclamation, ^^ and it was not until the
close of the Civil War, on February 1, 1365 (ratified December 1.8,
1865) that the US Congress denied the legality of slavery by the
1. This government, also drew up a Constitution which forbade the
enactment of any law "impairing the right of property in negro
slaves" and included a manifest threat to the slave states which had
not yet seceded: "Congress shall also have power to prohibit the
introduction of slaves from any State not a member of ... this
Confederacy". This was an effort to coerce Virginia especially,
where the selling of excess negroes had. been very profitable
(Hofstadter et al, 196li;l89).
2. Most notably the Crittenden Plan put forward by Senator John 0".
Crittenden of Kentucky, and another version of this from Virginia.
3. Critical border states, slave and free, were however held by-
Lincoln.
li-. See, Richardson (comp.) 1897:VI:96-97- Lincoln's role in
emancipation was essentially conservative. Only 3 months after
issuing this proclamation he suggested slaves should be freed over a
period of 37 years, during which time efforts would be made to
colonise the freedmen outsid.e the US (see Richardson (comp.) 1897'
VI: 126-1!|2).
505.
(i)Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. v J
However, as will "become evident in the next and final
chapter, despite the illegality of slavery now, a two hundred
yea?? old legacy which consistently affirmed the legality of claims
to slave property, was to provide a category which could he used
within law as the basis for analogising to the legality of other
statuses which formally contradicted the central ideological
foundations of the rule of law itself.
1. For the text of the 13th Amendment, see Note 2, page 431 °f
this chapter.
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In Chapter 8 it was argued that the ITS Supreme Court played
a central part not only in recognising "but also in strengthening
the legal status of slavery at a national level, in both slave
/.j \
holding and non-slave holding states. From Groves v Slaughter ^ J
(2)
through, Peigg v Commonwealth of Pennsylvania v ' culminating in
(3)
Bred Scott v Sandford., the TJS Supreme Court articulated an
interpretation of the US Constitution which permitted slave owners
to take their slaves anywhere in US territory and retain legal title
in them, and, moreover, which denied US citizenship, irrespective
of state citizenship, to ail blacks, slave or free.. And,
while chattel slavery as a legal category was to disappear
officially from law with the ratification of the Thirteenth
Amendment to the US Constitution in 1865, two hundred years of
colonial, state and federal court decisions and legislative
enactments which affirmed the legality of claims to property in
human beings was to provide the legacy of a category within law
which could be used as the basis for analogising to the legality of
other statuses which denied the central ideological, foundations of
1. 1+0 US (15 Pet) U1l9 (18I4I).
2. l|l US (16 Pet) 539 (1852).
3. 60 US, 393 (1857).
I|. In denying US citizenship to blacks the Court denied protection
normally granted to US citizens under the privileges and immunities
clause of Article IY, Section 2, Clause 1 of the US Constitution.
5. Passed by Congress, February 1, 1865; ratified by the states
December 18, 1865.
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fthe rale of law1 itself: liberty, formal equality before the
law and the proportionality of labour and rewards. Indeed, the
Thirteenth Amendment itself, in outlawing one form ox slavery,
explicitly legalised another. thus:
Section. 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a •priuiishment for crime whereof
the party shall have been duly convicted, shall
exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction. (My emphasis)
this explicit authorisation of 8 slavery' or * .involuntary servitude5
as punishment for crime permitted the most obvious •translation of
the distinguishing features of chattel slavery into another context.
Within the legal category, slaves had been regarded as articles of
property, which, like other property, could be bought, sold,
transferred, traded and inherited. Their labour was central to the
definition of their status as 'slaves5. This labour had been
controlled primarily through, the domestic discipline imposed on
slaves by the master class, afforded legality by special courts and
(i)
punishments for criminal slaves J or special forms of pleading
(2)
applicable solely to the master/slave relation. 1' After the
ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment, however, ex-slaves were
no longer subject to this form of legal control and. the penal laws
of the Southern states became applicable to all offenders regardless
of race. Ex-slaves, however, owned nothing and could still only be
1. See Chapter b.
2. See Chapter ~J.
punished in their bodies. ^ ' It is therefore not surprising to
find that in the post-Civil War era the master class relied on
a system of penal servitude which made public slaves of black and
poor white convicts: "in some states they in fact became the
temporary or lifelong slaves of private employers or corporations to
whom the government delegated the right to exploit them for private
(2)
profit". ' In both creating and justifying this kind of
punishment, the status of the punished was analogised in law with
the status of slave. This analogy had,, of course, been given an.
explicit legal foundation by the language of the Thirteenth
Amendment which, while denying the legality of racial slavery,
(3)affirmed the legality of penal slavery. v''
Penal slavery and forced labour as punishment have, of course,
an exceedingly long history and Kusohe and Kirchheimer have argued
that such penal methods are primarily related to economic
considerations, especially the use of convict labour in situations
where the economy is predominantly labour intensive or could make use
1. Commenting on slavery in the Ancient World, Demosthenes noted
that slaves were punished in their bodies, citizens in their
property (as quoted in Sellin, 1976: 177) * Those without property
are still punished differently from those with it.
2. Sellin, 1976:Ik?.
3. While this is the case, I am not arguing that criminal
punishment derives or follows from the precedent of slavery. I am
not, therefore, in agreement with Sellin's (1976) argument that the
physical punishments which characterised the treatment of slaves in
different epochs and which were gradually extended to cover free men,
only leads one to the conclusion that contemporary penal systems
retain the essential marks of these formerly slave punishments.
What I am arguing is simply that within legal discourse analogies
were drawn between slavery and punishment just as within legal
discourse analogies were drawn between other unfree statuses, such as
villenage, and slavery.
of large numbers of workers at marginal cost. In particular,
they argue that the use of convict labour, ffcom the mid-seventeenth
century until the industrial revolution was well under way in
Europe, was intimately and profitably connected with
mercantilist economics. Great Britain was particularly
successful in making use of convict labour in its colonial
expansion ^^ through transportation: ^ its success in the convict
trade not being surprising given thai it was the foremost slave
trader in the world.
Indeed, when Great Britain found it necessary to abolish
transportation as its central mode of penal policy, it was
primarily through arguments amlogising between the legal status of
the transported convict and the slave that the ideological basis
for abandonment was accomplished. However, like their North
1. Rusche and Kirchheimer, 1968 (ed.)
2, For a discussion of British colonial theories, see Enorr, 19^U;
R.L. Schuyler, "The Fell of the Old Colonial System", London, Oxford
University Press, 1955; George Nadel and Perry Curtis, "Imperialism
and Colonialism", New York, Macmillan, 1965; E.J. Hobsbavm,
"Industry and Empire", Haraondsworth, Penguin, 196; Semmel, 1970
and Bobb, 1975-
3- See Chapter 3 f°r a brief discussion of the importance of
transported convicts' labour to colonisation.
I4. See Chapter 6 on the international slave trade.
5. Primarily in response to the stage of development reached in
Australia and the pressure from free settlers in that Continent
against accepting more convict labour (see O'Brien, 1950)• This
was remarkably similar "to the pressure from the free settlers of
Hie Western territories in the USA against the expansion of slavery.
Am.erica.2i ex-colonists in abolishing slavery, when the British
abandoned transportation, they retained the idea that the convict
may be forced to labour and that the fruits of this labour belong
exclusively to "the state. Thus, in 1853 'penal servitude1 became
the substitute punishment for transportation serving to strengthen
the notion that unfree labour could be legally authorised, given
convict status. Ibis legacy is still evident in contemporary
penal systems in both Great Britain and the USA in that prison
labour is compulsory, refusal of it being a disciplinary offence,
and even in new developments in penology, such as community service
by offenders, where offenders are sentenced to a number of hours of
'community service work'«
Penal slavery, however, involves a, temporary denial or
suspension of rights and would be applied to only a minority of the
North American ex-slaves. But the Thirteenth Amendment had said
nothing about the status of all ex-slsves and in 1857 > in Bred Scot
v Sandford, Chief Justice Taney had said that all blacks, free or
slave, were not citizens of the US and that the framers of the US
Constitution considered them as "a subordinate and inferior class o
beings". Indeed, the Southern states had already adopted the
"black codes" to ensure the role of blacks as a labouring force in
the South by the time the Thirteenth Amendment was ratified in
December 1865. These codes, based partly on pre-war laws
governing free negroes in the South, and partly on vagrancy laws in
the North, attempted to define the legal position of the freed
men, ~J as they were called. In. roost Southern states, these
codes prohibited negroes from working as artisans or in other
capacities where they may be in competition with white labour,
and, except under stated conditions, they could not leave their
jobs. Nowhere could negroes vote, hold office or serve on juries,
thus "the control of the Negro permitted to white employers was
(2)
about as great as that which slaveholders had exercised".
This Reconstruction policy being followed by President
(3)
Johnson v J met with severe opposition xn Congress, where Northern
and Western interests fought the possibility that the slave power,
in a different guise, would be able to achieve a situation of white
Southern minority .rule comparable to the pre-Civil War er-a.
(\ \
Congress itself determined to take charge of Reconstruction • J
passing the Fourteenth Amendment on June 16, 1866 though it was not
gr'N
ratified until July 28, 1868. 1
There Is no doubt that the Fourteenth Amendment was passed
1. The name * freedmen* came from the establishment of the
Freedmen's Bureau established by Congress in March l8bf> as part
of the War Department and authorised to issue, "provisions,
clothing and fuel .,. for .., "the destitute and suffering" (as
cited in Hofstadter et al. I96J4;211; and Franklin, 1969:302-306-
10).
2. Franklin, 1969:3*
3. Lincoln*s Vice-President who took over after the former's
assassination in April l86£* Johnson was a Southerner, from
Kentucky.
i|. For a fuller discussion of this policy, see Franklin, 1969:
30I4; ana Hofstadter et al, I96I4.: 216-220,
5. Hie Fourteenth Amendment had a stormy history before
ratification (as discussed in Hofstadter et al, l$6k:217).
primarily to grant citizenship to ail "blacks, thus overruling
the US Supreme Court's holding in 31ced Scott, and to effect 'the
restoration of the Union. Thus;
Section 1. All persons born or naturalised in the
United States, and subject to the jurisdiction
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of
the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges
or immunities of citizens of the United States; (l)
nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law;
nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned
among the several States according to their
respective numbers, counting the whole number of
persons (2) in each State, excluding Indians not taxed.
But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President
of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the
Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the
members of the legislature thereof, is denied to any
of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-
one years of age, and citizens of the United States,
or in any way abridged, except for participation in
rebellion, ox* other crime, the basis of representation
therein shall be reduced (3) in the proportion which
the number of such male citizens shall bear to the
whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age
in such State.
1. Phis clause gave effect to Article IT, Section 2, Clause 1 of
the US Constitution in the case of blacks since they were now
citizens. In Crarida.ll v Connecticut, discussed in Chapter 8,
blacks had been denied the protection of the "privileges and
immunities" clause of the US Constitution because the Court ruled
that they were not citizens.
2. Phis clause amended Article I, Section 2, Clause 3 of the US
Constitution where representation had been based partly on the
counting of slaves as "three-fifths of all other persons". For a.
discussion of the 'Constitutional Compromises' which resulted in
slaves (though never specifically mentioned by name) being counted
as three-fifths of a, person, see Chapter 3'.
3- This clause was inserted to attempt to ensure that the Southern
states, where the vast majority of blacks lives, would only get
representation in the US Government on the basis of those blacks
who were not denied the right to vote.
51h.
Section ^ ' The Congress shall have power
to enforce, by appropriate legislation,the
'
provisions of this article.
Despite the Fourteenth Amendment, however, certain states, such
as Louisiana and Georgia, prevented blacks from voting in the
presidential election of 1868, thus Congress strengthened the
protection of the black vote through the passage of the
Fifteenth Amendment in 1869, ratified in 1870, which guaranteed
both a wider exercj.se of the franchise along with the explicit
removal of race as a, disability. Thus;
Section 1. The right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied ox-
abridged by the United States or by any State
on account of race, color or previous condition
of servitude.
Section 2, The Congress shall have power to
enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
While the meaning and purpose of these Civil War Amendments have
1. Section 3 denied certain government offices to
insurrectionists - Confederate leaders but left Congress with
the option to remove this disability, and Section 1+ concerned debt
accrued during the Civil War and did not recognise the legality of
Confederate debts.
been the subject of much controversy v it is certainly "the
case that the possibility was created, within law, for a
comprehensive federal programme guaranteeing fundamental civil
rights protected by federal machinery against both state and
private encroachment. The seven federal statutes supporting the
13th, ll+th and 15th .Amendments were passed more or less in.
conjunction with the Amendments and, despite the fact thai there
were members of Congress who voted against the constitutionality
(?) C'-O
of these statutes, - ' known as the Civil Rights Acts, •- '
1. The literature on the Civil War Amendments is voluminoris.
With respect to the 13th Amendment, see Emerson et al, 1967:1001+-
1008. On the li+th Amendment, see P. Graham, "She 'Conspiracy
Theory' of the Fourteenth Amendment", in i+7 Yale L.J, 371:1938;
A. Fairman, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment incorporate the Bill of
Rights?", in 2 Stanford Law Review, 5:191+9; B- Prank and G. Munro,
"The Original Understanding of 'Equal Protection of the Lavs'", in
50 Columbia Law Review, 131:1950; L. Prantz, "Congressional Power
to Enforce the Fourteenth Amendment Against Private Acts", in 73
Yale Law Journal, 1353:1961+5 and J. Henkin, '"Selective
Incorporation1 in the Fourteenth Amendment", in 73 Yale L.J. 7i+:
19o3- Por a specifically Southern view attacking the validity of
the ratification process of the ll+th Amendment, see I. Suthon, "Hie
Dubious Origin of the Fourteenth Amendment", in 28 Tulsne L.R. 22:
1953- O-1 the 15'th Amendment, see Rote 71+ Yale Law Journal, 111+8:
19b5. For a discussion of the economic, political acid social
background to the Civil War Amendments,' see, for example, Stampp,
1956.
2. Just as there were those who voted against the Amendments
themselves (see, R. Carr, "Federal Protection of Civil Rights:
Quest for a Sword", Boston, Little, Brown and Co. 1957) •
3. With reference to the enactment of the Civil Rights Acts, see
United States Commission on Civil Rights, Washington B.C., USGPO,
1963. Carr, 19k7, discusses the statutes in some detail and
provides the text of the legislation. Miller, 1966, notes the
significance of these statutes and the Amendments in guaranteeing
fundamental civil rights.
fundamental civil rights had not only "been given a constitutional
guarantee but had also been constructed in legislation: "by
constitutional fiat and statutory direction, the national writ
would run to guarantee privileges .and immunities, due process,
and equal protection of the law for every man, white and black".
Five of the seven statutes enacted to implement the Civil War
Amendments were general civil rights acts. Hie first of these,
the Act of April 9j 1866, "An Act to protect all Persons in the
United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of
their Vindication", known as the Civil Rights or Enforcement Act,
was passed at a time "when only the Thirteenth Amendment had gone
into effect, The Act was aimed at outlawing the cblack codes"
enacted by the Southern states immediately after the close of the
Civil War, which restricted the movement and occupation of negroes,
Thus it provided that all persons born in the United States were
citizens and endeavoured to ensure equality before the law for all
races by guaranteeing rights:
To make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
and given evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease,
sell, hold and convey real and personal property,
and to full and equal benefit of all lavs and
proceedings for the security of persons and
property.
The federal courts were given exclusive jurisdiction over cases
arising under the Act, penalties were prescribed for its violation,
and the President was empowered to use the land and naval forces
to procure its enforcement.
1. Miller, 1966:101.
Ihe second Civil Rights or Enforcement Act, "An. Act to
enforce the Rights of Citizens of the United States to vote in
the several States of this Union, and for other purposes", ^^
passed by Congress on May J>1, I87O, and its amended version in
the third Civil Rights Act of February 2.8, 1871, ^ ^ attempted to
make the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments effective. More
specifically these two statutes were designed to protect the right
to vote by providing federal machinery to supervise elections in
the states. In the 1870 end I87I Civil Rights Acts, Congress
provided penalties for actions done "under color of law" and it was
made a felony to conspire "under color of law".
the Act of April 20, 1871, known as the Ku Klux Klan Act,
or the An.tilynchi.ng Act, entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions
of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United
(3)
States", KJ penalised action, "under color of law", which deprived
persons of their rights under the laws or Constitution of the
United States. The President was authorised to use the military
forces to suppress unlawful action when the states were unable or
unwilling to prevent interference with citizens1 rights or the
obstruction of the federal government processes.
Finally, there was the Civil Rights Act of March 1, 1875,
1. US, 16 Stat. U4O.
2. US, 16 Stat. Jx33.
3. US, 17 Stat. 13.
U. US, 18 Stat. 335.
518.
"An Act to protect all Citizens in their civil and legal rights",
designed to guarantee to negroes equal accommodation with white
citizens in all inns, public conveyances, theatres and other' places
ox amusement. Refusal by private persons to provide such
accommodation was declared to be a misdemeanor, and injured parties
were given the right to sue for damages.
The other two of the seven statutes were more limited in purpose
and application. These were the Slave Kidnapping Act of May 21,.
(l)1866, v ' "An Act to prevent and punish Kidnapping", which made it a
federal crime to kidnap and carry away a person with the intention
of placing him in slavery or involuntary servitude•, and the Peonage
Abolition Ant of March 2, 1867, ^ "An Act to abolish and forever
prohibit the System of Peonage in the Territory of few Mexico and
other parts of the "united States", which, while specifically aimed
(3)at px*aetices prevailing in Mew Mexico, - was also designed to
define "involuntary servitude" and to provide specific criminal
(U)
penalties for violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. 'y
Prom the language of these seven Acts, it is clear that, within
legal ideology, the rights of individuals could arguably be
protected against interference either by public officers or private
individuals. While they were aimed specifically at safeguarding
1. US, ill Stat. 50.
2. US, Ik Stat. 5J46.
3. In this context the term 'peonage1 referred to the enslaved
debtors of Hew Mexico.
k- Carr, 19V/:36-39.
the newly freed negro's rights, without exception, 110 mention
is made in any of these statutes of the negro as such. Instead
the wording is sufficiently broad to cover the rights of all
citizens if not all inhabitants or persons. Indeed, as will be
discussed later on .in this chapter, the wording of 'these civil
rights statutes and the 13th, llpfch. and lf/fch Amendments, have made
it possible, within lav?, to extend considerably the applicability
of these categories, in litigation right up 'bo the present day.
Thus, many years after its passage, the use of the word 'person5
in iiie first section of the llith Amendment was interpreted by the
federal courts as applying to such ''legal persons' as business
corporations, thus supplying the legal grounds for courts to
declare as unconstitutional the state regulation of railroads,
(l)trusts and the like. "
In abolishing the legality of slavery then, the political,
economic and social conditions .surrounding abolition were
translated into a, quite specific language. The Constitutional
Amendments and subsequent legislation and legal practices which
represent this translation have, in turn, had their own
distinctive effects on the political aims originally sought through
them. Thus while the eradication of discrimination against blacks
due to lack of US citizenship was the stated aim of, fox' example,
the Fourteenth Amendment, it will become clear in the following
discussion that, within legal discourse, it was nevertheless
1. Hofstadter et al, 196)4:217.
possible fox' a negative discrimination to operate by denying
"full" citizenship on the grounds that the Fourteenth
Amendment only referred to legal discrimination which was based
on "state antion" as opposed to individual action. Yet premised
on the same constitutional guarantee it was also possible to
appeal to individual rights and, within legal discourse, positive
discrimination could be upheld on the basis of such rights in
relation to education and voting in particular.
It will therefore become clear in this chapter that, .just as
with slavery, the notion of individual rigilts is by no means
definitive of law in other areas? while within legal discourse
the basis of right- is consistently referred to, it is evident
that the question of whose rights, whether it he master or slave,
state or individual, will be legally upheld, can be settled in any
given situation through an appeal to supporting or non~supporting
precedent, through reference to other clauses in the ITS
Constitution., through differing interpretations of statutory law,
arid so on. Trie same body of law can therefore provide the basis
for.positive or negative discrimination, just as it was able to
provide for the recognition of property and personality in the
slave.
In studying the development of chattel slavery in Forth
America as a legal category it is clear not only that law can operate
quite effectively 'without premising its conclusions on notions of
individual rights, but also that law cannot simply be analysed as a
mere concomitant of something else, such as the mode of production,
nor can it "be regarded as having some essential or origins,!
general form. On the contrary, as has been discussed
throughout this thesis and as will be discussed in the subsequent
sections of this chapter, legal categories, practices and
institutions can exert their own distinctive effects on other
social, economic and political forms, effects which can have
reproductive and transformative qualities even after the official
disappearance of a category from law. Thus, through analogising
with the slave status, legal institutions and practices ware able
to define, for example, the nature of the convict status, the scope
of grass-roots political power and the limits to educational
opportunity in ways which have had profound effects on the
development of other social institutions. The discussion which
follows, therefore, gives some indication of the longer-term
effects of the development of chattel slavery as a legal category
and, in so doing, indicates just how my analysis of the operation
of law in relation to chattel slavery is consistent with, the more
general concerns addressed in Chapter 1 of this thesis about the
nature of law in society.
ANALOGIES IN LAW : CONVICT STATUS
As was discussed in the introduction to this chapter, with the
defeat of the Confederacy and the passage and ratification of the
Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution in 1865, chattel slavery
officially disappeared from law "except as a punishment for crime".
The explicit attribution of legality to penal slavery or servitude
given by the Thirteenth Amendment permitted a translation of some
of the distinctive features of the system of chattel slavery, in
particular the use of forced labour, into a new context",.
The Southern states in the Reconstruction era, burdened with
heavy taxes to meet the expenses of rebuilding a shattered economy,
subjected to confiscatory federal taxes, attempting to revive
trade and committed to the traditional penological view that
convicts should, by their labour, reimburse the government for their
maintenance and. create revenue, introduced a system of penal
servitude where black and poor white convicts were "public slaves".
In some states these convicts became "the temporary or lifelong
slaves of private employers or corporations to whom the government
(3)
delegated the right to exploit them for private profit . ••
This revived convict lease system, as it was known, not only
translated the basis 'of chattel slavery into a, penal context at
that time, but also uniquely affected the manner in which the penal
system of the South was to develop up to the present time.
The convict lease system which developed in the Southern states
was in part attributable to the legacy Of two centuries of chattel
slavery. While the slave owners of the South had been stripped of
their human property following the passage of the Thirteenth
Amendment, the'view of the status of blacks, in a society dominated
1. Eofstadter et al, 19ol|:212--3,
2. Sell-in, 1976:155.
3. Sellin, 1976:11+5'.
'by a white ex-slave-owning minority, as "a subordinate and
inferior cla,ss of beings" was to survive the abolition of slavery.
Thus, an Alabama prison physician could assert, in an address to
the National Prison Congress of 1839:
That there is a vast difference between all the
races no one doubts. That there is still a
greater difference between the Caucasian and the
Negro, occupying, as they do, the two extremes of
the human family, I think is true. That, as a
race, the Negro is physically and mentally
inferior I assert as a fact beyond dispute.
Whether this is a result of previous conditions or
the discriminating handiwork of the Creator makes
no difference.
Another prison physician from Tennessee, in his address to the
National Prison Congress of 1890 echoed this view:
We have difficulties at the South, which you a.t
the North have not ... We have a large alien
population, an inferior race. Just what we are
to do with them as prisoners is a great question as
yet unsettled. Ike Negro's moral sense is lower than
that of the white man .., The Negro regards it as no
disgrace to be sent to the penitentiary. He never
cares to conceal the fact that he has been there.
How we are going to reform that race we do not know.
Initially the way that the "great question." w?,s settled was to
create a Southern penal system based on forced labour where, in
leasing convicts, the government sold the labour of the convicts to
1. P.M. Cunningham, '"The Convict Lease System of Alabama in its
Relation to Health and Disease", in Proceedings of the National
Prison Association (1889), p. 133 - cited by Scllin, 1976; 1)46.
2, P.D, Simrns, Proceedings of the National Prison Association
(1890)5 pp. 120-121 - cited by Sellin, 1976:11*6.
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the lessees. Where 85 - 95% of the convict population was
"black, racism provided an easy ideological justification.
¥hen, leasing ended early on in the twentieth century, largely
because of the lack of profitability to the.state as opposed to the
private lessees, many Southern states replaced the convict lease
system by the establishment of prison plantations and farms to
exploit the labour of those convicts not employed on the chain
gangs working on the roads. Many of these institutions, in
particular those in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Louisiana,
Mississippi and Texas, proved to be highly profitable financially.
For example, in Louisiana, when a particular firm lost its monopoly
on leased convict labour in 1901, "the state bought the firm5 s
Angola plantation along with its prisons and continued to raise
cotton, and later sugar cane, along plantation system lines.
Additional land was acquired by the state and by 1929 Angola had
18,000 acres and a smaller plantation of 3?500 acres at
(?)
Monticello. v ' these convicts were, "treated very much like black
slaves had been treated on any large *well-run* antebellum
(-0
plantation", K-JJ obedience being enforced, by corporal punishments
such as flogging.
1. Sellin, 1976j 11|6. Hiese figures indicate a disproportionate
representation of blacks in the convict population. In the free
population blacks accounted for 30 - q0% of the total population in
the Southern states (see Franklin. 1969:185-187).
2. Sellin, 1976:170.
3. M.T. Carleton, "Politics and Punishment: Hie History of the
Louisiana State Penal System", Baton Rouge, Louisiana State
University Press, 1971:168.
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That forced labour continues to be regarded as legally
guaranteed in the context of convicts is not only evident in
prison administrative law where prison labour is regarded as
compulsory and refusal of it a disciplinary offence, but is also
(l)
evident in a, series of decisions ^ establishing a consistent
(?)
precedent up to Rhodes v Meyer, N that hard labour incidental to
a properly imposed prison sentence does not violate the
Thirteenth Amendment to the US Constitution. Thus, even today, in
the bourgeois democratic republic par excellence, the central
characteristics of chattel slavery, the performance of compulsory
labour and deprivation of liberty, have been analog!sed to and
("0
legally guaranteed in a penal context. X JJ Indeed, as Morris
comments;
The long struggle to establish prisoners5 rights -
"to litigate, to demand natural justice as a part of
prison, discipline - as distinct from their right not
to be beaten or starved to death, may be compared to
the task of outlawing slavery itself, as distinct
from enacting laws that will protect domestic
animals from undue cruelty. (h)
1. Lindsey v leavy, IJ49 F 2d. 899 (9th Cir.), 1955; United
States v Dowd, 2'J1 F 2d. 292 (7th dir.), 1959; Reaper v Rhay.
315 F 2d." 193 (9th Cir.), 1963.
2. Rhodes v Meyer, 33/4 F 2d. 709, 719 (8th Cir.), I96I4, Cert,
den., 379 US"915, 196U.
3. Morris • notes that the systems of convict leasing, chain
gangs and. prison farms, subject to investigation in the 1930s and
again in the 1960s, persist in states like Arkansas in the USA and
are mirrored most obviously in the treatment of black and coloured
convicts in South Africa (1978:295).
5. Morris, 1973:295-
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This analogy "between the status of the convict and that of
the slave is certainly evident in ideological, delates surrounding
penological developments, perhaps ioost notably in the case of the
abandonment of transportation, which, as the central fea,ture of
l8th century penology persisting through the first half of the 19th
century, had been explicitly used as a, means of supplying labour
, for British colonial expansion.
In both parliamentary reports and debates concerning
transportation in the 19th century analogies were continually drawn
between the status of the transported convict and ihat of the slave
in arguments against the perpetuation of transportation as a
criminal sentence. Thus, the Parliamentary Select Committee on
Transportation of 1837-8, trie Holesworth Committee, reported that;
It appears ... to have been the practice at an early
period (l) to subject transported offenders to penal
labour, and to employ them as slaves on the estates of the
planters, and the CgtatuteJ i| Geo. 1, c.ll, gave to the
person who contracted to transport them, to his heirs,
successors, and assigns, a property and interest in the
services of such offenders for the period of their
sentences. The great want ox servants in the colonies
was one of the reasons assigned for this mode of
punishment, and offenders were put up to auction, and
sold by the persons who undertook to transport them, as
bond slaves . . . Transportation ... is slavery ... and.
the condition of the convict slave is frequently a very
miserable one ... it is the restraint on freedom of
action, the degradation of slavery ... which chiefly
constitutes the pains of transportation. (2)
1. This reference is to the early transportation, from the early
17th century until the American War of Independence, of convicts,
to North America. As early as l6l5> the Privy Council had ordered
that, unless convicted of wilful murder, rape, witchcraft or burglary :
a convict could be sent to the North American plantations. See
Chapter 3 a discussion of the use of convict labour in early
colonial expansion.
2. Select Committee on. Transportation, 1837-38 (The Molesworth
Committee), Parliamentary Papers, Yol (669) xxii, ii.i-iv.
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This view of. transportation as analogous to the system of
negro slavery was held "by many contemporary commentators. Thus,
in 1824-7» one writer could argue that the transportation system was
"one of downright slavery" and that since "we have done well in
abolishing Regro slavery: we shall do still better by
(2^
abolishing slavery in our penal colonies". v ' In the General
Report on Convict Prisons of 1860-61 to Parliament, Sir Joshua Jebb
again drew attention to analogies between transported convicts and
slaves in noting that the convicts had "embarked in small vessels,
similar to slavers of the present day, and the dungeons in which
they were confined during the passage are described by Qfecaulayj
as sbeing all darkness, stench, lamentations, disease and death
those who reached their house of bondage were mere skeletons,
requiring to be fattened before they were sold5". ^ And at a
meeting of the Rational Association for the Promotion of Social
Science in 1863 it was argued that the transported convict "was
converted into a sort of white slave. That slavery was as irksome
to him as slavery is to the negroes in the Southern States of
America"; and that if transportation was revived a price would have
1. This reference is to the British Abolition of the slave trade
in 1807.
2. Anon., "Benevolence in Punishment or Transportation Made
Reformatory", London, Selley, Burnside and Seeley, 181x5:35} 36-7*
3* An illuminating reference to an illegal practice at that time.
h. Sir Joshua Jebb, 1 General Report on the Convict Prisons 1860-
61', London, for HMSO by George Eyre and William Spottiswoode,
l862 :2|.
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to be paid for it at some time in the future, just as was
currently happening in the Ci-v.il War in the USA:
I do not suppose that two years ago any one of us
imagined that the guilt of our ancestors in
establishing negro slavery in America would have
recoiled upon us at the present day. Yet at this
moment we see in the arrestment of our principal
manufacture, in the suffering of millions of our
population, that sin of our fathers, after the
lapse of two centuries, visited on the children. (l
This view of the system of transportation as being analogous with
the Worth. American system of slavery continued throughout the 19th
century and into the 20th in debates concerning penal policy.
Indeed, writing about experiments in punishment, Da Cane could
argue that transportation had been established, 15as a kind of
slave trade, and offenders were put up to auction and sold for the
(2)
period of their sentences"; v ' and VJines could argue that
transported convicts, "were slaves, for a term of years, and the
traffic in convicts was a form of competition with the African
(3)
slave-trade'1. Thus, long after transportation had officially
disappeared as a legitimate criminal sentence it could be referred
to as an instance of slavery and comparisons could be drawn between
the convict trade and the slave trade: the buying and selling of
convicts and slaves; conditions on toe convict and slave ships;
1. J JR.. Fowler and Martin Ware, Jun., (eds), "Hie Transportation
of Criminals", London, Fmily Faithfull, l863:l8,15>.
2. E.F, Da. Cane, "Experiments in Punishment", in Hie Nineteenth
Century, November 1879, Vol.6,, 871.
3» Frederick H. Wines, "Punishment and Reformation", New York,
Thomas Y. Crowell and Co., 1910 ed:l63.
the profit of both systems; the rules governing the conduct of
transported convicts and slaves; and the fact that in complaining
about their treatment, transported convicts and slaves faced
benches of magistrates or justices drawn from the ranks of the
master class. ^
Nevertheless, despite the abandonment of transportation in
(2)
the mi&-19th century, v ' the central characteristics of that
criminal sentence, which made it possible to aualogise with the
system of slavery, were in fact retained. Thus the same I837--38
fl)
Committee, which had categorically argued against transportation
could also argue that any new punishment must entail both compulsory
labour and the loss of personal liberty:
As capital and severe corporal punishments have
gradually been relinquished, the loss of personal
liberty and the performance of compulsory labour
have necessarily become the chief elements of every
penal sy stem that has been devised ...
Exactly why this was necessarily the case was not discussed by
this Committee. They simply stated that:
1. See, for example, Du Cane, 1879; V,rines5 1910; and 05Srien,
1950.
2. Although the 2nd Penal Servitude Act of 1857 saw the
disappearance of the word 'transportation' from the statutes,
transportation in fact lasted, under the name of probation, until
1867, v/hen the last convict ship sailed (as cited by Wines, 1910:
171.)
3. The Molesworth Committee, as discussed on page 526 of this
chapter.
Parliamentary Papers, Yol (669) xxii, xli - my emphasis.
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Such being the case, the question under discussion
will be greatly simplified by considering, in the
first instance, in what manner and by what
arrangements confinement and forced labour can best
be inflicted. (l)
Hie solution, to finding an alternative to transportation was
ultimately found in the system of penal servitude which developed
(2)from 1853 onwards. v ' Forced, labour, "remunerative in its
character but unremunerated" and the deprivation of liberty
were the hallmarks of the system of penal servitude. And, as
with transportation, in later arguments against penal servitude,
analogies were drawn between the convict sentenced to penal
servitude and the negro slave. Thus, in correspondence with the
Home Secretary in. 1907. Sir Pochard Hartington could note that
"penal servitude is ... a condition far worse than, that of negro
u (U)srsvery".
Nevertheless, despite the fact that analogi.es have been
numerously drawn between the distinctive characteristics of the
system of chattel slavery and different modes of punishing convicts,
each new punishment devised has retained these characteristics.
1. Parliamentary Papers, Yol (669) xxii, xli.
2. In the Act of 16 and 17, Vic, c. 99j 3-853? penal servitude
could replace some of the sentences of transportation but in the
Act of 20 and 21, Yic. c. 3, 1857? penal servitude wholly replaced,
transportation as a punishment.
3. Fowler and. Ware, 1863:10.
Sir Richard Hartington, Bart, "She Punishment of Crime", paper*
printed by J.S, Cook, Worcester, 1895:3-6, in H.0, 1|5/i!j099/i6576/2•
As Morris argues, "the slave, being proper ty~less, provides an
ante-type for the property-less members of the nation state that
emerged in the loth century" in the sense that, being property-les
such people are not simply regarded as having no substantial right
in society but are "'treated as if they vers themselves property".
Thus, in relation to the convict;
Those who rule the state, certainly since the
emergence of property of a distinctive indicator of
status, have frequently been at pains to identify those
who offend against property as being outside the
society, or at least deserving of banishment from it
for varying periods. But whether the banishment is
to a far country or merely to the confines of a
penitentiary, the punishment is, in strict legal
terminology, ?corporal5. In that sense, the convict
may be employed as a factor of production wholly at
the disposal of the state, lacking in rights other
than those which might be equally applied to domestic
animals. In that prison labour is compulsory, and
refusal of it a disciplinary offence, it reflects that
continued servile status ...
This continued "servile status", however*, has not only been
maintained within the convict status but also, as will be
discussed in the next section, is reflected in various civil and
political statuses right up to the present day. The analogies
within law between penal treatments and slavery are only the most-
obvious ones, given the explicit legitimation of penal slavery in
the Thirteenth' Amendment to the US Constitution. Penal slavery,
however, has, at any given time, only been .applied to a limited
1. Morris, 1978;29.4 - emphasis in original.
2. Ibid.. 295.
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proportion of the population in any state, and, as was noted in
the introduction to this chapter, in the USA in the post Civil
War era, would "be. applied only to a minority of the ex-slaves or
freedmen liberated from the system of chattel slavery "by the
passage and ratification of the Thirteenth Amendment.
Nevertheless, the passage of the 13th, lijth and 15th Amendments to
(l)
the US Constitution and the civil rights statutes - / enacted to
ensure that these constitutional provisions were effective in
legal practices, provided a much broader basis, within law, for
redefining the status of ex-slaves and other persons in terms of
basic civil and political rights. In, the discussion which
follows some indication of just how broad this redefinition of
status would become is given.
THE LEGACY OF THE LEGAL CATEGORY
The initial construction of civil rights in legislation,
premised on the 13th, liith. and 15th Amendments to the US
Constitution, was aimed specifically at defining the legal rights of
freedmen in the post Civil War era,. This legislative definition
of rights was accomplished in conjunction with the legal abolition
of chattel slavery, and, as such, was a direct consequence of the
fact that chattel slavery as a legal category, had existed and
developed over a period of two hundred years. The official
disappearance of chattel slavery from law, however, did not remove
1. See pages 5'l2~5l9 of this chapter.
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the unique effects of the legal category. On the contrary, tb.e
legal category of chattel slavery has left behind a particularly
potent legacy in legislation and legal practices, the effects of
which are still evident in contemporary civil rights litigation
in the USA.
As was mentioned earlier in this chapter, while the Civil
Rights Acts of the 1860s and 1870s and the Constitutional
Amendments were directed at ex-slaves, neither the legislation nor
the Amendments make explicit reference to negroes. Indeed the
wording used has made it possible, within law, to extend the
applicability of the abolition of the legal category of chattel
slavery in litigation in diverse substantive areas right up to
the present. In abolishing the legality of slavery then, by means
of the law itself, the political, economic and social conditions
leading to the abolition in law. were translated into a different
realm of discourse with its own specific language and form and its
own specific effects.
l'hus, under Section 2 of tie 13th Amendment, Congress has been
able to enact both civil and criminal statutes, in addition to the
Civil Rights Acts of the 1860s and 187OS, to implement the
abolition of slavery, not only in its traditional form, but also in
other contexts. JJ'or example, while the history and origin of the
relevant provisions of the contemporary ITS Criminal Code are somewhat
complex, y 18 TJ.S.C. ^ l58l (1958)5 dealing with peonage, which
1. For a discussion of this complexity, see Emerson et ad, 1967J
1005.
took its original form from the Anti-Peonage Act of 1867, ' is
aimed at preventing the holding, arresting, or returning of anyone
to a condition of peonage, and was primarily designed to eliminate
debt "bondage, a condition which was commonplace in the territory-
acquired from Mexico in the iaid-19th century, as well as in other
(2)
parts of the USA. J This particular provision was discussed as
(3)
recently as 191+1-h where, in "the case of Pollok v Williams, the
US Supreme Court held that an. Alabama statute, which enabled
employers to force employees, in debt on account of advances in
wages, to continue "bo work for them under threat of criminal
punishment, was a violation of the 13th Amendment to the US
Constitution. This particular practice had been one of the more
1. US, ll| Stat. 51+6? "An .Act to abolish and forever Prohibit
the System of Peonage in the Territory of New Mexico and other
parts of the United States", discussed at page 518 of this
chapter.
2. For a discussion of the relevant cases under the anti-
peonage statute and provisions, see Emerson et al, 1967;1005.
See also Carr, 191+7? where he discusses the peonage provisions
under the 13th Amendment in the general context of civil rights,
3. 322 US k, 61+ s.Ct. 792, 88 L.Ed. 1095 (19100.
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subtle devices used for securing forced labour.
The criminal code provision, 18 U.S.C. ) 1585, dealing with
involuntary servitude, which, unlike peonage, has no requirement
of debt, is the result of a 1958 provision which merged the anti-
(2)
slave trade, pre-Civil War Act of April 20, l8l8, v ' with the Act
of June, 1875? "An Act to Protect Persons of Foreign Birth
Against Involuntary Servitude". While this latter statute was
originally enacted to prevent abuses to Italian children who were
being recruited to perform as street musicians, it has been
■h)
regarded as applicable to all persons. v ' The provision
(l8 U.S.C.51685) itself prohibits the holding of a person in or
selling of a person into a condition of involuntary servitude, or
bringing into the United States any person held in involuntary
(5) (6)
servitude. ' However, in United States v Shackney, ' decided
1. Other practices have included, in soma areas, sheriffs freeing
prisoners into the custody of local entrepreneurs who pay fines or
post bonds. The prisoners then work for the "benefactors" under
threat of being returned to prison. Frequently the original charge
against the prisoner has been trumped up for the purpose of securing
labour by this means. In other cases, persons have simply been held
in bondage by sheer force or by threat of prosecution for debt. The
Civil Rights Division of the US Department of Justice, established in
1939? received a total of 105 complaints of peonage and involuntary
servitude for the period from 1961 to 1963. Of these, only 2
resulted, in prosecution; 92 being closed on the face of the complaint
or after investigation (as cited by A. Shapiro, "Involuntary
Servitude: The Need for a more Flexible Approach", in 19 Rutgers Law
Review, 65-85, 1965)•
2. US, 3 Stat. 552.
3. US, 18 Stat. 251,
5. fbr a discussion of the relevant cases, see Biterson et al, 1967:
1005-1006.
5- See the full discussion of this in the case of United States v
Shackney, 333 F. 2d. 575, 581-583 (2d Cir. 1965)-
6. Ibid.
in 1961+ before the US Court of Appeals, the issue before the
Court was what constituted an involuntary servitude within the
meaning of the statute. In the event, the Court held that the
lower court's conviction of a Connecticut farmer, who had imported
a Mexican family to work on his farm, and had used psychological
and economic intimidation to keep them working there, could not be
upheld under the statute - the threat to have the employee sent
back to Mexico could not be interpreted as involuntary servitude
under 18 U.S.C. £ 1581+•
Claims that compulsory civilian labour as an alternative to
military service violates the 13th Amendment have been rejected by
the courts V-'L^ and military service itself has been held not to
(2)violate the 13th Amendment. v Likewise, courts have rejected
the contention that legislation which imposes limits on the right
to strike, or which requires a striker to return to work, conflicts
with the 13th Amendment. A question, however, which has not
yet been ruled on fully under the 13th Amendment is whether a
recipient of welfare funds may be required by a state to work,
/ \ N
voider the threat of a penal sanction. In People v La Fountain,
decided in 1961+. a conviction under such a statute was reversed,
1. See, for example, Badger v United States, 322 P. 2d. 902,
908 (9th Cir. 1963).
2. See, for example, Koch v Zlneback, 31° P« 2d. 1 (9th Cir. 19ol).
3. See. for example, H.L.S«B. v National Maritime Union, 175 P«
2d. 686 (2d. Cir. 191+9), cert.den. 338 US 95U [19507. """
i+. 21 App. Div. 2d. 719, 21+9 1I.Y.S. 2d. 714+ (1961+).
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and the indictment dismissed. This decision, however, was "based
on. the grounds that the refusal to work was not wilful, as
required by the applicable statute and in other cases the courts
have consistently held that a cut-off of welfare funds for
refusal to work does not violate the 13th Amendment. ■'
On the other hand, a much broader interpretation of the 13th
(2)
Amendment was adopted in Jones v A3.fred B. Mayer Co., ^ in 1963.
On appeal, the Court held that i\2 U.S.C. & 1982, originally enacted
( 3)
as the Civil Eights Act of 1866, "bars all racial discrimination,
private as well as public, in the sale or rental of property, and
that the statute, thus construed, is a valid exercise of the power
(h I
of Congress to enforce the Thirteenth Amendment", ' thus the
plaintiffs were entitled to recover damages and injunctive relief
because of the refusal of the defendants to sell their home in a
private sub-division.to the plaintiffs solely because of race.
Such a refusal, on the grounds of race, was taken to represent one
of the "badges and incidents of slavery" which the 13th Amendment
had been designed specifically to abolish.
Nevertheless, while some cases have considerably broadened the
definition of what is to be considered as slavery, involuntary
1. For a discussion of these cases, see Emerson et al, 196?:
1007. On the 13th Amendment generally, see John Hope Franklin,
"Civil Rights in the US : A Chapter in the Emancipation of the
Negro, 1863-1962", New York, Random House, 1962.
2. 392 US, i+09 (1968).
3. See pages 516-517 of this chapter.
k- 392 us, U13.
servitude or peonage, under the 13th Amendment, in a number of
other cases, decided in the decades after the adoption of the
Civil War Amendments, ^^ the US Supreme Court invalidated
various provisions of the Civil Rights Acts. In United States v
(2)
Cmileshank - J in 1875, the defendants were among more than 100
persons jointly indicted in a federal court in Louisiana who were
variously charged with offences in violation of the Civil Rights
or Enforcement Act of May JL, 1870 (Section 6), which made it
a felony to conspire to deprive any citizen of his constitutional
rights and privileges.. The Louisiana federal court had found the
defendants guilty and the US Supreme Court was considering the
constitutional issues. The US Supreme Court held that the ll+th
Amendment applied only to state not private action and that no
other part of the US Constitution afforded authority for the I87O
civil rights statute - it was therefore considered unconstitutional.
In United States v Reese in 1876, two election inspectors
in. a Kentucky municipal election were indicted, for refusing to
receive and count the vote of a negro, under various provisions of
the Civil Rights Acts which prohibited interference with the right
to vote. The US Supreme Court, considering the issues exclusively
under the lf>th Amendment, held the provisions of the Civil Rights
1. That is, the 13th, llgth and 15th Amendments.
2. 92 US, 5U2, 23 L.Ed. 588 (1875).
3. See Page 517 of this chapter.
l±< 92 US, 2lli, 23 L.Ed. 563 (1876).
539.
Acts unconstitutional as going beyond the l5th Amendment, in that
the statutory provisions under which the defendants had been
indicted were not limited to interference on account of race,
colour or previous condition of servitude - a strictly
constructionist view of the US Constitutional Amendments reminiscent
of the pre-Civil War cases on the constitutional issues surrounding
(1)slavery.
(2)
Similarly, the Civil Rights Cases, ' argued before the US
Supreme Court in 1883, involved a, series of indictments under the
(,)
Civil Rights Act of March 1, l875> charging the defendants with
refusal, to grant accommodation to negroes in various theatres, a
hotel and a railroad car. In holding that the lhih Amendment was
applicable solely to an abridgement of privileges and immunities
through "state action" as opposed to priva.te action, Sections 1 and
2 of the 1875 Civil Rights Act, under which the defendants had been
charged, were held to be unconstitutional and void. Moreover, in
arguing that the 13th Amendment, abolishing slavery and involuntary
servitude, did not afford constitutional authority to lQ75 Civil
' r _
Rights Act f 1 and 3 2 , Justice Bradley argued that there was no
similarity between the kind of "badges" of slavery and servitude
abolished by the 13th Amendment and the actions to which the 1875
Act was addressed:
1. See Chapter 7 for a discussion of the early US Supreme Court
cases regarding slavest suits for freedom and Chapter 8 for a
discussion of the later cases dealing with the .inter-state commerce
in slaves, fugitive slaves and the citizenship of negroes (free or
slave).
2. 109 US, 3, 3 Sup.Ct. 18, 27 L.Ed. 835 (1883).
3. See pages 517? 5l8 of this chapter.
Is there any sirni.larj.iy between such servitudes
and a denial by the owner of an inn, a public
conveyance, or a theater, of its accommodations
and privileges, to an individual, even though "the
denial be founded on the race or color of that
individual? Where does any slavery or sexvitu.de,
or badge of either, arise from such an act of
denial? ... What has it to do with the question
of slavery?
Moreover, said Bradley:
It would be running the slavery argument into the
ground to make it apply to every act of
dlscrimination .., When a man has emerged from
slavery ..- there must be some stage in the progress
of his elevation when he takes the rank of a mere
citizen, and ceases to be the special favorite ox
the laws ...
Given this interpretation of the Civil War Amendments and the
alleged unconstitutionality of the central provisions of the Civi
Rights Acts, it is not surprising to find the US Supreme Court
( 3 )
upholding this view in United States v Harris, K J an I8S3 case
involving the indictment of twenty persons under the provisions o
the Civil Rights Acts of I87O and 1371, prohibiting a
conspiracy by two or more persons to deprive another of equal
protection of the laws, equal privileges or immunities under the
laws, or from hindering state authorities from affording such
1. 109 us, 29.
2. Ibid., 31 ~ my emphasis.
3. 106 US, 629, 1 S. Ct. 601, 27 L.Ed. 290 (1883).
J]. See page 3x7 of this chapter.
protection. Twenty members of a Tennessee lynch, mob captured






Supreme Court did uphold were those which they considered the
(2)
US Constitution guaranteed (through Article 1, Section h) or
the "state action" interpretation of the l/fth Amendment, Thus
(3)
in Ex parte Virginia K J 1880, the US Supreme Court upheld, the
3.. Given this kind of construction of the Civil War Amendments
by the US Supreme Court, it is not surprising that, "The civil
rights laws did not succeed in obtaining actual as well as legal
equality for freed-men. For a brief period vigorous enforcement
was attempted in the hope that the Ku Kiux Klan and its allies
could, be defeated in their uncompromising effort, to nullify the
new amendments ... 7,372 criminal prosecutions were brought under
the civil rights laws between 187O and 1897s of which 5,172 were in
the South. About twenty per cent of the prosecutions resulted in
convictions. In the end, however, the Klan forces won. The very
extent of the litigation under the Enforcement Acts soon over-taxed
the capacity of the twenty-four district courts in the South ...
other factors were C'alsqj at work to deprive the civil rights laws
of the public support ... The disputed, presidential election of
1876 ... was settled by a deal ... The compromise was not only the__
withdrawal of federal troops from the southern states ». . but [alsoj
the end of the Reconstruction effort itself. It was plain that the
North had. abandoned the fight .(J. Maslow and S, Robinson,
"Civil Rights Legislation and the Fight for Equality", in 20
University of Chicago Review, 1953? 3631 370-371)•
2. This provision concerns the election of Senators and Representative
severely, killing one. The US Supreme Court held that
twenty persons had been wrongly indicted since the ll.|.th
applied only to "state action", not private action, and
other part of the US Constitution could afford legality
statutory provisions at issue. ^J
The only provisions of the Civil Rights Acts which
3. 100 US, 89, 25 L.Ed. 676 (1880).
indictment of a Virginia judge charged with excluding negroes
from state juries in violation of a specific prohibition of the
Civil Rights Acts. The Court ruled that the action of the judge
constituted "state action" under "the lijth Amendment. And, in
Ex Parte Siebold, ^ ^ 1880, Maryland election officials were
indicted for stuffing ballot boxes in a Congressional election.
The provisions cf the Civil Rights Acts making this a criminal
offence were sustained under the federal power to control
Congressional elections, conferred by Article 1, Section J;,
(2^
Clause 1 of the US Constitution. ^ '
Nevertheless, despite this kind of case, where some
provisions of the Civil Rights Acts were held to be constitutional
by the US Supreme Court, the view that the federal government had
no jurisdiction over social discrimination by private persons or
organisations, against persons of a different race or colour,
under the llpfch Amendment, was to have far-reaching- consequences
and is still upheld in contemporary cases involving this
oonstitut?.onal issue. v / Indeed, these early cases ruling on the
scope of the Civil War Amendments opened the way to poll taxes and
literacy tests designed to disqualify negroes from marking a ballot
1. 100 US, 371, 25 L.Ed. 717 (1880).
2. "Article 1, Section i|.l. The times, places, and manner of
holding elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be
prescribed in each State by the legislature thereof; but the
Congress may at any time by lav; make or alter such regulations,
except as to the planes of chasing Senators".
3. See, for example, Moose Lodge No. 107 v Irvis US 92, S.Ct. 1965
(1972) where the issue was whether the ledge which excluded negroes
bore the attribute of "state action". The Court held that there had
been no violation of the llpth Amendment since the Lodge did not bear
the attribute of "state action".
5h3"
(l)
and. to laws segregating negroes from whites in public places» v 'J
Although the Civil War Amendments and 'the Civil Eights
(2)
Acts were directed at protecting the ex-slave's right to vote, v '
resistance, initially talcing the form of violence and intimidation,
and latterly on a legal basis, led to the effective
disenfranchisement of blacks before the turn of the 20th. century:
"beginning about I89O the southern states undertook to establish
the disenfranchisement of the Degro on a legal basis". Various
measures, all aimed at circumventing the 15th Amendment, were adopted,
including various literacy, property, residence and character
nh) ,uqualifications as well as the "grandfather clause", the "poll
(t)
tax" v- ' and, with the ultimate establishment ox" the Democratic
Party as the sole Southern party, ^ the "white primary1'.
1. Hofstadter et al, 1961i:226: and Plranklin, I969:331-2.
2. It should be remembered, of course, that at this time women
were still nowhere near being granted the right to vote.
3. Emerson et al, 1967:1106.
For example, the "grandfather clause" was written, into
Louisiana's State Constitution in 189O. Phis called for the addition
to the permanent registration list of the names of those male persons
whose fathers and grandfathers were qualified to vote on January 1,
I867. At that time, of course, no negroes in Louisiana, were
qualified to vote. Phis pattern was repeated throughout the Southern
states. For a discussion of this, see Franklin, 1969:335-3^1•
5. In Mississippi, for example, an I89O suffrage amendment was
written which imposed a poll tax of 2 dollars. Again, oilier Southern
states adopted, similar measures (Franklin, 1969s3^»39)•
6. See, Franklin, 1969:332-339; and Emerson et al, 1967:1106.
7. Degrees were excluded from the Democratic Primary in the South
by the rules of the Party (Franklin, 1.989:3^4-2).
5Ui.
Whether these laws were pushed through "by conservative
politicians anxious to disenfrancliise poor whites as well as
blacks or by Populist forces fearful of losing the negro vote
to their conservative opponents, as in Georgia and South Carolina
particularly, there is no doubt that they were effective in
disenfranchising the negro in 'the South - a pattern which still
continues. Thus, while in IS67, 66.9% of the negro voting age
population in Mississippi were registered to vote, by 1892 only
5.7% were so registered and in 1955 only k-3% were registered.
It was not until Smith v M3-.wri.aht ^ in 19^1| that the US
Supreme Court held that the exclusion of negroes from the Democratic
Party primaries was a clear violation of the 15th Amendment. In an
attempt to circumvent this decision, some states, most notably South
Carolina, changed the rules governing the Democratic Party
organisation and the conduct of primary elections. The Party
organised into clubs, open to members on a racially segregated basis,
though all members were allowed to vote in the primaries including
qualified negro electors but only if they took an oath stating:
"I further solemnly swear that I believe in and will support ...
(3)
social and educational separation of the races". When in 19hS
3.. See, United States Commission on CiviJ. Eights, Yoting in
Mississippi, 8, Washington D.C., U.S.G.P.O., 1965-
2. 321 US 6)49, S.Ct. 757, 68 L.Ed. 98?' (l9kh) >
3. As cited by Emerson et al, 1967:1119, Note 2,
the need for negroes to take this oath was held to "be a "clear
and flagrant evasion of the law", the Southern states
responded by bringing in literacy, character and other
(2)
qualifications for voting. v '
The poll tax was one of the most common measures adopted by
Southern states in the post-Civil War era to disenfranchise negroes
and it continued, in various guises, into the 1960s. In Breedlove
(3)
v Su.tt.Les, 1937s the US Supreme Court held that the poll tax
was not unconstitutional and could not be said to violate the
"equal protection" and "privileges and immunities" clauses of the
ll+th Amendment. And, while various legislative and judicial
efforts were made to eliminate the poll tax, none succeeded until
the passage of the 21(13:1 Amendment to the US Constitution, passed by
Congress on January 23, I96I4.. Notwithstanding this Amendment,
however, Mississippi passed a law in I96J4 which provided that, in
order to vote, those previously exempted from poll tax by state law
need only obtain permanent exemption certificates while those who
previously had been subject to the tax had to obtain an annual poll
1. For a discussion of the relevant cases which dealt with the
issue of the white primary, see Emerson et al, 1967:1107-1120.
2. See Emerson et al, 1967:1120, Note i>.
3. 302 US, 277, 58 S.Ct. 205, 82 L.Ed. 252 (.1937)-
ix. "Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote
in any primary or other elections for President or Vice President,
for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senators or
Representatives in Congress, shall not be derided or abridged by the
United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax
or other tax.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by
appropriate legislation".
tax receipt. This law was subsequently invalidated on the




And, in Harper v Virginia State Board of Elections, v ' 1
US Supreme Court overturned its precedent of Breedlove v Sattles
by declaring the Virginia poll tax to be unconstitutional.
In another area - the area of racial segregation versus
integration - the early constitutional holdings on the Civil Rights
Acts were to uniquely affect the development of I\Tor th American
society right up to the present day. In 1896, in Plessy v
Ferguson.-, the US Supreme Court held that an IS90 Louisiana
statute, which provided, for separate facilities for negro and white
passengers 0:1 trains within the state and provided criminal
penalties for violations by railway officials, was not a violation
of the "equal protection clause" of the 14th Amendment and was quite
consistent with the US Constitution. The "separate but equal"
doctrine as set forth in Plessy v Ferguson relied on "the precedent
■ (6) r
of Roberts v City of Bo s ton, - in which the Supreme Court of
Massachusetts hail held that the Primary School Committee of Boston
had. power to make provisions for the instruction of coloured children
1. Emerson et al, 1967:1125} Note,
2. 383 US 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 1.6 L.Ed. 2d. 169 (1966).
3. Discussed on the previous page of this chapter.
U- For a full discussion of the development of poll tax cases post
the 24th Amendment, see Emerson et al, 1967:1125-113^*
5. 163 US 537, 16 S.Ct. 1138, la L.Ed. 256 (1896).
6. 5 Cush. (59 Mass) 198-210 (18I4.9) * This case was fully
discussed in Chapter 8.
in separate schools established exclusively for them, and to
prohibit their attendance upon the other schools.
Mr Justice Brown, in delivering the opinion of the US Supreme
Court in Plessy, however, failed to regard it as significant or of
(2)
any consequence, that in relying on Roberts as precedent, v the
Court was relying on a, case decided prior to the abolition of
slavery hence prior to "the passage of the Civil War Amendments and
any subsequent civil rights legislation. Instead, Mr Justice
Brown denied Plessy's contention that "in any mixed community, the
reputation of belonging to the dominant race, in this instance the
white race, is property" and argued that it was an "underlying
fallacy" for Plessy to maintain that the "enforced separation of the
two races stamped the colored race with a badge of inferiority".
Moreover, said Brown, "if one race be inferior to another socially,
the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same
plane".
Segregated public education was, of course, common at the time
of the Plessy decision and the term "separate but equal" was
(6)
frequently used in relation to education prior to Plessy. ^ J
1. For a full discussion of the significance of Roberts v The City
of Boston, see Chapter 8.
2. The Court also relied on state laws prohibiting inter-racial
marriage as support for the "separate but equal" doctrine.




Congress itself had established segregated schools in the
hi
District of Columbia- by that time. v ' In fact, the "separate
but equal" doctrine, particularly in relation to eduction, was
upheld in law into the second half of this century. In Missouri
(2)
ex rel. Gaines v Canada, 1938, the negro plaintiff had been
denied admission to •the Missouri State University Law School on
the basis of race, in accordance with a state statute providing
fox* segregation in public schools. There was, however, no
separate negro law school s-t the time and the US Supreme Court
held that because no separate facility existed, the discrimination
was a denial of the "equal protection clause" of the lljth
Amendment.
following this decision the number of negro plaintiffs
increased and courts began to define more extensively just what
(3)
Substantial equality1 in separate facilities was about. In
Sweatt v Painter, ^ 1950, for example, a negro had sought
admission to an all white University of Texas law school even though
there was a separate negro law school in the area. The negro lav?
school had, in fact, been established in response to an earlier suit
by Sweatt. However, cnce established. Sweatt refused to register
there, renewing his application to the white law school on the basis
1. Emerson et al, 1967:123^-.
2. 305 US 337, 59 s.ct. 232, 83 L.Ed. 208 (1938).
3. See, Emerson et ad, 1967:1235; and franklin, 1969:553~U«
h. 339 tTS 629, 70 s.ct. 8U8, 9k L.Ed, lllh (1950).
Sk9'
•that the negro lav/ school was -unequal to it under the Plessy
doctrine. The US Supreme Court upheld Sv/eatt1 s argument on "the
ground that the negro school was unequal j.n facilities, curriculum,
reputation and professional contact.
The US Supreme Court went further than this in Hchaurin v
0)Oklahoma State Hegents. N McLaurin had been admitted to a
previously segregated white graduate school for education because
the separate negco school had been found unequal to the white one at
an earlier stage in the litigation. McLaurin, however, was only-
admitted on a, specially segregated basis, including a separate seat
for classroom attendance and in the cafeteria. The Court held that
such state approved restrictions on the basis of race alone produced
an inequality in educational opportunity which violated the
"separate but equal" constitutional test.
FinaJ.ly, after more than a century of upholding the
constitutionality of the "separate but equal" doctrine, in Brown v
(2)
Board of Education (1st decision) ^ ' in 195h> the US Supreme Court
Justices held that the "separate but equal" doctrine itself was a
violation of the "equal protection clause" of the llj.th Amendment.
However, the decision in Brown v Board of Educa.tion (2nd decision) ^'
in 1955, v/here the US Supreme Court left the implementation of
desegregation to the District Courts, has itself contributed




339 US 67, 70 S.Ct. 851, 9k L.Ed. 11h9 (1950).
3J77 us I4.83, 74 S.Ct. 686, 98 L.Ed. 873 (195'U)•
31+9 us 29J4, 75 s.ct. 753j 99 L.Ed. 1083 (1955).
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only underway to a minimal extent. v -
The extent to which desegregation/integration is currently
underway is, of course, integrally connected with the legality of
other forms of discrimination, for example, in housing, which lead
to a de facto if not de jure segregation in other areas such as
education. Moreover, the manner in which the public school system
is itself financed can be and has been regarded a,s discriminatory.
Thus, as recently as 1971? in Serrano v Priest, the Supreme
Court of California held that the public school financing system
which relies on local property taxes, causing disparities between
.individual school districts in the amount of revenue available per
pupil, "discriminates against the poor and violates the equal
( 3)
protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment".
Thus, through, the Civil War Amendments, the Civil Sights Acts
ana subsequent implementing legislation as well as in judicial
decisions, the legal category of chattel slavery has been extended
to include under the "badges and incidents of slavery" various kinds
of discrimination based on race, wealth, sex and so on, and, in trie
areas drawn particular attention to. that is voting and education,
both considered as legally guaranteed within bourgeois notions of
right, some indication of the unique effects which a legal category
can produce as a legacy in the course of outgrowing its initial
1. For a fuller discussion of the origin, development, refinement and
abolition of the "separate but equal" doctrine in case law, see
Emerson et al, 1967:1230-lU02.
2. h87 P.2d. 1210. (1971).
3. Ibid., 121*1.
discursive and categoric forms has been presented.
CONCLUSION
In producing those unique effects from within the development
and abolition of slavery as a legal category, "Hie law, in the form
of legislation and legal practices, has both produced and reproduced
certain forms of political, economic and social relations and these
relations have themselves played a part in the production and
reproduction of the law. As was argued in Chapter 1, society itself
is only possible and maintains itself insofar as the sets of
activities, interactions, relations and institutions which are
constitutive of it are reproduced.
In this thesis, law has not simply been conceived of as some
institutional form or set of rules but rather.'' has been considered as
a social practice itself. As such, law reproduces itself not only
in the creation or enforcement of roles of lav/ but also on the level
of the reproduction of social relations which form the core of its
subject matter and upon which it acts. Law is produced and
reproduced, and, in the sense that every act of production is, in an
important sense, a novel enterprise, which may be transformative by
altering a structure at the same time as it reproduces it, "this work
has addressed itself to the question of what part law has to play in
the process of the reproduction and transformation of given societies.
More specifically, it has focused on the lav/ in relation to chattel
slavery from the point at which that particular legal category was
developed within a particular society to the point at which the
category officially disappeared as law.
The substantive part of this taesis then has attempted to
address itself to an understanding of the precise nature of the
effectivity of legal regulation in a specific instance. And, in
arguing in Chapter" 1 that any attempt to analyse or understand the
conception of the legal form in general necessarily leads to either
essentialist notions of the law-as-origin or reductionist
conceptions of tie legal form, such as those which regard law as an.
exigency of the mode of production of which it is an effect, I posed
the problem of lav as a problem of undei*standing legislation, legal
institutions and legal practices. Trie general question I
addressed was the question of how it comes about that law, in the
form of legislation, legal institutions and practices, can define
social relationships which are not based on assumptions of
equivalence, exchange or equality.
In answering that question in relation to the development of
chattel slavery in North America, as a legal category, I have argued
that law in fact does not come about in response to the recognition
of prior realities and as a means of regulating an already given
realm of relations between agents. w Instead, I have argued that
law, in fact, can and does define agents as agents, that it can. and
does, through, its regulatory aspect, impose requirements of action
upon agents, and that the 'subjects1 recognised in law and the
1. Pashukanis, 195'i ? is arguing in this way in attempting to
develop his general theory of law.
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activities regulated "by it can be and are constructed in
legislation.
The central concern of this thesis has therefore been with the
question of the nature and effectivity of legislative/legs,! systems
as specific forms, a question which necessarily involves an
explanation of the origin and operation of specific laws and. legal
practices within a specific set of apparatuses. As Hirst comments,
to view law in this way, as a social practice, is to recognise that
there is a definite effectivity to legislation and legal practice,
thus "law can. outrun and re-define its discursive and categoric
forms". And, while recognising that law is, by definition,
created by the conditions of its existence, social, political and
economic, its specific sphere of effectivity is not simply an
expression of these conditions, but is rather a translation of the
conditions into another and quite distinctive language. Legislation,
legal apparatuses and practices represent this translation, and, as
such, constitute their own particular sphere of effectivity -- a sphere
with its own unique effects which can be transformative as well as
reproductive of the conditions of its existence.
The specific instance, the development of the law of chattel
slavery in North America, was chosen for the focus of ay analysis
because this form of slavery developed, wholly within ■(he context of
legality and it was through the forms of law that the slave status was
legitimated or otherwise, In defining chattel slavery as a form of
1. Hirst, 1979:112.
legal subordination in which the owner had the rights of property
over another human being, Ms slave, this particular form of legal
subordination was not only consistent with capitalist development in
North America but also represented the necessary legal form of
slavery in the slave mode of production which developed in the Southern
colonies and states. Within the development of the legal category of
chattel slavery, the slave was a variant of private property, premised
on the existence of the general form of private property. As
property, the slave was bought, sold and inherited, and was regarded as
a legal non-subject.
At the same time, the slave's value, as property, was wholly
dependent on Ms having the apparently contradictory attributes of a
human subject, in particular, the ability to labour. The ability of
legal systems to support inconsistencies in definitions and practices
is clearly instanced in relation to chattel slavery, where, from
witMn the same body of rules of law, legal institutions and practices
corJ.d uphold the legality of claims to slave property, while
recognising the personality in sieves. QM.s containment of apparent-
contradiction was primarily acMeved through the development of legal
arguments which reasoned on the basis of the institutional
arrangements governing the master/slave relation rather than on the
basis of the regulation of disputes between 5individuals1 or 'subjects',
and on the development of special forms of pleading and procedure in
relation to chattel slavary including the establishment of special
courts to deal with slaves. And, while there were inconsistencies
in definition and practice, as the substantive chapters in this thesis
have demonstrated, the legal category schattel slaveE was
constructed, refined and articulated from the lowest to the
highest courts, in civil and criminal actions, in legislation and
in constitutional law, in a way which clearly regarded the slave
as primarily a form of property.
In this thesis the detailed examination of the law and its
practices in relation to chattel slavery has indicated how chattel
slavery developed as a legal form, the part which that particular
legal category played in the production and reproduction of social
and political relations, and the manner in which social and
political structures shaped the nature of the slave system through
the forms of law. Indeed, my argument has "been that while
capitalist development created the possibility for a particular form
of chattel slavery to exist, the operation of law and legal
institutions was, in this case, part of the process of the uneven
development of capitalism and, as such, was inextricably linked
with that development exerting its own influence upon it.
Thus, contrary to the assumption made by other scholars that
capitalist and slave systems are necessarily antagonistic, I have
argued that slave production appeared under specific conditions as a
subordinate form to capitalist production. The only antagonism
between these two modes could have been at the ideologies,! level,
insofar as the ideological basis of bourgeois right, that is,
liberty, equality before the law, equity, the proportionality of
labour and rewards, is, in formal terms, apparently contradicted by
the existence of slave property. However, given the institutional
confinement of chattel slavery to "blacks, and the ideological
support for this afforded "by racism, and, more importantly, given
the 'mastership' of the 'rule of law' itself as the central
legitimating ideology of l8th and 19th century "bourgeois social
orders, there was, in fact, no substantive contradiction "between
the existence of slave property within the North American "bourgeois
democratic republic„
Indeed, in its practices and discourse, the law in relation to
chattel slavery performed its own unique task, producing its own
unique effects, in defining and legitimating the status of master
( owner )versus slave (owned) - a social relationship which denied
any semblance of equality, exchange, equivalence, liberty or any
other ideological notion cf bourgeois right. Hie case of chattel
slavery, far from being incompatible with bourgeois notions of
legality and right, only serves to highlight the 'dark side' of
these same notions of legality. Hie fact that chattel slavery was
constructed within bourgeois law itself clearly demonstrates that
such law is not defined by notions of individual rights - this
conception of bourgeois law is itself ideological and colludes with
a central 'legal fiction' within bourgeois social formations.
If, as this work has demonstrated, law can clearly and
consistently deny individual rights, as in the case of chattel
slavery, or temporarily suspend them, as in the case of the convict
(penal slavery) then the category of 'rights' cannot be definitive
of law; and again, if that lav; can deny the status of 'subject' as
in the case of chattel sieves, or temporarily suspend it, as in. the
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case of convicts (penal slaves), then neither can the category
of 'subject' be definitive of law. To understand lav;, analyses
must be based on an approach which regards law as a practice, thus
requiring an explanation of the emergence and development of
specific laws in the form of legislation, legal institutions and
practices. Only by adopting such en approach to the study of law
in society can we begin to understand the precise effects of law in
particular social formations and thereby build up a body of knowledge
which can contribute to more general theorising about the specific
natur.e and effectivity of legal as opposed, to othar forms of defining
and regulating social relationships. The case of the development
of chattel slavery in North America provides an analysis of both why
and how, within this particular category, the law has functioned as
an instance of construction, recognition, regulation and
transformation and, in so doing, demonstrates the specific
effectivity of this particular legal category, in the form, of
legislation, legal .institutions and practices.
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